{"metadata": {"vulnerability": "CVE-2026-125283", "count": 50, "kinds": {"milestone": 11, "sighting": 8, "kev": 0, "other": 31}, "linked_omitted": 0}, "data": [{"timestamp": "2025-08-04T16:30:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-08-04T16:30:00Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Document generated", "source": "csaf_ncscnl \u00b7 NCSC-2026-0506", "record": "NCSC-2026-0506", "field": "document.tracking.generator.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-09T18:42:54.356Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-09T18:42:54.356Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Reserved", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "cveMetadata.dateReserved"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_opensuse \u00b7 OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "record": "OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.0.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Document generated", "source": "csaf_opensuse \u00b7 OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "record": "OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "field": "document.tracking.generator.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Impact", "source": "csaf_opensuse \u00b7 OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "record": "OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.threats.0.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T00:00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Last revision date", "source": "certfr_avis \u00b7 CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "record": "CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "field": "last_revision_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "date_only": true, "value": "2026-11-18", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "certfr_avis \u00b7 CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "record": "CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "field": "initial_release_date", "linked_record": true, "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "csaf_opensuse \u00b7 OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "record": "OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "field": "document.tracking.initial_release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T00:00:00.000000", "kind": "other", "label": "Revision date", "source": "certfr_avis \u00b7 CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "record": "CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "field": "revisions.0.revision_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T09:52:32Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T09:52:32.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://www.kyberturvallisuuskeskus.fi/fi/haavoittuvuudet/haavoittuvuus-2026-39", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "ce32bab3-8f0f-40b8-b57d-d8ed5631838a", "url": "https://www.kyberturvallisuuskeskus.fi/fi/haavoittuvuudet/haavoittuvuus-2026-39"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T15:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T15:00:00.000Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Made public", "source": "cvelistv5 / f5", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "containers.cna.datePublic", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T15:05:34.221Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T15:05:34.221187Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/8243f740-d533-4164-8784-c8f276735a39", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "222d421b-ff4f-4c66-bb53-d9406737e1a0", "url": "https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/8243f740-d533-4164-8784-c8f276735a39"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T15:23:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T15:23:00Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "osv_ubuntu \u00b7 UBUNTU-CVE-2026-125283", "record": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-125283", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T15:23:32.329Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T15:23:32.329Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T15:23:32.329Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T15:23:32.329Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5 / f5", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "containers.cna.providerMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T15:39:38.794Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T15:39:38.794127Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://infosec.exchange/users/cve/statuses/117638193366458520", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "e64cb85c-8d5e-4c2b-b964-f171df723d1e", "content": "CVE-2026-125283 NGINX try_files vulnerability When NGINX Plus or NGINX Open Source is configured to use the try_files and alias directives with a map variable, certain combinations of regular expression captures in map and try_files can cause a segmentation fault in an NGINX worker process.\nImpact:An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to cause an NGINX worker process to terminate unexpectedly. There is no control plane exposure; this is a data plane issue only.\nNote: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.\nhttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-125283https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000163933#F5 #NGINXPlus #NGINXOpenSource#CVE_2026_125283#bot", "url": "https://infosec.exchange/users/cve/statuses/117638193366458520"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T16:07:19.721Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T16:07:19.721106Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_ncscnl \u00b7 NCSC-2026-0506", "record": "NCSC-2026-0506", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.0.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T16:07:19.721Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T16:07:19.721106Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "csaf_ncscnl \u00b7 NCSC-2026-0506", "record": "NCSC-2026-0506", "field": "document.tracking.initial_release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T16:07:19.721Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T16:07:19.721106Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "csaf_ncscnl \u00b7 NCSC-2026-0506", "record": "NCSC-2026-0506", "field": "document.tracking.current_release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T16:18:05Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T16:18:05Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Nvd published at", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-CGQQ-HX2V-PF8C", "record": "GHSA-CGQQ-HX2V-PF8C", "field": "database_specific.nvd_published_at", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T16:18:05Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T16:18:05Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "osv_azurelinux \u00b7 AZL-114607", "record": "AZL-114607", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T16:18:05.967Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T16:18:05.967", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2026-125283", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2026-125283", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T16:32:44.844Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T16:32:44.844535Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Recorded", "source": "cvelistv5 / CISA-ADP", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "containers.adp.0.metrics.0.other.content.timestamp"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T16:32:44.844Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T16:32:44.844535Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Recorded", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2026-125283", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2026-125283", "field": "metrics.ssvcV203.0.ssvcData.timestamp", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T16:48:00.521Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T16:48:00.521Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "cveMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T16:48:00.521Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T16:48:00.521Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5 / CISA-ADP", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "containers.adp.0.providerMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T17:17:33.910Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T17:17:33.910", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2026-125283", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2026-125283", "field": "lastModified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T17:47:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T17:47:00.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://gist.github.com/nharu-0630/df00453f6315582b5fc9ea522fe62729", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "716fe132-e2ee-429a-bfa4-3ba2e45f3eb5", "content": "# nginx 1.31.8 \u2192 1.31.9 \u30bb\u30ad\u30e5\u30ea\u30c6\u30a3\u4fee\u6b63\u306e\u691c\u8a3c\u30ec\u30dd\u30fc\u30c8\n\nCVE-2026-123007 \u306e\u30e9\u30dc\u518d\u73fe\u3068\u3001\u540c\u30ea\u30ea\u30fc\u30b9\u306b\u542b\u307e\u308c\u308b10\u4ef6\u306e\u4fee\u6b63\u306e\u9069\u5207\u6027\u8a55\u4fa1\n\n2026-11-19\n\n## \u6982\u8981\n\n\u672c\u30ec\u30dd\u30fc\u30c8\u306f\u3001nginx 1.31.9\uff082026-11-18 \u30ea\u30ea\u30fc\u30b9\uff09\u304c\u4fee\u6b63\u3057\u305f CVE-2026-123007 \u306b\u3064\u3044\u3066\u3001\u4fee\u6b63\u524d\u306e\u30b3\u30fc\u30c9 1.31.8 \u3092\u30ed\u30fc\u30ab\u30eb\u30e9\u30dc\u3067\u518d\u73fe\u3057\u3001\u30e1\u30e2\u30ea\u7834\u58ca\u30d7\u30ea\u30df\u30c6\u30a3\u30d6\u307e\u3067\u5230\u9054\u3067\u304d\u308b\u3053\u3068\u3092\u78ba\u8a8d\u3057\u305f\u8a18\u9332\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\u3042\u308f\u305b\u3066\u30011.31.9 \u306b\u542b\u307e\u308c\u308b\u4fee\u6b63\u7fa4\u304c\u305d\u308c\u305e\u308c\u306e CVE \u3092\u5c01\u3058\u3066\u3044\u308b\u304b\u3001\u5b89\u5b9a\u7248 1.30.7 \u306e\u30d0\u30c3\u30af\u30dd\u30fc\u30c8\u306b\u5dee\u7570\u304c\u306a\u3044\u304b\u3001\u4fee\u6b63\u5f8c\u306b\u6b8b\u308b\u554f\u984c\u304c\u306a\u3044\u304b\u3092\u3001\u30d1\u30c3\u30c1\u5dee\u5206\u306e\u8aad\u89e3\u3068\u5b9f\u9a13\u306e\u4e21\u9762\u304b\u3089\u8a55\u4fa1\u3057\u305f\u3002\n\n\u5b9f\u9a13\u306e\u7bc4\u56f2\u306f\u30e1\u30e2\u30ea\u7834\u58ca\u306e\u767a\u751f\u307e\u3067\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\u30d2\u30fc\u30d7\u30b0\u30eb\u30fc\u30df\u30f3\u30b0\u3001\u30a2\u30c9\u30ec\u30b9\u6f0f\u3048\u3044\u3001\u95a2\u6570\u30dd\u30a4\u30f3\u30bf\u66f8\u304d\u63db\u3048\u3068\u3044\u3063\u305f\u30b3\u30fc\u30c9\u5b9f\u884c\u30c1\u30a7\u30fc\u30f3\u306e\u69cb\u7bc9\u306f\u3001\u672a\u30d1\u30c3\u30c1\u306e\u7a3c\u50cd\u30b5\u30fc\u30d0\u304c\u591a\u3044\u72b6\u6cc1\u4e0b\u3067\u653b\u6483\u80fd\u529b\u306e\u5b9f\u88c5\u306b\u76f8\u5f53\u3059\u308b\u305f\u3081\u3001\u672c\u691c\u8a3c\u306e\u5bfe\u8c61\u304b\u3089\u610f\u56f3\u7684\u306b\u5916\u3057\u3066\u3044\u308b\u3002\n\n## \u8106\u5f31\u6027\u306e\u69cb\u9020\n\nCVE-2026-123007 \u306f HTTP/2 \u63a5\u7d9a\u30ec\u30d9\u30eb\u9001\u4fe1\u30d5\u30ed\u30fc\u5236\u5fa1\u30ab\u30a6\u30f3\u30bf `h2c-&gt;send_window` \u306e\u4e0d\u5909\u6761\u4ef6\u9055\u53cd\u304b\u3089\u59cb\u307e\u308b\u3002HTTP/2 \u306f\u63a5\u7d9a\u3042\u305f\u308a\u306e\u9001\u4fe1\u30af\u30ec\u30b8\u30c3\u30c8\u3092 2^31-1 \u30d0\u30a4\u30c8\u307e\u3067\u306b\u5236\u9650\u3059\u308b\u3002nginx \u306f\u30af\u30ec\u30b8\u30c3\u30c8\u3092 `size_t`\uff0864 \u30d3\u30c3\u30c8\u7b26\u53f7\u306a\u3057\uff09\u3067\u4fdd\u6301\u3057\u3066\u304a\u308a\u3001\u30d7\u30ed\u30c8\u30b3\u30eb\u4e0a\u9650\u3092\u8d85\u3048\u308b\u5024\u3092\u8868\u73fe\u3067\u304d\u308b\u3002\u4e0a\u9650\u3092\u5b88\u308b\u691c\u67fb\u306f `WINDOW_UPDATE` \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u51e6\u7406\u306e\u6b21\u306e1\u884c\u306b\u4f9d\u5b58\u3057\u3066\u3044\u305f\u3002\n\n```c\n// src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c (1.31.8)\nif (window &gt; NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - h2c-&gt;send_window) {\n    ...FLOW_CTRL_ERROR...\n}\nh2c-&gt;send_window += window;\n```\n\n\u3053\u306e\u691c\u67fb\u304c\u6210\u7acb\u3059\u308b\u524d\u63d0\u306f\u3001`send_window` \u304c\u5e38\u306b MAX \u4ee5\u4e0b\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3053\u3068\u3060\u3002\u305d\u306e\u524d\u63d0\u3092\u5d29\u3059\u7d4c\u8def\u304c\u5fdc\u7b54\u30c7\u30fc\u30bf\u306e\u30ad\u30e5\u30fc\u30a4\u30f3\u30b0\u3068\u30ad\u30e3\u30f3\u30bb\u30eb\u306e\u9593\u306b\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n`ngx_http_v2_send_chain()` \u306f DATA \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u3092\u30ad\u30e5\u30fc\u306b\u8f09\u305b\u308b\u6642\u70b9\u3067 `send_window` \u304b\u3089\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u9577\u3092\u5dee\u3057\u5f15\u304f\u3002\u3053\u308c\u306f\u9001\u4fe1\u524d\u306e\u4e88\u7d04\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30fc\u30e0\u304c RST_STREAM \u3067\u6253\u3061\u5207\u3089\u308c\u308b\u3068\u3001`ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup()` \u304c\u672a\u9001\u4fe1\u306e\u307e\u307e\u6b8b\u3063\u3066\u3044\u305f\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u306e\u9577\u3055\u3092\u5408\u8a08\u3057\u3001`h2c-&gt;send_window += window` \u3067\u8fd4\u9084\u3059\u308b\u3002\u3053\u306e\u8fd4\u9084\u306b\u4e0a\u9650\u691c\u67fb\u306f\u306a\u3044\u3002\u305d\u3053\u3067\u3001\u30af\u30e9\u30a4\u30a2\u30f3\u30c8\u304c\u30c7\u30fc\u30bf\u306e\u8aad\u307f\u53d6\u308a\u3092\u6b62\u3081\u3066 DATA \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u3092\u6ede\u7559\u3055\u305b\u3001\u63a5\u7d9a\u30af\u30ec\u30b8\u30c3\u30c8\u3092 MAX \u307e\u3067\u5f15\u304d\u4e0a\u3052\u305f\u72b6\u614b\u3067\u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30fc\u30e0\u3092\u6253\u3061\u5207\u308b\u3068\u3001\u8fd4\u9084\u306b\u3088\u3063\u3066 `send_window` \u304c MAX \u3092\u8d85\u3048\u308b\u3002\n\n\u6b21\u306e `WINDOW_UPDATE` \u3067\u6e1b\u7b97 `MAX - send_window` \u304c\u7b26\u53f7\u306a\u3057\u7b97\u8853\u3068\u3057\u3066\u30a2\u30f3\u30c0\u30fc\u30d5\u30ed\u30fc\u3057\u3001\u691c\u67fb\u304c\u4e8b\u5b9f\u4e0a\u7121\u52b9\u5316\u3055\u308c\u308b\uff08CWE-191\uff09\u3002\u4ee5\u5f8c\u30011\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u3042\u305f\u308a\u6700\u5927 2^31-1 \u306e\u5897\u5206\u304c\u7121\u5236\u9650\u306b\u53d7\u7406\u3055\u308c\u3001\u7d04 2^32 \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u306e\u9001\u4fe1\u3067 `send_window` \u3092 2^63 \u8d85\u307e\u3067\u5f15\u304d\u4e0a\u3052\u3089\u308c\u308b\u3002\n\n`send_window` \u304c 2^63 \u3092\u8d85\u3048\u308b\u3068\u3001\u51fa\u529b\u30d5\u30a3\u30eb\u30bf\u306e\u6b21\u306e\u5909\u63db\u3067\u7b26\u53f7\u304c\u53cd\u8ee2\u3059\u308b\u3002\n\n```c\n// ngx_http_v2_send_chain()\nif (limit == 0 || limit &gt; (off_t) h2c-&gt;send_window) {\n    limit = h2c-&gt;send_window;            // 2^64-d \u304c off_t \u3068\u3057\u3066 -d \u306b\u306a\u308b\n}\n...\nframe_size = (size_t) limit;             // \u5de8\u5927\u306a\u7b26\u53f7\u306a\u3057\u5024\u306b\u623b\u308b\n...\ncl = ngx_http_v2_filter_get_shadow(stream, in-&gt;buf, offset, rest);\n// shadow \u30d0\u30c3\u30d5\u30a1: chunk-&gt;last = chunk-&gt;pos + (off_t)rest \u2192 last &lt; pos \u306e\u4e0d\u6b63\u30d0\u30c3\u30d5\u30a1\n```\n\n`last &lt; pos` \u306e\u30d0\u30c3\u30d5\u30a1\u304c TLS \u51fa\u529b\u7d4c\u8def\u306b\u6e21\u308b\u3068\u3001`ngx_ssl_send_chain()` \u306e\u30b9\u30c6\u30fc\u30b8\u30f3\u30b0\u30b3\u30d4\u30fc\u3067\u9577\u3055\u304c\u518d\u3073\u7b26\u53f7\u306a\u3057\u306b\u89e3\u91c8\u3055\u308c\u3001`ngx_memcpy(buf-&gt;last, in-&gt;buf-&gt;pos, 2^64-d)` \u304c\u5b9f\u884c\u3055\u308c\u308b\u3002\u3053\u308c\u304c\u7bc4\u56f2\u5916\u30e1\u30e2\u30ea\u30a2\u30af\u30bb\u30b9\u306e\u767a\u751f\u70b9\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n## \u5b9f\u8a3c\u5b9f\u9a13\n\n### \u74b0\u5883\n\n\u691c\u8a3c\u306f macOS \u4e0a\u306e\u30ed\u30fc\u30ab\u30eb\u30e9\u30dc\u3067\u884c\u3063\u305f\u3002\u5bfe\u8c61\u306f nginx 1.31.8 \u3092 `--with-debug --with-http_ssl_module --with-http_v2_module` \u3067\u30d3\u30eb\u30c9\u3057\u305f\u3082\u306e\u3067\u3042\u308a\u3001TLS \u3068 HTTP/2 \u3092\u540c\u4e00\u30dd\u30fc\u30c8\u3067\u63d0\u4f9b\u3059\u308b\u3002\u81ea\u5df1\u7f72\u540d\u8a3c\u660e\u66f8\u3092\u4f7f\u3044\u3001\u30af\u30e9\u30a4\u30a2\u30f3\u30c8\u306f ALPN \u3067 h2 \u3092\u9078\u629e\u3057\u305f\u3002\u6bd4\u8f03\u7528\u306b\u4fee\u6b63\u7248 1.31.9 \u3068\u5b89\u5b9a\u7248 1.30.7 \u3092\u540c\u4e00\u69cb\u6210\u3067\u7528\u610f\u3057\u3001\u540c\u4e00\u30af\u30e9\u30a4\u30a2\u30f3\u30c8\u30b9\u30af\u30ea\u30d7\u30c8\u3092\u4e09\u3064\u3059\u3079\u3066\u306b\u5b9f\u884c\u3057\u305f\u3002\u30d0\u30fc\u30b8\u30e7\u30f3\u306e\u8b58\u5225\u306f\u63a5\u7d9a\u306e\u5fdc\u7b54\u3067\u884c\u3044\u3001\u30cf\u30fc\u30c9\u30cb\u30f3\u30b0\u306e\u5f71\u97ff\u3092\u9664\u304f\u305f\u3081 ASLR \u3084 PIE \u306e\u8a2d\u5b9a\u306f\u5909\u66f4\u3057\u3066\u3044\u306a\u3044\u3002\n\n\u30af\u30e9\u30a4\u30a2\u30f3\u30c8\u306f h2 \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u3092\u76f4\u63a5\u69cb\u7bc9\u3059\u308b Python \u30b9\u30af\u30ea\u30d7\u30c8\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002HPACK \u306f\u9759\u7684\u30a4\u30f3\u30c7\u30c3\u30af\u30b9\u3068 literal without indexing \u306e\u307f\u3092\u4f7f\u3044\u3001\u52d5\u7684\u30c6\u30fc\u30d6\u30eb\u306e\u72b6\u614b\u306b\u4f9d\u5b58\u3057\u306a\u3044\u3002\n\n### \u30b9\u30c6\u30fc\u30b81\u304b\u30892: \u4e0d\u5909\u6761\u4ef6\u9055\u53cd\u3068\u691c\u67fb\u7121\u52b9\u5316\u306e\u5b9f\u8a3c\n\n\u653b\u6483\u5074\u306e\u624b\u9806\u306f\u6b21\u306e\u3068\u304a\u308a\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n1. \u63a5\u7d9a\u30af\u30ec\u30b8\u30c3\u30c8\u3092 `WINDOW_UPDATE` \u4e00\u767a\u3067 65535 \u304b\u3089 MAX \u307e\u3067\u5f15\u304d\u4e0a\u3052\u308b\u3002\n2. \u5358\u4e00\u30d0\u30c3\u30d5\u30a1\u3067\u69cb\u6210\u3055\u308c\u308b\u7d04 8.88 MB \u306e autoindex \u30ec\u30b9\u30dd\u30f3\u30b9\u3092\u8981\u6c42\u3057\u3001\u8aad\u307f\u53d6\u308a\u3092\u505c\u6b62\u3059\u308b\u3002nginx \u306f 1 \u56de\u306e `send_chain` \u547c\u3073\u51fa\u3057\u3067\u5fdc\u7b54\u5168\u4f53\u3092 512 KB \u306e DATA \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u3068\u3057\u3066\u30ad\u30e5\u30fc\u306b\u8f09\u305b\u308b\u3002\u30bd\u30b1\u30c3\u30c8\u30d0\u30c3\u30d5\u30a1\u304c\u6e80\u676f\u306b\u306a\u3063\u305f\u6642\u70b9\u3067\u66f8\u304d\u8fbc\u307f\u304c\u6b62\u307e\u308a\u3001\u6b8b\u308a\u5927\u534a\u304c\u672a\u9001\u4fe1\u306e\u307e\u307e\u6ede\u7559\u3059\u308b\u3002\n3. \u30af\u30ec\u30b8\u30c3\u30c8\u3092\u6ede\u7559\u5206\u3060\u3051\u518d\u88dc\u586b\u3059\u308b\u3002\u5897\u5206\u306f\u300c\u66f8\u304d\u8fbc\u307f\u6e08\u307f\u30d0\u30a4\u30c8\u6570\uff08\u30bd\u30b1\u30c3\u30c8\u30d0\u30c3\u30d5\u30a1\u306b\u5438\u53ce\u3055\u308c\u305f\u5206\uff09\u300d\u3068\u300c\u6ede\u7559\u5206\u300d\u306e\u3042\u3044\u3060\u306b\u7f6e\u3051\u3070\u3088\u304f\u3001\u6b63\u78ba\u306a\u6ede\u7559\u91cf\u3092\u77e5\u308b\u5fc5\u8981\u306f\u306a\u3044\u3002\u88dc\u586b\u5f8c\u306e\u5b9f\u52b9\u72b6\u614b\u306f `send_window + \u6ede\u7559 &gt; MAX` \u3068\u306a\u308b\u3002\n4. \u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30fc\u30e0\u3092 `SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE` \u306e\u8abf\u6574\u3067\u6253\u3061\u5207\u308b\u3002nginx \u306f RST_STREAM \u3092\u9001\u308a\u3064\u3064\u63a5\u7d9a\u3092\u4fdd\u6301\u3057\u3001\u30af\u30ea\u30fc\u30f3\u30a2\u30c3\u30d7\u304c\u6ede\u7559\u5206\u3092\u8fd4\u9084\u3057\u3066 `send_window` \u3092 MAX \u8d85\u306b\u3059\u308b\u3002\n5. \u5897\u5206 0xFFFFFFFF\uff08RFC \u9055\u53cd\u3001\u53d7\u7406\u3055\u308c\u3066\u306f\u306a\u3089\u306a\u3044\u5024\uff09\u306e `WINDOW_UPDATE` \u3092\u9001\u308a\u3001PING ACK \u3067\u63a5\u7d9a\u306e\u751f\u5b58\u3092\u78ba\u8a8d\u3059\u308b\u3002\n\n\u7d50\u679c\u306f\u660e\u78ba\u306b\u5206\u304b\u308c\u305f\u30021.31.8 \u306f\u5897\u5206 0xFFFFFFFF \u3092\u53d7\u7406\u3057\u3001\u63a5\u7d9a\u306f\u751f\u5b58\u3057\u305f\u3002\u5897\u5206\u306e\u53d7\u7406\u306f\u691c\u67fb\u306e\u30a2\u30f3\u30c0\u30fc\u30d5\u30ed\u30fc\u6210\u7acb\u306e\u76f4\u63a5\u8a3c\u62e0\u3067\u3042\u308b\u30021.31.9 \u3068 1.30.7 \u306f\u540c\u4e00\u30b7\u30fc\u30b1\u30f3\u30b9\u3067\u88dc\u586b\u6bb5\u968e\u3092\u62d2\u5426\u3057\u3001GOAWAY\uff08FLOW_CTRL_ERROR\uff09\u3067\u63a5\u7d9a\u3092\u5207\u65ad\u3057\u305f\u3002\u30ed\u30b0\u306b\u306f\u6b21\u306e\u3068\u304a\u308a\u6b8b\u308b\u3002\n\n```text\n# 1.31.8 / 1.30.7 \u3067\u62d2\u5426\u304c\u671f\u5f85\u3055\u308c\u308b\u88dc\u586b\u3092 1.31.9 \u304c\u53d7\u3051\u305f\u5834\u5408\u306e\u4f8b (1.31.9)\nclient violated connection flow control: received WINDOW_UPDATE frame\nwith window increment 1500000 not allowed for window 2147483494\n```\n\n1.31.9 \u304c\u3053\u306e\u88dc\u586b\u3092\u62d2\u5426\u3067\u304d\u308b\u306e\u306f\u3001\u4fee\u6b63\u304c `send_queued` \u3068\u3044\u3046\u65b0\u30ab\u30a6\u30f3\u30bf\u3067\u672a\u9001\u4fe1\u4e88\u7d04\u5206\u3092\u8ffd\u8de1\u3057\u3001\u691c\u67fb\u3092 `window &gt; MAX - send_window - send_queued` \u306b\u5f37\u3081\u305f\u305f\u3081\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\u30af\u30e9\u30a4\u30a2\u30f3\u30c8\u304b\u3089\u898b\u308c\u3070\u3001\u63a5\u7d9a\u304c\u751f\u304d\u305f\u307e\u307e\u62d2\u5426\u3055\u308c\u3001\u653b\u6483\u306e\u5165\u53e3\u304c\u9589\u3058\u305f\u3053\u3068\u304c\u52d5\u4f5c\u3067\u78ba\u8a8d\u3067\u304d\u308b\u3002\n\n### \u30b9\u30c6\u30fc\u30b83: \u5897\u5e45\n\n`WINDOW_UPDATE` \u306e\u5897\u5206\u306f nginx \u5185\u90e8\u3067 31 \u30d3\u30c3\u30c8\u306b\u30de\u30b9\u30af\u3055\u308c\u308b\uff08`ngx_http_v2_parse_window` \u306e\u5b9a\u7fa9 `parse_uint32(p) &amp; 0x7fffffff`\uff09\u3002\u305d\u306e\u305f\u3081 1 \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u3042\u305f\u308a\u306e\u6700\u5927\u5897\u5206\u306f 2^31-1 \u3067\u3042\u308a\u30012^63 \u5230\u9054\u306b\u306f\u7d04 2^32 \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u304c\u5fc5\u8981\u306b\u306a\u308b\u3002Rapid7 \u306e\u516c\u8868\u5024\uff0852 GiB \u304b\u3089 104 GiB\u30012^32 \u304a\u3088\u3073 2^33 \u5897\u5206\uff09\u3068\u4e00\u81f4\u3059\u308b\u898f\u6a21\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n\u9001\u4fe1\u306b\u306f\u3075\u305f\u3064\u306e\u5236\u7d04\u3092\u6e80\u305f\u3059\u5fc5\u8981\u304c\u3042\u3063\u305f\u3002nginx \u306f\u53d7\u4fe1\u30d0\u30a4\u30c8\u3068\u30da\u30a4\u30ed\u30fc\u30c9\u306e\u6bd4\u3092 `total_bytes / 8 &gt; payload_bytes + 1MB` \u3067\u76e3\u8996\u3057\u3001\u9038\u8131\u3067\u63a5\u7d9a\u3092\u5207\u308b\u3002`payload_bytes` \u306f\u53d7\u4fe1\u3057\u305f\u30ea\u30af\u30a8\u30b9\u30c8\u30dc\u30c7\u30a3\u306e DATA \u30d0\u30a4\u30c8\u3067\u3057\u304b\u5897\u52a0\u3057\u306a\u3044\u305f\u3081\u3001flood \u3068\u4e26\u884c\u3057\u3066 POST \u30dc\u30c7\u30a3\u3092\u9001\u308a\u7d9a\u3051\u308b\u5fc5\u8981\u304c\u3042\u308b\u3002\u5b9f\u6e2c\u3067\u306f\u7d04 56 GB \u306e `WINDOW_UPDATE`\uff08\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u672c\u4f53 13 \u30d0\u30a4\u30c8 \u00d7 \u7d04 42.9 \u5104\uff09\u306b\u5bfe\u3057\u3001\u7d04 8 GB \u306e POST \u30dc\u30c7\u30a3\u3092\u540c\u4e00\u63a5\u7d9a\u306b\u6df7\u305c\u305f\u3002\u30dc\u30c7\u30a3\u306e\u53d7\u3051\u76bf\u306b\u306f\u30ea\u30af\u30a8\u30b9\u30c8\u30dc\u30c7\u30a3\u3092\u6700\u5f8c\u307e\u3067\u8aad\u3080 `proxy_pass` \u69cb\u6210\u3092\u4f7f\u3063\u305f\u3002\u5fdc\u7b54\u3092 `return 204` \u3067\u8fd4\u3059\u69cb\u6210\u3067\u306f\u3001\u5fdc\u7b54\u5b8c\u4e86\u6642\u70b9\u3067\u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30fc\u30e0\u304c\u9589\u3058\u3089\u308c\u3001\u5f8c\u7d9a\u306e DATA \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u304c\u300cincorrect identifier\u300d\u3067\u62d2\u5426\u3055\u308c\u308b\u305f\u3081\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n\u3082\u3046\u3072\u3068\u3064\u306e\u5236\u7d04\u306f\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u306e\u30a2\u30ed\u30b1\u30fc\u30b7\u30e7\u30f3\u4e0a\u9650\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002nginx \u306f\u51fa\u529b\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u3092 10000 \u500b\u307e\u3067\u3057\u304b\u78ba\u4fdd\u305b\u305a\u3001\u8d85\u904e\u3067 flood \u5224\u5b9a\u3092\u51fa\u3059\u3002triggers \u3084 probe \u306e\u5fdc\u7b54\u3092\u6700\u5c0f\u5316\u3057\u3066\u56de\u907f\u3057\u305f\u3002\n\n\u5b9f\u6e2c\u3067\u306f\u300142.9 \u5104\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u306e\u9001\u4fe1\u3068 nginx \u5074\u306e\u51e6\u7406\u304c 41 \u79d2\u3067\u5b8c\u4e86\u3057\u305f\uff08\u30eb\u30fc\u30d7\u30d0\u30c3\u30af\u3001\u5b9f\u52b9\u7d04 1.4 GB/s\uff09\u3002\u7d42\u4e86\u6642\u306e\u63a8\u5b9a\u30af\u30ec\u30b8\u30c3\u30c8\u306f 2^63 \u3092\u308f\u305a\u304b\u306b\u8d85\u3048\u305f\u3002\n\n### \u30b9\u30c6\u30fc\u30b84: \u30e1\u30e2\u30ea\u7834\u58ca\u306e\u5b9f\u8a3c\n\n2^63 \u8d85\u306e\u72b6\u614b\u3067\u5927\u5bb9\u91cf\u9759\u7684\u30d5\u30a1\u30a4\u30eb\u3078\u306e GET \u3092\u65b0\u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30fc\u30e0\u3067\u767a\u884c\u3059\u308b\u3068\u3001nginx \u306f 1 \u3064\u76ee\u306e DATA \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u751f\u6210\u6642\u306b\u524d\u8ff0\u306e\u5909\u63db\u3092\u901a\u904e\u3057\u3001`last &lt; pos` \u306e\u4e0d\u6b63\u30d0\u30c3\u30d5\u30a1\u3092\u4f5c\u308b\u3002\u9001\u4fe1\u7d4c\u8def\u3067\u3053\u308c\u3092\u6d88\u8cbb\u3057\u305f\u77ac\u9593\u3001worker \u306f\u843d\u3061\u308b\u3002error.log \u306e\u8a18\u9332\u306f\u6b21\u306e\u3068\u304a\u308a\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n```text\n[alert] worker process 35742 exited on signal 11\n```\n\nSIGSEGV \u306e\u767a\u751f\u3092 2 \u56de\u8a18\u9332\u3057\u305f\u3002\u3055\u3089\u306b\u5b9f\u884c\u4e2d\u306e worker \u306b lldb \u3092\u30a2\u30bf\u30c3\u30c1\u3057\u3001\u30af\u30e9\u30c3\u30b7\u30e5\u77ac\u9593\u306e\u72b6\u614b\u3092\u6355\u7372\u3057\u305f\u3002\n\n```text\nstop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0x80003fe9d69204a8)\nframe #0: libsystem_platform.dylib`_platform_memmove + 492\nframe #1: nginx`ngx_ssl_send_chain        ngx_event_openssl.c:3150\nframe #2: nginx`ngx_http_v2_send_output_queue  ngx_http_v2.c:544\nframe #3: nginx`ngx_http_v2_filter_send   ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c:1477\nframe #4: nginx`ngx_http_v2_send_chain    ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c:1274\nframe #5: nginx`ngx_http_write_filter\nframe #6: nginx`ngx_http_trailers_filter\nframe #7: nginx`ngx_output_chain\nframe #8: nginx`ngx_http_copy_filter\nframe #9: nginx`ngx_http_output_filter\nframe #10: nginx`ngx_http_static_handler   \u2190 \u30af\u30e9\u30c3\u30b7\u30e5\u30c8\u30ea\u30ac\u30fc\u306e GET\n```\n\n\u30d0\u30c3\u30af\u30c8\u30ec\u30fc\u30b9\u306f\u3001\u9759\u7684\u30d5\u30a1\u30a4\u30eb\u30cf\u30f3\u30c9\u30e9\u306e\u5fdc\u7b54\u304c `send_chain` \u3067\u4e0d\u6b63\u30d0\u30c3\u30d5\u30a1\u306b\u5909\u63db\u3055\u308c\u3001TLS \u9001\u4fe1\u30d1\u30b9\u306e\u30b9\u30c6\u30fc\u30b8\u30f3\u30b0 memcpy \u3067\u7bc4\u56f2\u5916\u306b\u5230\u9054\u3057\u305f\u3053\u3068\u3092\u793a\u3059\u3002\u30d5\u30a9\u30eb\u30c8\u30a2\u30c9\u30ec\u30b9 0x80003fe9d69204a8 \u306f\u30e6\u30fc\u30b6\u7a7a\u9593\u306e\u4eee\u60f3\u30a2\u30c9\u30ec\u30b9\u7bc4\u56f2\u3092\u5927\u304d\u304f\u5916\u308c\u3066\u304a\u308a\u3001\u9577\u3055 2^64-d \u304c\u30a8\u30f3\u30c9\u30a2\u30c9\u30ec\u30b9\u8a08\u7b97\u3092\u98db\u3073\u8d8a\u3057\u305f\u3053\u3068\u306b\u6574\u5408\u3059\u308b\u3002macOS \u306e memmove \u5b9f\u88c5\u306f glibc \u306e EVEX \u5b9f\u88c5\u304c\u3082\u3064\u300c\u30a8\u30f3\u30c9\u30a2\u30c9\u30ec\u30b9\u306e\u30e9\u30c3\u30d7\u3067\u5c11\u6570\u306e\u7bc4\u56f2\u5916\u30a2\u30af\u30bb\u30b9\u3067\u7d42\u4e86\u3059\u308b\u300d\u6319\u52d5\u3092\u6301\u305f\u306a\u3044\u305f\u3081\u3001\u672c\u74b0\u5883\u3067\u306f\u640d\u50b7\u306e\u7bc4\u56f2\u3092\u5236\u5fa1\u3067\u304d\u306a\u3044\u5373\u6642\u30d5\u30a9\u30eb\u30c8\u306b\u306a\u3063\u305f\u3002Rapid7 \u304c RCE \u6761\u4ef6\u306b\u300c\u7279\u5b9a\u306e glibc memcpy \u5b9f\u88c5\u3078\u306e\u4f9d\u5b58\u300d\u3092\u6319\u3052\u3066\u3044\u308b\u306e\u306f\u3053\u306e\u5dee\u7570\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n\u540c\u4e00\u30af\u30e9\u30a4\u30a2\u30f3\u30c8\u3092 1.31.9 \u306b\u5411\u3051\u3066\u5b9f\u884c\u3057\u305f\u5834\u5408\u306f\u3001\u30b9\u30c6\u30fc\u30b81\u306e\u88dc\u586b\u62d2\u5426\u3067\u30b9\u30af\u30ea\u30d7\u30c8\u304c\u65e9\u671f\u7d42\u4e86\u3057\u3001worker \u306f\u751f\u5b58\u3057\u305f\u3002\u30af\u30e9\u30c3\u30b7\u30e5\u306f\u8106\u5f31\u6027\u306e\u6709\u7121\u3067\u5b8c\u5168\u306b\u5206\u96e2\u3055\u308c\u308b\u3002\n\n### \u4fee\u6b63\u7248\u306b\u5bfe\u3059\u308b\u6b63\u5e38\u7cfb\u306e\u78ba\u8a8d\n\n1.31.9 \u304c\u6b63\u5f53\u306a\u30af\u30e9\u30a4\u30a2\u30f3\u30c8\u3092\u8aa4\u3063\u3066\u5207\u65ad\u3057\u306a\u3044\u3053\u3068\u3092\u78ba\u8a8d\u3057\u305f\u3002\u691c\u67fb `window &gt; MAX - send_window - send_queued` \u306e\u8a31\u5bb9\u91cf\u306f `MAX - \u7dcf\u4ed8\u4e0e + \u30ef\u30a4\u30e4\u9001\u4fe1\u6e08\u307f\u30d0\u30a4\u30c8` \u3067\u8868\u305b\u308b\u3002RFC 9113 \u306e\u53d7\u4fe1\u5074\u4e0d\u5909\u6761\u4ef6\uff08\u7dcf\u4ed8\u4e0e \u2212 \u53d7\u4fe1\u6e08\u307f \u2264 MAX\uff09\u304c\u8981\u6c42\u3059\u308b\u5897\u5206\u306e\u4e0a\u9650\u306f `MAX - \u7dcf\u4ed8\u4e0e + \u53d7\u4fe1\u6e08\u307f` \u3067\u3042\u308a\u3001\u53d7\u4fe1\u6e08\u307f \u2264 \u9001\u4fe1\u6e08\u307f \u304c\u5e38\u306b\u6210\u7acb\u3059\u308b\u305f\u3081\u3001\u6b63\u5f53\u306a\u30af\u30e9\u30a4\u30a2\u30f3\u30c8\u306e\u5897\u5206\u306f\u5fc5\u305a\u8a31\u5bb9\u91cf\u4ee5\u5185\u306b\u53ce\u307e\u308b\u3002\u5b9f\u6e2c\u3067\u3082 67 MB \u306e\u901a\u5e38\u30c0\u30a6\u30f3\u30ed\u30fc\u30c9\u304c 1.31.9 \u3067\u5b8c\u4e86\u3057\u305f\u3002\n\n## \u4fee\u6b63\u306e\u9069\u5207\u6027\u8a55\u4fa1\n\n### 1.31.9 \u306e\u4fee\u6b63\u5185\u5bb9\n\n\u30e1\u30a4\u30f3\u30e9\u30a4\u30f3\u306e\u4fee\u6b63\u306f\u6b21\u306e\u56db\u3064\u306e\u8981\u7d20\u304b\u3089\u306a\u308b\u3002\n\n- `send_queued` \u30ab\u30a6\u30f3\u30bf\u306e\u5c0e\u5165\u3068\u3001`WINDOW_UPDATE` \u691c\u67fb\u3078\u306e\u7d44\u307f\u8fbc\u307f\n- \u30af\u30ea\u30fc\u30f3\u30a2\u30c3\u30d7\u8fd4\u9084\u3092 DATA \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u306e\u307f\u306b\u9650\u5b9a\uff08\u65e7\u5b9f\u88c5\u306f\u30d8\u30c3\u30c0\u3084\u30c8\u30ec\u30fc\u30e9\u306e\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u9577\u3082\u8fd4\u9084\u5bfe\u8c61\u3060\u3063\u305f\u3002\u3053\u308c\u3089\u306f\u6c7a\u3057\u3066 `send_window` \u304b\u3089\u5dee\u3057\u5f15\u304b\u308c\u3066\u304a\u3089\u305a\u3001\u8fd4\u9084\u306f\u7d14\u5897\u3092\u751f\u3080\uff09\n- `SETTINGS` \u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u306e ACK \u30d5\u30e9\u30b0\u5224\u5b9a\u3092\u7b49\u5024\u6bd4\u8f03\u304b\u3089\u30d3\u30c3\u30c8\u30c6\u30b9\u30c8\u3078\u5909\u66f4\uff08ACK \u3068\u4ed6\u30d5\u30e9\u30b0\u306e\u4f75\u7528\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u3092\u6b63\u3057\u304f ACK \u3068\u3057\u3066\u6271\u3046\uff09\n- \u51fa\u529b\u30ad\u30e5\u30fc\u306e\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u633f\u5165\u4f4d\u7f6e\u3092\u4e8b\u524d\u8a08\u7b97\u3059\u308b\u69cb\u9020\u5909\u66f4\u3068\u3001\u30c8\u30ec\u30fc\u30e9\u306e `blocked` \u30ea\u30bb\u30c3\u30c8\n\n\u691c\u67fb\u306f `send_window + send_queued` \u3068\u3044\u3046\u548c\u306b\u3064\u3044\u3066\u306e\u4e0d\u5909\u6761\u4ef6\u3068\u3057\u3066\u6a5f\u80fd\u3059\u308b\u3002\u30ad\u30e5\u30fc\u4e88\u7d04\u5206\u3082\u542b\u3081\u3066\u548c\u304c MAX \u3092\u8d85\u3048\u306a\u3044\u3088\u3046\u5236\u9650\u3059\u308b\u3053\u3068\u3067\u30011.31.8 \u306e\u653b\u6483\u7d4c\u8def\u306f\u5165\u53e3\u3067\u9589\u3058\u308b\u3002\u5b9f\u9a13\u7d50\u679c\u3068\u6574\u5408\u3057\u3001\u6b63\u5f53\u306a\u30af\u30e9\u30a4\u30a2\u30f3\u30c8\u3092\u5dfb\u304d\u8fbc\u307e\u306a\u3044\u8a2d\u8a08\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002RFC 9113 \u304c\u9001\u4fe1\u8005\u306b\u8ab2\u3059\u300c\u9001\u4fe1\u30af\u30ec\u30b8\u30c3\u30c8\u306f\u53d7\u4fe1\u6e08\u307f\u3092\u542b\u3081 MAX \u4ee5\u4e0b\u300d\u3068\u3044\u3046\u610f\u5473\u8ad6\u306b\u5bfe\u3057\u3066\u3082\u3001nginx \u306e\u5b9f\u88c5\u306f\u30ad\u30e5\u30fc\u4e88\u7d04\u3092\u9001\u4fe1\u6e08\u307f\u3068\u3057\u3066\u5148\u53d6\u308a\u8a08\u4e0a\u3059\u308b\u3088\u308a\u53b3\u3057\u3044\u5074\u306b\u5bc4\u308b\u304c\u3001\u53d7\u4fe1\u6e08\u307f \u2264 \u9001\u4fe1\u6e08\u307f \u306e\u95a2\u4fc2\u304b\u3089\u6b63\u5f53\u306a\u5897\u5206\u3092\u5f3e\u304f\u3053\u3068\u306f\u306a\u3044\u3002\n\n\u30b3\u30fc\u30c9\u306e\u5074\u9762\u304b\u3089\u3001\u4fee\u6b63\u5f8c\u306b\u4f3c\u305f\u69cb\u9020\u304c\u4ed6\u306b\u306a\u3044\u304b\u3092\u78ba\u8a8d\u3057\u305f\u3002QUIC \u5b9f\u88c5\u306e\u9001\u4fe1\u5074\u306b\u306f\u3053\u306e\u7a2e\u306e\u300c\u8fd4\u9084\u300d\u69cb\u9020\u304c\u306a\u304f\u3001`cg-&gt;window +=` \u306e\u8a72\u5f53\u7b87\u6240\u306f\u8f3b\u8f33\u5236\u5fa1\u306e AIMD/CUBIC \u5897\u52a0\u3067\u3042\u308a\u4e0a\u9650\u3092\u6301\u3064\u3002HTTP/3 \u306e\u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30fc\u30e0\u751f\u6210\u307e\u308f\u308a\u306f\u5225\u306e CVE\uff08UAF\uff09\u306e\u4fee\u6b63\u5bfe\u8c61\u3067\u3042\u308a\u3001\u30d5\u30ed\u30fc\u5236\u5fa1\u306e\u540c\u7b49\u6b20\u9665\u306f\u898b\u3042\u305f\u3089\u306a\u3044\u3002\n\n### 1.30.7 \u30d0\u30c3\u30af\u30dd\u30fc\u30c8\u306e\u5dee\u7570\n\n\u5b89\u5b9a\u7248 1.30.7 \u306b\u306f\u4e2d\u6838\u7684\u306a\u4fee\u6b63\u304c\u5165\u308a\u3001\u5b9f\u9a13\u3067\u3082\u88dc\u586b\u62d2\u5426\u3092\u78ba\u8a8d\u3057\u305f\u3002\u3057\u304b\u3057\u305d\u306e\u5b9f\u88c5\u306f 1.31.9 \u3068\u5b8c\u5168\u306b\u306f\u4e00\u81f4\u3057\u306a\u3044\u3002\n\n\u5dee\u5206\u3092\u6bd4\u8f03\u3059\u308b\u3068\u30011.30.7 \u306f\u691c\u67fb\u306e\u5f37\u5316\u3001`send_queued` \u306e\u5c0e\u5165\u3001\u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30fc\u30e0\u751f\u6210\u6642\u306e `ngx_reusable_connection()` \u547c\u3073\u51fa\u3057\u3092\u542b\u3080\u4e00\u65b9\u3067\u3001\u6b21\u306e\u4e09\u70b9\u304c\u5165\u3063\u3066\u3044\u306a\u3044\u3002\u30af\u30ea\u30fc\u30f3\u30a2\u30c3\u30d7\u8fd4\u9084\u306e DATA \u9650\u5b9a\u3001SETTINGS ACK \u30d5\u30e9\u30b0\u306e\u30d3\u30c3\u30c8\u30c6\u30b9\u30c8\u5316\u3001\u51fa\u529b\u30ad\u30e5\u30fc\u306e\u633f\u5165\u4f4d\u7f6e\u518d\u69cb\u7bc9\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n\u3053\u306e\u3046\u3061\u8fd4\u9084\u306e\u9650\u5b9a\u304c\u7121\u3044\u3053\u3068\u306e\u5e30\u7d50\u3092\u89e3\u6790\u3057\u305f\u30021.30.7 \u306e\u30af\u30ea\u30fc\u30f3\u30a2\u30c3\u30d7\u306f\u6ede\u7559\u4e2d\u306e\u5168\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u306e\u9577\u3055\u3092\u8fd4\u9084\u3059\u308b\u3002DATA \u306e\u9577\u3055\u306f `send_window` \u3068 `send_queued` \u306e\u4e21\u65b9\u304b\u3089\u5dee\u3057\u5f15\u304b\u308c\u305f\u984d\u306a\u306e\u3067\u3001\u8fd4\u9084\u3067\u4e21\u8005\u306f\u7b49\u3057\u304f\u5dfb\u304d\u623b\u308b\u3002\u554f\u984c\u306f\u30d8\u30c3\u30c0\u3084\u30c8\u30ec\u30fc\u30e9\u306e\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u9577\u3067\u3001\u3053\u308c\u306f `send_window` \u304b\u3089\u4e00\u5ea6\u3082\u5dee\u3057\u5f15\u304b\u308c\u3066\u3044\u306a\u3044\u7d14\u5897\u3067\u3042\u308a\u3001`send_queued` \u306e\u307f\u304c\u672c\u6765\u306e\u5024\u3088\u308a\u591a\u304f\u6e1b\u7b97\u3055\u308c\u308b\u3002\u6e1b\u7b97\u304c\u8ca0\u306b\u306a\u308b\u3068 `size_t` \u306e\u30e9\u30c3\u30d7\u3067 send_queued \u304c 2^64 \u306b\u8fd1\u3044\u5024\u306b\u306a\u308b\u3002\n\n\u3053\u3053\u304b\u3089\u4e8c\u3064\u306e\u5e30\u7d50\u304c\u51fa\u308b\u3002\u3072\u3068\u3064\u306f\u3001\u30e9\u30c3\u30d7\u3057\u305f `send_queued` \u304c `send_window` \u306e\u7d14\u5897\u5206\u3092\u3061\u3087\u3046\u3069\u6253\u3061\u6d88\u3059\u305f\u3081\u3001\u691c\u67fb\u304c\u53c2\u7167\u3059\u308b\u548c `send_window + send_queued` \u306f\u7dcf\u4ed8\u4e0e \u2212 \u9001\u4fe1\u6e08\u307f \u3092\u4fdd\u3064\u3002\u691c\u67fb\u306e\u5b9f\u52b9\u6027\u306f\u640d\u306a\u308f\u308c\u306a\u3044\u3002\u3044\u307e\u3072\u3068\u3064\u306f\u3001`send_window` \u5358\u4f53\u306f\u8fd4\u9084\u306e\u305f\u3073\u306b\u30d8\u30c3\u30c0\u5206\u3060\u3051 MAX \u3092\u4e0a\u56de\u308a\u3046\u308b\u3053\u3068\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\u305f\u3060\u3057 1 \u56de\u306e\u30ad\u30e3\u30f3\u30bb\u30eb\u3067\u7d14\u5897\u3059\u308b\u306e\u306f\u6ede\u7559\u4e2d\u306e\u5fdc\u7b54\u30d8\u30c3\u30c0\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u9577\uff08\u901a\u5e38 100 \u30d0\u30a4\u30c8\u7a0b\u5ea6\uff09\u3067\u3042\u308a\u30012^63 \u306b\u5c4a\u304f\u306b\u306f 2^49 \u30aa\u30fc\u30c0\u30fc\u306e\u30ad\u30e3\u30f3\u30bb\u30eb\u306e\u7a4d\u307f\u91cd\u306d\u304c\u5fc5\u8981\u306b\u306a\u308b\u3002\u540c\u6642\u306b\u3001\u30d8\u30c3\u30c0\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30e0\u3092\u672a\u9001\u4fe1\u306e\u307e\u307e\u6ede\u7559\u3055\u305b\u308b\u306b\u306f\u63a5\u7d9a\u30d0\u30c3\u30d5\u30a1\u3092\u30d8\u30c3\u30c0\u9577\u672a\u6e80\u306b\u7d5e\u308b\u5fc5\u8981\u304c\u3042\u308b\u306a\u3069\u3001\u524d\u63d0\u6761\u4ef6\u306e\u7a4d\u307f\u91cd\u306d\u304c\u73fe\u5b9f\u7684\u3067\u306a\u3044\u3002\n\n\u7d50\u8ad6\u3068\u3057\u3066 1.30.7 \u306f CVE-2026-123007 \u306e\u65e2\u77e5\u306e\u653b\u6483\u7d4c\u8def\u306b\u5bfe\u3057\u3066\u5b89\u5168\u3060\u3068\u8a55\u4fa1\u3059\u308b\u3002\u305f\u3060\u3057\u3001\u30a2\u30ab\u30a6\u30f3\u30c6\u30a3\u30f3\u30b0\u306e\u6574\u5408\u6027\u3068\u3044\u3046\u70b9\u3067\u306f 1.31.9 \u3088\u308a\u5f31\u3044\u5b9f\u88c5\u306e\u307e\u307e\u3067\u3042\u308a\u3001\u5c06\u6765\u7684\u306b\u3053\u306e\u30ab\u30a6\u30f3\u30bf\u3092\u53c2\u7167\u3059\u308b\u65b0\u305f\u306a\u6a5f\u80fd\u304c\u8ffd\u52a0\u3055\u308c\u305f\u5834\u5408\u306b\u6f5c\u4f0f\u30d0\u30b0\u306e\u6e29\u5e8a\u306b\u306a\u308a\u3046\u308b\u3002\u30d0\u30c3\u30af\u30dd\u30fc\u30c8\u306b\u8fd4\u9084\u9650\u5b9a\u306e\u4fee\u6b63\u3092\u8ffd\u9069\u7528\u3059\u308b\u4fa1\u5024\u304c\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n### \u305d\u306e\u4ed6\u306e\u4fee\u6b639\u4ef6\n\n\u6b8b\u308b\u4fee\u6b63\u306b\u3064\u3044\u3066\u3001\u5dee\u5206\u3068\u30b3\u30fc\u30c9\u304b\u3089\u52d5\u4f5c\u3092\u78ba\u8a8d\u3057\u305f\u7d50\u679c\u3092\u8ff0\u3079\u308b\u3002\n\n**resolver \u306e use-after-free\uff08CVE-2026-123634\uff09**\uff1a\u89e3\u6c7a\u5b8c\u4e86\u51e6\u7406\u304c\u5f85\u3061\u884c\u5217\u306b\u6b8b\u308b\u30b3\u30f3\u30c6\u30ad\u30b9\u30c8\u3092\u89e3\u653e\u3059\u308b\u4e00\u65b9\u3001\u5fdc\u7b54\u51e6\u7406\u304c\u5f8c\u304b\u3089\u540c\u3058\u30b3\u30f3\u30c6\u30ad\u30b9\u30c8\u306e\u30cf\u30f3\u30c9\u30e9\u3092\u547c\u3076\u4e8c\u91cd\u30e9\u30a4\u30d5\u30bf\u30a4\u30e0\u304c\u539f\u56e0\u3002\u4fee\u6b63\u306f\u3001\u89e3\u653e\u3067\u304d\u306a\u304b\u3063\u305f\u30b3\u30f3\u30c6\u30ad\u30b9\u30c8\u306e\u30cf\u30f3\u30c9\u30e9\u3092\u5185\u90e8\u306e\u89e3\u653e\u5c02\u7528\u30cf\u30f3\u30c9\u30e9\u306b\u5dee\u3057\u66ff\u3048\u3001\u5f8c\u7740\u306e\u547c\u3073\u51fa\u3057\u3092\u5b89\u5168\u306a\u89e3\u653e\u306b\u7f6e\u304d\u63db\u3048\u308b\u3002\u30bf\u30a4\u30e0\u30a2\u30a6\u30c8\u7d4c\u8def\u3068 