{"metadata": {"vulnerability": "CVE-2021-37577", "count": 26, "kinds": {"milestone": 7, "sighting": 2, "kev": 0, "other": 17}, "linked_omitted": 0}, "data": [{"timestamp": "2021-07-26T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2021-07-26T00:00:00.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Reserved", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2021-37577", "field": "cveMetadata.dateReserved"}, {"timestamp": "2023-12-13T01:23:09.879Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2023-12-13T01:23:09.879836Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "gsd \u00b7 GSD-2021-37577", "record": "GSD-2021-37577", "field": "gsd.osvSchema.modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T00:00:00.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2021-37577", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T14:25:02.705Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T14:25:02.705Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5 / mitre", "record": "CVE-2021-37577", "field": "containers.cna.providerMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T15:11:47.437Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T15:11:47.437294Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Recorded", "source": "cvelistv5 / CISA-ADP", "record": "CVE-2021-37577", "field": "containers.adp.0.metrics.1.other.content.timestamp"}, {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T15:11:47.437Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T15:11:47.437294Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Recorded", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2021-37577", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2021-37577", "field": "metrics.ssvcV203.0.ssvcData.timestamp", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T15:15:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T15:15:00Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "osv_ubuntu \u00b7 UBUNTU-CVE-2021-37577", "record": "UBUNTU-CVE-2021-37577", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T15:15:06Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T15:15:06Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Nvd published at", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-F7H9-HRG7-94FG", "record": "GHSA-F7H9-HRG7-94FG", "field": "database_specific.nvd_published_at", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T15:15:06.423Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T15:15:06.423", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2021-37577", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2021-37577", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T15:32:08Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T15:32:08Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-F7H9-HRG7-94FG", "record": "GHSA-F7H9-HRG7-94FG", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T17:45:54Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T17:45:54.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://t.me/cvedetector/6762", "record": "CVE-2021-37577", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "1c9f0280-e7fb-4641-bb4e-7e4beb98a6d6", "content": "{\n  \"Source\": \"CVE FEED\",\n  \"Title\": \"CVE-2021-37577 - Bluetooth Passkey Reflection Vulnerability\", \n  \"Content\": \"CVE ID : CVE-2021-37577 \nPublished : Oct. 1, 2024, 3:15 p.m. | 21\u00a0minutes ago \nDescription : Bluetooth LE and BR/EDR Secure Connections pairing and Secure Simple Pairing using the Passkey entry protocol in Bluetooth Core Specifications 2.1 through 5.3 may permit an unauthenticated man-in-the-middle attacker to identify the Passkey used during pairing by reflection of a crafted public key with the same X coordinate as the offered public key and by reflection of the authentication evidence of the initiating device, potentially permitting this attacker to complete authenticated pairing with the responding device using the correct Passkey for the pairing session. This is a related issue to CVE-2020-26558. \nSeverity: 0.0 | NA \nVisit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...\",\n  \"Detection Date\": \"01 Oct 2024\",\n  \"Type\": \"Vulnerability\"\n}\n\ud83d\udd39 t.me/cvedetector \ud83d\udd39", "url": "https://t.me/cvedetector/6762"}, {"timestamp": "2024-11-15T20:32:52.782Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-11-15T20:32:52.782Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2021-37577", "field": "cveMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2024-11-15T20:32:52.782Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-11-15T20:32:52.782Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5 / CISA-ADP", "record": "CVE-2021-37577", "field": "containers.adp.0.providerMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2024-11-16T00:31:49Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-11-16T00:31:49Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-F7H9-HRG7-94FG", "record": "GHSA-F7H9-HRG7-94FG", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-02-10T00:00:00Z", "date_only": true, "value": "2025-02-10", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "certfr_avis \u00b7 CERTFR-2025-AVI-0119", "record": "CERTFR-2025-AVI-0119", "field": "vendor_advisories.0.published_at", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-02-11T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-02-11T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.0.