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  <updated>2026-09-28T13:33:55.845901+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100835</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-100835</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T13:33:55.878885+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Contrast before 1.16.0 is susceptible to remote attestation relay attacks. Contrast accepted any TEE attestation report that verified correctly and contained the expected firmware patch levels and software measurements, regardless of which machine produced it, so attestation was not bound to specific, physically trusted hardware. An attacker who can both intercept network traffic between the CLI and the Coordinator (or between the Coordinator and an attested component) and forge reports or extract secrets from any single TEE machine under their physical control can relay such a report to impersonate a Contrast Coordinator or a Contrast workload, defeating identity verification in Contrast's attested TLS (aTLS).</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100835"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jw33-f4wc-8736</id>
    <title>GHSA-jw33-f4wc-8736</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T13:33:55.879002+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Contrast before 1.16.0 is susceptible to remote attestation relay attacks. Contrast accepted any TEE attestation report that verified correctly and contained the expected firmware patch levels and software measurements, regardless of which machine produced it, so attestation was not bound to specific, physically trusted hardware. An attacker who can both intercept network traffic between the CLI and the Coordinator (or between the Coordinator and an attested component) and forge reports or extract secrets from any single TEE machine under their physical control can relay such a report to impersonate a Contrast Coordinator or a Contrast workload, defeating identity verification in Contrast's attested TLS (aTLS).</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jw33-f4wc-8736"/>
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