SRV \u518d\u89e3\u6c7a\u7d4c\u8def\u306e\u4e21\u65b9\u306b\u540c\u3058\u51e6\u7406\u304c\u5165\u3063\u3066\u304a\u308a\u3001\u5dee\u3057\u66ff\u3048\u6e08\u307f\u30cf\u30f3\u30c9\u30e9\u306e\u518d\u5e30\u547c\u3073\u51fa\u3057\u3082 `ngx_resolver_resolve_srv_names()` \u5192\u982d\u306e\u5224\u5b9a\u3067\u5c01\u3058\u3089\u308c\u3066\u3044\u308b\u3002\u69cb\u9020\u4e0a\u306e\u59a5\u5f53\u6027\u3092\u78ba\u8a8d\u3057\u305f\u3002\n\n**HTTP/2 \u306e use-after-free\uff08CVE-2026-123633\uff09**\uff1a\u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30fc\u30e0\u751f\u6210\u6642\u306b\u63a5\u7d9a\u3092\u975e\u518d\u5229\u7528\u6271\u3044\u306b\u3059\u308b\u4e00\u884c\u306e\u4fee\u6b63\u3002`worker_connections` \u67af\u6e07\u6642\u306b\u63a5\u7d9a\u304c\u56de\u53ce\u3055\u308c\u3001\u51e6\u7406\u4e2d\u306e h2 \u69cb\u9020\u304c\u61f8\u5782\u306b\u306a\u308b\u7d4c\u8def\u3092\u5c01\u3058\u308b\u30021.30.7 \u306b\u3082\u540c\u68b1\u3055\u308c\u3066\u3044\u308b\u3002\n\n**HTTP/3 \u306e use-after-free\uff08CVE-2026-121810\uff09**\uff1aQUIC \u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30fc\u30e0\u3092\u5931\u6557\u7d4c\u8def\u3088\u308a\u5148\u306b\u30ec\u30c3\u30c9\u30d6\u30e9\u30c3\u30af\u30c4\u30ea\u30fc\u3078\u633f\u5165\u3057\u3001\u78ba\u4fdd\u5931\u6557\u6642\u306f\u78ba\u5b9f\u306b\u524a\u9664\u3057\u3066\u623b\u3059\u4fee\u6b63\u3002\u78ba\u4fdd\u5931\u6557\u6642\u306b\u30c4\u30ea\u30fc\u5916\u306e\u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30fc\u30e0\u304c\u6b8b\u308a\u3001\u5f8c\u306e\u53c2\u7167\u304c\u61f8\u5782\u306b\u306a\u308b\u7d4c\u8def\u3092\u5c01\u3058\u308b\u3002\n\n**mail proxy \u306e use-after-free\uff08CVE-2026-113425\uff09**\uff1a\u30bb\u30c3\u30b7\u30e7\u30f3\u306e\u5404\u6bb5\u968e\u3067\u66f8\u304d\u8fbc\u307f\u30cf\u30f3\u30c9\u30e9\u304c `ngx_mail_send` \u306e\u307e\u307e\u7f6e\u304d\u63db\u3048\u3089\u308c\u305a\u3001\u89e3\u653e\u6e08\u307f\u30bb\u30c3\u30b7\u30e7\u30f3\u3078\u306e\u767a\u706b\u304c\u53ef\u80fd\u3060\u3063\u305f\u7b87\u6240\u3092\u3001\u8aad\u307f\u66f8\u304d\u3068\u3082\u5c02\u7528\u306e\u30d6\u30ed\u30c3\u30af\u30cf\u30f3\u30c9\u30e9\u3067\u8986\u3046\u4fee\u6b63\u3002SMTP \u540d\u524d\u89e3\u6c7a\u306e\u5404\u6bb5\u968e\u3001\u8a3c\u660e\u66f8\u691c\u8a3c\u30a8\u30e9\u30fc\u5fdc\u7b54\u3001auth_http \u5fdc\u7b54\u51e6\u7406\u307e\u3067\u4e00\u8cab\u3057\u3066\u5165\u3063\u3066\u304a\u308a\u3001`s-&gt;out.len = 0` \u306b\u3088\u308b\u6b8b\u5fdc\u7b54\u306e\u7834\u68c4\u3082\u52a0\u3048\u3089\u308c\u3066\u3044\u308b\u3002\n\n**\u30ea\u30af\u30a8\u30b9\u30c8\u30dc\u30c7\u30a3\u8aad\u307f\u8fbc\u307f\u306e\u7121\u9650\u30eb\u30fc\u30d7\uff08CVE-2026-118899\uff09**\uff1a\u30eb\u30fc\u30d7\u8131\u51fa\u6761\u4ef6\u306b\u300c\u4eca\u56de\u306e\u8aad\u307f\u8fbc\u307f\u304c\u9032\u5c55\u3057\u306a\u304b\u3063\u305f\u300d\u3053\u3068\u3092\u793a\u3059 `n == NGX_AGAIN` \u3092\u8ffd\u52a0\u3057\u3001\u30eb\u30fc\u30d7\u5909\u6570\u3092\u4e00\u5ea6\u3082\u8aad\u307f\u66f8\u304d\u3057\u306a\u3044\u7d4c\u8def\u3067\u521d\u671f\u5024 NGX_AGAIN \u3092\u4fdd\u8a3c\u3059\u308b\u4fee\u6b63\u3002TLS 1.3 \u3067 SSL_read \u304c\u30c7\u30fc\u30bf\u306a\u3057\u3067\u623b\u308b\u30b1\u30fc\u30b9\u306b\u3088\u308b CPU 100% \u56fa\u5b9a\uff08\u8a8d\u8a3c\u4e0d\u8981 DoS\uff09\u3092\u6b62\u3081\u308b\u3002\u5358\u7d14\u3067\u5b8c\u5168\u306a\u4fee\u6b63\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n**alias \u3068 try_files \u306e\u30d0\u30c3\u30d5\u30a1\u30aa\u30fc\u30d0\u30fc\u30d5\u30ed\u30fc\uff08CVE-2026-125283\uff09**\uff1aalias \u5c55\u958b\u306e memmove \u304c\u65e7\u6765\u306e\u78ba\u4fdd\u9577\u3092\u4f7f\u3044\u3001\u5b9f\u8a55\u4fa1\u5f8c\u306e\u9577\u3055\u3068\u98df\u3044\u9055\u3046\u72b6\u614b\u3067\u30d1\u30b9\u3092\u518d\u69cb\u7bc9\u3059\u308b\u7d4c\u8def\u3092\u3001\u8a55\u4fa1\u7d50\u679c\u304b\u3089 `len` \u3092\u518d\u8a08\u7b97\u3057\u3066\u9589\u3058\u308b\u4fee\u6b63\u3002\u5f71\u97ff\u306f\u7279\u5b9a\u306e alias \u3068 try_files \u306e\u7d44\u5408\u305b\u306b\u9650\u3089\u308c\u3001\u6df1\u523b\u5ea6 minor \u3068\u8a55\u4fa1\u3055\u308c\u3066\u3044\u308b\u3002\n\n**stream \u306e SNI \u30d0\u30a4\u30d1\u30b9\uff08CVE-2026-120967\uff09**\uff1a\u8a3c\u660e\u66f8\u691c\u8a3c\u306b\u4f7f\u3046\u8a2d\u5b9a\u3092\u30c7\u30d5\u30a9\u30eb\u30c8\u30b5\u30fc\u30d0\u304b\u3089\u53d6\u5f97\u3057\u3066\u3044\u305f\u30d0\u30b0\u3092\u3001SNI \u3067\u9078\u629e\u3055\u308c\u305f\u4eee\u60f3\u30b5\u30fc\u30d0\u306e\u8a2d\u5b9a\u306b\u4fee\u6b63\u3002\u691c\u8a3c\u306a\u3057\u306e\u30c7\u30d5\u30a9\u30eb\u30c8\u30b5\u30fc\u30d0\u3092\u6301\u3064\u69cb\u6210\u3067\u3001\u4efb\u610f\u306e\u4eee\u60f3\u30b5\u30fc\u30d0\u3078\u306e\u63a5\u7d9a\u304c\u691c\u8a3c\u306a\u3057\u3067\u901a\u308b\u8a8d\u8a3c\u56de\u907f\u3092\u6b62\u3081\u308b\u3002\u4e00\u884c\u4fee\u6b63\u3067\u6a5f\u69cb\u7684\u306b\u5b8c\u5168\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n**PROXY protocol v2 \u306e NULL \u30c7\u30ea\u30d5\u30a1\u30ec\u30f3\u30b9\uff08CVE-2026-120993\uff09**\uff1a\u52d5\u7684\u8a3c\u660e\u66f8\u30ed\u30fc\u30c9\u69cb\u6210\u3067 `SSL_get_certificate()` \u304c NULL \u3092\u8fd4\u3059\u30b1\u30fc\u30b9\u306b NULL \u30c1\u30a7\u30c3\u30af\u3092\u8ffd\u52a0\u3002segmentation fault \u306e\u4e88\u9632\u4fee\u6b63\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n**ssl_preread \u306e\u691c\u8a3c\u4e0d\u8db3\uff08CVE-2026-123640\uff09**\uff1aClientHello \u306e\u89e3\u6790\u306b\u62e1\u5f35\u9577\u306e\u4e00\u81f4\u691c\u67fb\u3001SNI \u3068 ALPN \u306e\u91cd\u8907\u62d2\u5426\u3001SNI\u3001ALPN\u3001supported_versions \u306e\u5f62\u5f0f\u691c\u67fb\u3092\u8ffd\u52a0\u3002\u4ee5\u524d\u306f\u4ed6\u306e TLS \u5b9f\u88c5\u306a\u3089\u62d2\u5426\u3059\u308b\u4e0d\u6b63\u306a ClientHello \u3092 ssl_preread \u3060\u3051\u304c\u7de9\u304f\u89e3\u91c8\u3057\u3001SNI \u3084 ALPN \u3092\u7528\u3044\u305f\u30eb\u30fc\u30c6\u30a3\u30f3\u30b0\u5224\u65ad\u304c\u5b9f\u969b\u306e TLS \u30b9\u30bf\u30c3\u30af\u306e\u5224\u65ad\u3068\u98df\u3044\u9055\u3044\u3046\u308b\u3002\u4fee\u6b63\u306b\u3088\u308a\u89e3\u6790\u306e\u6319\u52d5\u304c\u53b3\u5bc6\u5074\u306b\u5bc4\u308b\u3002\n\n## \u6b8b\u5b58\u3059\u308b\u554f\u984c\n\n### 1.28 \u7cfb\u306e\u653e\u7f6e\n\n\u4fee\u6b63\u306f 1.31.9\uff08\u30e1\u30a4\u30f3\u30e9\u30a4\u30f3\uff09\u3068 1.30.7\uff08\u5b89\u5b9a\u7248\uff09\u306e\u307f\u3067\u884c\u308f\u308c\u3001\u524d\u5b89\u5b9a\u7248 1.28 \u7cfb\u306b\u306f\u79fb\u690d\u3055\u308c\u3066\u3044\u306a\u3044\u3002\u516c\u5f0f\u30a2\u30c9\u30d0\u30a4\u30b6\u30ea\u306e\u300cNot vulnerable: 1.31.9+, 1.30.7+\u300d\u3068\u3044\u3046\u8868\u8a18\u306f\u88cf\u8fd4\u305b\u3070\u30011.28 \u7cfb\u3092\u542b\u3080\u305d\u308c\u4ee5\u524d\u306e\u5168\u30d6\u30e9\u30f3\u30c1\u304c\u8106\u5f31\u306e\u307e\u307e\u3060\u3068\u3044\u3046\u610f\u5473\u3067\u3042\u308b\u30021.28 \u7cfb\u3067\u904b\u7528\u3059\u308b\u30b5\u30fc\u30d0\u306f\u3001\u30d6\u30e9\u30f3\u30c1\u306e\u4e57\u308a\u63db\u3048\u3092\u542b\u3081\u305f\u5bfe\u5fdc\u304c\u5fc5\u8981\u306b\u306a\u308b\u3002\u30c7\u30a3\u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30d3\u30e5\u30fc\u30b7\u30e7\u30f3\u30d1\u30c3\u30b1\u30fc\u30b8\u306e\u30d0\u30c3\u30af\u30dd\u30fc\u30c8\u304c\u5404\u30d9\u30f3\u30c0\u30fc\u3067\u307e\u3060\u6574\u3063\u3066\u3044\u306a\u3044\u6642\u70b9\u3067\u306e\u79fb\u884c\u306f\u3001\u5b9f\u8cea\u7684\u306b\u672c\u5bb6 1.30.7 \u3078\u306e\u30a2\u30c3\u30d7\u30b0\u30ec\u30fc\u30c9\u3092\u610f\u5473\u3059\u308b\u3002\n\n### 1.30.7 \u306e\u672a\u30d0\u30c3\u30af\u30dd\u30fc\u30c8\u9805\u76ee\n\n\u524d\u7bc0\u3067\u8ff0\u3079\u305f h2 \u30a2\u30ab\u30a6\u30f3\u30c6\u30a3\u30f3\u30b0\u4e0d\u6574\u5408\u306b\u52a0\u3048\u30011.31.9 \u306b\u542b\u307e\u308c\u308b\u30cf\u30fc\u30c9\u30cb\u30f3\u30b0\u306e\u3046\u3061\u6b21\u306e\u3082\u306e\u304c 1.30.7 \u306b\u5165\u3063\u3066\u3044\u306a\u3044\u3002\n\n- \u30ea\u30af\u30a8\u30b9\u30c8\u30d8\u30c3\u30c0\u884c\u306e\u30b3\u30ed\u30f3\u6b20\u843d\u62d2\u5426\uff08\u30ea\u30af\u30a8\u30b9\u30c8\u30b9\u30de\u30b0\u30ea\u30f3\u30b0\u7684\u89e3\u91c8\u306e\u4f59\u5730\u3092\u72ed\u3081\u308b\u5909\u66f4\uff09\n- chunked \u30dc\u30c7\u30a3\u306e\u30d5\u30ec\u30fc\u30df\u30f3\u30b0\u30aa\u30fc\u30d0\u30fc\u30d8\u30c3\u30c9\u691c\u51fa\uff08\u30da\u30a4\u30ed\u30fc\u30c9\u6bd4\u306e\u76e3\u8996\u3068\u540c\u578b\u306e\u4fdd\u8b77\u3092\u30ea\u30af\u30a8\u30b9\u30c8\u30dc\u30c7\u30a3\u306b\u9069\u7528\u3059\u308b\u3082\u306e\uff09\n\n\u3069\u3061\u3089\u3082\u300cChange\u300d\u533a\u5206\u3067\u914d\u4fe1\u3055\u308c\u3066\u304a\u308a\u3001\u30bb\u30ad\u30e5\u30ea\u30c6\u30a3\u4fee\u6b63\u3068\u3057\u3066\u306e\u30d0\u30c3\u30af\u30dd\u30fc\u30c8\u7fa9\u52d9\u304c\u751f\u3058\u3066\u3044\u306a\u3044\u53ef\u80fd\u6027\u304c\u9ad8\u3044\u3002\u305f\u3060\u3057\u653b\u6483\u9762\u306e\u524a\u6e1b\u3068\u3044\u3046\u610f\u5473\u3067\u306f\u5b89\u5b9a\u7248\u306b\u6b20\u3051\u3066\u3044\u308b\u3002\n\n### \u30ab\u30fc\u30cd\u30eb\u5074\u306e\u9023\u9396\u7d4c\u8def\n\nXint \u306f\u672c\u8106\u5f31\u6027\u306e worker \u6a29\u9650\u3067\u306e\u30b3\u30fc\u30c9\u5b9f\u884c\u306b\u52a0\u3048\u3001Linux \u30ab\u30fc\u30cd\u30eb\u306e SCTP \u5b9f\u88c5\u306b\u3042\u308b\u672a\u4fee\u6b63\u306e use-after-free\uff084.15 \u4ee5\u964d\u306b\u5b58\u5728\uff09\u3092\u9023\u9396\u3055\u305b\u3066\u30db\u30b9\u30c8 root \u3078\u5230\u9054\u3067\u304d\u305f\u3068\u5831\u544a\u3057\u3066\u3044\u308b\u3002\u30ab\u30fc\u30cd\u30eb\u4fee\u6b63\u306f\u307e\u3060\u5b58\u5728\u305b\u305a\u3001CVE \u3082\u4ed8\u4e0e\u3055\u308c\u3066\u3044\u306a\u3044\u3002nginx \u3092\u66f4\u65b0\u3057\u3066\u3082\u3001SCTP \u3092\u8aad\u307f\u8fbc\u3081\u308b\u30db\u30b9\u30c8\u3067\u306f root \u5230\u9054\u7d4c\u8def\u304c\u6b8b\u308b\u3002SCTP \u3092\u4f7f\u308f\u306a\u3044\u74b0\u5883\u3067\u306f `install sctp /bin/false` \u3092 modprobe \u8a2d\u5b9a\u306b\u7f6e\u304f\u3053\u3068\u304c\u73fe\u6642\u70b9\u306e\u552f\u4e00\u306e\u7de9\u548c\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n### \u30c7\u30a3\u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u30d3\u30e5\u30fc\u30b7\u30e7\u30f3\u3078\n\n\u516c\u8868\u6642\u70b9\u3067 Red Hat\u3001Ubuntu\u3001Debian\u3001SUSE\u3001Alpine \u306e\u3044\u305a\u308c\u3082 CVE-2026-123007 \u306e\u30ec\u30b3\u30fc\u30c9\u3092\u516c\u958b\u3057\u3066\u3044\u306a\u304b\u3063\u305f\u3002\u30c7\u30a3\u30b9\u30c8\u30ea\u306e\u30d1\u30c3\u30b1\u30fc\u30b8\u306f `nginx -v` \u306e\u8868\u793a\u304c\u65e7\u30d0\u30fc\u30b8\u30e7\u30f3\u306e\u307e\u307e\u6b8b\u308b\u5834\u5408\u304c\u3042\u308a\u3001\u9069\u7528\u78ba\u8a8d\u306f\u30d1\u30c3\u30b1\u30fc\u30b8\u306e\u5b8c\u5168\u306a\u30d0\u30fc\u30b8\u30e7\u30f3\u3068\u5404\u30d9\u30f3\u30c0\u30fc\u306e\u30a2\u30c9\u30d0\u30a4\u30b6\u30ea\u3067\u884c\u3046\u5fc5\u8981\u304c\u3042\u308b\u3002`nginx -s reload` \u306f\u65b0\u3057\u3044\u30d0\u30a4\u30ca\u30ea\u3092\u8aad\u307f\u8fbc\u307e\u306a\u3044\u305f\u3081\u3001\u30d1\u30c3\u30c1\u9069\u7528\u306b\u306f\u518d\u8d77\u52d5\u304c\u8981\u308b\u3002\n\n### ssl_preread \u306e\u6319\u52d5\u5909\u66f4\n\n\u53b3\u5bc6\u5316\u306b\u3088\u308a\u3001\u4ee5\u524d\u306f\u89e3\u91c8\u3055\u308c\u3066\u3044\u305f ClientHello \u304c NGX_DECLINED\uff08\u5909\u6570\u672a\u8a2d\u5b9a\uff09\u306b\u306a\u308b\u3002SNI \u3084 ALPN \u306e\u5024\u306b\u57fa\u3065\u304f\u30eb\u30fc\u30c6\u30a3\u30f3\u30b0\u3084\u30a2\u30af\u30bb\u30b9\u5236\u5fa1\u3092 ssl_preread \u3067\u7d44\u3093\u3067\u3044\u308b\u69cb\u6210\u3067\u306f\u3001\u3053\u308c\u307e\u3067\u901a\u3063\u3066\u3044\u305f\u63a5\u7d9a\u306e\u632f\u308a\u5206\u3051\u304c\u5909\u308f\u308b\u53ef\u80fd\u6027\u304c\u3042\u308b\u3002\u30af\u30e9\u30c3\u30b7\u30e5\u3084\u30e1\u30e2\u30ea\u7834\u58ca\u3067\u306f\u306a\u304f\u632f\u308b\u821e\u3044\u306e\u5909\u5316\u3060\u304c\u3001\u30a2\u30c3\u30d7\u30b0\u30ec\u30fc\u30c9\u6642\u306e\u691c\u8a3c\u9805\u76ee\u3068\u3057\u3066\u660e\u793a\u3057\u3066\u304a\u304f\u4fa1\u5024\u304c\u3042\u308b\u3002\n\n## \u7d50\u8ad6\n\nCVE-2026-123007 \u306e\u653b\u6483\u7d4c\u8def\u306f\u3001\u30e9\u30dc\u3067\u56db\u6bb5\u968e\u306b\u308f\u305f\u3063\u3066\u518d\u73fe\u3067\u304d\u3001\u6700\u7d42\u7684\u306b worker \u30d7\u30ed\u30bb\u30b9\u306e\u7bc4\u56f2\u5916\u30e1\u30e2\u30ea\u30a2\u30af\u30bb\u30b9\u3068\u3057\u3066\u89b3\u6e2c\u3055\u308c\u305f\u3002\u305d\u306e\u5404\u6bb5\u968e\u306f\u3001\u516c\u958b\u3055\u308c\u305f\u6280\u8853\u89e3\u6790\u3068\u5dee\u5206\u304b\u3089\u5c0e\u3044\u305f\u624b\u9806\u3068\u4e00\u81f4\u3059\u308b\u30021.31.9 \u306e\u4fee\u6b63\u306f\u4e0d\u5909\u6761\u4ef6\u3092\u5165\u53e3\u3067\u5f37\u5236\u3059\u308b\u69cb\u9020\u5909\u66f4\u3067\u3042\u308a\u3001\u5b9f\u9a13\u3068\u7406\u8ad6\u306e\u4e21\u9762\u3067\u76ee\u7684\u3092\u9054\u6210\u3057\u3001\u6b63\u5f53\u306a\u30af\u30e9\u30a4\u30a2\u30f3\u30c8\u3092\u8aa4\u50b7\u3057\u306a\u3044\u3002\u4fee\u6b63\u5f8c\u306e\u30b3\u30fc\u30c9\u306b\u540c\u578b\u306e\u672a\u4fee\u6b63\u30d1\u30bf\u30fc\u30f3\u306f\u898b\u3064\u304b\u3089\u306a\u304b\u3063\u305f\u3002\n\n\u4e00\u65b9\u3067\u3001\u8a55\u4fa1\u306e\u7d50\u679c\u3068\u3057\u3066\u4e09\u3064\u306e\u7559\u4fdd\u304c\u6b8b\u308b\u3002\u5b89\u5b9a\u7248 1.30.7 \u306e\u30d0\u30c3\u30af\u30dd\u30fc\u30c8\u306f\u4e2d\u6838\u691c\u67fb\u3068\u3057\u3066\u306f\u6709\u52b9\u3060\u304c h2 \u30a2\u30ab\u30a6\u30f3\u30c6\u30a3\u30f3\u30b0\u306e\u6574\u5408\u6027\u3067\u672c\u5bb6\u3088\u308a\u5f31\u304f\u3001\u8ffd\u9069\u7528\u306e\u4f59\u5730\u304c\u3042\u308b\u30021.28 \u7cfb\u306f\u4fee\u6b63\u3055\u308c\u305a\u3001\u5bfe\u5fdc\u306b\u306f\u30d6\u30e9\u30f3\u30c1\u79fb\u884c\u304c\u5fc5\u8981\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002nginx \u306e\u5916\u5074\u306b\u306f\u3001\u672c\u8106\u5f31\u6027\u3068\u9023\u9396\u3057\u3066 root \u6a29\u9650\u306b\u81f3\u308b\u672a\u4fee\u6b63\u306e\u30ab\u30fc\u30cd\u30eb\u8106\u5f31\u6027\u304c\u5b58\u5728\u3057\u3001SCTP \u3092\u7121\u52b9\u5316\u3057\u306a\u3044\u9650\u308a\u5b8c\u5168\u306a\u7de9\u548c\u306b\u306a\u3089\u306a\u3044\u3002\n\n\u653b\u6483\u306e\u5fc5\u8981\u30c8\u30e9\u30d5\u30a3\u30c3\u30af\u304c\u7d04 56 GB \u3068\u5927\u304d\u304f\u3001\u304b\u3064\u7279\u5b9a\u306e memcpy \u5b9f\u88c5\u3078\u306e\u4f9d\u5b58\u304c\u3042\u308b\u3068\u306f\u3044\u3048\u3001\u8a8d\u8a3c\u4e0d\u8981\u3067 HTTP/2 \u6709\u52b9\u306a\u30b5\u30fc\u30d0\u5168\u4f53\u304c\u5bfe\u8c61\u306b\u306a\u308a\u3046\u308b\u70b9\u306f\u5909\u308f\u3089\u306a\u3044\u3002\u66f4\u65b0\u3068\u518d\u8d77\u52d5\u3092\u5373\u6642\u306b\u884c\u3044\u3001\u66f4\u65b0\u307e\u3067\u306e\u9593\u306f `http2 off;` \u306b\u3088\u308b\u7de9\u548c\u304c\u59a5\u5f53\u3067\u3042\u308b\u3002\n", "url": "https://gist.github.com/nharu-0630/df00453f6315582b5fc9ea522fe62729"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T18:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T18:00:00.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://www.hkcert.org/security-bulletin/nginx-multiple-vulnerabilities_20261119", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "0df72519-2253-41d3-b4c5-f4327c861fc4", "url": "https://www.hkcert.org/security-bulletin/nginx-multiple-vulnerabilities_20261119"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T18:32:02Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T18:32:02Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-CGQQ-HX2V-PF8C", "record": "GHSA-CGQQ-HX2V-PF8C", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T18:32:02Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T18:32:02Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-CGQQ-HX2V-PF8C", "record": "GHSA-CGQQ-HX2V-PF8C", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T20:32:32Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T20:32:32Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "osv_dhi \u00b7 DHI-75ZW-B2U3-J56T-B2HZ", "record": "DHI-75ZW-B2U3-J56T-B2HZ", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T21:18:54Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T21:18:54.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://gist.github.com/cyberheartmi9/778d6ef6e7edd77d72e41a63fc87068f", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "5b971004-2c5e-4a71-8862-363cfce20142", "content": "# CVE-2026-123007 \u2014 NGINX HTTP/2 Flow-Control Integer Underflow Leading to Remote Code Execution\n\n**Full Technical Report**\n\n| Item | Value |\n|---|---|\n| Report date | 19 November 2026 |\n| CVE | CVE-2026-123007 |\n| Affected component | NGINX `ngx_http_v2_module` (HTTP/2) |\n| Vendor | F5 / NGINX |\n| Severity | **Critical** \u2014 CVSS 4.0: 9.2; CVSS 3.1: 8.1 |\n| Weakness | CWE-191 (Integer Underflow), CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write) |\n| Impact | Worker-process memory corruption, DoS, memory disclosure, potential unauthenticated RCE |\n| Fixed versions | NGINX OSS 1.30.7 / 1.31.9; NGINX Plus 37.0.8.1 / 37.3.0.1 |\n| Public exploit | Yes \u2014 Rapid7 PoC and full exploit |\n| Known ITW exploitation | None confirmed as of 18 November 2026 |\n| Report classification | Public / TLP:CLEAR |\n\n&gt; **Scope and method.** This report is an independent synthesis of public vendor advisories, upstream NGINX source and patch data, and technical publications by Rapid7, Wiz, Xint, JFrog, Red Hat, SUSE and Ubuntu. No live target was tested for this report. Code excerpts are reproduced for analysis; line numbers and surrounding context may differ between NGINX branches. All claims about exploit behavior are attributed to the researchers who demonstrated them.\n\n---\n\n## Table of Contents\n\n1. [Executive Summary](#1-executive-summary)\n2. [Vulnerability Identification](#2-vulnerability-identification)\n3. [Affected Products, Versions and Exposure](#3-affected-products-versions-and-exposure)\n4. [Background: HTTP/2 Flow Control in NGINX](#4-background-http2-flow-control-in-nginx)\n5. [Root Cause Analysis](#5-root-cause-analysis)\n6. [Trigger Sequences and Traffic Cost](#6-trigger-sequences-and-traffic-cost)\n7. [Exploitability Assessment](#7-exploitability-assessment)\n8. [Patch Analysis](#8-patch-analysis)\n9. [Detection and Hunting](#9-detection-and-hunting)\n10. [Remediation and Mitigation](#10-remediation-and-mitigation)\n11. [Timeline](#11-timeline)\n12. [References](#12-references)\n- [Appendix A \u2014 Code Path Map](#appendix-a--code-path-map)\n- [Appendix B \u2014 Upstream Patch](#appendix-b--upstream-patch)\n- [Appendix C \u2014 CVSS Vectors and Glossary](#appendix-c--cvss-vectors-and-glossary)\n- [Appendix D \u2014 Assessment Confidence](#appendix-d--assessment-confidence)\n\n---\n\n## 1. Executive Summary\n\nCVE-2026-123007 is a critical memory-safety vulnerability in NGINX's HTTP/2 implementation. A remote, unauthenticated client can push the connection-level HTTP/2 send window above its protocol-defined maximum of `2^31 - 1` bytes, bypass the `WINDOW_UPDATE` validation through an unsigned integer underflow, and cause NGINX to perform a memory copy with an attacker-influenced, effectively huge length in the TLS output path. The result ranges from a worker-process crash (denial of service) to memory disclosure and, under specific conditions, remote code execution with the privileges of the NGINX worker process.