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-02-11T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-02-11T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "field": "document.tracking.initial_release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-02-11T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-02-11T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Release date", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "field": "vulnerabilities.7.release_date", "linked_record": true, "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, {"timestamp": "2025-02-12T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-02-12T00:00:00.000000", "kind": "other", "label": "Revision date", "source": "certfr_avis \u00b7 CERTFR-2025-AVI-0119", "record": "CERTFR-2025-AVI-0119", "field": "revisions.0.revision_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-02-13T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-02-13T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.1.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-03-13T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-03-13T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.2.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-03-13T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-03-13T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "field": "document.tracking.current_release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-03-14T09:14:40.457Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-03-14T09:14:40.457+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Document generated", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2025-0325", "field": "document.tracking.generator.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-06-17T04:00:46.510Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-06-17T04:00:46.510", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2021-37577", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2021-37577", "field": "lastModified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-10-17T09:08:30Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-10-17T09:08:30Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "osv_ubuntu \u00b7 UBUNTU-CVE-2021-37577", "record": "UBUNTU-CVE-2021-37577", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-20T22:55:15Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-20T22:55:15.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://gist.github.com/ivan/e69e790d27ff397f39cee920c6472467", "record": "CVE-2021-37577", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "a125ef3d-3508-4727-a612-2441389fdf6b", "content": "{\n  lib,\n  fetchpatch,\n  fetchurl,\n}:\n\n{\n  ath_regd_optional = rec {\n    name = \"ath_regd_optional\";\n    patch = fetchpatch {\n      name = name + \".patch\";\n      url = \"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/raw/ed2015c38617ed6624471e77f27fbb0c58c8c660/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/402-ath_regd_optional.patch\";\n      sha256 = \"1ssDXSweHhF+pMZyd6kSrzeW60eb6MO6tlf0il17RC0=\";\n      postFetch = ''\n        sed -i 's/CPTCFG_/CONFIG_/g' $out\n        sed -i '/--- a\\/local-symbols/,$d' $out\n      '';\n    };\n  };\n\n  bridge_stp_helper = {\n    name = \"bridge-stp-helper\";\n    patch = ./bridge-stp-helper.patch;\n  };\n\n  btrfs_dedupe_no_time_update_6_18 = {\n    name = \"btrfs_dedupe_no_time_update_6_18\";\n    patch = ./btrfs_dedupe_no_time_update_6_18.patch;\n  };\n\n  # ie31200_edac: report each DIMM's ECC mode as SECDED or None (instead of Unknown) on Sandy\n  # Bridge, Ivy Bridge and Haswell, from the ECC bits of MAD_DIMM. It isn't in Linus's tree\n  edac_ie31200_ecc_mode_6_18 = {\n    name = \"edac_ie31200_ecc_mode_6_18\";\n    patch = ./edac_ie31200_ecc_mode_6_18.patch;\n  };\n\n  mq_default_scheduler_bfq_6_12 = {\n    name = \"mq_default_scheduler_bfq_6_12\";\n    patch = ./mq_default_scheduler_bfq_6_12.patch;\n  };\n\n  mq_default_scheduler_bfq_6_18 = {\n    name = \"mq_default_scheduler_bfq_6_18\";\n    patch = ./mq_default_scheduler_bfq_6_18.patch;\n  };\n\n  request_key_helper = {\n    name = \"request-key-helper\";\n    patch = ./request-key-helper.patch;\n  };\n\n  libbpf_C23_compat = {\n    name = \"c23-compat-libbpf\";\n    patch = ./C23-compat-6.1.patch;\n  };\n\n  tools_128bit_types = rec {\n    name = \"tools-add-128-bit-integer-types-for-aarch64\";\n    patch = fetchpatch {\n      name = name + \".patch\";\n      url = \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/10a47fb67340bca274276faf855d7d460afd9a7a.patch\";\n      hash = \"sha256-w6ZnvodW2kS3bqtZVvVN5qDt1Zc7fJvnywki3MBsER0=\";\n    };\n  };\n\n  # https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20261022104217.1852191-1-pointerliu@126.com/, with its\n  # context adjusted for kernels before 7.3 (no from-&gt;unreadable check after the frag loop).