https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundles/feed.atom Most recent bundles. 2025-02-09T21:09:38.156763+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent bundles. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/d938dc28-6877-40db-ad5f-25f3051288e6 RSYNC: 6 vulnerabilities 2025-02-09T21:09:38.165588+00:00 Alexandre Dulaunoy http://vulnerability.circl.lu/user/adulau # 6 vulnerabilities in rsync server As published in [https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/01/14/3](https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/01/14/3) Hello OSS-security, Two independent groups of researchers have identified a total of 6 vulnerabilities in rsync. In the most severe CVE, an attacker only requires anonymous read access to a rsync server, such as a public mirror, to execute arbitrary code on the machine the server is running on. Upstream has prepared patches for these CVEs. These fixes will be included in rsync 3.4.0 which is to be released shortly. CVE Details: [1] Heap Buffer Overflow in Rsync due to Improper Checksum Length Handling CVE ID: CVE-2024-12084 CVSS 3.1: 9.8 - AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Description: A heap-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the rsync daemon. This issue is due to improper handling of attacker-controlled checksum lengths (s2length) in the code. When MAX_DIGEST_LEN exceeds the fixed SUM_LENGTH (16 bytes), an attacker can write out of bounds in the sum2 buffer. Affected Versions: >= 3.2.7 and < 3.4.0 Reporters: Simon Scannell from Google, Pedro Gallegos from Google, Jasiel Spelman from Google Mitigation: Disable SHA* support by compiling with CFLAGS=-DDISABLE_SHA512_DIGEST and CFLAGS=-DDISABLE_SHA256_DIGEST. ---------- [2] Info Leak via Uninitialized Stack Contents CVE ID: CVE-2024-12085 CVSS 3.1: 7.5 - AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Description: A flaw was found in the rsync daemon which could be triggered when rsync compares file checksums. This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the checksum length (s2length) to cause a comparison between a checksum and uninitialized memory and leak one byte of uninitialized stack data at a time. Affected Versions: < 3.4.0 Reporters: Simon Scannell from Google, Pedro Gallegos from Google, Jasiel Spelman from Google Mitigation: Compile with -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero to zero the stack contents. ---------- [3] Rsync Server Leaks Arbitrary Client Files CVE ID: CVE-2024-12086 CVSS 3.1: 6.1 - AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N Description: A flaw was found in rsync. It could allow a server to enumerate the contents of an arbitrary file from the client's machine. This issue occurs when files are being copied from a client to a server. During this process, the rsync server will send checksums of local data to the client to compare with in order to determine what data needs to be sent to the server. By sending specially constructed checksum values for arbitrary files, an attacker may be able to reconstruct the data of those files byte-by-byte based on the responses from the client. Affected Versions: < 3.4.0 Reporters: Simon Scannell from Google, Pedro Gallegos from Google, Jasiel Spelman from Google ---------- [4] Path Traversal Vulnerability in Rsync CVE ID: CVE-2024-12087 CVSS 3.1: 6.5 - AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Description: A path traversal vulnerability exists in rsync. It stems from behavior enabled by the `--inc-recursive` option, a default-enabled option for many client options and can be enabled by the server even if not explicitly enabled by the client. When using the `--inc-recursive` option, a lack of proper symlink verification coupled with deduplication checks occurring on a per-file-list basis could allow a server to write files outside of the client's intended destination directory. A malicious server could write malicious files to arbitrary locations named after valid directories/paths on the client. Affected Versions: < 3.4.0 Reporters: Simon Scannell from Google, Pedro Gallegos from Google, Jasiel Spelman from Google ---------- [5] --safe-links Option Bypass Leads to Path Traversal CVE ID: CVE-2024-12088 CVSS 3.1: 6.5 - AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Description: A flaw was found in rsync. When using the `--safe-links` option, rsync fails to properly verify if a symbolic link destination contains another symbolic link within it. This results in a path traversal vulnerability, which may lead to arbitrary file write outside the desired directory. Affected Versions: < 3.4.0 Reporters: Simon Scannell from Google, Pedro Gallegos from Google, Jasiel Spelman from Google ---------- [6] Race Condition in Rsync Handling Symbolic Links CVE ID: CVE-2024-12747 CVSS 3.1: 5.6 - AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N Description: A flaw was found in rsync. This vulnerability arises from a race condition during rsync's handling of symbolic links. Rsync's default behavior when encountering symbolic links is to skip them. If an attacker replaced a regular file with a symbolic link at the right time, it was possible to bypass the default behavior and traverse symbolic links. Depending on the privileges of the rsync process, an attacker could leak sensitive information, potentially leading to privilege escalation. Affected Versions: < 3.4.0 Reporters: Aleksei Gorban "loqpa" Best Regards, Red Hat Product Security Nick Tait He / Him (why? <https://medium.com/gender-inclusivit/why-i-put-pronouns-on-my-email-signature-and-linkedin-profile-and-you-should-too-d3dc942c8743> ) Incident Commander - Product Security <https://www.redhat.com> <https://www.redhat.com> secalert@...hat.com for urgent response. My working hours may not be your working hours. Do not feel obligated to reply outside of your normal work schedule. 