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  <updated>2026-10-08T22:57:00.700390+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107576</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-107576</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T22:57:00.713904+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Inefficient algorithmic complexity in the inbound DKIM and ARC signature verification of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.5 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to make the mail services unavailable by sending a message. Building the canonical header and choosing the header fields named in a signature's h= tag took time growing with the square of the message's header: the 'simple' canonicalisation prepended each continuation line of a folded field to the lines already gathered, and both canonicalisations searched the gathered fields from the bottom for each h= name and erased the match from the middle of the list. A message whose header holds very many fields, or a field folded over very many lines, with a DKIM-Signature the attacker signs for a domain they control, keeps a worker thread busy for tens of seconds per signature; up to ten signatures are evaluated per message by each of the DKIM and DMARC tests, on the threads that serve delivery and SMTP.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107576"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6pj8-9c42-v5rp</id>
    <title>GHSA-6pj8-9c42-v5rp</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T22:57:00.713976+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Inefficient algorithmic complexity in the inbound DKIM and ARC signature verification of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.5 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to make the mail services unavailable by sending a message. Building the canonical header and choosing the header fields named in a signature's h= tag took time growing with the square of the message's header: the 'simple' canonicalisation prepended each continuation line of a folded field to the lines already gathered, and both canonicalisations searched the gathered fields from the bottom for each h= name and erased the match from the middle of the list. A message whose header holds very many fields, or a field folded over very many lines, with a DKIM-Signature the attacker signs for a domain they control, keeps a worker thread busy for tens of seconds per signature; up to ten signatures are evaluated per message by each of the DKIM and DMARC tests, on the threads that serve delivery and SMTP.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6pj8-9c42-v5rp"/>
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