\n  # Merged as 79dc34beb1fd for 7.4; remove it from a kernel's patch list once that kernel's\n  # release contains 79dc34beb1fd\n  skb_zerocopy_shared_frag_pre_7_3 = {\n    name = \"skb-zerocopy-shared-frag-pre-7.3\";\n    patch = ./skb-zerocopy-shared-frag-pre-7.3.patch;\n  };\n\n  # Security fixes from Linus's tree (the 7.3 rc cycle, the 7.4 merge window\n  # and the 7.4 rc cycle) that the 6.18.y release in kernels-org.json lacks,\n  # in the order they apply; postFetch adapts a patch's context to 6.18, and\n  # `backport` names a vendored file for a fix that needed a real backport.\n  # Once a 6.18.y release contains one, the build fails in patchPhase (usually\n  # \"Reversed (or previously applied) patch detected\"); remove that entry then.\n  security_fixes_6_18 =\n    map\n      (\n        {\n          commit,\n          hash ? null,\n          postFetch ? \"\",\n          backport ? null,\n        }:\n        let\n          name = \"linux-${lib.substring 0 12 commit}\";\n        in\n        assert lib.assertMsg (\n          if backport == null then hash != null else hash == null &amp;&amp; postFetch == \"\"\n        ) \"security_fixes_6_18: ${commit} needs either hash (with an optional postFetch) or backport\";\n        {\n          inherit name;\n          patch =\n            if backport != null then\n              backport\n            else\n              fetchpatch {\n                name = \"${name}.patch\";\n                # GitHub first: git.kernel.org's cgit answers parallel fetches with 503\n                urls = [\n                  \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/${commit}.patch\"\n                  \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/patch/?id=${commit}\"\n                ];\n                inherit hash postFetch;\n              };\n        }\n      )\n      [\n        # ucount: read the parent ucounts before dropping the rlimit count (UAF, any user)\n        {\n          commit = \"38bf603d1ea5d5a65a9cb277df75327ffec01ff1\";\n          hash = \"sha256-KPpHC9wwdKnGes2DIh/dTV1ho5I4BW38046h0OlLBTI=\";\n        }\n        # xattr: always invoke cap_convert_nscap() for security.capability writes\n        # (any user could put an empty security.capability on any file and break its exec)\n        {\n          commit = \"0f4a9e682f7fa5becc3af7204606d9bf4780e425\";\n          hash = \"sha256-0v3hSSOwsMywGDXM1gHGesPmBmVj3/nI6u20psYx3uQ=\";\n        }\n        # net/sched: act_api: reject duplicate actions in a batch (UAF, any user via a user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"f67b3ed1308d7a282e2d6202d61af052ab0da39e\";\n          hash = \"sha256-/3dsYOScdGJM7+Ohjsp/aAp3PnDtug3lRDnDJCKxYQw=\";\n        }\n        # gro: do not GRO GSO packets with inconsistent payload (slab out-of-bounds write, any user via a user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"de788d8a7032475f900c16e9cc0c1417f4f719eb\";\n          hash = \"sha256-F2MbT3v2ri9rRtInjzXggiWqU+kk3TfNcm2wzFReWoA=\";\n        }\n        # netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: narrow down range completion to anonymous sets (UAF, any user via a user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"86d47d4c84a1b8470ba3fc16df13ea2a220b74ff\";\n          hash = \"sha256-Y3r5wRjf26AVeDeh2/kV7vfUXkg5AVreN9eLLK+m/oc=\";\n        }\n        # netfilter: nf_conntrack: avoid truncating IPv6 nexthdr offset\n        # (remote: conntrack can see a different port than the one the packet is delivered to)\n        {\n          commit = \"48d522b65fb0ce2bd54f8f5838d77b48afcf1f3e\";\n          hash = \"sha256-cjL1sP5tBGrWXxHIx0BUZrmQjHOGobVB2HL+9zgkvYY=\";\n        }\n        # sit: fix UAF in ipip6_tunnel_del_prl() (any user via a user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"5145bb6a2c2683d541828f86d5321e0565f2e30c\";\n          hash = \"sha256-mKCXKcm1HEin9ISthiZnYvqOHJfZGG81e2KjwvWG9fo=\";\n        }\n        # tcp: avoid double destroy in tcp_abort() of an unaccepted child (UAF, any user via a user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"dbd62ad55a4c898f5a4c9edb20c0c062afb799df\";\n          hash = \"sha256-Xh0u+0lTyInkSKtVEBFktUvuIf0BYc3SkLTK9MeXlFQ=\";\n        }\n        # xfrm: hold net_device reference under RCU in bundle creation (UAF, any user via a user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"9fa903b24b1f46b4ff5443bcd4aca23e5c57f9c1\";\n          hash = \"sha256-B41fj/6P+vpYvX+Wkf+oXEAKDsBt3Qow3pYvN/vsrU8=\";\n        }\n        # bpf: Require prog fd or capability for cgroup detach (permission bypass: any user\n        # who can open a cgroup's directory could detach a program that had been attached\n        # to that cgroup without BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI)\n        {\n          commit = \"2962329f7c86fc51c177d4049c0f15a95ebd270c\";\n          hash = \"sha256-1CPuFqBfvLYobuGgwZML3SP7saow3DAz8rlSwU+H8Ho=\";\n        }\n        # tcp: wait for TIME_WAIT teardown before freeing per-netns ehash (UAF, any user via a\n        # user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"647b81ddefc6364290e67bf33c89d54971f8995e\";\n          hash = \"sha256-RqxdfvbzfozopKnxGVeDKb25kY8fYkFqXe20AyrH18M=\";\n        }\n        # ip6mr: Serialize multicast router socket ownership (UAF, any user via a user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"c6b41de4dd9f2d6856d8d8d292348f7961034152\";\n          hash = \"sha256-jTt0bzDfX73gmSVeCxk2xC2nYKnjHrQ+K8QSvpbXcvg=\";\n        }\n        # ipv6: fix fib6 walker UAF on NLM_F_REPLACE (any