2025-01-14T19:22:34.779124+00:00 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/1589f952-6079-4a2c-b742-e8d947b50a39 Haunted by Legacy: Discovering and Exploiting Vulnerable Tunnelling Hosts 2025-02-09T21:09:38.165518+00:00 Alexandre Dulaunoy http://vulnerability.circl.lu/user/adulau Ref: [https://github.com/vanhoefm/tunneltester/blob/main/README.md](https://github.com/vanhoefm/tunneltester/blob/main/README.md) # Haunted by Legacy: Discovering and Exploiting Vulnerable Tunnelling Hosts <a id="id-intro"></a> ## [1. Introduction](#id-intro) This repository will contain scripts to test whether hosts/servers accept unauthenticated tunneling packets. In particular, it can test whether a host accepts IPIP, IP6IP6, GRE, GRE6, 4in6, and 6in4 packets using various scanning methods. A high-level description of the resulting attacks can be found below, and a detailed description and evaluation of all attacks can be found in our [USENIX Security '25 paper](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/usenix2025-tunnels.pdf). **NOTE: To prevent abuse, this scanning script is not yet publicly available. Only the README of the script is available. Please contact [Angelos Beitis](https://www.kuleuven.be/wieiswie/en/person/00165395) and [Mathy Vanhoef](https://www.kuleuven.be/wieiswie/en/person/00086006) to get access to the actual scanning scripts. We can also provide Z-Map modules to scan multiple hosts at once.** For advice on how to mitigate the resulting attacks, see Section 6 in [our paper](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/usenix2025-tunnels.pdf). The vulnerabilities were reported to CERT/CC on May 16, 2024, and are being tracked using the identifier VU#199397 and using the [CVE identifiers described below](#id-summary-cves). We have also collaborated with the [Shadowserver Foundation](https://www.shadowserver.org/) to better reach affected organizations, and they are now performing periodic scans for vulnerable tunneling hosts. <a id="id-summary"></a> ## [2. Vulnerability Summary](#id-summary) ![Attack Overview](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/vanhoefm/tunneltester/refs/heads/main/attack_overview.png) We found that many Internet hosts accept unauthenticated [IPIP](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2003), [IP6IP6](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2473), [GRE](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2784/), [6in4](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4213), or [4in6](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2473) tunneling packets from an arbitrary source. This means an adversary can send a tunneling packet to such vulnerable hosts, and the vulnerable host will process the encapsulated inner packet, without authenticating (the source of) the tunneling packet. An adversary can abuse this to perform Denail-of-Service attacks, to spoof their source IP address, and possibly to gain access to an organization's private or local network. An example attack, written using the [Python Scapy](https://scapy.net/) library, is: from scapy.all import * inner_packet = IP(src="1.1.1.1", dst="8.8.8.8")/ICMP() vulnerable_host = "1.0.0.1" send(IP(dst=vulnerable_host)/GRE()/inner_packet) The vulnerable host at `1.0.0.1` will receive the IP/GRE packet and then process and forward the inner IP packet to its destination. More worrisome, many vulnerable hosts will perform no sanity checks on the inner packet. This means many vulnerable hosts can be abused to spoof the source IP addresses of packets. As shown in the above example, the forwarded packet can have the IP address `1.1.1.1`, even though the real IP address of the vulnerable host is `1.0.0.1`. This means an ICMP packet will be sent to `8.8.8.8` with as spoofed source address `1.1.1.1`. Similar attacks are possible against IPv4 and IPv6 hosts using the protocols [IPIP](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2003), [IP6IP](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2473), [GRE6](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2784/), [6in4](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4213), or [4in6](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2473). Note that we use 'host' as a synonym for an IPv4 or IPv6 address and that we will use 'GRE6' when GRE packets are sent between IPv6 hosts. <a id="id-summary-scans"></a> ### [2.1 Scanning Methods](#id-summary-scans) To detect vulnerable hosts, we scanned the IPv4 and IPv6 Internet using three main methods. These methods are further explained in the indicated sections of our paper: - **Standard Scan** (Section 3.2.1): In this scan, the inner packet is an ICMP ping reply with as source IP address the vulnerable host and as destination our scanning server. We also did a subnet spoofing variant of this scan, where the inner packet has as source an IP address within the same subnet as the host. Additionally, we did a spoofing variant, where the inner packet has a spoofed source IP address that is outside the subnet of the host. - **ICMP Echo/Reply (Ping) Scan** (Section 3.2.2): In this scan, the inner packet is an ICMP ping request with as destination the vulnerable host itself and as source address our scanning server. In case the host is vulnerable, it will process the ping request, and send a ping reply to our scanning server. - **Time Exceeded (TTL) Scan** (Section 3.2.3): In this scan, the inner packet is an IP packet with a Time-To-Live (TTL) equal to one, or an IPv6 packet with a Hop Limit equal to zero. This inner packet has as source address our scanning server, and has as destination address a random public IP address. If the host tries to forward this packet, and hence is vulnerable, it will generate an ICMPv4 or ICMPv6 Time Exceeded packet towards our scanning server. For the 4in6 scans, where we send a tunneling packet to an IPv6 host with as inner packet an IPv4 packet, we cannot perform a ping scan because we do not know the IPv4 address of the IPv6 host being scanner. This also implies we can only do the spoofing variant of the standard scan, because we do not know the IPv4 subnet of the host. For the 6in4 scans, where we send a tunneling packet to an IPv4 host with as inner packet an IPv6 packet, we can use the [IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Address](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4291#section-2.5.5.2) of the form `ffff:IPV4_ADDRESS_IN_HEX::` to perform the standard and ping scans. <a id="id-summary-impact"></a> ### [2.2 Impact Summary](#id-summary-impact) - **Denial-of-Service**: An attack that is always possible is a Denial-of-Service attack by recursively encapsulating tunneling