\n\nThe defect was introduced with NGINX's first HTTP/2 implementation in **1.9.5 (2015)** and was present in every release through **1.31.8**. F5 fixed it in **NGINX Open Source 1.30.7 (stable)** and **1.31.9 (mainline)**, and in **NGINX Plus 37.0.8.1** and **37.3.0.1**, released on **18 November 2026**.\n\n### 1.1 Key findings\n\n1. **The primary defect is an unchecked flow-control refund.** When NGINX queues response DATA it reserves connection-level credit by subtracting the frame length from `h2c-&gt;send_window`. If the stream is then terminated while the DATA is still queued, `ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup()` adds the reserved credit back with `h2c-&gt;send_window += window;` and does not check whether the result exceeds `NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW` (`0x7fffffff`).\n2. **The refund can double-count credit.** A client can grant connection-level credit while DATA is queued, then cause the stream to be reset. The cleanup refund is added on top of the already-restored credit, leaving `send_window` above the protocol maximum.\n3. **The next validation underflows.** `ngx_http_v2_state_window_update()` computes the remaining allowance as `NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - h2c-&gt;send_window` using unsigned `size_t` arithmetic. Once `send_window &gt; MAX`, the subtraction wraps to a value near `2^64`, so further `WINDOW_UPDATE` frames are accepted and the counter can be driven to an arbitrary 64-bit value.\n4. **The oversized counter becomes a negative length.** `ngx_http_v2_send_chain()` converts the unsigned counter to signed `off_t`. A value at or above `2^63` becomes negative; the output filter builds an `ngx_buf_t` whose `last` pointer precedes its `pos` pointer, and the TLS staging path computes a negative `ssize_t` length. That length is passed to `memcpy()`, where it is converted back to a huge `size_t`.\n5. **The oversized copy can return instead of faulting.** In the tested x86-64 glibc `memcpy`/`memmove` implementation (EVEX/YMM, selected when AVX-512F and AVX-512VL are available), the backward-copy loop computes its end address modulo `2^64`. For a length of `2^64 - d`, the address wraps below the start, so the loop performs only a small, bounded set of out-of-bounds accesses. This yields a constrained OOB read and OOB write rather than an immediate crash.\n6. **The OOB primitives are sufficient for RCE in a favorable layout.** The OOB read can disclose heap and library pointers, defeating ASLR. The OOB write can corrupt adjacent heap metadata and, ultimately, a callback pointer. Rapid7's public PoC recovers glibc addresses, resolves `system()`, redirects a request-pool cleanup callback and executes a command as the worker.\n7. **Exploitation is constrained but confirmed.** The public exploit requires roughly **119 GiB of HTTP/2 plaintext** (about **128 GB** on the wire), a 64-bit target, a network path capable of finishing within NGINX's one-hour connection lifetime (about 300 Mbit/s minimum for the demonstrated route), no intermediary that normalizes or retransmits the crafted frame sequence, and \u2014 for the known strategy \u2014 a specific glibc copy routine on an AVX-512-capable CPU. Rapid7 demonstrated RCE against NGINX 1.31.8 in a Docker container serving static files over HTTPS; Xint demonstrated exploitation across AWS, GCP and Azure, including over public IP addresses and under concurrent traffic.\n8. **A public PoC exists.** Rapid7 published a minimal trigger and a full exploit on GitHub on disclosure day. No in-the-wild exploitation had been confirmed as of the CVE record's last update (18 November 2026, 20:13 UTC). CISA's SSVC assessment is **Exploitation: none, Automatable: no, Technical Impact: total**; the CVE was not present in the 2026.11.18 CISA KEV catalog.\n\n### 1.2 Root cause statement\n\n&gt; NGINX reserves connection-level HTTP/2 flow-control credit when it queues response DATA, but returns that credit in `ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup()` without accounting for credit the peer granted in the interim and without enforcing the `2^31 - 1` ceiling. The resulting out-of-range `size_t` violates an invariant assumed by the `WINDOW_UPDATE` validator, whose unsigned subtraction underflows. The corrupted counter is later reinterpreted as a signed response length, producing an inverted buffer and an out-of-bounds `memcpy`.\n\n### 1.3 Immediate actions\n\n- **Patch internet-facing NGINX servers with HTTP/2 enabled first**: upgrade to **1.31.9**, **1.30.7**, **NGINX Plus 37.3.0.1**, or **37.0.8.1** as applicable.\n- **Restart**, do not merely reload. Long-lived HTTP/2 connections remain on old worker processes after a reload; confirm the old workers have exited.\n- If immediate patching is impossible, **disable HTTP/2** on affected listeners (set `http2 off;` in NGINX 1.25.1+ and remove the `http2` parameter from `listen` directives), reload, and restart or otherwise drain old workers.\n- Treat the vulnerability as **remotely reachable without authentication** wherever HTTP/2 is exposed directly to untrusted networks. Do not assume a CDN or WAF protects the origin unless the origin is unreachable except through a proxy that normalizes HTTP/2.\n\n---\n\n## 2. Vulnerability Identification\n\n### 2.1 Core record\n\n| Field | Value |\n|---|---|\n| CVE ID | CVE-2026-123007 |\n| CNA / assigner | F5 Networks |\n| Published | 18 November 2026, 15:23:29 UTC (`datePublished`) |\n| Public disclosure | 18 November 2026, 15:00:00 UTC (`datePublic`) |\n| CVE reserved | 9 November 2026, 18:42:53 UTC |\n| Last CVE record update | 18 November 2026, 20:13:04 UTC |\n| Affected module | `ngx_http_v2_module` |\n| Product | NGINX Open Source, NGINX Plus |\n| Weaknesses | CWE-191 (Integer Underflow or Wraparound), CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write) |\n| CVSS 4.0 | **9.2 Critical** \u2014 `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` |\n| CVSS 3.1 | **8.1 High** \u2014 `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` |\n| CISA SSVC (ADP) | Exploitation: **none** \u00b7 Automatable: **no** \u00b7 Technical Impact: **total** |\n| KEV status | Not listed in the 2026.11.18 KEV catalog |\n| Public exploit | Yes (Rapid7) |\n| Vendor workaround | F5 CVE record lists no workaround; disabling HTTP/2 is the practical mitigation |\n\n### 2.2 Description\n\nThe authoritative F5 description states:\n\n&gt; \"This issue affects NGINX Plus or NGINX Open Source configurations that use HTTP/2. When NGINX processes undisclosed traffic, the flow control window can exceed the allowed threshold, potentially resulting in a heap buffer overflow typically followed by an NGINX worker segmentation fault. Additionally, attackers can execute code on systems with Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) disabled or when the attacker can bypass ASLR. Impact: An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to crash the NGINX worker process, corrupt its memory, or potentially execute code remotely. There is no control plane exposure; this is a data plane issue only.\"\n\nThe F5 wording is conservative. Public research demonstrates that ASLR is **not** a durable barrier to the confirmed exploit: the memory-corruption primitive includes an out-of-bounds read that leaks pointers, which is used to defeat ASLR before the overwrite.\n\n### 2.3 Scoring interpretation\n\nThe CVSS 4.0 vector is consistent with a network-reachable, unauthenticated, no-interaction vulnerability with high confidentiality, integrity and availability impact. The **High Attack Complexity** reflects the operational and exploitation constraints: the need for substantial traffic, precise frame ordering, transport backpressure, a 64-bit target, a specific heap layout and (for the known strategy) a particular glibc copy routine and CPU feature set. The CVSS 3.1 score is lower primarily because the 3.1 formula does not capture the same attack-requirement nuance; both scores classify the issue as severe.\n\n### 2.4 Credits and independent discovery\n\nThe CVE record credits multiple independent reporters:\n\n- **Stephen Fewer**, Senior Principal Security Researcher, Rapid7.\n- **Tomer Schwartz**, Wiz Research.\n- **Xint.io** (the upstream patch commit credits Xint.io; the NGINX changelog thanks Xint.io).\n- **Ikotas Labs, Inc.** (credited as `@ikotas00 using GPT-6 Astra`).\n\nThe NGINX 1.31.9 changelog entry reads:\n\n&gt; \"Security: a flow control window overflow in HTTP/2 might allow an attacker to cause a segmentation fault in a worker process, or might have potential other impact (CVE-2026-123007). Thanks to Xint.io.\"\n\nWiz, Rapid7, Xint, Ikotas Labs and Metnir independently discovered or validated aspects of the issue, according to the public disclosures.\n\n---\n\n## 3. Affected Products, Versions and Exposure\n\n### 3.1 Version matrix\n\n| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |\n|---|---|---|\n| NGINX Open Source (mainline) | 1.31.0 \u2013 1.31.8 | **1.31.9** |\n| NGINX Open Source (stable and older) | 1.9.5 \u2013 1.30.6 | **1.30.7** (upgrade path for older branches) |\n| NGINX Plus (37.1.x / 37.2.x) | 37.1.0 \u2013 37.2.0.1 | **37.3.0.1** |\n| NGINX Plus (37.0.x) | 37.0.0 \u2013 37.0.7.1 | **37.0.8.1** |\n| NGINX Plus (R33 \u2013 R36) | R33 and later; R34 \u2013 R36 listed with no fix | **No fixed build listed** \u2014 upgrade to a fixed 37.x release or disable HTTP/2 |\n\nNotes:\n\n- F5's CVE record expresses the Open Source ranges as `1.9.5 &lt; *`, `1.30.0 &lt; 1.30.7`, and `1.31.0 &lt; 1.31.9`. In practical terms, every official release from 1.9.5 through 1.31.8 contains the vulnerable code.\n- Distribution packages may backport the fix without changing the `nginx -v` version string. Compare the **full package version** (for example, `1.18.0-6ubuntu14.x`) against the distribution's security advisory, not just the upstream version.\n- The NGINX 1.31.9 release also fixed multiple other vulnerabilities, including CVE-2026-123633 (HTTP/2 use-after-free), CVE-2026-123634 (resolver use-after-free), CVE-2026-121810 (HTTP/3 use-after-free), CVE-2026-113425 (mail proxy use-after-free), CVE-2026-118899, CVE-2026-125283 and others. Upgrading to 1.31.9 addresses all of them.\n\n### 3.2 Configuration prerequisites\n\nA deployment is exposed to CVE-2026-123007 only if **all** of the following are true:\n\n1. **HTTP/2 is enabled** on a listener or server block, for example:\n   - NGINX 1.25.1 and later: `http2 on;` in the `server` block, or\n   - older configurations: `listen 443 ssl http2;`.\n2. The binary was built with `--with-http_v2_module` (the official packages and Docker images normally include it).\n3. The attacker can reach the HTTP/2 endpoint, directly or through a proxy that forwards the crafted HTTP/2 frames without normalizing them.\n4. For the **confirmed RCE strategy**: the target is a 64-bit build (Rapid7 tested `linux/amd64`), the C library selects the affected optimized copy routine, and the CPU exposes the required features (AVX-512F and AVX-512VL for the EVEX/YMM path).\n5. The attacker can generate sufficient response data and hold it queued (transport backpressure), and can sustain enough bandwidth for the amplification phase within the connection lifetime.\n\nThe vulnerability is in the HTTP/2 data plane. It does **not** require a vulnerable application, a backend/upstream, a specific `location`, or third-party modules. Rapid7 demonstrated exploitation against NGINX serving **ordinary static files**; Wiz independently demonstrated code execution in the same static-file scenario over HTTPS on a 64-bit system.\n\n### 3.3 What is not affected\n\n- **HTTP/1.1-only deployments**: if HTTP/2 is not enabled and the HTTP/2 module is not serving traffic, the vulnerable code path is not reachable.\n- **Builds without `ngx_http_v2_module`**.\n- **F5 BIG-IP and F5OS**: F5 reportedly found these products not vulnerable; F5 cloud services were still being evaluated at disclosure. The CVE is specific to NGINX Open Source / NGINX Plus HTTP/2 processing.\n- **Control plane**: F5 states there is no control-plane exposure; this is a data-plane issue.\n- **Clients**: the vulnerability is in the NGINX HTTP/2 **server** implementation. An HTTP/2 client is not the vulnerable party in this CVE.\n\n### 3.4 Exposure considerations\n\nXint's Shodan snapshot (10 November 2026) found approximately **56.7 million** hosts matching `product:nginx`, of which **11.94 million** reported an identifiable version. Among those with an identifiable version, **98.9%** fell within the affected 1.9.5 \u2013 1.31.8 range. These figures are **not** a vulnerability count: they do not confirm that HTTP/2 is enabled, that the host is directly reachable, or that a distribution has not backported the fix. They do illustrate the potential scale of the affected install base.\n\nThe highest-risk deployments are:\n\n- Internet-facing NGINX instances that terminate HTTP/2 directly, especially self-hosted web servers, load balancers, ingress controllers and appliances.\n- Reverse proxies and API gateways with HTTP/2 enabled on the client side.\n- Containerized NGINX deployments built from older base images, including OpenResty and Kubernetes ingress controllers that bundle NGINX.\n- NGINX Plus R33 \u2013 R36 installations for which no fixed build is listed.\n\nA CDN or WAF that terminates HTTP/2 in front of NGINX can reduce exposure, because the origin may receive HTTP/1.1 or normalized HTTP/2. It is not a guarantee: the origin must be unreachable directly, and the intermediary must not preserve the exact attacker-controlled frame sequence. Rapid7 notes that proxied HTTP/2 connections will likely not retransmit the precise frames required for the exploit.\n\n### 3.5 Related vulnerabilities and the \"nginx2root\" context\n\nCVE-2026-123007 was disclosed alongside **CVE-2026-123633**, a use-after-free in HTTP/2 connection handling that requires reverse-proxy processing and low free connection slots. Both were fixed in the same 1.31.9 / 1.30.7 / NGINX Plus releases. Xint's \"nginx2root\" disclosure groups five NGINX vulnerabilities plus a separate Linux kernel SCTP local privilege escalation; CVE-2026-123007 is the most impactful of the NGINX set because it requires only HTTP/2 and can be exploited against a static-file server.\n\nThe kernel SCTP flaw is **not** part of CVE-2026-123007. Xint used it after obtaining worker-level code execution to escalate to root and, in their tests, escape a Docker container. CVE-2026-123007 itself yields code execution with the **NGINX worker's** privileges, not root.\n\n---\n\n## 4. Background: HTTP/2 Flow Control in NGINX\n\n### 4.1 HTTP/2 flow control in one page\n\nHTTP/2 multiplexes multiple request/response exchanges (\"streams\") over one TCP/TLS connection. Response body bytes are carried in `DATA` frames. Flow control prevents a sender from overwhelming a receiver:\n\n- Each stream has a **stream send window**.\n- The connection has a **connection send window** shared by all streams.\n- Sending `DATA` requires credit in **both** windows.\n- The receiver grants more credit with a `WINDOW_UPDATE` frame:\n  - Stream ID `0` increases the **connection** window.\n  - A nonzero Stream ID increases that **stream's** window.\n- The initial window is `65,535` bytes; the maximum window is `2^31 - 1` bytes (`0x7fffffff`), referred to here as **MAX**.\n- `SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE` changes the initial window for new streams. When it changes, the sender must adjust every active stream's window by the difference (`delta`) between the old and new values. The connection window is not directly changed by this setting, and it has no equivalent \"negative window\" state.\n- RFC 9113 \u00a76.9 requires a `FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR` when a window exceeds the maximum. In particular, if a `SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE` change causes an active stream's window to exceed MAX, the **connection** must be terminated with `FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR`.\n\nA crucial accounting distinction: the sender's `send_window` is not merely \"bytes not yet written to the socket.\" NGINX reserves credit when it **queues** a DATA frame, before the bytes are actually encrypted and written. From the receiver's point of view, those queued bytes are still outstanding and still consume window credit.\n\n### 4.2 NGINX data structures\n\nThe vulnerable state is in `src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h`:\n\n```c\n#define NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW  ((1U &lt;&lt; 31) - 1)\n\nstruct ngx_http_v2_connection_s {\n    /* ... */\n    size_t   send_window;      /* unsigned 64-bit on the tested build */\n    /* ... */\n};\n\nstruct ngx_http_v2_stream_s {\n    /* ... */\n    ssize_t  send_window;      /* signed 64-bit; may go negative */\n    /* ... */\n};\n```\n\nThe connection counter is `size_t` (unsigned). The stream counter is `ssize_t` (signed), because `SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE` reductions can legitimately make a stream's credit negative until the peer grants more. The asymmetry matters later: the connection counter can hold values above MAX, and an oversized value is eventually converted to a signed `off_t`.\n\n### 4.3 The connection-window invariant\n\nFor correct HTTP/2 behavior, the following must hold at all times:\n\n```text\nsend_window + send_queued  &lt;=  NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW\n```\n\nwhere `send_queued` is the total length of DATA frames that have been queued but not yet fully written to the transport. Before the fix, NGINX did not maintain `send_queued` at all. Its validation effectively assumed:\n\n```text\nsend_window  &lt;=  NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW\n```\n\nand used `send_window` alone as the measure of remaining credit. That assumption is false while DATA is queued: the queued bytes have already been subtracted from `send_window`, but they are still outstanding from the peer's perspective. The peer can therefore grant credit for bytes that NGINX has already reserved, and a later refund can push the counter above MAX.\n\n---\n\n## 5. Root Cause Analysis\n\n### 5.1 Causal chain at a glance\n\n```text\n[1] Client causes response DATA to be queued while transport is backpressured.\n    NGINX subtracts the DATA length from h2c-&gt;send_window (credit reserved).\n\n[2] Client sends a connection WINDOW_UPDATE that restores the connection\n    window to MAX (or raises it while DATA is still queued).\n\n[3] Client causes the owning stream(s) to terminate (RST_STREAM, or a\n    SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE increase that NGINX handles by resetting\n    only the stream). Request cleanup removes the unstarted DATA and refunds\n    its length with an unchecked h2c-&gt;send_window += window.\n\n[4] h2c-&gt;send_window is now &gt; MAX. The connection-window invariant is broken.\n\n[5] The next connection WINDOW_UPDATE evaluates\n        window &gt; MAX - h2c-&gt;send_window\n    in unsigned size_t arithmetic. Because send_window &gt; MAX, the right side\n    underflows to a value near 2^64, so the guard accepts increments that\n    should be rejected.\n\n[6] Repeated WINDOW_UPDATE frames drive h2c-&gt;send_window to 2^64 - d\n    (or at least into the signed-negative range).\n\n[7] ngx_http_v2_send_chain() converts the counter to off_t -&gt; -d.\n    The output filter creates an ngx_buf_t with last = pos - d.\n\n[8] The TLS staging path computes size = last - pos = -d (ssize_t) and calls\n    memcpy(..., size). The argument is converted to size_t = 2^64 - d.