user via a user namespace);\n        # 6.18's fib6_del_route() has no del_reason argument\n        {\n          commit = \"23fec4bd76904e9df7a8cc0a81ceb14c36971da4\";\n          hash = \"sha256-aBcCemtjq1wXcBXmNJsSRyBUUE7wiGx8XxOpstXQpc8=\";\n          postFetch = ''\n            substituteInPlace $out --replace-fail 'enum rt_del_reason del_reason)' 'struct fib6_info __rcu **rtp, struct nl_info *info)'\n          '';\n        }\n        # inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue (UAF of a socket, any user via\n        # a user namespace); backported, because 6.18 has no secpath check in\n        # inet_frag_queue_insert()\n        {\n          commit = \"3ae20e4697eb969104fe4b1e98a675f0100382b6\";\n          backport = ./inet-frags-limit-truesize-6.18.patch;\n        }\n        # tcp: ipv6: do not read ireq-&gt;pktopts from tcp_v6_send_synack() (UAF of the SYN skb,\n        # any user with a listener that reflects flow labels); 6.18 defines tcp_rsk() as a function\n        {\n          commit = \"8e069fd3fd396b89af417e50b359bc9892dd41cd\";\n          hash = \"sha256-DtRfM4km0PRYoG+jHONEgtNuKTF0/U6qqZDvR4rQfPw=\";\n          postFetch = ''\n            substituteInPlace $out --replace-fail '#define tcp_rsk(ptr) container_of_const(ptr, struct tcp_request_sock, req.req)' 'static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req)'\n          '';\n        }\n        # aio: don't let exit_aio() return before complete() is done (write to a kernel stack\n        # frame that is gone; any user, with four io_setup() calls and an exit)\n        {\n          commit = \"ac4b449b39e605123c12ea10042cafc9b6f39603\";\n          hash = \"sha256-ogMXCY4z4wqgo5Rxr8cdbz7A2unqQDFyf7/+4dZJhr4=\";\n        }\n        # ipv4: keep XFRM headers out of corked skb lengths (a corked send through AH tunnel\n        # states overwrites an skb's shared info; any user via a user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"0f47fce51a98d3d9f439c16861d519a7b833a176\";\n          hash = \"sha256-G4FATdAmuRh86lLp6rTde51ADqmSLORo+EgZmH6RuyM=\";\n        }\n        # tcp: do not coalesce segments after FIN (coalesced FINs make tcp_inq() overcount: UAF in\n        # software kTLS receive, and TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE walks past the queue; a remote TCP peer can cause it)\n        {\n          commit = \"1c46780dec48893b8c25fd5e33a3127e8dc39dd4\";\n          hash = \"sha256-ZRkaU97nkAjlAlflZgMabhUxxBEq0JJsVstDHo+ThaU=\";\n        }\n        # net: gro: avoid parsing headers from shared fragments (headers change after\n        # validation: out-of-bounds write in GRO completion; any user)\n        {\n          commit = \"44818c9a826d766dc0e21179dc76f229334f1dda\";\n          hash = \"sha256-wADh1ptfmHZtyK0d+rGpRmcByUwHSk0LVo5duZ2pxZw=\";\n        }\n        # net: protect negative destination advice with RCU (UAF of a dst from SO_CNX_ADVICE\n        # racing a connected UDP send; any user)\n        {\n          commit = \"4b77d2792c3e482afa108c08f224ea6fa396d80b\";\n          hash = \"sha256-nwinGhT9cmecknJs4kTVIXF7dFoxdnD6k+uF1Wl23CQ=\";\n        }\n        # ipvs: fix protocol data lifetime during namespace teardown (UAF write from the\n        # secure_tcp defense work; any user via a user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"832aa3e89e806bb2667fe4e656b705f4088b3c9d\";\n          hash = \"sha256-+3ChMqjn4JFDou/aE84qWYCXkOla7q99fmhDJOu3bkQ=\";\n        }\n        # net: skbuff: preserve fclone lifetime when freeing stolen heads (UAF of an skb\n        # after IPv4 reassembly and GRO; any user via a user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"86706ffa990ecd46a4326f8eecbccbbd60a6cb8d\";\n          hash = \"sha256-4YVvpUGOHoHTdCurRpAD+SZF8yCRsE6y7HL1nwr9bOQ=\";\n        }\n        # net: skbuff: uncharge trimmed zerocopy frags on error (failed MSG_ZEROCOPY sends\n        # can wrap skb-&gt;truesize and free the socket while in use; any user)\n        {\n          commit = \"8b67debdfbf6b370312ebec5c9e0a1c39b5c7733\";\n          hash = \"sha256-CqO3fUnLcxGlJxr5K+M1d7GO7MGs+epQGR5SkaJsS0w=\";\n        }\n        # net/rds: Do not unpin a page after a failed atomic pin (UAF of a page; any user:\n        # socket(AF_RDS) autoloads rds, and setsockopt(SO_RDS_TRANSPORT) loads rds_tcp)\n        {\n          commit = \"8d5ce4751fad9499ea408163af7f410f18a85782\";\n          hash = \"sha256-VoArEuU/AwDd8iR4oZ6GuYTglO3OOnDhoZdsSqVodfk=\";\n        }\n        # net: require a full socket in sock_confirm_neigh() (out-of-bounds write past a request\n        # socket; any user via a user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"c78b47704934e44442f4e48bfdcc99039e3b85a5\";\n          hash = \"sha256-6kpqvYzxi3U2TRzj/WAdjV0BsGknKd3sHo8ygwA3+2M=\";\n        }\n        # net: gro: do not undo remote checksum offload on merged packets (a 2-byte write into another\n        # packet or into a released page; user namespace: VXLAN remote checksum offload, fraglist GRO)\n        {\n          commit = \"c817ec1b06875b98460fbd19591be541bc3fa924\";\n          hash = \"sha256-O3Vy0PJx1lmVThfkowubvQZEjUwnWxCWPNbnUTPnync=\";\n        }\n        # net: gro: invalidate frag0 after a pull (reads and a 2-byte write through a frag0 that a pull\n        # released; user namespace, as above); must