packets and sending this constructed packet to a vulnerable host. The vulnerable host will then recursively keep processing the encapsulated tunneling packets until the last nested packet is reached. This implies that sending a single packet will result in substantial processing time on the vulnerable host. In terms of CPU usage on the vulnerable host, this can result in an amplification factor of 70x when performing a DoS attack, and even higher when combined with IP fragmentation. Depending on the behaviour of the vulnerable tunneling host, other DoS attacks may also be possible, such as a Tunneled-Temporal Lensing Attack or Economic DoS attack. See our draft paper for details. - **Source Address Spoofing**: An adversary can abuse vulnerable tunneling hosts to spoof their source IP address. This is because the vulnerable tunneling host will forward IP packets on behalf of the attacker. A host can spoof source IP addresses when the Standard "subnet spoof" and "spoof" scans indicate that the server is vulnerable. - **Internal Network Access**: In case the vulnerable host is connected to a private network, then the open tunneling host can possibly be abused to gain access to all devices within this connected private network. This may particularly be possible if the vulnerable hosts also implement Network Address Translation (NAT). The precise details of this are still being investigated. <a id="id-summary-cves"></a> ### [2.3 Assigned CVE Identifiers](#id-summary-cves) - [CVE-2020-10136](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10136): IPv4-in-IPv4 (IPIP) protocol (RFC2003). - [CVE-2024-7595](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7595): GRE and GRE6 (RFC2784). - [CVE-2024-7596](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7596): Generic UDP Encapsulation (GUE) (IETF Draft). We did not detect any vulnerable hosts using this draft protocol. - [CVE-2025-23018](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23018): IPv4-in-IPv6 (4in6) and IPv6-in-IPv6 (IP6IP6) protocols (RFC2473). - [CVE-2025-23019](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23019): IPv6-in-IPv4 (6in4) protocol (RFC4213). <a id="id-prerequisites"></a> ## [3. Tool Prerequisites](#id-prerequisites) You can execute the following commands to initialize the Python environment to execute the script. We tested these commands on Ubuntu 24.04: python3 -m venv venv source venv/bin/activate pip install wheel scapy==2.4.3 You can then load this Python environment as root and execute the script: sudo su source venv/bin/activate ./tunnel_tester.py <a id="id-reproduce"></a> ## [4. Steps to Reproduce](#id-reproduce) After the prerequisite steps, you can execute the following command to test IPv4-capable hosts: ./tunnel_tester.py eth0 -t 183.232.161.42 The parameters are: * `-i eth0`: The interface that should be used to send and receive the packets. It must have an IPv4 address, otherwise, no tests are performed. * `-t 183.232.161.42`: This is the IPv4 address of the host being tested. You can test IPv6-capable hosts using the following command: ./tunnel_tester.py eth0 -t6 2a00::1000 The parameters are: * `-i eth0`: The interface that should be used to send and receive the packets. It must have an IPv6 address, otherwise, no tests are performed. * `-t6 2a00::1001`: This is the IPv6 address of the host being tested. The IPv4 and IPv6 tests can also be performed in a single execution: ./tunnel_tester.py -t 183.232.161.42 -t6 2a00::1001 For each performed test, the script will output `SAFE` if no vulnerability was detected, and `VULNERABLE` if a vulnerability was detected. Note that we recommend executing the script multiple times, since sometimes replies may get lost. You can also increase or decrease how long the script waits for replies using the `--timeout` parameter. For instance, by specifying `--timeout 0.5` the script will only wait half a second for replies. <a id="id-advanced"></a> ## [5. Advanced Usage](#id-advanced) By default, the script will use the IP address associated to the given interface as the source address in transmitted packets. To use a different source address, or explicitly set the IP address in case it does not get detected properly, you can use: * `-P A.A.A.A`: The IPv4 to use as source address in outgoing IP packets. * `-P6 2a00::1000`: The IPv6 to use as source address in outgoing IP packets. By default, the script will try to spoof IP addresses belonging to KU Leuven University in the standard spoof scan. To try to spoof a different source IP address you can use the following arguments: * `-s 212.224.129.90`: Test whether the vulnerable host has the ability to spoof the given source IPv4 addresses. * `-s6 2a02:2c40:0:80::80:15`: Test whether the vulnerable host has the ability to spoof the given source IPv6 addresses. In the Time Expired TTL scans, the inner IP addresses by default belong to KU Leuven University. To use a different inner destination IP address, in order to trigger packet forward and generate the TTL Expired error, you can use the following arguments: * `-t 212.224.129.90`: Test whether the vulnerable host has the ability to spoof the given source IPv4 addresses. * `-t6 2a02:2c40:0:80::80:15`: Test whether the vulnerable host has the ability to spoof the given source IPv6 addresses. When running the script on an AWS EC2 server, you need to explicitly provide the private and public IP address of the server using the following arguments: * `-p 172.0.0.1`: The private IPv4 address of the scanning server. * `-P 1.2.3.4`: The public IPv4 address of the scanning server. <a id="id-troubleshooting"></a> ## [6. Troubleshooting](#id-troubleshooting) - Ensure you are injecting packets on the correct interface! - When you are testing your own vulnerable server, ensure that the `accept_local` and `ip_forwarding` sysctl's for both IPv4/6 are set. Otherwise the host may not be vulnerable to (all) attacks. - With tcpdump you can use the filter `"proto 4 or proto gre or proto 41"` to capture the packets that the scanning tool is transmitting (this will not show possible replies). ## Additional feedback - [https://infosec.exchange/@jeroen@secluded.ch/113831359550444599](https://infosec.exchange/@jeroen@secluded.ch/113831359550444599) `that is only 20 years after http://www.dia.uniroma3.it/~compunet/tunneldiscovery/ and there are other similar papers that wrote this up. It is the full intent and purpose on how those protocols are supposed to be used, and spoofing is a network issue in this case (they rely on a trusted network... ouch). Source Address Validation is one solution, not using non-authenticated protocols another.