\n\n[9] The optimized glibc copy routine wraps the end address, performing a\n    bounded OOB read and OOB write instead of traversing 2^64 bytes.\n\n[10] OOB read leaks pointers (ASLR bypass); OOB write corrupts heap metadata\n     and can redirect a callback -&gt; code execution as the NGINX worker.\n```\n\n### 5.2 Stage 1 \u2014 reserving credit for queued DATA\n\nWhen NGINX sends a response body over HTTP/2, `ngx_http_v2_send_chain()` builds DATA frames and queues them. The relevant code is:\n\n```c\n/* src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c\n * ngx_http_v2_send_chain()\n */\nngx_http_v2_queue_frame(h2c, frame);\n\nh2c-&gt;send_window -= frame_size;\nstream-&gt;send_window -= frame_size;\nstream-&gt;queued++;\n```\n\nThe subtraction is a **reservation**. It prevents two streams from spending the same connection credit before the bytes reach the wire. If the transport is backpressured \u2014 for example, because the client stops reading and the TLS/TCP send buffers fill \u2014 the frame remains in `h2c-&gt;frames` with `frame-&gt;blocked == 0` and has not started transmission.\n\nAn attacker can create this state deliberately:\n\n- Stop reading server output to create TCP/TLS backpressure.\n- Use stream-level `WINDOW_UPDATE` frames to grant exactly enough credit for selected response bodies.\n- Keep the connection-level window low enough that the DATA cannot all be sent, while still allowing the frames to be queued.\n- Continue sending control frames in the client-to-server direction; stopping reads does not stop the client from writing.\n\n### 5.3 Stage 2 \u2014 the unchecked refund (root cause)\n\nWhen a request is cleaned up, `ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup()` walks the connection's frame queue, removes the terminating stream's unstarted frames, totals their lengths, and returns that credit:\n\n```c\n/* src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c\n * ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup()\n */\nfor ( ;; ) {\n    frame = *fn;\n    if (frame == NULL) {\n        break;\n    }\n    if (frame-&gt;stream == stream &amp;&amp; !frame-&gt;blocked) {\n        *fn = frame-&gt;next;\n        window += frame-&gt;length;\n        if (--stream-&gt;queued == 0) {\n            break;\n        }\n        continue;\n    }\n    fn = &amp;frame-&gt;next;\n}\n/* ... */\nh2c-&gt;send_window += window;   /* &lt;-- no MAX check */\n```\n\nThe addition at the end is the root cause. It is correct to return credit for DATA that was never sent, but it is **not** correct to return it without accounting for credit the peer granted in the meantime. The connection may already have been restored to MAX by a `WINDOW_UPDATE`; adding the reserved bytes again pushes it past MAX.\n\nA minimal arithmetic example:\n\n```text\nInitial connection window (after client grants credit):   MAX          = 2,147,483,647\nQueue a 1,393-byte DATA frame:                             MAX - 1,393  = 2,147,482,254\nClient sends WINDOW_UPDATE(0, 1,393):                      MAX          = 2,147,483,647\n   (accepted because 1,393 &lt;= MAX - (MAX - 1,393) = 1,393)\nStream terminated; cleanup refunds 1,393:                  MAX + 1,393  = 2,147,485,040\n```\n\n`2,147,485,040` is `0x80000570`: above the HTTP/2 maximum, but still far below `2^64`. The addition itself has not wrapped; the protocol invariant is simply broken.\n\n#### Two ways to trigger cleanup\n\nThe cleanup path runs whenever a stream with queued DATA is terminated. Public research demonstrates two variants:\n\n- **Client-initiated reset (Xint):** the client sends `RST_STREAM` for streams whose DATA is still queued. Cleanup removes the frames and refunds the credit.\n- **Server-initiated reset via SETTINGS (Rapid7):** the client raises selected stream windows to just below MAX, then sends `SETTINGS` with a larger `SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE`. The `delta` pushes those stream windows over MAX; NGINX terminates the affected streams (instead of terminating the connection, as RFC 9113 requires) and continues processing the connection.\n\nBoth variants reach the same unchecked refund. The SETTINGS variant is described next because it also illustrates an independent protocol-handling weakness.\n\n### 5.4 Stage 3 \u2014 a stream-level flow-control error leaves the connection alive\n\nWhen `SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE` changes, NGINX adjusts every active stream by `delta` in `ngx_http_v2_adjust_windows()`:\n\n```c\n/* src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c\n * ngx_http_v2_adjust_windows()\n */\nif (delta &gt; 0\n    &amp;&amp; stream-&gt;send_window\n          &gt; (ssize_t) (NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - delta))\n{\n    if (ngx_http_v2_terminate_stream(h2c, stream,\n                                     NGX_HTTP_V2_FLOW_CTRL_ERROR)\n        == NGX_ERROR)\n    {\n        return NGX_ERROR;\n    }\n    continue;   /* &lt;-- connection remains usable */\n}\n```\n\nRFC 9113 \u00a76.9.2 requires the **connection** to be terminated with `FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR` if a `SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE` change causes a stream window to exceed the maximum. NGINX instead calls `ngx_http_v2_terminate_stream()`, which sends `RST_STREAM` for that stream and lets the loop continue on the same connection.\n\nThat behavior gives the attacker a server-initiated stream termination while preserving the connection state that holds the over-credited `h2c-&gt;send_window`. It is an enabler for the Rapid7 trigger, but it is not the primary defect: the Xint trigger uses a client `RST_STREAM` and reaches the same accounting error. The upstream patch does not change this SETTINGS behavior; it removes the possibility of over-credit, which is the exploitable precondition.\n\n### 5.5 Stage 4 \u2014 unsigned underflow in the WINDOW_UPDATE guard\n\nWith `h2c-&gt;send_window` above MAX, the next connection-level `WINDOW_UPDATE` is validated here:\n\n```c\n/* src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c\n * ngx_http_v2_state_window_update()\n */\nif (window &gt; NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - h2c-&gt;send_window) {\n    /* ... */\n    return ngx_http_v2_connection_error(h2c,\n                                        NGX_HTTP_V2_FLOW_CTRL_ERROR);\n}\n\nh2c-&gt;send_window += window;\n```\n\nThe intent is to ensure that `send_window + window &lt;= MAX`, i.e. that the increment does not push the window over the protocol limit. The check is safe only while `send_window &lt;= MAX`.\n\nIf cleanup has restored `R` bytes on top of MAX, the intended allowance is:\n\n```text\nMAX - (MAX + R) = -R\n```\n\nUnsigned `size_t` arithmetic cannot represent `-R`. On the verified 64-bit build it wraps to:\n\n```text\n2^64 - R\n```\n\nwhich is an enormous positive value. The comparison therefore accepts any increment up to `2^31 - 1` (and in practice any 31-bit `WINDOW_UPDATE` value). Each accepted frame adds to the counter. Repeating this about `2^32` times can raise `send_window` past `2^63`; about `2^33` times can bring it to `2^64 - d` for a small, attacker-chosen `d`.\n\nThis is the **CWE-191 integer underflow** at the heart of the CVE. The underflow is a direct consequence of the violated invariant from Stage 2; the guard itself is correct only under an assumption that the rest of the code failed to maintain.\n\n### 5.6 Stage 5 \u2014 signedness confusion and the inverted buffer\n\nThe corrupted counter is consumed in `ngx_http_v2_send_chain()`. The function uses `off_t` (signed 64-bit on the verified build) for its send limit:\n\n```c\n/* src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c\n * ngx_http_v2_send_chain()\n */\nif (limit == 0 || limit &gt; (off_t) h2c-&gt;send_window) {\n    limit = h2c-&gt;send_window;             /* size_t -&gt; off_t */\n}\nif (limit &gt; stream-&gt;send_window) {\n    limit = (stream-&gt;send_window &gt; 0) ? stream-&gt;send_window : 0;\n}\n/* ... */\nif ((off_t) frame_size &gt; limit) {\n    frame_size = (size_t) limit;          /* off_t -&gt; size_t */\n}\n/* ... */\nrest = frame_size;\nwhile ((off_t) rest &gt;= size) {\n    /* ... */\n}\nif (rest) {\n    cl = ngx_http_v2_filter_get_shadow(stream, in-&gt;buf,\n                                       offset, rest);  /* rest -&gt; off_t */\n    /* ... */\n}\n```\n\nConsider `h2c-&gt;send_window = 2^64 - d` for a small positive `d`:\n\n1. `(off_t) h2c-&gt;send_window` is `-d`.\n2. A positive `limit` is greater than `-d`, so `limit` becomes `-d`.\n3. The stream-window check does not reject a negative limit: it only reduces limits that are too large. The negative value survives.\n4. `(off_t) frame_size &gt; limit` is true for a positive `frame_size`, so `frame_size = (size_t) limit` becomes `2^64 - d`.\n5. The loop condition `(off_t) rest &gt;= size` is false because `rest` is negative, so the normal body-consuming loop is skipped.\n6. `rest` is passed to `ngx_http_v2_filter_get_shadow()` as an `off_t`, where it is negative.\n\nThe helper creates a \"shadow\" buffer that refers to part of the existing response body rather than copying it:\n\n```c\n/* src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c\n * ngx_http_v2_filter_get_shadow()\n */\nstatic ngx_chain_t *\nngx_http_v2_filter_get_shadow(ngx_http_v2_stream_t *stream, ngx_buf_t *buf,\n    off_t offset, off_t size)\n{\n    /* ... */\n    ngx_memcpy(chunk, buf, sizeof(ngx_buf_t));\n    /* ... */\n    if (ngx_buf_in_memory(chunk)) {\n        chunk-&gt;pos += offset;\n        chunk-&gt;last = chunk-&gt;pos + size;   /* &lt;-- size is negative */\n    }\n    /* ... */\n}\n```\n\nFor a valid `ngx_buf_t`, `last &gt;= pos`; the length is `last - pos`. Here `size = -d`, so `last` is placed `d` bytes **before** `pos`. The buffer metadata is now invalid: the response has not become larger, but the next output stage will trust the pointers.\n\n### 5.7 Stage 6 \u2014 a negative length reaches `memcpy`\n\nFor buffered TLS output, `ngx_ssl_send_chain()` gathers bytes from the output chain into a staging buffer before encryption:\n\n```c\n/* src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c\n * ngx_ssl_send_chain()\n */\nssize_t send, size, file_size;\n/* ... */\nsize = in-&gt;buf-&gt;last - in-&gt;buf-&gt;pos;      /* -d */\nif (size &gt; buf-&gt;end - buf-&gt;last) {\n    size = buf-&gt;end - buf-&gt;last;\n}\nif (send + size &gt; limit) {\n    size = (ssize_t) (limit - send);\n}\n/* ... */\nngx_memcpy(buf-&gt;last, in-&gt;buf-&gt;pos, size);\nbuf-&gt;last += size;\nin-&gt;buf-&gt;pos += size;\n```\n\nBoth bounds checks only reduce lengths that are **too large**. Neither rejects a negative `size`:\n\n- `size &gt; buf-&gt;end - buf-&gt;last` is false for a negative `size`.\n- `send + size &gt; limit` is false for a negative `size` (assuming `send` is not already at the limit).\n\n`ngx_memcpy` is a wrapper around `memcpy`. Its third parameter is `size_t` (unsigned), so `-d` is converted back to `2^64 - d`. The source and destination buffers are ordinary heap/TLS buffers, far smaller than that. This is the point where the corrupted flow-control state first becomes a native out-of-bounds memory access.\n\n### 5.8 Why an \"almost 2^64-byte\" copy can return\n\nA literal copy of `2^64 - d` bytes would run off the end of the address space and fault. The tested x86-64 glibc implementation does not behave that way because it uses a backward-copy loop whose end-address arithmetic wraps modulo `2^64`.\n\nglibc selects optimized `memcpy`/`memmove` routines at runtime based on CPU features. The tested routine uses EVEX/YMM instructions (32-byte vectors). In the glibc 2.41 source, the relevant backward path computes a cursor from the destination and length:\n\n```asm\n/* glibc 2.41: sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S\n * Simplified, AT&amp;T syntax: %rdi = dest (D), %rsi = src (Q), %rdx = n\n */\nL(more_8x_vec_backward):\n    leaq    (VEC_SIZE * -4 + -1)(%rdi, %rdx), %rcx   /* D + n - 129 */\n    andq    $-(VEC_SIZE), %rcx                       /* align down to 32 */\nL(loop_4x_vec_backward):\n    /* load/store four 32-byte vectors */\n    addq    $(VEC_SIZE * -4), %rcx                   /* cursor -= 128 */\n    cmpq    %rcx, %rdi\n    jb      L(loop_4x_vec_backward)                  /* while D &lt; cursor */\n    /* store leading and trailing vectors */\n    VZEROUPPER_RETURN\n```\n\nWith `VEC_SIZE = 32` and `n = 2^64 - d`:\n\n```text\ncursor = align_down_32((D + n - 129) mod 2^64)\n       = align_down_32(D - d - 129)\n```\n\nFor an ordinary heap address `D` and small `d`, `cursor` is already **below** `D`. The loop condition `D &lt; cursor` is false on the first check, so the loop performs at most one 128-byte block. The routine then stores a leading 128-byte vector at `D` and a trailing 32-byte vector at `D - d - 32`. The total out-of-bounds footprint is the 160-byte region ending at `D - d`:\n\n```text\n        D - d - 160            D - d - 32   D - d        D\n             |---- 128 B loop ----|-- 32 B --|            |\n             ^                                   ^\n             OOB write region                    in-bounds head write\n```\n\nThe same shape applies to the source: the routine reads a 160-byte region ending at `Q - d`, which can lie before the start of the source buffer.\n\nTwo consequences follow:\n\n- The copy is **bounded** in practice: it touches a small region before the source and destination, not `2^64` bytes.\n- The exact footprint depends on `d`, the alignment of `D`, the CPU-selected routine and the glibc version. Other lengths, layouts or copy implementations may fault immediately, producing a crash rather than a controlled primitive.\n\nRapid7 explicitly notes that alternative exploitation strategies may exist but none were known at disclosure, and that the demonstrated strategy depends on the x86-64 glibc EVEX/YMM implementation selected at runtime based on `avx512f` and `avx512vl`.\n\n### 5.9 From memory corruption to code execution\n\nThe invalid copy gives the attacker two constrained primitives:\n\n#### OOB read / address disclosure\n\nThe shadow buffer's source (`in-&gt;buf-&gt;pos`) can be positioned in the request pool \u2014 for example, at the multipart boundary string that NGINX allocates for a multi-range response. The 160-byte OOB read before the source can contain heap pointers, NGINX image pointers, and glibc pointers. Because the invalid buffer is subsequently sent as response data, those bytes can be returned to the client through TLS, disclosing addresses that ASLR is supposed to hide.\n\nRapid7's PoC uses this to recover heap addresses and pointers into NGINX and glibc from memory preceding the original response body. It then forges NGINX request and response-buffer objects that return selected parts of glibc's loaded image over HTTP/2, parses the ELF metadata to resolve `system()` despite ASLR, and redirects a request-pool cleanup callback to invoke an attacker-chosen command.\n\n#### OOB write / heap corruption\n\nThe destination is the next write position in the TLS plaintext buffer (`buf-&gt;last`). The 160-byte OOB write ends `d` bytes before that position. By choosing `d`, the attacker can align the write so that:\n\n- `96` bytes land immediately **before** the TLS buffer (for example, on heap metadata such as a size field), and\n- `64` bytes land at the **start of the TLS plaintext buffer**, which is then encrypted and sent to the client.\n\nXint's analysis describes shaping the source region with multiple `Cookie` header fields (which NGINX joins into a heap buffer and describes with an `ngx_table_elt_t` containing a static NGINX pointer and a heap pointer) and using the Range multipart boundary allocation to position the source. The result is a single malformed copy that both corrupts adjacent heap metadata and discloses code/heap pointers. With the disclosed addresses and controlled overwrite, the attacker can overwrite a cleanup function pointer and execute a command when cleanup runs.\n\n#### Execution context\n\nExecution is with the **NGINX worker process's** permissions. It is not root or master-process execution by itself. Xint chained CVE-2026-123007 with a separate Linux kernel SCTP local privilege escalation to obtain root on the host and, in their tests, escape a Docker container; that escalation is outside the scope of this CVE.\n\n#### Reliability factors\n\nThe primitive is not an unconditional arbitrary read/write. Its usefulness depends on:\n\n- Where NGINX allocated the response and TLS buffers.\n- How much output is already buffered.\n- The alignment and distance `d`.\n- The glibc copy routine selected at runtime.\n- The heap layout, including whether the worker is freshly started and whether other clients are active.\n\nRapid7's public exploit is explicitly scoped to a **local, freshly started Docker container** with a single client. It states that it will likely fail against a busy server, a messy heap, a proxied connection, or a network that cannot deliver the required traffic consistently. Xint reports a more robust exploit that worked under concurrent normal traffic and across AWS, GCP and Azure, including over public IPs, but omits the final function-pointer overwrite details from its public write-up.\n\n### 5.10 Root cause classification\n\n| Layer | Location | Defect | Consequence |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Accounting | `ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup()` | Unchecked `send_window += window` refund; no `send_queued` tracking | Connection window exceeds MAX |\n| Validation | `ngx_http_v2_state_window_update()` | `MAX - send_window` in unsigned `size_t`; assumes `send_window &lt;= MAX` | Underflow to ~2^64; invalid increments accepted |\n| Type handling | `ngx_http_v2_send_chain()` | `size_t` \u2192 `off_t` \u2192 `size_t` conversions; negative limit not rejected | Huge frame size / negative shadow-buffer length |\n| Buffer construction | `ngx_http_v2_filter_get_shadow()` | `last = pos + size` with negative `size` | `last &lt; pos`; invalid `ngx_buf_t` |\n| Memory copy | `ngx_ssl_send_chain()` | Negative `ssize_t` passed to `memcpy(size_t)`; checks do not reject negatives | OOB read/write of ~160 bytes |\n| Exploitation | glibc `memcpy`/heap layout | Backward-copy end-address wrap; predictable heap adjacency | ASLR bypass, heap corruption, callback overwrite, RCE |\n\n**Primary CWE:** CWE-191 (Integer Underflow or Wraparound). **Impact CWE:** CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write). **Contributing weaknesses:** signed/unsigned conversion errors (CWE-195/CWE-681 class), out-of-bounds read (CWE-125), and a protocol-handling deviation from RFC 9113 \u00a76.9.2 (stream termination instead of connection termination).\n\n---\n\n## 6. Trigger Sequences and Traffic Cost\n\n### 6.1 Rapid7's SETTINGS-based sequence\n\nRapid7's published analysis describes four main stages, reproduced here in operational order:\n\n1. **Create backpressure and queue DATA.** The client slows or stops reading server output. It raises the connection credit to MAX and selected streams' credit to just below MAX, and arranges for response DATA to be queued but not started.\n2. **Force stream termination while keeping the connection.** The client sends a `SETTINGS` frame that increases `SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE` by enough to push the selected streams over MAX (for example, from 65,535 to 65,537 adds two bytes to each active stream; a stream at MAX\u22121 becomes MAX+1). NGINX resets those streams instead of terminating the connection. Request cleanup refunds the reserved DATA credit, pushing `h2c-&gt;send_window` above MAX.