come after c817ec1b0687\n        {\n          commit = \"98d949a15ff9d3fffaa6983223178374aab92db6\";\n          hash = \"sha256-aWqyu+jCyhGiPihQ/Ss75OV+fzm0RCi9UHXPrNb5+UQ=\";\n        }\n        # net: gro: compare skb-&gt;protocol in gro_list_prepare() (GRO on an L3 GRE device parses a held\n        # packet with the wrong layout and writes into skb_shared_info; user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"511582022bfd07475d0daa209e6e6aa5a940740d\";\n          hash = \"sha256-mFKfhX4CjitdfhFsrSUiyUXeQ1PrYD2fPkexH0gEL9o=\";\n        }\n        # udp: do not use a cross-family sk_rx_dst in early demux (IPv6 packets get an IPv4 dst on a\n        # dual-stack socket connected to a v4-mapped address; UAF of the socket; any user, or the peer)\n        {\n          commit = \"5636e67320563be743d47706ef4914078c27edb2\";\n          hash = \"sha256-lklba8wpvIPjYpvQezQxWYNqH9W2t/AlzvzCbTC3AJM=\";\n        }\n        # udp: check frag_list IP family before using skb_segment_list() (writes IPv6 addresses past\n        # IPv4 headers; user namespace: fraglist GRO and tc act_mpls)\n        {\n          commit = \"22b7cb932c6a0f7566d41072be6956cb6c8af4e1\";\n          hash = \"sha256-mtyGqAtaHbDNliEwtYPeZZigS7BshgV0M986YOjR5FY=\";\n        }\n        # net: skbuff: don't BUG() on bad arguments to pskb_expand_head() (taken for the ipvlan\n        # fix below: its skb_cow_head() reaches this BUG() for the shared skbs that pktgen sends)\n        {\n          commit = \"c7d8bc3dd511dac309754543d3063f3950b364c2\";\n          hash = \"sha256-eUP4tzoehO8SFaXnkVPlWwYWQtY7axlAhaJri6pdcvc=\";\n        }\n        # ipvlan: make outbound skb headers writable (L3/L3S output rewrites a header shared with\n        # another skb, which then writes past its linear data; user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"a45dbf182137275f44ad7c8bc8acd23f7af6b2cf\";\n          hash = \"sha256-pvPzDbJPOZWQoS5SEcwsGQyznzGAzy4+bvRZO8RW1DY=\";\n        }\n        # ipv6: Check the Home Address option again before its address is used (a write past the skb\n        # data after a seg6 route moved the headers; user namespace with seg6 routes)\n        {\n          commit = \"30c71476d842b094651bd7712f6c8ee8716147d0\";\n          hash = \"sha256-0faWI3eP6L6c9/OTMIKfXikiT+m7lszhASRpRIP7bhE=\";\n        }\n        # net: ipv6: keep room for the mac header in dst_dev_overhead() (seg6 encapsulation of\n        # packets that came in through a VLAN device with reorder_hdr off writes about 64 KB past\n        # skb-&gt;head; user namespace). It also changes the ioam6 and rpl lwtunnels, which our kernels\n        # don't build\n        {\n          commit = \"87cd6b717e4069dca34e0866e57eaeb44d3b173e\";\n          hash = \"sha256-G5AdV4jAsnfSDKlg/5JncuFLZLSKljocIH1KyAyggOk=\";\n        }\n        # seg6: fix transport header for inner IPv4 with IP options (with an inbound AH state, an IPv4\n        # packet that End.DT4, End.DT46 or End.DX4 decapsulated makes ah_input() write into\n        # skb_shared_info; user namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"5838f10563d58afca6711edb5e4eda968ca181d9\";\n          hash = \"sha256-8kWtF3GKYX/LrfYcq/J0V9mLov8HT5YNuuZvOiOEQE4=\";\n        }\n        # tcp: Do not allow buggy transitions between ehash and lhash2 (prerequisite of 8c011697f76a;\n        # taken on purpose on 2026-11-13 although it changes behaviour: connect() on a socket that was\n        # a listener, and listen() on a socket that left the hash tables in another state, now fail\n        # with EINVAL). Drop it, 404381b4f105 and 8c011697f76a together. The postFetch adapts the\n        # context: 6.18's inet_hash() has no inet_init_ehash_secret() call, and 6.18's\n        # __inet_hash_connect() declares other locals\n        {\n          commit = \"8cc3aef0cb198049805ecc061a2cc7b79b0ae43e\";\n          hash = \"sha256-AeUdhzgHNy+vtDENHtolJ4sP/fsXbSaoE/gRUbSmiNo=\";\n          postFetch = ''\n            substituteInPlace $out \\\n              --replace-fail $' \\tinet_init_ehash_secret();\\n \\n' $' \\t\\treturn 0;\\n \\t}\\n' \\\n              --replace-fail $' \\tint ret, i, low, high;\\n \\tbool local_ports;\\n \\n+' $' \\tint step, l3mdev;\\n \\tu32 index;\\n \\n+'\n          '';\n        }\n        # tcp: Set unhashed_state in inet_twsk_hashdance_schedule() (Fixes: 8cc3aef0cb19, and goes\n        # with it); backported, because 6.18 still declares ehead in that function\n        {\n          commit = \"404381b4f1053a271a85679cc76a543b10ae043e\";\n          backport = ./tcp-set-unhashed-state-in-twsk-hashdance-6.18.patch;\n        }\n        # tcp: do not resurrect a former listener with SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_[CE]BPF (UAF in\n        # espintcp_destruct(); a user in a user and network namespace of their own, where they can\n        # turn on net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req; espintcp is built in); needs 8cc3aef0cb19 and 404381b4f105\n        {\n          commit = \"8c011697f76abf3b2302718a7a1c50e36d849f28\";\n          hash = \"sha256-m6hXnGZidAAnX8ndnjleX7CcGj5dFKMS8rsvtzkY+MQ=\";\n        }\n        # net: wait for in-flight device unregistrations before netns dismantle (while a device waits\n        # for its last references, NETDEV_UNREGISTER is