` 2025-01-16T14:33:35.445554+00:00 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/0ff87615-7549-4602-8c19-766d8fd43c8d Unit42 Threat Brief: CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283 2025-02-09T21:09:38.165446+00:00 Alexandre Dulaunoy http://vulnerability.circl.lu/user/adulau On Jan. 8, 2025, Ivanti released a security advisory for two vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283) in its Connect Secure, Policy Secure and ZTA gateway products. This threat brief provides attack details that we observed in a recent incident response engagement to provide actionable intelligence to the community. These details can be used to further detect current attacks noted in the wild using CVE-2025-0282. These Ivanti products are all appliances that facilitate remote connections into a network. As such, they are outward-facing assets that attackers could target to infiltrate a network. CVE-2025-0282 is a stack-based buffer overflow in Ivanti Connect Secure before version 22.7R2.5, Ivanti Policy Secure before version 22.7R1.2 and Ivanti Neurons for ZTA gateways before version 22.7R2.3 that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution. This vulnerability has been assigned a critical CVSS score of 9.0. CVE-2025-0283 is a stack-based buffer overflow in Ivanti Connect Secure before version 22.7R2.5, Ivanti Policy Secure before version 22.7R1.2 and Ivanti Neurons for ZTA gateways before version 22.7R2.3 that allows a local authenticated attacker to escalate their privileges. This vulnerability has been assigned a high CVSS score of 7.0. On the same day of Ivanti’s advisory, Mandiant disclosed its findings of attacks in the wild using the CVE-2025-0282 remote code execution vulnerability. On January 10, Watchtowr Labs also provided analysis of the exploited vulnerability. On January 12, Watchtowr provided a walkthrough and on January 16 they published a proof of concept (PoC). For more info [https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-ivanti-cve-2025-0282-cve-2025-0283/](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-ivanti-cve-2025-0282-cve-2025-0283/) 2025-01-17T08:21:59.963244+00:00 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/b0eb6548-dfb1-42e3-90a2-d9bf681ffc71 A triple-exploit chain. auth bypass (1) to exposed dbus interface (2) to command injection (3) (from @da_667@infosec.exchange) 2025-02-09T21:09:38.165374+00:00 Cédric Bonhomme http://vulnerability.circl.lu/user/cedric A triple-exploit chain. auth bypass (1) to exposed dbus interface (2) to command injection (3): https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45100 2025-01-23T08:14:00.851963+00:00 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/f16e4486-bb1e-424d-9c5e-24cd9c0be4c1 CMSimple 5.16 vulnerabilities leading to RCE 2025-02-09T21:09:38.165297+00:00 Cédric Bonhomme http://vulnerability.circl.lu/user/cedric #### Vulnerabilities in CMSimple 5.16 leading to RCE * CVE-2024-57546 - An issue in CMSimple v.5.16 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via a crafted script to the validate link function. * CVE-2024-57547 - Insecure Permissions vulnerability in CMSimple v.5.16 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via a crafted script to the Functionality of downloading php backup files. * CVE-2024-57548 - CMSimple 5.16 allows the user to edit log.php file via print page. * CVE-2024-57549 - CMSimple 5.16 allows the user to read cms source code through manipulation of the file name in the file parameter of a GET request. #### Original research [https://github.com/h4ckr4v3n/cmsimple5.16_research](https://github.com/h4ckr4v3n/cmsimple5.16_research) 2025-01-24T07:56:51.051542+00:00 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/bd1f7e06-4107-433a-9fa6-fbf3db5cfa34 CISA and FBI Release Advisory on How Threat Actors Chained Vulnerabilities in Ivanti Cloud Service Applications 2025-02-09T21:09:38.165214+00:00 Alexandre Dulaunoy http://vulnerability.circl.lu/user/adulau CISA, in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), released Threat Actors Chained Vulnerabilities in Ivanti Cloud Service Applications. This advisory was crafted in response to active exploitation of vulnerabilities—CVE-2024-8963, an administrative bypass vulnerability; CVE-2024-9379, a SQL injection vulnerability; and CVE-2024-8190 and CVE-2024-9380, remote code execution vulnerabilities—in Ivanti Cloud Service Appliances (CSA) in September 2024. CISA, and the use of trusted third-party incident response data, found that threat actors chained the listed vulnerabilities to gain initial access, conduct remote code execution (RCE), obtain credentials, and implant webshells on victim networks. CISA and FBI strongly encourage network administrators and defenders to upgrade to the latest supported version of Ivanti CSA and to hunt for malicious activity on their networks using the detection methods and indicators of compromise (IOCs) provided in the advisory. All members of the cybersecurity community are also encouraged to visit CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog to help better manage vulnerabilities and keep pace with threat activity. For more information and guidance on protection against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures, visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals. Ref: [https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/01/22/cisa-and-fbi-release-advisory-how-threat-actors-chained-vulnerabilities-ivanti-cloud-service](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/01/22/cisa-and-fbi-release-advisory-how-threat-actors-chained-vulnerabilities-ivanti-cloud-service) 2025-01-24T12:55:48.457634+00:00 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/ef590220-936b-4bad-a04d-fea5234fae47 CISA Releases Fact Sheet Detailing Embedded Backdoor Function of Contec CMS8000 Firmware 2025-02-09T21:09:38.165128+00:00 Alexandre Dulaunoy http://vulnerability.circl.lu/user/adulau CISA released a fact sheet, Contec CMS8000 Contains a Backdoor, detailing an analysis of three firmware package versions of the Contec CMS8000, a patient monitor used by the U.S. Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) sector. Analysts discovered that an embedded backdoor function with a hard-coded IP address, CWE – 912: Hidden Functionality (CVE-2025-0626), and functionality that enables patient data spillage, CWE – 359: Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor (CVE-2025-0683 ), exists in all versions analyzed. Please note the Contec CMS8000 may be re-labeled and sold by resellers. For a list of known re-labeled devices, please refer to FDA’s safety communication, Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities with Certain Patient Monitors from Contec and Epsimed: FDA Safety Communication. Contec Medical Systems, the company which manufactures this monitor as well as other medical device and healthcare solutions, is headquartered in Qinhuangdao, China. The Contec CMS8000 is used in medical settings across the U.S. and European Union to provide continuous monitoring of a patient’s vital signs—tracking electrocardiogram, heart rate, blood oxygen saturation, non-invasive blood pressure, temperature, and respiration rate. CISA assesses that inclusion of this backdoor in the firmware of the patient monitor can create conditions which may allow remote code execution and device modification with the ability to alter its configuration. This introduces risk to patient safety as a malfunctioning patient monitor could lead to an improper response to patient vital signs. CISA strongly urges HPH sector organizations review the fact sheet and implement FDA's mitigations. Visit CISA’s Healthcare and Public Health Cybersecurity page to learn more about how to help improve cybersecurity within the HPH sector. For more information and guidance on protection against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures, visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals. [Reference](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/01/30/cisa-releases-fact-sheet-detailing-embedded-backdoor-function-contec-cms8000-firmware) 2025-01-31T14:10:50.910125+00:00 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/a4c1e6ab-1786-4631-8cc9-dfa00c7171a6 Threat Actors Use CVE-2019-18935 to Deliver Reverse Shells and… 2025-02-09T21:09:38.164995+00:00 Alexandre Dulaunoy http://vulnerability.circl.lu/user/adulau From: [https://www.esentire.com/blog/threat-actors-use-cve-2019-18935-to-deliver-reverse-shells-and-juicypotatong-privilege-escalation-tool](https://www.esentire.com/blog/threat-actors-use-cve-2019-18935-to-deliver-reverse-shells-and-juicypotatong-privilege-escalation-tool) # Threat Actors Use CVE-2019-18935 to Deliver Reverse Shells and… BY eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU) Adversaries don’t work 9-5 and neither do we. At eSentire, our 24/7 SOCs are staffed with Elite Threat Hunters and Cyber Analysts who hunt, investigate, contain and respond to threats within minutes. We have discovered some of the most dangerous threats and nation state attacks in our space – including the Kaseya MSP breach and the more_eggs malware. Our Security Operations Centers are supported with Threat Intelligence, Tactical Threat Response and Advanced Threat Analytics driven by our Threat Response Unit – the TRU team. In TRU Positives, eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) provides a summary of a recent threat investigation. We outline how we responded to the confirmed threat and what recommendations we have going forward. Here’s the latest from our TRU Team… What did we find? In early January 2025, the eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU) identified an unknown threat actor(s) exploiting the now six year old vulnerability, CVE-2019-18935, in Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX. TRU observed threat actor(s) using the w3wp.exe (IIS worker process) to load a reverse shell and run follow up commands for reconnaissance through cmd.exe. Reverse shells were dropped in the C:\Windows\Temp directory matching [10 digits].[6 digits].dll and [10 digits].[7 digits].dll. The infection process begins when the threat actor(s) send a specific request to the IIS server to determine if the file upload handler is available. This can be seen in IIS logs as shown below: 2025-01-03 10:25:51 10.22.12.20 GET /Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd type=rau 443 - - - 200 0 0 171 After confirming the file upload handler is available and determining the software version is vulnerable, the threat actor(s) made use of a customized version of the PoC here to upload and execute a remote shell. The reverse shell is simple and is a mixed mode .NET assembly containing a routine that serves to connect to the C2 at 213.136.75[.]130 via Windows Sockets. The legitimate windows binary cmd.exe is started and the input/output/error handles are redirected to threat actor control. Figure 1 – Decompiled reverse shell Figure 1 – Decompiled reverse shell After the threat actor(s) established connection via the reverse shell, they executed several commands to get information about users on the system. The figure below contains the parent/child relationships and subsequent commands executed through the reverse shell to enumerate users via net.exe and net1.exe. Figure 2 – Remote shell loaded by w3wp.exe IIS worker process leading to recon commands Figure 2 – Remote shell loaded by w3wp.exe IIS worker process leading to recon commands The following Yara rule can be used for detecting the reverse shell. This Yara rule is also available for download here. rule TCP_Reverse_Shell_Windows_x64 { meta: description = "Detects Windows based 64-bit TCP reverse shell" author = "YungBinary" hash = "b971bf43886e3ab1d823477826383dfaee1e2935788226a285c7aebeabee7348" strings: $winsock_2_0 = { 66 B? 02 00 FF 15 } $winsock_2_1 = { 66 B? 02 01 FF 15 } $winsock_2_2 = { 66 B? 02 02 FF 15 } $winsock_1_0 = { 66 B? 01 00 FF 15 } $winsock_1_1 = { 66 B? 01 01 FF 15 } $socket_params = { 41 B8 06 00 00 00 BA 01 00 00 00 B9 02 00 00 00 } $cmd = { 48 C7 44 24 ?? 00 00 00 00 48 C7 44 24 ?? 00 00 00 00 C7 44 24 ?? 