RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, match_value/3 passes the user-supplied ?name= regular expression to re:run with no match_limit option, and executes it once per resource in the result set. OTP's default 10M match_limit caps each call at roughly 100-200ms, but the regex runs once per resource in the result set. With a large set, for example 5000 queues at 150ms each, a single request consumes 12 or more minutes of CPU. Parallel requests saturate the schedulers. The use_regex=true option is a supported feature on list endpoints, so this path is reachable through normal API use. Preconditions include Any user with the management tag can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

rabbitmq-server: RabbitMQ: Unsanitized vhost names allow for XSS in management UI rabbitmq: RabbitMQ: Authenticated user can bypass connection limits via stream protocol rabbitmq: RabbitMQ: Information disclosure of decrypted Shovel URIs in debug logs rabbitmq-server: RabbitMQ: Monitoring user can reset authentication attempt counters rabbitmq-server: RabbitMQ: Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) misconfiguration allows unauthorized actions rabbitmq-server: RabbitMQ: Denial of Service via atom table exhaustion in stream chunk_selector rabbitmq: RabbitMQ: Denial of Service via management API regular expression filter rabbitmq-server: RabbitMQ: Monitoring user can disrupt message flow via authorization flaw rabbitmq: RabbitMQ: Information disclosure via cross-vhost authorization bypass RabbitMQ: RabbitMQ: Account takeover via stored Cross-Site Scripting in TLS peer-certificate DN rabbitmq-server: RabbitMQ: Denial of Service via AMQP 1.0 array32 parsing rabbitmq-server: RabbitMQ: Denial of Service via unbounded super-stream partition allocation rabbitmq-server: RabbitMQ: Privilege escalation via super-stream HTTP creation rabbitmq: RabbitMQ: Denial of Service via unbounded consistent-hash exchange weight rabbitmq-server: RabbitMQ: Denial of Service via JMS topic exchange atom exhaustion rabbitmq: RabbitMQ: Information disclosure of AMQP 1.0 shovel URI passwords rabbitmq: RabbitMQ: Administrator path traversal allows arbitrary file write rabbitmq: RabbitMQ: Denial of Service vi…

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: rabbitmq-server, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: rabbitmq-server, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: rabbitmq-server, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: rabbitmq-server, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rabbitmq-server, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rabbitmq-server

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, match_value/3 passes the user-supplied ?name= regular expression to re:run with no match_limit option, and executes it once per resource in the result set. OTP's default 10M match_limit caps each call at roughly 100-200ms, but the regex runs once per resource in the result set. With a large set, for example 5000 queues at 150ms each, a single request consumes 12 or more minutes of CPU. Parallel requests saturate the schedulers. The use_regex=true option is a supported feature on list endpoints, so this path is reachable through normal API use. Preconditions include Any user with the management tag can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.