<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-10T16:27:07.585588+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107812</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-107812</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T16:27:07.607489+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, the self-upgrade mechanism validates a downloaded binary only with a same-origin digest obtained from the same upgrade mirror. A compromised mirror or network attacker able to alter both responses can supply a malicious executable and matching digest. An operator-triggered upgrade is required, and the application installs and runs the attacker-controlled code in the Nginx UI process context on the next upgrade. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107812"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-662p-52hx-cmh2</id>
    <title>GHSA-662p-52hx-cmh2 — Nginx UI: Self-upgrade runs an unsigned binary verified only by a same-origin digest → RCE via a compromised mirror or…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T16:27:07.607555+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI</p>
<p>## Summary
The self-upgrade downloads the release binary and its checksum (`*.tar.gz` and `*.tar.gz.digest`)
through the SAME endpoint (`version.GetUrl()`, which is `github_proxy` or, by default, the project's
`cloud.nginxui.com` mirror), and verifies the binary ONLY by comparing it to that digest:
`digestFileContent == DigestSHA512(tarName)`. Both the binary and the digest come from the same
origin, and there is NO cryptographic signature / public-key verification. The downloaded binary then
replaces the running executable (`selfupdate.CommitBinary`) and the process restarts, so the binary
runs as the nginx-ui user (typically root).</p>
<p>Because integrity rests only on a digest fetched from the same place as the binary, anyone who
controls that download path can substitute a malicious binary plus a matching digest and obtain code
execution as root on the next upgrade. Additionally, the `github_proxy` setting accepts `http://`
URLs, so the binary+digest can be fetched over cleartext.</p>
<p>## Affected code
- `internal/version/url.go GetUrl(path)` = `&lt;github_proxy or cloud.nginxui.com&gt;/&lt;path&gt;` — used for
  BOTH the binary and the digest.
- `internal/upgrader/upgrade.go DownloadLatestRelease`: digest URL and binary URL are both wrapped
  with `GetUrl()`, fetched, and checked with `digestFileContent == DigestSHA512(tarName)`. No
  signature verification anywhere in `internal/upgrader/`.
- `selfupdate.CommitBinary` then replaces the running binary; the process restarts.
- `settings/http.…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-662p-52hx-cmh2"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