\n3. **Underflow the guard and amplify.** The next connection `WINDOW_UPDATE` causes `MAX - send_window` to wrap. Repeated `WINDOW_UPDATE` frames, each with an increment up to MAX, raise the counter into the upper half of the 64-bit range. This is the traffic-heavy phase.\n4. **Trigger the invalid copy.** An active stream with available credit processes an ordinary response body. The oversized connection counter becomes a negative `off_t` limit; the output filter creates an inverted shadow buffer; the TLS staging copy performs the OOB read/write.\n\nRapid7's full exploit uses a Range response and heap shaping to turn the malformed copy into an address leak and a callback overwrite. Its minimal trigger, `simple-trigger-poc.py`, demonstrates the accounting error and then drives the counter to a crash in a native output consumer; it does not attempt full RCE.\n\n### 6.2 Xint's RST_STREAM-based sequence\n\nXint's independent analysis describes a simpler trigger that does not rely on the SETTINGS behavior:\n\n1. Raise the connection send window to `Wmax` with a connection `WINDOW_UPDATE`.\n2. Set `SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE` to `0` so new streams receive no DATA credit; responses can produce HEADERS but not body DATA.\n3. Stop reading and send a burst of `PING` frames. NGINX prioritizes control-frame responses (PING ACKs, SETTINGS ACKs) ahead of pending DATA, filling the TLS/TCP send buffers.\n4. Grant each selected stream enough `WINDOW_UPDATE` credit for its entire response body. NGINX queues the DATA, subtracting the total `Q` from the connection window: `Wmax - Q`.\n5. Send a connection `WINDOW_UPDATE` for `Q`. The check allows equality (`Q &lt;= Wmax - (Wmax - Q)`), restoring the connection window to `Wmax`.\n6. Send `RST_STREAM` for the selected streams. Cleanup discards the queued DATA and refunds `Q` again: `Wmax + Q`.\n\nThe double refund is the same defect: `Q` is added once by the client's `WINDOW_UPDATE` and once by cleanup. Xint notes that the exact response sizes and stream count do not matter; what matters is that the same known quantity is added back twice.\n\n### 6.3 Frame-level summary\n\n| Direction | Frame | Stream | Purpose |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Client \u2192 NGINX | `SETTINGS` | 0 | Set initial stream window (e.g., 0 or a value that will be increased) |\n| Client \u2192 NGINX | `WINDOW_UPDATE` | 0 | Raise connection credit to MAX (or restore it after queuing) |\n| Client \u2192 NGINX | `WINDOW_UPDATE` | nonzero | Grant stream credit so response DATA is queued |\n| Client \u2192 NGINX | `HEADERS` | nonzero | Request a response with a known body size (static file, Range request) |\n| Client \u2192 NGINX | `PING` / `SETTINGS` | 0 | Fill transport buffers with control-frame responses; create backpressure |\n| Client \u2192 NGINX | `RST_STREAM` or `SETTINGS` | nonzero / 0 | Terminate the stream(s) and trigger cleanup while keeping the connection |\n| Client \u2192 NGINX | `WINDOW_UPDATE` \u00d7 ~2^32\u20132^33 | 0 | Amplify the corrupted counter to \u22652^63 / 2^64\u2212d |\n| NGINX \u2192 client | `HEADERS` / `DATA` | nonzero | Normal response processing; eventually triggers the invalid shadow buffer |\n| NGINX \u2192 client | `RST_STREAM` | nonzero | Stream reset (Rapid7 SETTINGS variant; `FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR`) |\n| NGINX \u2192 client | `PING` ACK | 0 | Proves the connection remains alive in the PoC |\n\n### 6.4 Traffic amplification math\n\nA connection-level `WINDOW_UPDATE` frame is **13 bytes** on the wire: a 9-byte HTTP/2 frame header plus a 4-byte increment. The increment grants credit but carries no response data.\n\n| Target state | Approximate increments | Bytes of WINDOW_UPDATE frames | Notes |\n|---|---:|---:|---|\n| Cross `2^63` (signed-negative threshold) | ~2^32 | ~52 GiB | Each increment \u2264 2^31\u22121; 2^32 \u00d7 13 B = 55.8 GB |\n| Reach `2^64 \u2212 d` for small `d` | ~2^33 | ~104 GiB | Needed for the glibc end-address wrap and controlled `d` |\n| Header/control carrier traffic | \u2014 | ~15 GiB | Keeps control-frame traffic within NGINX's flood-accounting limits |\n| **Total plaintext (Rapid7 route)** | \u2014 | **~119 GiB** | About **128 GB** after TLS/network overhead |\n\nRapid7's figures:\n\n- Approximately **128 GB of HTTP/2 data** on the wire for the full RCE.\n- About **2.5 minutes** in the lab demonstration (video at 8\u00d7 speed).\n- About **2 minutes** on a 10 Gbit/s network.\n- About **17 minutes** on a 1 Gbit/s network.\n- NGINX's default **one-hour** connection lifetime means a network slower than approximately **300 Mbit/s** cannot deliver the required traffic in time for this route.\n\nThe 300 Mbit/s threshold follows from the arithmetic: `128 GB / 3600 s \u2248 35.6 MB/s \u2248 284 Mbit/s`, before accounting for protocol overhead and retransmissions.\n\nThese numbers describe the **64-bit amplification route used by the public exploit**, not a universal minimum for every possible exploitation strategy. They are nonetheless a significant operational barrier and a useful detection lever: a single HTTP/2 connection that receives tens to hundreds of gigabytes while sending little back is anomalous.\n\n---\n\n## 7. Exploitability Assessment\n\n### 7.1 Confirmed exploitation\n\n- **Rapid7** demonstrated unauthenticated RCE against a `linux/amd64` Docker image running NGINX **1.31.8**, with HTTP/2 and TLS enabled. The target served ordinary static files. The exploit took about 2.5 minutes in the lab.\n- **Wiz Research** independently demonstrated code execution against NGINX serving static files over HTTPS on a 64-bit system, without a backend application or third-party modules.\n- **Xint** reports successful exploitation on AWS, GCP and Azure, from inside the target, across a private network, and over a public IP, including under concurrent normal traffic. Xint also chained the worker-level compromise with a separate kernel SCTP LPE to obtain root and escape a container in its demonstration.\n\n### 7.2 Constraints and reliability\n\n| Constraint | Effect |\n|---|---|\n| HTTP/2 must be enabled | Removes HTTP/1.1-only deployments from scope |\n| 64-bit target | The confirmed `size_t`/`off_t` behavior and pointer arithmetic are 64-bit; 32-bit behavior differs and is not the demonstrated RCE path |\n| ~128 GB wire traffic | Requires high bandwidth or a long-lived connection; &lt;300 Mbit/s likely exceeds the one-hour connection lifetime |\n| No frame-normalizing proxy | A proxy/CDN that terminates or re-frames HTTP/2 will likely break the precise frame sequence |\n| Transport backpressure | The attacker must keep DATA queued and unstarted; a fast-reading client or a small response set can prevent the required state |\n| Heap layout | The OOB read/write must land on useful objects; a busy worker with a fragmented heap is less reliable |\n| glibc/CPU specificity | The known strategy depends on an x86-64 glibc EVEX/YMM routine selected by `avx512f`/`avx512vl`; other libc/CPU combinations may crash instead of yielding a controlled primitive |\n| Connection lifetime | Default one-hour limit caps the available time; `keepalive_time` and other timeouts affect feasibility |\n\n### 7.3 Public tooling\n\nRapid7 published:\n\n- `simple-trigger-poc.py` \u2014 a minimal Python script that demonstrates the cleanup over-credit and the unsigned underflow, then drives the counter to a signed-window crash. It requires 64-bit CPython 3.10 linked to OpenSSL 3 for its TLS KeyUpdate bridge.\n- `exploit/exploit.py` \u2014 a full PoC that demonstrates unauthenticated RCE against a vulnerable local Docker container. The repository README explicitly limits its applicability to a freshly started container with a single client and warns that it will likely fail against busy, proxied or bandwidth-constrained targets.\n- `NGINX_HTTP2_STANDALONE_REPRODUCTION.md` \u2014 reproduction steps.\n\nThe existence of a public full exploit lowers the barrier for capable attackers, but the operational constraints mean it is not a \"one-click Internet worm.\" Targeted exploitation of high-value, directly reachable NGINX endpoints is the more plausible near-term risk.\n\n### 7.4 In-the-wild status and risk\n\nAs of the CVE record's last update on **18 November 2026, 20:13 UTC**:\n\n- CISA's SSVC assessment: **Exploitation: none**, **Automatable: no**, **Technical Impact: total**.\n- The CVE was **not** in the 2026.11.18 CISA KEV catalog.\n- No public report confirmed in-the-wild exploitation.\n\nThis is a point-in-time assessment. Critical edge-server vulnerabilities with public PoCs can move to exploitation quickly, and the KEV/SSVC status should be rechecked. The practical risk is elevated by:\n\n- NGINX's large Internet footprint and common role as a TLS/HTTP/2 terminator.\n- The availability of a full public exploit and a minimal trigger.\n- The fact that exploitation does not require a vulnerable application, only HTTP/2.\n- The difficulty of detecting the attack in encrypted traffic and default access logs.\n\n### 7.5 DoS versus RCE\n\nThe same primitive can cause a worker segmentation fault with less effort than full RCE. Rapid7's minimal trigger still performs the large amplification (about 52 GiB) before crashing the worker; it is not a cheap request-rate DoS. However, once the counter is corrupted, a single malformed response can crash the worker, and repeated attempts can cause worker respawns and service disruption. The availability impact is therefore real but bandwidth-bound for the known route.\n\n---\n\n## 8. Patch Analysis\n\n### 8.1 Commit metadata\n\n| Field | Value |\n|---|---|\n| Mainline commit | `e27f5fa84fe6e98505e70bc543b748747dad0a3b` |\n| Stable backport | `b89c4100bf6762a45e4a6463eaf4b70368277c94` |\n| Author | Roman Arutyunyan, NGINX |\n| Commit date | 29 October 2026 |\n| Subject | `HTTP/2: account for queued frames when validating WINDOW_UPDATE` |\n| Files changed | `src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c`, `src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h`, `src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c` |\n| Diffstat | 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) |\n| Fixed releases | NGINX OSS 1.31.9 / 1.30.7; NGINX Plus 37.3.0.1 / 37.0.8.1 |\n\nThe commit message states:\n\n&gt; \"When a stream is terminated, its unsent payload length is refunded back to the connection flow control. Previously, this could increase the flow control beyond `NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW`, if it was increased by the client after the stream frames were queued and before the stream was terminated. This eventually resulted in broken buffer size control in `ngx_http_v2_send_chain()` followed by memory corruption and a possible segmentation fault. The fix is to account for the queued frames when validating a client `WINDOW_UPDATE`. From the client's point of view, the queued frames still belong to the flow control window. Reported by Xint.io.\"\n\n### 8.2 The fix\n\nThe patch adds a new connection field:\n\n```c\nstruct ngx_http_v2_connection_s {\n    /* ... */\n    size_t   send_window;\n    size_t   send_queued;      /* new */\n    /* ... */\n};\n```\n\nIt increments `send_queued` when a DATA frame is queued:\n\n```c\nngx_http_v2_queue_frame(fn, frame);\n\nh2c-&gt;send_window -= frame_size;\nh2c-&gt;send_queued += frame_size;\n```\n\nIt decrements `send_queued` when a queued DATA frame is actually handled/sent:\n\n```c\nh2c-&gt;payload_bytes += frame-&gt;length;\nh2c-&gt;send_queued -= frame-&gt;length;\n```\n\nIt decrements `send_queued` when cleanup removes and refunds queued frames:\n\n```c\nh2c-&gt;send_window += window;\nh2c-&gt;send_queued -= window;\n```\n\nAnd it changes the `WINDOW_UPDATE` validation to account for both counters:\n\n```c\n- if (window &gt; NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - h2c-&gt;send_window) {\n+ if (window &gt; NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - h2c-&gt;send_window - h2c-&gt;send_queued) {\n      ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_INFO, h2c-&gt;connection-&gt;log, 0,\n                    \"client violated connection flow control: \"\n                    \"received WINDOW_UPDATE frame \"\n                    \"with window increment %uz \"\n                    \"not allowed for window %uz\",\n-                   window, h2c-&gt;send_window);\n+                   window, h2c-&gt;send_window + h2c-&gt;send_queued);\n```\n\n### 8.3 Why the fix works\n\nDefine:\n\n```text\nS = h2c-&gt;send_window + h2c-&gt;send_queued\n```\n\n`S` is the amount of connection-level credit that is **outstanding** from the peer's point of view: credit already reserved for queued DATA plus credit still available in `send_window`. The patch maintains this invariant:\n\n| Operation | `send_window` | `send_queued` | `S` | Client-visible effect |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Initial state | `W0` | 0 | `W0` | Initial connection window |\n| Queue DATA of length `f` | `-f` | `+f` | unchanged | Credit reserved; bytes not yet sent |\n| DATA frame fully sent | unchanged | `-f` | `-f` | Bytes consumed by the peer; credit becomes available |\n| Cleanup refunds `w` queued bytes | `+w` | `-w` | unchanged | Reservation removed; no net new credit |\n| Accepted `WINDOW_UPDATE` of `inc` | `+inc` | unchanged | `+inc` | Peer grants new credit |\n\nThe validation now accepts an increment only if:\n\n```text\ninc &lt;= MAX - S\n```\n\nAfter acceptance, `S &lt;= MAX`. Because queuing and cleanup preserve `S`, and sending only decreases it, `S` can never exceed MAX. Therefore `send_window &lt;= S &lt;= MAX`, and the unsigned subtraction `MAX - send_window - send_queued` cannot underflow. The root-cause over-credit is eliminated, not merely detected.\n\nThis also explains the counter-intuitive point that the patch **subtracts** `send_queued` in the validation while **adding** it to the logged window value: the check must compare the increment against the credit that is actually still available, and `send_queued` is credit the peer considers already consumed.\n\n### 8.4 Residual observations\n\n- The patch does not change NGINX's handling of a `SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE` increase that pushes a stream over MAX: it still resets the affected stream(s) rather than terminating the connection. That behavior is a deviation from RFC 9113 \u00a76.9.2, but with the `send_queued` invariant in place it no longer produces an over-credited connection window. It could be hardened separately.\n- The patch is small and targeted, which is appropriate for a stable security backport, but it relies on every path that queues, sends or removes DATA frames maintaining `send_queued` consistently. The three instrumented sites cover the queue, completion and cleanup paths.\n- The fix is in the HTTP/2 connection and filter modules; no configuration change is required.\n- Distribution backports may differ in packaging but should carry both the mainline change and the stable backport.\n\n### 8.5 Distribution status at disclosure\n\n- **Ubuntu**: as of 18 November 2026, the Ubuntu CVE page listed nginx as vulnerable across 16.04 through 26.10, with 14.04 (nginx 1.4.6, no HTTP/2) not affected. The page listed both upstream commits as patch details. Check for updated packages.\n- **SUSE**: the SUSE CVE page listed nginx as \"Analysis\" for the products shown, with no SUSE security announcement cross-referenced at the time of writing.\n- **Red Hat**: the Red Hat CVE page described the flaw and the HTTP/2-disable mitigation, with a CVSS 3.1 score of 8.1 and CWE-787. Check the product-specific errata for fixed builds.\n- **Docker / OpenResty / ingress-nginx**: official NGINX Docker images, OpenResty and Kubernetes ingress controllers may lag upstream. JFrog noted at disclosure that the official NGINX Docker images had not yet been updated and that `kubernetes/ingress-nginx` was archived and would not receive a fix. Verify image digests and rebuild; do not rely on a tag alone.\n\n---\n\n## 9. Detection and Hunting\n\nThe attack is difficult to see in default logs: the critical frames are HTTP/2 control frames, TLS encrypts them in transit, and NGINX's access log records requests, not raw frame streams. Detection therefore combines host telemetry, connection statistics, traffic accounting and post-exploitation indicators.\n\n### 9.1 Host-based indicators\n\n**Worker crashes and core dumps:**\n\n```bash\nsudo grep -Ei 'worker process.*exited|signal 11|segfault' /var/log/nginx/error.log\nsudo coredumpctl list nginx\n```\n\nRepeated `worker process  exited on signal 11` entries, especially on HTTP/2 listeners, are a strong signal of a failed or successful memory-corruption attempt. They are not specific to this CVE; correlate with traffic anomalies.\n\n**Unexpected command execution by a worker:**\n\nA normal NGINX worker does not spawn shells or arbitrary programs. Identify the worker UID:\n\n```bash\nps -eo uid,user,pid,ppid,args | grep '[n]ginx: worker process'\n```\n\nInstall an audit rule for `execve`/`execveat` by that UID (replace `NGINX_UID`):\n\n```bash\nsudo auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve,execveat \\\n  -F euid=NGINX_UID -k nginx_worker_exec\nsudo ausearch -k nginx_worker_exec -ts recent -i\n```\n\nLook for `/bin/sh`, `/bin/bash`, `curl`, `wget`, or other programs whose parent is an NGINX worker. The rule only records events after installation; absence of events does not rule out earlier compromise. If other services share the UID, validate the parent process.\n\n**Process and file integrity:**\n\n- Unexpected child processes of NGINX workers.\n- New or modified files in the NGINX prefix, web root, modules directory, cron, systemd units, or `/tmp`.\n- New listening sockets or outbound connections from the NGINX host.\n- Changes to `nginx.conf` or included configuration files.\n\n### 9.2 Network-based indicators\n\n**Per-connection byte accounting:**\n\n```bash\nsudo ss -tinp state established '( sport = :443 )'\n```\n\nRun it twice a short interval apart and compare `bytes_received` and `bytes_sent`. Prioritize connections that combine:\n\n- A long-lived connection from the same external IP (minutes, not seconds).\n- Rapidly growing `bytes_received`.\n- Much smaller `bytes_sent` than received volume.\n- The same external IP also opening many short-lived TLS connections.\n\nThe tested attack sends a large number of `WINDOW_UPDATE` frames over one long-lived connection, so inbound bytes climb while NGINX sends little back. The Xint write-up also notes many short-lived TLS connections from the same source.\n\n**Flow / NetFlow / IPFIX:**\n\n- A single host/port receiving tens to hundreds of gigabytes inbound on 443 in a short period.\n- Extreme inbound/outbound asymmetry for a single connection.\n- Long connection duration combined with high inbound volume.\n\n**HTTP/2-aware inspection:**\n\nIf TLS is terminated at a proxy, load balancer or eBPF probe, count HTTP/2 frame types per connection. A healthy connection has a mix of HEADERS, DATA, SETTINGS, PING and occasional WINDOW_UPDATE. The attack is dominated by 13-byte connection-level WINDOW_UPDATE frames, potentially billions of them, with very little DATA relative to control traffic.\n\nUseful signals:\n\n- WINDOW_UPDATE count per connection far above normal (e.g., &gt;10^6).\n- WINDOW_UPDATE:DATA byte ratio extremely high.