00 00 00 00 C7 44 24 ?? (01 | 00) 00 00 00 45 33 C9 45 33 C0 48 8D 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 33 C9 FF 15 } $wait = { BA FF FF FF FF 48 8B 4C ?? ?? FF 15 } condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ((1 of ($winsock*)) and $socket_params and $cmd and $wait) } Figure 3 – Yara rule to detect Windows TCP reverse shell TRU also observed the threat actor(s) dropping the open-source privilege escalation tool JuicyPotatoNG on the host under various file names: C:\Users\Public\PingCaler.exe C:\Users\Public\JuicyPotatoNG.exe The following batch files were also dropped on the host but the purpose of these files is not known at this time: C:\Users\Public\rdp.bat C:\Users\Public\user.bat C:\Users\Public\All.bat The following diagram provided by Telerik can be used to determine if your specific version of Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX is vulnerable. Figure 4 – Vulnerable version decision tree diagram, source Figure 4 – Vulnerable version decision tree diagram, source. What did we do? Our team of 24/7 SOC Cyber Analysts proactively isolated the affected host to contain the infection on the customer’s behalf. We communicated what happened with the customer and helped them with incident remediation efforts. What can you learn from this TRU Positive? While the vulnerability in Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX is several years old, it continues to be a viable entry point for threat actors. This highlights the importance of patching systems, especially if they are going to be exposed to the internet. Recommendations from the Threat Response Unit (TRU): Implement a comprehensive vulnerability management service with robust patch management solution and process to ensure systems are up to date with the latest security patches before exposing them to the Internet. Use an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solution and ensure it is deployed across all workstations and servers. Indicators of Compromise You can access the Indicators of Compromise here. References https://www.esentire.com/security-advisories/active-exploitation-of-cve-2019-18935 https://bishopfox.com/blog/cve-2019-18935-remote-code-execution-in-telerik-ui https://www.telerik.com/products/aspnet-ajax/documentation/knowledge-base/common-allows-javascriptserializer-deserialization https://github.com/noperator/CVE-2019-18935 https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-074a https://github.com/antonioCoco/JuicyPotatoNG 2025-02-03T13:12:08.204190+00:00 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/cf59c148-4047-4ccd-8ba0-26fb7197899c Android Security Bulletin February 2025 2025-02-09T21:09:38.163649+00:00 Alexandre Dulaunoy http://vulnerability.circl.lu/user/adulau Android Security Bulletin February 2025 Published February 3, 2025 The Android Security Bulletin contains details of security vulnerabilities affecting Android devices. Security patch levels of 2025-02-05 or later address all of these issues. To learn how to check a device's security patch level, see Check and update your Android version. Android partners are notified of all issues at least a month before publication. Source code patches for these issues have been released to the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) repository and linked from this bulletin. This bulletin also includes links to patches outside of AOSP. The most severe of these issues is a high security vulnerability in the Framework component that could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. The severity assessment is based on the effect that exploiting the vulnerability would possibly have on an affected device, assuming the platform and service mitigations are turned off for development purposes or if successfully bypassed. Refer to the Android and Google Play Protect mitigations section for details on the Android security platform protections and Google Play Protect, which improve the security of the Android platform. Android and Google service mitigations This is a summary of the mitigations provided by the Android security platform and service protections such as Google Play Protect. These capabilities reduce the likelihood that security vulnerabilities could be successfully exploited on Android. Exploitation for many issues on Android is made more difficult by enhancements in newer versions of the Android platform. We encourage all users to update to the latest version of Android where possible. The Android security team actively monitors for abuse through Google Play Protect and warns users about Potentially Harmful Applications. Google Play Protect is enabled by default on devices with Google Mobile Services, and is especially important for users who install apps from outside of Google Play. Note: There are indications that CVE-2024-53104 may be under limited, targeted exploitation. 2025-02-01 security patch level vulnerability details In the sections below, we provide details for each of the security vulnerabilities that apply to the 2025-02-01 patch level. Vulnerabilities are grouped under the component they affect. Issues are described in the tables below and include CVE ID, associated references, type of vulnerability, severity, and updated AOSP versions (where applicable). When available, we link the public change that addressed the issue to the bug ID, like the AOSP change list. When multiple changes relate to a single bug, additional references are linked to numbers following the bug ID. Devices with Android 10 and later may receive security updates as well as Google Play system updates. Framework The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. CVE References Type Severity Updated AOSP versions CVE-2024-49721 A-354682735 EoP High 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2024-49743 A-305695605 [2] [3] EoP High 12, 12L, 13, 14, 15 CVE-2024-49746 A-359179312 [2] EoP High 12, 12L, 13, 14, 15 CVE-2025-0097 A-364037868 EoP High 15 CVE-2025-0098 A-367266072 EoP High 15 CVE-2025-0099 A-370962373 EoP High 15 CVE-2023-40122 A-286235483 ID High 12, 12L, 13, 14, 15 CVE-2023-40133 A-283264674 ID High 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-40134 A-283101289 ID High 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-40135 A-281848557 ID High 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-40136 