broadcast again, and the notifiers that run\n        # then use pernet state, or the netns itself, after it was freed; user namespace);\n        # backported, because 6.18's struct net has no dev_mc_genid and 6.18's\n        # default_device_exit_batch() has no rtnl_net_flush_workqueue()\n        {\n          commit = \"c164a431a646983275d0076ff5b0e4c326fbc10b\";\n          backport = ./net-wait-for-inflight-unregistrations-6.18.patch;\n        }\n        # ipv4: use RCU protection in inet_netconf_get_devconf() (an RTM_GETNETCONF request racing the\n        # destruction of a device's IPv4 state uses the device's in_device after the in_device was\n        # freed; any user via a user namespace: the request needs no capability, and destroying the\n        # IPv4 state needs CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device's network namespace)\n        {\n          commit = \"b2039a6dd36b5c89142bfb95bc0205be8abcc600\";\n          hash = \"sha256-egdIWi/tcsaQjkhi3eP1QfKctQ96WE/IpstYFdJLT5g=\";\n        }\n        # smb: client: validate absolute native symlink targets before NT fixups (creating a symlink\n        # with a short absolute target such as /ab, on a share mounted without symlinkroot, writes\n        # past two heap buffers and then copies 65534 bytes into a 24-byte one; any user who can\n        # write to the share, default mount options);\n        # backported, because 6.18 tests the mount flags with cifs_sb_flags(cifs_sb)\n        {\n          commit = \"23c240d9509e15f72e4112fc95f0160ab32ec430\";\n          backport = ./smb-client-validate-absolute-native-symlink-targets-6.18.patch;\n        }\n        # smb: client: bound invalid NTLMSSP signature diagnostic (a malicious server's challenge makes\n        # the client's log message read past the received blob)\n        {\n          commit = \"0584b02669c3e76188097174b4f25ed13723e94c\";\n          hash = \"sha256-B729xmJx1lziP71TuBVIrZdWUEF80SesZr717BW7wO8=\";\n        }\n        # smb: client: fix OOB write when compounding SMB2_IOCTL with encryption (on a mount with\n        # encryption, any user who can create a symlink with a long target there writes past a\n        # 448-byte slab buffer)\n        {\n          commit = \"73a0060cb22a1d2bd8bff364c18a4259ec0cb528\";\n          hash = \"sha256-tqcqH+yFv+Wx0GOcteZ++3OgVAJ9Bga8upUc2LiHrwM=\";\n        }\n        # smb: client: validate descriptor headers before query result allocation (a server's\n        # zero-length ACL response makes chown or chmod read through ZERO_SIZE_PTR); 6.18 still\n        # takes the owner and group SID offsets from the server unchecked, which mainline's\n        # 29f1005b8b4d validates\n        {\n          commit = \"ffb59029c0d52bf76fdd2678f5d6fd13e26220dd\";\n          hash = \"sha256-ntqoTtJdXsc6NaLLgNmM5sDRpfYlXd5WPQiuByHO/Y8=\";\n        }\n        # smb: client: fix out-of-bounds read in dfs_parse_target_referral() (a DFS mount with a mount\n        # charset other than utf8, when the server's referral consumes more of the path than the\n        # mount charset's string holds; an honest server fails such a mount earlier on 6.18, which\n        # lacks 92509ce64fff)\n        {\n          commit = \"86aacc2f3f6ba18e1d87feee24f37c94b3ce863a\";\n          hash = \"sha256-LuIQUvFctfGsTy/OjvFUiAR9UaRPal+RWPojEp4ElvQ=\";\n        }\n        # smb: client: hold the inode across cifs_oplock_break() (dropping the handle can evict the\n        # inode, for instance of an open file that was unlinked, and the oplock break handler then\n        # keeps using it; a server's oplock or lease break starts the handler)\n        {\n          commit = \"fce78321f1b59531cf6fc94860550db1db8dec55\";\n          hash = \"sha256-2nhIoZ9JJcORccIKHcX+lnvTL1abiYdp0/zxm32pSHk=\";\n          # 6.18 has no CONFIG_SWAP block after cifs_oplock_break()\n          postFetch = ''\n            substituteInPlace $out \\\n              --replace-fail $' }\\n \\n #ifdef CONFIG_SWAP\\n' $' }\\n \\n static int cifs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis,\\n'\n          '';\n        }\n        # smb: client: hold server ref while queueing reconnect work (on a multichannel mount, a\n        # reconnect that finds the server no longer supports multichannel can drop a secondary\n        # channel's last reference and then queue reconnect work on the freed server); backported,\n        # because 6.18 calls cifs_chan_skip_or_disable() and mod_delayed_work() directly\n        {\n          commit = \"f02d249e9756b78990aaaa1635e47e06deb2cb51\";\n          backport = ./smb-client-hold-server-ref-while-queueing-reconnect-work-6.18.patch;\n        }\n        # smb: client: skip NULL channel in __cifs_put_smb_ses() (on a multichannel mount, when a\n        # reconnect finds that the server no longer supports multichannel,\n        # cifs_chan_skip_or_disable() sets a secondary channel's server pointer to NULL without\n        # lowering chan_count; releasing the session before the primary channel's reconnect has\n        # lowered it calls cifs_put_tcp_session(NULL), which takes cifs_tcp_ses_lock and then\n        # oopses, so every later CIFS operation that takes the lock spins forever); DoS only,\n        # taken at the user's request on 2026-11-14\n        {\n          commit = \"8deaf64a59a263161dfc5128f8398fb3dcba4fac\";\n          hash = \"sha256-Mv8YtrJxxAeXW+QPoTYbd5vER00YPhu04gSVKat5e3E=\";\n        }\n        # perf/core: Do not resurrect cpuctx-&gt;cgrp after last cgroup event exit (when a context\n        # switch consumes the pending disable of a CPU's last cgroup event, perf_cgroup_switch()\n        # sets cpuctx-&gt;cgrp, which that disable has just cleared, to the incoming task's cgroup,\n        # without taking a reference; after that cgroup is removed and freed,\n        # perf_cgroup_set_timestamp() writes through the freed perf_cgroup's per-CPU pointer;\n        # reachable where kernel.perf_event_paranoid is 0 or lower, since a cgroup event is a\n        # per-CPU event, by any user who can also remove a cgroup that their tasks ran in, such\n        # as one in the subtree that systemd delegates to the user's own user manager)\n        {\n          commit = \"59f1398140869432c7171b9a2a279ca315467c4e\";\n          hash = \"sha256-fYJ4QTjK/C45HeH1HoPF/E0VHvS7blD7pmVnMx2QC1w=\";\n        }\n        # mm: limit pagecache folio refcount (5 patches: the refcount of a large pagecache folio\n        # could be overflowed into a use-after-free: each PTE that maps one of its pages holds a\n        # reference, a file can be mapped many times, and pipes and GUP take more; any user who\n        # can read a file on a cifs mount gets large folios, and so does any user from a tmpfs\n        # mounted with huge=always in a user namespace). The series' networking half, for\n        # references that skbs take, goes through the net tree and isn't merged yet. \"when\n        # mapping pages\" is backported, because 6.18 has no mm/folio.c,\n        # cond_install_uffd_wp_ptes() or uffd RWP, and its copy_huge_pud() takes no reference;\n        # a 6.18.y release with d90bdc02e36e (queued) makes copy_huge_pud() take one, and then\n        # needs mainline's check there too\n        {\n          commit = \"26b8f029ce5224dd5c5f45a4bc964a209c259914\";\n          backport = ./mm-limit-pagecache-folio-refcount-when-mapping-pages-6.18.patch;\n        }\n        # mm: limit pagecache folio refcount when splicing into pipes; 6.18's mm/internal.h has\n        # the vmalloc.c section after splice_folio_into_pipe()\n        {\n          commit = \"c6c9a4c1c9a1669693330205cb9d86fafd3cf235\";\n          hash = \"sha256-c1yDW5ndPDbIb+mWpZFHVz1LLMtqsnWMP4ZsxhPCwPw=\";\n          postFetch = ''\n            substituteInPlace $out \\\n              --replace-fail $' \\n static inline bool vma_is_single_threaded_private(struct vm_area_struct *vma)\\n {\\n' $' \\n /*\\n  * mm/vmalloc.c\\n'\n          '';\n        }\n        # mm/mmu_gather: flush pending references early before the folio limit\n        {\n          commit = \"317bd7d28b248fd4d4e14614d7c30b17a36ef4d7\";\n          hash = \"sha256-6Q+cmuU2ignfjcScG8nNncF+0Wdr+lQuzj+vZdVr+B8=\";\n        }\n        # iommufd: fix cleanup when adding memfd folio pins fails (the GUP limit below makes the\n        # failure easier to reach)\n        {\n          commit = \"b8ba6cc9943222676d46ac77d3d3de2685a55bf8\";\n          hash = \"sha256-EE/jvY3mY7dRBr/efkx8Ay1eEVb85/NViux/kAvdUx0=\";\n        }\n        # mm/gup: limit pagecache folio refcount when grabbing references\n        {\n          commit = \"2d9bcd380585abc436f055fbb618b34f98882004\";\n          hash = \"sha256-jvLkXXtQncPzGTUh3zdtQr1Priu5mcpZCvM3Iju57Eo=\";\n        }\n        # xarray: clear the new head's parent before freeing the old head. Unpatched,\n        # xas_shrink() queues the old head for RCU freeing before it clears the new head's\n        # parent pointer, so a lockless page cache walker that starts after the grace period\n        # has begun can climb from the new head into the old head after it is freed\n        # (use-after-free; any user who reads a file while it is truncated). It has no\n        # Cc: stable, so 6.18.y may never take it, and it may outlive the entries next to it\n        {\n          commit = \"9378306c5d3db7e733d60a8b85a22b2b143ecffd\";\n          hash = \"sha256-O5B0hC4W4rsmsZdTgSuKj2e68n5RerlWejPCRtIwnDE=\";\n        }\n        # mm/filemap: stop fault-around when the walk steps back. Unpatched, when the page\n        # cache walk in filemap_map_pages() returns a lower index, vmf-&gt;pte moves back and can\n        # leave the page table it locked: a use-after-free read of a freed page-table page, or\n        # a PTE write outside the locked page table. Any user can race read faults against the\n        # split of a large folio of at least 64 pages (a memfd collapsed with MADV_COLLAPSE, a\n        # tmpfs mounted with huge=always in a user namespace, or MADV_HUGEPAGE on a file on\n        # cifs, ext4 or XFS). 