\n- Repeated WINDOW_UPDATE increments near `0x7fffffff`.\n- A connection that sends PING/SETTINGS bursts and then a sustained WINDOW_UPDATE flood.\n- TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate floods: Rapid7's minimal trigger uses many KeyUpdate messages to create a parser boundary. This is PoC-specific and not a general signature, but a high KeyUpdate rate on one connection is unusual.\n\n**ALPN exposure check:**\n\n```bash\nopenssl s_client -connect HOST:443 -servername HOST -alpn h2 &amp;1 \\\n  | grep -E 'ALPN protocol:|No ALPN negotiated'\n```\n\n`ALPN protocol: h2` means HTTP/2 is reachable. If a CDN/proxy is in front, test the origin directly as well; the edge result does not prove origin exposure.\n\n### 9.3 Log-based indicators\n\nDefault access logs do not identify the connection or the number of requests per connection. Add a temporary or permanent log format:\n\n```nginx\nlog_format h2_hunt '$time_iso8601 src=$remote_addr conn=$connection '\n                   'requests=$connection_requests proto=$server_protocol '\n                   'status=$status request_length=$request_length '\n                   'bytes_sent=$bytes_sent request_time=$request_time';\n\naccess_log /var/log/nginx/h2-hunt.log h2_hunt;\n```\n\nThen:\n\n```bash\nsudo nginx -t &amp;&amp; sudo nginx -s reload\nsudo grep 'proto=HTTP/2.0' /var/log/nginx/h2-hunt.log | tail -n 200\n```\n\nFor a suspicious source, sum `request_length` per `conn` and compare it with the kernel's `bytes_received` for the same connection. If `bytes_received` grows rapidly while logged request lengths stay small, the client is sending data that never appears as requests \u2014 consistent with a control-frame flood.\n\nAlso look for:\n\n- A high number of requests on one connection with long `request_time`.\n- `499`/client-closed requests, worker resets, or unusual `RST_STREAM` behavior.\n- `client violated connection flow control` messages at info level. Successful underflow attempts bypass the check, but failed or probing attempts may log this message.\n- `worker process ... exited on signal 11` in the error log.\n\n### 9.4 Post-exploitation indicators\n\nIf worker-level RCE is suspected:\n\n- Shell or utility processes whose parent is an NGINX worker.\n- Outbound connections from the NGINX host to unfamiliar destinations.\n- New files, web shells, modified static content, or tampered configuration.\n- Credential/secret access: NGINX workers can read configuration files, TLS keys, environment variables, upstream credentials and application secrets reachable by their UID.\n- Lateral movement from the NGINX host into backend networks.\n- Container escape attempts if the worker is containerized; Xint's chain used a separate kernel LPE.\n\n### 9.5 Detection limitations\n\n- TLS 1.3 encrypts HTTP/2 control frames; without termination or endpoint instrumentation, network sensors cannot see WINDOW_UPDATE contents.\n- Default access logs do not record control frames, connection IDs, or per-connection byte counts.\n- A successful exploit can be quiet: the worker may not crash, and the only external symptom may be a large inbound transfer and a leaked response.\n- Worker crashes have many benign causes (OOM, bugs, signals); correlate with HTTP/2 traffic and the other signals.\n- Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, especially if logs were not retained or the worker was restarted.\n\n---\n\n## 10. Remediation and Mitigation\n\n### 10.1 Patch matrix\n\n| Product | Affected | Fixed |\n|---|---|---|\n| NGINX Open Source mainline | 1.31.0 \u2013 1.31.8 | **1.31.9** |\n| NGINX Open Source stable/older | 1.9.5 \u2013 1.30.6 | **1.30.7** |\n| NGINX Plus 37.1.x / 37.2.x | 37.1.0 \u2013 37.2.0.1 | **37.3.0.1** |\n| NGINX Plus 37.0.x | 37.0.0 \u2013 37.0.7.1 | **37.0.8.1** |\n| NGINX Plus R33 \u2013 R36 | R33 and later; R34 \u2013 R36 no fix listed | Upgrade to a fixed 37.x release or disable HTTP/2 |\n\nF5's CVE record lists no workaround. Disabling HTTP/2 is the practical mitigation when patching is not immediately possible.\n\n### 10.2 Upgrade procedure\n\n1. **Identify exposure**:\n\n   ```bash\n   nginx -v\n   nginx -V 2&gt;&amp;1 | grep -q -- '--with-http_v2_module' \\\n     &amp;&amp; echo 'HTTP2_MODULE=present' || echo 'HTTP2_MODULE=absent'\n   sudo nginx -T 2&gt;&amp;1 | sed 's/#.*//' \\\n     | grep -nE 'listen[[:space:]].*http2|^[[:space:]]*http2[[:space:]]+on[[:space:]]*;'\n   ```\n\n2. **Upgrade** to 1.31.9 / 1.30.7 or the appropriate NGINX Plus build. For distribution packages, install the fixed package version, not just a newer-looking `nginx -v` string.\n\n3. **Validate** the configuration:\n\n   ```bash\n   sudo nginx -t\n   ```\n\n4. **Restart**, do not only reload:\n\n   ```bash\n   sudo systemctl restart nginx\n   ```\n\n   A reload starts new workers with the new binary but leaves existing connections on old workers. Long-lived HTTP/2 connections can persist; confirm the old workers have exited:\n\n   ```bash\n   ps -eo pid,ppid,args | grep '[n]ginx: worker process'\n   ```\n\n5. **Verify** the running binary and version:\n\n   ```bash\n   nginx -V\n   ```\n\n6. **Re-test ALPN**:\n\n   ```bash\n   openssl s_client -connect HOST:443 -servername HOST -alpn h2 &amp;1 \\\n     | grep -E 'ALPN protocol:|No ALPN negotiated'\n   ```\n\n### 10.3 Temporary mitigation: disable HTTP/2\n\nFor NGINX **1.25.1 and later**, set `http2 off;` in each affected `server` block and remove the legacy `http2` parameter from its `listen` directives:\n\n```nginx\nserver {\n    listen 443 ssl;\n    http2 off;\n    # ...\n}\n```\n\nFor NGINX **1.9.5 through 1.25.0**, remove `http2` from the `listen` directive:\n\n```nginx\nserver {\n    listen 443 ssl;\n    # ...\n}\n```\n\nThen:\n\n```bash\nsudo nginx -t\nsudo nginx -s reload\n```\n\nConfirm the change:\n\n```bash\nopenssl s_client -connect HOST:443 -servername HOST -alpn h2 &amp;1 \\\n  | grep -F 'ALPN protocol: h2'\n```\n\nNo output means HTTP/2 is no longer negotiated. Because a reload leaves existing connections on old workers, follow with a restart or otherwise ensure the old workers have exited. Disabling HTTP/2 affects gRPC and other HTTP/2-only services; plan accordingly.\n\n### 10.4 Platform-specific notes\n\n- **NGINX Plus**: use the F5 advisory and your subscription channel. R33 \u2013 R36 have no fixed build listed; upgrade to a fixed 37.x release or disable HTTP/2. Contact F5 for supported migration guidance.\n- **Linux distributions**: the upstream version string may not reflect a backport. Check the full package version and the distribution's CVE tracker (Ubuntu, Debian, SUSE, Red Hat). At disclosure, Ubuntu still listed nginx as vulnerable; SUSE was in analysis; Red Hat published the CVE and mitigation.\n- **Containers**: rebuild from an updated base image; verify the NGINX binary version inside the image, not just the image tag. Official NGINX images, OpenResty and ingress controllers may lag. JFrog noted that `kubernetes/ingress-nginx` is archived and will not receive a fix; migrate to a maintained ingress implementation.\n- **Embedded/appliance products**: identify the NGINX version and whether HTTP/2 is enabled; vendor advisories may lag upstream.\n- **F5 BIG-IP / F5OS**: F5 reportedly found these not vulnerable; F5 cloud services were under evaluation. Verify with F5 for your specific product.\n\n### 10.5 Compensating controls\n\nThese are defense-in-depth measures, not substitutes for patching:\n\n- **Terminate HTTP/2 at a CDN/WAF** and ensure the origin is not directly reachable, or that the origin uses HTTP/1.1. Rapid7 notes that proxied HTTP/2 connections will likely not preserve the exact frame sequence required for exploitation, but this is not a guarantee.\n- **Restrict direct access** to HTTP/2 listeners with network ACLs, security groups, or a reverse proxy that normalizes traffic.\n- **Limit connection duration** (for example, lower `keepalive_time`) to reduce the time available for the ~128 GB amplification. This raises the bandwidth bar but does not fix the bug; a 10 Gbit/s attacker can still finish in minutes.\n- **Rate-limit and monitor** per-source inbound volume and connection counts. A single connection receiving tens of gigabytes is anomalous for most web services.\n- **Disable HTTP/2 on low-risk or internal-only listeners** that do not need it.\n- **Keep TLS termination and inspection** in place where feasible; HTTP/2-aware inspection can detect WINDOW_UPDATE floods.\n\n### 10.6 If compromise is suspected\n\n1. **Isolate** the host or container from the network, preserving memory and disk state where possible.\n2. **Assume worker-level compromise**: secrets readable by the NGINX worker (TLS private keys, upstream credentials, environment variables, application secrets) may be exposed.\n3. **Capture** NGINX error logs, access logs, core dumps, process tree, network connections, and file integrity data.\n4. **Rebuild** from trusted images/binaries rather than cleaning in place; verify the NGINX version and package provenance.\n5. **Rotate** credentials and keys that were accessible to the worker.\n6. **Hunt** for persistence: modified configuration, new modules, cron/systemd units, web shells, new binaries, unusual outbound connections.\n7. **Review** whether the host was used to pivot into backend networks or cloud metadata services.\n\n---\n\n## 11. Timeline\n\n| Date (2026) | Event |\n|---|---|\n| 2015 | HTTP/2 support introduced in NGINX 1.9.5 with the vulnerable flow-control accounting |\n| 11 October | Xint research team discovers the NGINX vulnerabilities (per Xint) |\n| 16 October | Xint reports the vulnerabilities to F5 via HackerOne |\n| 20 October | HackerOne completes validation |\n| 21 October | Wiz reports the HTTP/2 use-after-free later assigned CVE-2026-123633 to F5 |\n| 27 October | Reports delivered to the NGINX development team |\n| 29 October | Upstream patch `e27f5fa` authored by Roman Arutyunyan |\n| 9 November | CVE-2026-123007 reserved; NGINX team requests patch validation |\n| 10 November | Xint completes patch validation; vulnerable code still present in `master` |\n| 11 November | Rapid7 makes initial outreach to F5 |\n| 12 November | F5 confirms outreach; Rapid7 discloses the vulnerability; F5 confirms receipt |\n| 16 November | F5 validates Rapid7's report and assigns the CVE; Wiz reports the second HTTP/2 vulnerability, which F5 confirms matches CVE-2026-123007 |\n| 18 November, 15:00 UTC | Coordinated public disclosure; NGINX 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 released; Rapid7 publishes analysis and PoC; Wiz, Xint and JFrog publish analyses |\n| 18 November, 15:23 UTC | CVE-2026-123007 published |\n| 18 November, 19:17 UTC | CISA KEV catalog 2026.11.18 released; CVE not listed |\n| 18 November, 20:13 UTC | CVE record last updated at time of writing; CISA SSVC Exploitation=none |\n| 19 November | This report; no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation |\n\nNote: The Wiz and Xint timelines describe independent discovery and reporting paths. F5 coordinated the fixes and credited multiple reporters.\n\n---\n\n## 12. References\n\n1. NVD \u2014 CVE-2026-123007. \n2. CVE Program \u2014 CVE-2026-123007 record. \n3. F5 \u2014 NGINX `ngx_http_v2_module` vulnerability (K000163926). \n4. NGINX \u2014 Security advisories. \n5. NGINX \u2014 Changes with 1.31.9 (18 Nov 2026). \n6. Rapid7 \u2014 \"CVE-2026-123007: Critical NGINX HTTP/2 Integer Underflow Leads to RCE (FIXED)\", Stephen Fewer, 18 Nov 2026. \n7. Rapid7 \u2014 PoC repository. \n8. Wiz Research \u2014 \"Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in NGINX: CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007\", Nir Ohfeld and Tomer Schwartz, 18 Nov 2026. \n9. Xint \u2014 \"NGINX2Root: New Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities in nginx Require Urgent Patching\", 18 Nov 2026. \n10. JFrog Security Research \u2014 \"Nginx2Shell: All You Need to Know About CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633\", 18 Nov 2026. \n11. Red Hat \u2014 CVE-2026-123007. \n12. SUSE \u2014 CVE-2026-123007. \n13. Ubuntu \u2014 CVE-2026-123007. \n14. GitHub Advisory Database \u2014 GHSA-m4q8-cf44-f42r. \n15. CyberScoop \u2014 \"It's NGINX's turn to cause vulnpocalypse headaches\", Greg Otto, 18 Nov 2026. \n16. SecurityOnline \u2014 \"CVE-2026-123007: NGINX Remote Code Execution PoC Exploit Released\", 18 Nov 2026. \n17. NGINX upstream patch \u2014 `e27f5fa84fe6e98505e70bc543b748747dad0a3b`. \n18. NGINX stable backport \u2014 `b89c4100bf6762a45e4a6463eaf4b70368277c94`. \n19. RFC 9113 \u2014 HTTP/2, Section 6.9 (Flow Control). \n20. glibc \u2014 `sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S` (glibc 2.41). \n21. Miggo Vulnerability Database \u2014 CVE-2026-123007. \n22. CISA \u2014 Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (2026.11.18). \n23. NIST \u2014 CWE-191: Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound). \n24. NIST \u2014 CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write. \n\n---\n\n## Appendix A \u2014 Code Path Map\n\n| Stage | Function | File | Role in the vulnerability |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Parse `WINDOW_UPDATE` | `ngx_http_v2_state_window_update()` | `src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c` | Validates the increment; unsigned subtraction underflows after over-credit |\n| Adjust stream windows on SETTINGS | `ngx_http_v2_adjust_windows()` | `src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c` | Terminates over-limit streams but keeps the connection (Rapid7 trigger) |\n| Queue response DATA | `ngx_http_v2_send_chain()` | `src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c` | Reserves credit; later converts oversized counter to a negative limit |\n| Remove queued DATA on stream cleanup | `ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup()` | `src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c` | Root cause: unchecked `send_window += window` refund |\n| Build shadow buffer | `ngx_http_v2_filter_get_shadow()` | `src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c` | Sets `last = pos + size` with a negative `size` |\n| Complete DATA frame | `ngx_http_v2_data_frame_handler()` | `src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c` | Accounting hook for sent frames; patched with `send_queued` |\n| Stage TLS output | `ngx_ssl_send_chain()` | `src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c` | Computes negative `ssize_t` and calls `memcpy` with a huge `size_t` |\n| Native copy | `ngx_memcpy()` / glibc `memcpy` | libc | OOB read/write; backward-copy wrap makes the oversized copy return |\n\n---\n\n## Appendix B \u2014 Upstream Patch\n\n```diff\nFrom e27f5fa84fe6e98505e70bc543b748747dad0a3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Roman Arutyunyan \nDate: Thu, 29 Oct 2026 21:37:05 +0400\nSubject: [PATCH] HTTP/2: account for queued frames when validating\n WINDOW_UPDATE\n\nWhen a stream is terminated, its unsent payload length is refunded back\nto the connection flow control.  Previously, this could increase the\nflow control beyond NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW, if it was increased by the\nclient after the stream frames were queued and before the stream was\nterminated.  This eventually resulted in broken buffer size control in\nngx_http_v2_send_chain() followed by memory corruption and a possible\nsegmentation fault.\n\nThe fix is to account for the queued frames when validating a client\nWINDOW_UPDATE.  From the client's point of view, the queued frames\nstill belong to the flow control window.\n\nReported by Xint.io.\n---\n src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c               | 4 ++--\n src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h               | 1 +\n src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c | 3 +++\n 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c\nindex c308bdfcb2..807dd59c10 100644\n--- a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c\n+++ b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c\n@@ -2561,13 +2561,13 @@ ngx_http_v2_state_window_update(ngx_http_v2_connection_t *h2c, u_char *pos,\n         return ngx_http_v2_state_complete(h2c, pos, end);\n     }\n \n-    if (window &gt; NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - h2c-&gt;send_window) {\n+    if (window &gt; NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - h2c-&gt;send_window - h2c-&gt;send_queued) {\n         ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_INFO, h2c-&gt;connection-&gt;log, 0,\n                       \"client violated connection flow control: \"\n                       \"received WINDOW_UPDATE frame \"\n                       \"with window increment %uz \"\n                       \"not allowed for window %uz\",\n-                      window, h2c-&gt;send_window);\n+                      window, h2c-&gt;send_window + h2c-&gt;send_queued);\n \n         return ngx_http_v2_connection_error(h2c, NGX_HTTP_V2_FLOW_CTRL_ERROR);\n     }\ndiff --git a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h\nindex eb3cd008e9..b2eaa5787f 100644\n--- a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h\n+++ b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h\n@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ struct ngx_http_v2_connection_s {\n     ngx_uint_t                       refused_streams;\n \n     size_t                           send_window;\n+    size_t                           send_queued;\n     size_t                           recv_window;\n     size_t                           init_window;\n \ndiff --git a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c\nindex 61e6371374..e91eb58243 100644\n--- a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c\n+++ b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2_filter_module.c\n@@ -1242,6 +1242,7 @@ ngx_http_v2_send_chain(ngx_connection_t *fc, ngx_chain_t *in, off_t limit)\n             ngx_http_v2_queue_frame(fn, frame);\n \n             h2c-&gt;send_window -= frame_size;\n+            h2c-&gt;send_queued += frame_size;\n \n             stream-&gt;send_window -= frame_size;\n             stream-&gt;queued++;\n@@ -1634,6 +1635,7 @@ ngx_http_v2_data_frame_handler(ngx_http_v2_connection_t *h2c,\n     stream-&gt;request-&gt;header_size += NGX_HTTP_V2_FRAME_HEADER_SIZE;\n \n     h2c-&gt;payload_bytes += frame-&gt;length;\n+    h2c-&gt;send_queued -= frame-&gt;length;\n \n     ngx_http_v2_handle_frame(stream, frame);\n \n@@ -1770,6 +1772,7 @@ ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup(void *data)\n     }\n \n     h2c-&gt;send_window += window;\n+    h2c-&gt;send_queued -= window;\n }\n```\n\n---\n\n## Appendix C \u2014 CVSS Vectors and Glossary\n\n### C.1 CVSS 4.0\n\n```text\nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N\nBase score: 9.2 (Critical)\n```\n\n| Metric | Value | Interpretation |\n|---|---|---|\n| AV | Network | Reachable over the network |\n| AC | High | Requires precise state, traffic volume and target-specific conditions |\n| AT | None | No additional attack requirements beyond the vulnerable configuration |\n| PR | None | No authentication |\n| UI | None | No user interaction |\n| VC / VI / VA | High / High / High | Full confidentiality, integrity and availability impact on the vulnerable system |\n| SC / SI / SA | None / None / None | No direct impact on subsequent systems |\n\n### C.2 CVSS 3.1\n\n```text\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\nBase score: 8.1 (High)\n```\n\n### C.3 Glossary\n\n- **HTTP/2 stream**: a logical request/response exchange within a connection, identified by a stream ID.