A-281666022 ID High 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-40137 A-281665050 ID High 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-40138 A-281534749 ID High 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-40139 A-281533566 ID High 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2024-0037 A-292104015 ID High 12, 12L, 13, 14, 15 CVE-2025-0100 A-372670004 ID High 12, 12L, 13, 14, 15 CVE-2024-49741 A-353240784 DoS High 12, 12L, 13, 14, 15 Platform The vulnerability in this section could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. CVE References Type Severity Updated AOSP versions CVE-2025-0094 A-352542820 EoP High 12, 12L, 13, 14, 15 System The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. CVE References Type Severity Updated AOSP versions CVE-2025-0091 A-366401629 EoP High 12, 12L, 13, 14, 15 CVE-2025-0095 A-356117796 EoP High 14, 15 CVE-2025-0096 A-356630194 EoP High 15 CVE-2024-49723 A-357870429 [2] ID High 15 CVE-2024-49729 A-368069390 ID High 12, 12L, 13, 14, 15 Google Play system updates The following issues are included in Project Mainline components. Subcomponent CVE Conscrypt CVE-2024-49723 2025-02-05 security patch level vulnerability details In the sections below, we provide details for each of the security vulnerabilities that apply to the 2025-02-05 patch level. Vulnerabilities are grouped under the component they affect. Issues are described in the tables below and include CVE ID, associated references, type of vulnerability, severity, and updated AOSP versions (where applicable). When available, we link the public change that addressed the issue to the bug ID, like the AOSP change list. When multiple changes relate to a single bug, additional references are linked to numbers following the bug ID. Kernel The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to physical escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. CVE References Type Severity Subcomponent CVE-2024-53104 A-378455392 Upstream kernel [2] EoP High UVC CVE-2025-0088 A-377672115 Upstream kernel [2] EoP High mremap Arm components This vulnerability affects Arm components and further details are available directly from Arm. The severity assessment of this issue is provided directly by Arm. CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2025-0015 A-376311652 * High Mali Imagination Technologies These vulnerabilities affect Imagination Technologies components and further details are available directly from Imagination Technologies. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Imagination Technologies. CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2024-43705 A-372931317 PP-160756* High PowerVR-GPU CVE-2024-46973 A-379728401 PP-160739* High PowerVR-GPU CVE-2024-47892 A-365954523 PP-160576 * High PowerVR-GPU CVE-2024-52935 A-380478495 PP-171230* High PowerVR-GPU MediaTek components These vulnerabilities affect MediaTek components and further details are available directly from MediaTek. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by MediaTek. CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2025-20634 A-381773169 M-MOLY01289384 * High Modem CVE-2024-20141 A-381773173 M-ALPS09291402 * High DA CVE-2024-20142 A-381773175 M-ALPS09291406 * High DA CVE-2025-20635 A-381771695 M-ALPS09403752 * High DA CVE-2025-20636 A-381773171 M-ALPS09403554 * High secmem Unisoc components This vulnerability affects Unisoc components and further details are available directly from Unisoc. The severity assessment of this issue is provided directly by Unisoc. CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2024-39441 A-381429835 U-2811333 * High Android Qualcomm components These vulnerabilities affect Qualcomm components and are described in further detail in the appropriate Qualcomm security bulletin or security alert. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Qualcomm. CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2024-45569 A-377311993 QC-CR#3852339 Critical WLAN CVE-2024-45571 A-377313069 QC-CR#3834424 High WLAN CVE-2024-45582 A-377312377 QC-CR#3868093 High Camera CVE-2024-49832 A-377312238 QC-CR#3874301 High Camera CVE-2024-49833 A-377312639 QC-CR#3874372 [2] [3] [4] High Camera CVE-2024-49834 A-377312055 QC-CR#3875406 High Camera CVE-2024-49839 A-377311997 QC-CR#3895196 High WLAN CVE-2024-49843 A-377313194 QC-CR#3883522 High Display Qualcomm closed-source components These vulnerabilities affect Qualcomm closed-source components and are described in further detail in the appropriate Qualcomm security bulletin or security alert. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Qualcomm. CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2024-38404 A-357616389 * High Closed-source component CVE-2024-38420 A-357616296 * High Closed-source component Common questions and answers This section answers common questions that may occur after reading this bulletin. 1. How do I determine if my device is updated to address these issues? To learn how to check a device's security patch level, see Check and update your Android version. Security patch levels of 2025-02-01 or later address all issues associated with the 2025-02-01 security patch level. Security patch levels of 2025-02-05 or later address all issues associated with the 2025-02-05 security patch level and all previous patch levels. Device manufacturers that include these updates should set the patch string level to: [ro.build.version.security_patch]:[2025-02-01] [ro.build.version.security_patch]:[2025-02-05] For some devices on Android 10 or later, the Google Play system update will have a date string that matches the 2025-02-01 security patch level. Please see this article for more details on how to install security updates. 2. Why does this bulletin have two security patch levels? This bulletin has two security patch levels so that Android partners have the flexibility to fix a subset of vulnerabilities that are similar across all Android devices more quickly. Android partners are encouraged to fix all issues in this bulletin and use the latest security patch level. Devices that use the 2025-02-01 security patch level must include all issues associated with that security patch level, as well as fixes for all issues reported in previous security bulletins. Devices that use the security patch level of 2025-02-05 or newer must include all applicable patches in this (and previous) security bulletins. Partners are encouraged to bundle the fixes for all issues they are addressing in a single update. 