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  <updated>2026-09-28T16:10:21.715230+00:00</updated>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-101090</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-101090</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T16:10:21.747288+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Nezha 2.2.3 contains a Host header injection regression in the OAuth2 redirect endpoint. When the new optional dashboard_host setting is empty, /api/v1/oauth2/{provider} (cmd/dashboard/controller/oauth2.go) reflects the attacker-supplied HTTP Host header into the redirect_uri sent to the identity provider instead of falling back to the configured install_host. An attacker who induces a victim to begin OAuth2 login via a request that reaches Nezha with a forged Host header can cause an attacker-controlled callback URL to be used as the redirect_uri; if the OAuth2 provider accepts it, the victim's authorization code is delivered to the attacker origin, allowing the attacker to complete the OAuth2 login/binding flow and take over the account. This regresses the fix for GHSA-9rc6-8cjv-rcvx and is configuration-dependent (dashboard_host empty). At the time of the advisory no patched version was available.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-101090"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-62gj-x2f3-j2wj</id>
    <title>GHSA-62gj-x2f3-j2wj</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T16:10:21.747533+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Nezha 2.2.3 contains a Host header injection regression in the OAuth2 redirect endpoint. When the new optional dashboard_host setting is empty, /api/v1/oauth2/{provider} (cmd/dashboard/controller/oauth2.go) reflects the attacker-supplied HTTP Host header into the redirect_uri sent to the identity provider instead of falling back to the configured install_host. An attacker who induces a victim to begin OAuth2 login via a request that reaches Nezha with a forged Host header can cause an attacker-controlled callback URL to be used as the redirect_uri; if the OAuth2 provider accepts it, the victim's authorization code is delivered to the attacker origin, allowing the attacker to complete the OAuth2 login/binding flow and take over the account. This regresses the fix for GHSA-9rc6-8cjv-rcvx and is configuration-dependent (dashboard_host empty). At the time of the advisory no patched version was available.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-62gj-x2f3-j2wj"/>
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