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  <updated>2026-10-06T07:32:52.208620+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-105767</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-105767</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T07:32:52.210269+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command in the integrate-platform-docs composite GitHub Action of Chainguard Academy (edu) from commit 7375a80caabcc31c33ec90f29687ed78c13d16ff before commit fb0efb2537d326ab18c07d620875b8ed2a4b39f3 allows an actor who controls the project_id or storage_bucket inputs to execute arbitrary shell commands on the GitHub Actions runner, because the inputs are interpolated directly into Bash gcloud storage cp commands in several steps via ${{ inputs.* }} expressions. The only in-repository caller passed repository secrets and ran only on trusted triggers, so no untrusted input was known to reach the vulnerable steps.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-105767"/>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vh2r-m6q8-8hp3</id>
    <title>GHSA-vh2r-m6q8-8hp3</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T07:32:52.210343+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command in the integrate-platform-docs composite GitHub Action of Chainguard Academy (edu) from commit 7375a80caabcc31c33ec90f29687ed78c13d16ff before commit fb0efb2537d326ab18c07d620875b8ed2a4b39f3 allows an actor who controls the project_id or storage_bucket inputs to execute arbitrary shell commands on the GitHub Actions runner, because the inputs are interpolated directly into Bash gcloud storage cp commands in several steps via ${{ inputs.* }} expressions. The only in-repository caller passed repository secrets and ran only on trusted triggers, so no untrusted input was known to reach the vulnerable steps.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vh2r-m6q8-8hp3"/>
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