3. What do the entries in the Type column mean? Entries in the Type column of the vulnerability details table reference the classification of the security vulnerability. Abbreviation Definition RCE Remote code execution EoP Elevation of privilege ID Information disclosure DoS Denial of service N/A Classification not available 4. What do the entries in the References column mean? Entries under the References column of the vulnerability details table may contain a prefix identifying the organization to which the reference value belongs. Prefix Reference A- Android bug ID QC- Qualcomm reference number M- MediaTek reference number N- NVIDIA reference number B- Broadcom reference number U- UNISOC reference number 5. What does an * next to the Android bug ID in the References column mean? Issues that are not publicly available have an * next to the corresponding reference ID. The update for that issue is generally contained in the latest binary drivers for Pixel devices available from the Google Developer site. 6. Why are security vulnerabilities split between this bulletin and device / partner security bulletins, such as the Pixel bulletin? Security vulnerabilities that are documented in this security bulletin are required to declare the latest security patch level on Android devices. Additional security vulnerabilities that are documented in the device / partner security bulletins are not required for declaring a security patch level. Android device and chipset manufacturers may also publish security vulnerability details specific to their products, such as Google, Huawei, LGE, Motorola, Nokia, or Samsung. 2025-02-03T19:33:09.293698+00:00 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/bundle/d3075493-7100-4a9c-9b70-41f0581a825c Command injection and insecure default credentials vulnerabilities in certain legacy DSL CPE from Zyxel 2025-02-09T21:09:38.161726+00:00 Cédric Bonhomme http://vulnerability.circl.lu/user/cedric ## Summary Zyxel recently became aware of CVE-2024-40890 and CVE-2024-40891 being mentioned in a post on GreyNoise’s blog. Additionally, VulnCheck informed us that they will publish the technical details regarding CVE-2024-40891 and CVE-2025-0890 on their blog. We have confirmed that the affected models reported by VulnCheck, VMG1312-B10A, VMG1312-B10B, VMG1312-B10E, VMG3312-B10A, VMG3313-B10A, VMG3926-B10B, VMG4325-B10A, VMG4380-B10A, VMG8324-B10A, VMG8924-B10A, SBG3300, and SBG3500, are legacy products that have reached end-of-life (EOL) for years. Therefore, we strongly recommend that users replace them with newer-generation products for optimal protection. What are the vulnerabilities? ### CVE-2024-40890 **UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED** A post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the CGI program of certain legacy DSL CPE models, including VMG1312-B10A, VMG1312-B10B, VMG1312-B10E, VMG3312-B10A, VMG3313-B10A, VMG3926-B10B, VMG4325-B10A, VMG4380-B10A, VMG8324-B10A, VMG8924-B10A, SBG3300, and SBG3500, could allow an authenticated attacker to execute operating system (OS) commands on an affected device by sending a crafted HTTP POST request. It is important to note that WAN access is disabled by default on these devices, and this attack can only be successful if user-configured passwords have been compromised. ### CVE-2024-40891 **UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED** A post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the management commands of certain legacy DSL CPE models, including VMG1312-B10A, VMG1312-B10B, VMG1312-B10E, VMG3312-B10A, VMG3313-B10A, VMG3926-B10B, VMG4325-B10A, VMG4380-B10A, VMG8324-B10A, VMG8924-B10A, SBG3300, and SBG3500. This vulnerability could allow an authenticated attacker to execute OS commands on an affected device via Telnet. It is important to note that WAN access and the Telnet function are disabled by default on these devices, and this attack can only be successful if the user-configured passwords have been compromised. ### CVE-2025-0890 **UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED** Insecure default credentials for the Telnet function in certain legacy DSL CPE models, including VMG1312-B10A, VMG1312-B10B, VMG1312-B10E, VMG3312-B10A, VMG3313-B10A, VMG3926-B10B, VMG4325-B10A, VMG4380-B10A, VMG8324-B10A, VMG8924-B10A, SBG3300, and SBG3500, could allow an attacker to log in to the management interface if the administrators have the option to change the default credentials but fail to do so. It is important to note that WAN access and the Telnet function are disabled by default on these devices. What should you do? The following models—VMG1312-B10A, VMG1312-B10B, VMG1312-B10E, VMG3312-B10A, VMG3313-B10A, VMG3926-B10B, VMG4325-B10A, VMG4380-B10A, VMG8324-B10A, VMG8924-B10A, SBG3300, and SBG3500—are legacy products that have reached EOL status for several years. In accordance with industry product life cycle management practices, Zyxel advises customers to replace these legacy products with newer-generation equipment for optimal protection. If you obtained your Zyxel product through an internet service provider (ISP), please contact the ISP for support. For ISPs, please contact your Zyxel sales or service representatives for further details. Additionally, disabling remote access and periodically changing passwords are proactive measures that can help prevent potential attacks. Coordinated Timeline: * 2024-07-13: VulnCheck notified Zyxel about vulnerabilities in the EOL CPE VMG4325-B10A without providing any reports. * 2024-07-14: Zyxel requested VulnCheck to provide a detailed report; however, VulnCheck did not respond. * 2024-07-31: VulnCheck published CVE-2024-40890 and CVE-2024-40891 on their blog without informing Zyxel. * 2025-01-28: GreyNoise published CVE-2024-40890 and CVE-2024-40891 on their blog. * 2025-01-29: Zyxel received VulnCheck’s report regarding CVE-2024-40890, CVE-2024-40891, and CVE-2025-0890. * 2025-01-29: Zyxel became aware of the vulnerabilities in certain legacy DSL CPE models. 2025-02-05T18:29:21.812438+00:00