6.18's loop doesn't declare map_ret, so the postFetch replaces\n        # that context line with the `do {` line above it, which keeps the hunk's line counts\n        {\n          commit = \"cf5518aa1832d82b391ac2492863ae6a7315827c\";\n          hash = \"sha256-dtaHsNdCFFrMI0sVqV3Z+qzHmyOPS8P68mMmiuBe7Zs=\";\n          postFetch = ''\n            substituteInPlace $out \\\n              --replace-fail $' \\t\\tunsigned long end;\\n \\t\\tvm_fault_t map_ret;\\n' $' \\tdo {\\n \\t\\tunsigned long end;\\n'\n          '';\n        }\n        # xarray: fix index jumping backwards in xas_find() (one cause of the step back above:\n        # a multi-index entry in a non-leaf node that is split during the walk)\n        {\n          commit = \"a4e667346a8d91e629a2ca9affc70dc28978f4a1\";\n          hash = \"sha256-CXCJDy9bdzHIFNgnRq34nZtsunhRWMXgoTmvD/32q+o=\";\n        }\n        # ipv6: gro: limit the number of extension headers. Unpatched, a long chain of IPv6\n        # extension headers pushes a GRO packet's transport header offset past what 16 bits\n        # hold, and gro_receive_network_flush() then reads out of bounds with the truncated\n        # offset (any user via a user namespace, e.g. veth with GRO)\n        {\n          commit = \"050f2adb60434a2b4dee2cf3350269379a32cf72\";\n          hash = \"sha256-QZglRKpQznoN/ugJ3pu4G3+XMLIZWdQv4kChuwp+Oq4=\";\n        }\n        # net: make room for the tunnel header in skb_segment_list(). Unpatched, when a fraglist\n        # GRO packet is forwarded into a tunnel and segmented in software, the tunnel header\n        # is put in front of each segment without checking its headroom: skb_under_panic() on\n        # IPIP, and on VXLAN a copy in front of the segment's head (slab out-of-bounds write;\n        # any user via a user namespace). It has no Cc: stable, so 6.18.y may never take it,\n        # and it may outlive the entries next to it\n        {\n          commit = \"abccf171fa8e97954e74934bde811d76a5410cbd\";\n          hash = \"sha256-tn7fjP+Tr4qST520ck/7GyjSDVNMEnPqZVCv0xYy9dE=\";\n        }\n        # tcp: Fix the SO_REUSEPORT bind cache admitting a conflicting socket. Unpatched, any\n        # user can bind and listen on a port next to another user's listener where the bind\n        # conflict check should refuse it, and with a socket bound to a device, which the\n        # listener lookup prefers, take that listener's connections\n        {\n          commit = \"f675070191f202010b010160b509a543dd232ae6\";\n          hash = \"sha256-1ea3y40cPIQK4K9jb6stKzR3sflaf5f3A5NgQYKO62U=\";\n        }\n        # Bluetooth: SMP: Fail if local and remote public key X coords match. Unpatched, in\n        # Secure Connections pairing with Passkey Entry, a man in the middle can send the\n        # initiating device a public key with the X coordinate of that device's own key, and\n        # reflect its authentication values, to learn the passkey (CVE-2021-37577). It has no\n        # Cc: stable, so 6.18.y may never take it, and it may outlive the entries next to it\n        {\n          commit = \"fd038b82c71baa8dfb80e1781e53c0dbbda84e70\";\n          hash = \"sha256-ntzTfq3Bea7YjgFMlM6DyHTsV6bhJFnR4H5410eEiXk=\";\n        }\n        # ipvs: ftp: skip conntrack templates in ip_vs_ftp_out. Unpatched, IPVS's FTP helper\n        # (ip_vs_ftp) can make the conntrack template of a CT target with a conntrack helper\n        # the master of an expectation that outlives the template, and removing the\n        # expectation then reads and writes freed memory. Any user can set this up in a user\n        # namespace: a lookup of the IPVS generic netlink family loads ip_vs, and adding a\n        # service through IPVS's setsockopt interface with a scheduler named \"ftp\" loads\n        # ip_vs_ftp\n        {\n          commit = \"4656934d460da68382cf91766a1ff2d0610554ae\";\n          hash = \"sha256-38egDMN7C8HyrcQdaJFXpaTiw2e0JYGETl4PJSM/y80=\";\n        }\n      ];\n}\n", "url": "https://gist.github.com/ivan/e69e790d27ff397f39cee920c6472467"}], "metrics": {"as_of": "2026-11-22T04:11:55.571Z", "anchors": {"origin": {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T00:00:00.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2021-37577", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "discovery": null, "report": null, "acknowledgement": null, "disclosure": {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T00:00:00.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2021-37577", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "exploit_publication": null, "exploitation": null, "patch": null}, "vendor_response_time": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "time_to_exploit": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "disclosure_to_exploit": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "disclosure_to_exploit_publication": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "time_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "total_time_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "disclosure_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "time_unpatched": {"available": true, "seconds": 67579915.571922, "hours": 18772.198769978335, "days": 782.1749487490973, "min_seconds": 67493515.571922, "max_seconds": 67579915.571922, "approximate": true, "ongoing": true, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2024-10-01T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-10-01T00:00:00.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2021-37577", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "end": {"timestamp": "2026-11-22T04:11:55.571Z", "date_only": false, "label": "As of", "source": "Calculation clock"}}, "exploitation_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start"]}, "exploit_publication_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start"]}}}