\n- **Connection window**: the shared flow-control credit for all streams on an HTTP/2 connection.\n- **Stream window**: the flow-control credit for one stream.\n- **WINDOW_UPDATE**: an HTTP/2 frame that grants additional flow-control credit.\n- **SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE**: an HTTP/2 setting that controls the initial stream-level window and adjusts active streams by the delta.\n- **MAX**: `NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW = 2^31 - 1 = 0x7fffffff`.\n- **`size_t`**: unsigned integer type used for `h2c-&gt;send_window`; 64-bit on the tested build.\n- **`ssize_t`**: signed integer type used for `stream-&gt;send_window` and the TLS copy length.\n- **`off_t`**: signed 64-bit file/offset type used for the send limit and shadow-buffer length.\n- **`ngx_buf_t`**: NGINX buffer metadata with `pos` (next byte) and `last` (end of data); a valid buffer requires `last &gt;= pos`.\n- **Shadow buffer**: an `ngx_buf_t` that refers to part of an existing response body without copying the body.\n- **EVEX/YMM**: x86-64 AVX-512 encoding and 256-bit vector registers used by optimized glibc copy routines.\n\n---\n\n## Appendix D \u2014 Assessment Confidence\n\n| Area | Confidence | Basis |\n|---|---|---|\n| CVE metadata, CVSS, affected/fixed versions | **High** | F5 CVE record, NVD, NGINX advisories, upstream patch |\n| Root cause and code path | **High** | Upstream source, patch diff, Rapid7 and Xint code-level analyses |\n| Patch correctness | **High** | Small diff with a clear invariant; matches vendor fix and backport |\n| Exploitability (RCE confirmed) | **High** | Rapid7 and Wiz demonstrations; Xint multi-cloud validation |\n| Reliability against arbitrary Internet targets | **Medium** | Lab and cloud demonstrations are convincing, but heap layout, glibc/CPU, bandwidth and proxy constraints are significant; public PoC is scoped to a fresh local container |\n| In-the-wild exploitation status | **Medium** | Point-in-time CISA SSVC and KEV data; absence of reports does not prove absence of exploitation |\n| Long-term risk | **High** | Critical edge-server bug, public exploit, large exposed install base, difficult detection |\n\n---\n\n*End of report.*\n", "url": "https://gist.github.com/cyberheartmi9/778d6ef6e7edd77d72e41a63fc87068f"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2026-4658", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2026-4658", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.0.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2026-4658", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2026-4658", "field": "document.tracking.initial_release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Release date", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2026-4658", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2026-4658", "field": "vulnerabilities.7.release_date", "linked_record": true, "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-18T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2026-4658", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2026-4658", "field": "document.tracking.current_release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T01:05:29Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T01:05:29Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "osv_azurelinux \u00b7 AZL-114607", "record": "AZL-114607", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T01:08:16Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T01:08:16+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "alpine \u00b7 ALPINE-V3.22-MAIN-NGINX", "record": "ALPINE-V3.22-MAIN-NGINX", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T01:10:42Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T01:10:42+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "alpine \u00b7 ALPINE-V3.23-MAIN-NGINX", "record": "ALPINE-V3.23-MAIN-NGINX", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T03:34:56Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T03:34:56+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "alpine \u00b7 ALPINE-EDGE-MAIN-NGINX", "record": "ALPINE-EDGE-MAIN-NGINX", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T04:06:27Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T04:06:27+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "alpine \u00b7 ALPINE-V3.24-MAIN-NGINX", "record": "ALPINE-V3.24-MAIN-NGINX", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T04:57:02Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T04:57:02Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "osv_dhi \u00b7 DHI-75ZW-B2U3-J56T-B2HZ", "record": "DHI-75ZW-B2U3-J56T-B2HZ", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T08:02:06.758Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T08:02:06.758+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Document generated", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2026-4658", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2026-4658", "field": "document.tracking.generator.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T10:48:18Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T10:48:18Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_opensuse \u00b7 OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "record": "OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.1.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T10:48:18Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T10:48:18Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "csaf_opensuse \u00b7 OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "record": "OPENSUSE-SU-2026:12599-1", "field": "document.tracking.current_release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T12:09:37Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T12:09:37Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "osv_ubuntu \u00b7 UBUNTU-CVE-2026-125283", "record": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-125283", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T17:08:04.759Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T17:08:04.759617+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "debian_tracker \u00b7 DEBIAN-CVE-2026-125283", "record": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-125283", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T17:44:48Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T17:44:48.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://gist.github.com/mrs83/23f76151065f90d430b383853500e19e", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "446c88d7-8773-4c5a-ad36-3d4cc0e6d75b", "content": "---\nname: apt-mirror-audit\ndescription: Check whether a fleet is actually running patched packages when the OS image points apt at a provider mirror \u2014 compare the mirror against the official archive, add the official archive as an equal-priority fallback, upgrade rolling, and prove the daemon restarted. Use when asked \"is X vulnerable / is X updated\", when a CVE lands, or when `apt` claims nothing to upgrade on a host that should have a newer build.\n---\n\n# Auditing patches when the mirror is the bottleneck\n\nA provider's install image (Hetzner `installimage`, cloud images) usually writes its own\nDebian/Ubuntu mirror into `/etc/apt/sources.list.d/*.sources`. That mirror can lag the official\narchive by days. `apt` is not lying \u2014 the fixed package genuinely is not in the index it reads \u2014 so\n`apt upgrade` reports \"0 upgraded\" and `unattended-upgrades` reports success while the host runs a\nbuild that is already superseded.\n\n## 1. Establish what is installed and where it comes from\n\n```bash\ndpkg-query -W -f='${Package} ${Version}\\n' \napt-cache policy             # installed vs candidate vs source URI\ngrep -h \"^URIs\\|^deb \" /etc/apt/sources.list /etc/apt/sources.list.d/* 2&gt;/dev/null\n```\n\nAlways `apt-get update` first: `apt list --upgradable` reads a cached index, and a stale cache\nlooks exactly like a patched host.\n\n## 2. Compare the mirror with the official archive\n\nQuery the index directly instead of trusting either apt or the CVE tracker (the tracker can still\nsay `needed` after the fix is published):\n\n```bash\n# x86 hosts use archive.ubuntu.com; arm64/ppc64el/s390x use ports.ubuntu.com\nfor u in https://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu https://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu; do\n  for s in noble noble-updates; do\n    printf '%s %s -&gt; ' \"$u\" \"$s\"\n    curl -s \"$u/dists/$s/main/binary-amd64/Packages.gz\" | gunzip \\\n      | awk '/^Package: nginx$/{f=1;next} f&amp;&amp;/^Version:/{print $2; exit}'\n  done\ndone\n```\n\nProvider mirrors usually serve `Packages.xz` (not `.gz`) \u2014 try both. If the official archive is\nahead, the mirror is the problem, not the package.\n\nUbuntu CVE state per release (JSON, filter `packages[].statuses[]` on `release_codename`):\n\n```bash\ncurl -s https://ubuntu.com/security/cves/.json\n```\n\nStatus `needed` means no patched build exists; `released` means it does.\n\n## 3. Decide whether the fleet is exposed at all\n\nRead the advisory's preconditions and check the configs \u2014 a CVE you cannot reach is not an\nincident. For example, nginx CVE-2026-125283 needs `try_files` + `alias` + a `map` variable with\nregex captures in the same server:\n\n```bash\nsudo grep -rn \"^\\s*alias \\|^\\s*map \\|try_files\" /etc/nginx/\n```\n\nReport exposure per host, not in general.\n\n## 4. Add the official archive next to the mirror\n\nEqual priority, no pinning: apt takes the highest version, the local mirror keeps serving what it\nhas, and upstream fills the gaps. Pinning the mirror would keep it winning with the older version \u2014\nthat is the bug, not the fix.\n\n```yaml\n- name: Add the official Ubuntu archive as a fallback apt source\n  ansible.builtin.deb822_repository:\n    name: ubuntu-official\n    types: [deb]\n    uris: [\"{{ common_ubuntu_archive_uri }}\"]   # archive.ubuntu.com for x86_64, ports.ubuntu.com otherwise\n    suites:\n      - \"{{ ansible_distribution_release }}\"\n      - \"{{ ansible_distribution_release }}-updates\"\n      - \"{{ ansible_distribution_release }}-security\"\n      - \"{{ ansible_distribution_release }}-backports\"\n    components: [main, restricted, universe, multiverse]\n    signed_by: /usr/share/keyrings/ubuntu-archive-keyring.gpg\n```\n\nOne architecture rule is easy to miss: `archive.ubuntu.com` has no arm64 index \u2014 an arm64 host\n(bastion, cax VMs) needs `ports.ubuntu.com/ubuntu-ports`. A wrong URI fails the cache update with a\nwall of 404s.\n\nIn bidder-infra this lives in `ansible/roles/common/tasks/apt_sources.yml`, applied fleet-wide by\n`make apt-sources` (`ansible/playbooks/apt-sources.yml`, which also encodes the two access models:\nCloud VMs as `ubuntu` through the bastion, dedicated nodes as root).\n\n## 5. Upgrade rolling, then prove the daemon restarted\n\n- One host at a time; put the one holding the floating IP / VIP **last**.\n- `nginx -t` before restarting; `systemctl is-active` after.\n- The evidence that the new code runs is the master's start time, not the on-disk binary:\n\n```bash\napt-cache policy nginx | sed -n 2p                      # installed == expected\nsystemctl show -p ActiveEnterTimestamp nginx           # restarted just now\n```\n\n`nginx -v` reports the binary on disk, so it cannot distinguish a running old master from a new\none. Reload alone does not replace the worker code path from a new binary; restart the service.\n\n## 6. Report\n\nPer host: installed version, candidate version, source URI, master start time, and the exposure\nverdict for the specific CVE. Note what remains (other hosts without the package, patches still\n`needed` upstream) and that `unattended-upgrades` will take the rest once the mirror or the official\narchive has it", "url": "https://gist.github.com/mrs83/23f76151065f90d430b383853500e19e"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T18:00:10Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T18:00:10.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://gist.github.com/mrs83/80113afc458e6494f4dfab89084a2fb9", "record": "CVE-2026-125283", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "31f9a8ca-c909-4c0b-89f7-87cb3c35eaa6", "content": "---\nname: apt-mirror-audit\ndescription: Check whether a fleet is actually running patched packages when the OS image points apt at a provider mirror \u2014 compare the mirror against the official archive, add the official archive as an equal-priority fallback, upgrade rolling, and prove the daemon restarted.\n---\n\n# Auditing patches when the mirror is the bottleneck\n\nProvider install images and cloud images usually write their own Debian/Ubuntu mirror into\n`/etc/apt/sources.list.d/*.sources`. That mirror can lag the official archive by days. `apt` is\nnot lying \u2014 the fixed package genuinely is not in the index it reads \u2014 so `apt upgrade` reports\n\"0 upgraded\" and `unattended-upgrades` reports success while the host runs a build that is already\nsuperseded.\n\n## 1. Establish what is installed and where it comes from\n\n```bash\ndpkg-query -W -f='${Package} ${Version}\\n' \napt-cache policy             # installed vs candidate vs source URI\ngrep -h \"^URIs\\|^deb \" /etc/apt/sources.list /etc/apt/sources.list.d/* 2&gt;/dev/null\n```\n\nAlways `apt-get update` first: `apt list --upgradable` reads a cached index, and a stale cache\nlooks exactly like a patched host.\n\n## 2. Compare the mirror with the official archive\n\nQuery the index directly instead of trusting either apt or the CVE tracker (the tracker can still\nsay `needed` after the fix is published):\n\n```bash\n# x86 hosts use archive.ubuntu.com; arm64/ppc64el/s390x use ports.ubuntu.com\nfor u in https://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu https://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu; do\n  for s in noble noble-updates; do\n    printf '%s %s -&gt; ' \"$u\" \"$s\"\n    curl -s \"$u/dists/$s/main/binary-amd64/Packages.gz\" | gunzip \\\n      | awk '/^Package: nginx$/{f=1;next} f&amp;&amp;/^Version:/{print $2; exit}'\n  done\ndone\n```\n\nProvider mirrors usually serve `Packages.xz` (not `.gz`) \u2014 try both. If the official archive is\nahead, the mirror is the problem, not the package.\n\nUbuntu CVE state per release (JSON, filter `packages[].statuses[]` on `release_codename`):\n\n```bash\ncurl -s https://ubuntu.com/security/cves/.json\n```\n\nStatus `needed` means no patched build exists; `released` means it does.\n\n## 3. Decide whether the fleet is exposed at all\n\nRead the advisory's preconditions and check the configs \u2014 a CVE you cannot reach is not an\nincident. For example, nginx CVE-2026-125283 needs `try_files` + `alias` + a `map` variable with\nregex captures in the same server:\n\n```bash\nsudo grep -rn \"^\\s*alias \\|^\\s*map \\|try_files\" /etc/nginx/\n```\n\nReport exposure per host, not in general.\n\n## 4. Add the official archive next to the mirror\n\nEqual priority, no pinning: apt takes the highest version, the local mirror keeps serving what it\nhas, and upstream fills the gaps. Pinning the mirror would keep it winning with the older version \u2014\nthat is the bug, not the fix.\n\n```yaml\n- name: Add the official Ubuntu archive as a fallback apt source\n  ansible.builtin.deb822_repository:\n    name: ubuntu-official\n    types: [deb]\n    uris: [\"{{ common_ubuntu_archive_uri }}\"]   # archive.ubuntu.com for x86_64, ports.ubuntu.com otherwise\n    suites:\n      - \"{{ ansible_distribution_release }}\"\n      - \"{{ ansible_distribution_release }}-updates\"\n      - \"{{ ansible_distribution_release }}-security\"\n      - \"{{ ansible_distribution_release }}-backports\"\n    components: [main, restricted, universe, multiverse]\n    signed_by: /usr/share/keyrings/ubuntu-archive-keyring.gpg\n```\n\nOne architecture rule is easy to miss: `archive.ubuntu.com` has no arm64 index \u2014 an arm64 host\nneeds `ports.ubuntu.com/ubuntu-ports`. A wrong URI fails the cache update with a 404.\n\n## 5. Upgrade rolling, then prove the daemon restarted\n\n- One host at a time; put any host that holds a floating IP or service VIP **last**.\n- `nginx -t` before restarting; `systemctl is-active` after.\n- The evidence that the new code runs is the master's start time, not the on-disk binary:\n\n```bash\napt-cache policy nginx | sed -n 2p                      # installed == expected\nsystemctl show -p ActiveEnterTimestamp nginx           # restarted just now\n```\n\n`nginx -v` reports the binary on disk, so it cannot distinguish a running old master from a new\none. Reload alone does not replace the worker code path from a new binary; restart the service.\n\n## 6. Report\n\nPer host: installed version, candidate version, source URI, master start time, and the exposure\nverdict for the specific CVE. Note what remains (other hosts without the package, patches still\n`needed` upstream) and that `unattended-upgrades` will take the rest once the mirror or the official\narchive has it.", "url": "https://gist.github.com/mrs83/80113afc458e6494f4dfab89084a2fb9"}], "metrics": {"as_of": "2026-11-19T18:22:34.863Z", "anchors": {"origin": {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "date_only": true, "value": "2026-11-18", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "certfr_avis \u00b7 CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "record": "CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "field": "initial_release_date", "linked_record": true, "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "discovery": null, "report": null, "acknowledgement": null, "disclosure": {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "date_only": true, "value": "2026-11-18", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "certfr_avis \u00b7 CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "record": "CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "field": "initial_release_date", "linked_record": true, "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "exploit_publication": null, "exploitation": null, "patch": null}, "vendor_response_time": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "time_to_exploit": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "disclosure_to_exploit": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "disclosure_to_exploit_publication": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "time_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "total_time_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "disclosure_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "time_unpatched": {"available": true, "seconds": 152554.863501, "hours": 42.376350972500006, "days": 1.7656812905208334, "min_seconds": 66154.863501, "max_seconds": 152554.863501, "approximate": true, "ongoing": true, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2026-11-18T00:00:00Z", "date_only": true, "value": "2026-11-18", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "certfr_avis \u00b7 CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "record": "CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567", "field": "initial_release_date", "linked_record": true, "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "end": {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T18:22:34.863Z", "date_only": false, "label": "As of", "source": "Calculation clock"}}, "exploitation_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start"]}, "exploit_publication_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start"]}}}
