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  <updated>2026-10-05T18:50:53.234233+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19184</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-19184</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T18:50:53.250089+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The NXP GAU ADC driver (drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c) validated the caller-supplied sequence-&gt;buffer_size, which is expressed in bytes, against the number of active channels, which is a sample count. It then stored that byte count directly in data-&gt;results_length and used it in mcux_gau_adc_read_samples() as the number of uint16_t slots available. Because each conversion result occupies sizeof(uint16_t) bytes, a buffer that was accepted as "large enough" could be written with up to twice its size in bytes, so every sample past the buffer's midpoint was written out of bounds.</p>
<p>adc_read() and adc_read_async() are Zephyr system calls. The syscall verifier in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c only confirms that the caller owns buffer_size writable bytes (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE); deciding whether that size is sufficient for the requested channels and extra_samplings is delegated entirely to the driver. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a user-mode thread that has been granted the ADC device object could therefore submit a deliberately half-sized buffer and cause the driver's work-queue handler — which runs in supervisor mode, outside the caller's MPU restrictions — to write ADC conversion results past the end of that buffer, at an address and for a length of the caller's choosing.</p>
<p>The overrun is bounded by the requested sequence: with sequence-&gt;options-&gt;extra_samplings set, the sampling loop walks the buffer pointer forward across every sampling, so the total overrun can reach the…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19184"/>
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