Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

The sandbox browser entrypoint launched `x11vnc` without authentication (`-nopw`) for noVNC observer sessions.

OpenClaw-managed runtime flow publishes the noVNC port to host loopback only (`127.0.0.1`), so default exposure is local to the host unless operators explicitly expose the port more broadly (or run the image standalone with broad port publishing).

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `docker/openclaw` - Affected: `<= 2026.2.19-2` - Patched: `>= 2026.2.21`

## Technical details

- `scripts/sandbox-browser-entrypoint.sh` used `x11vnc ... -nopw` for noVNC observer flow. - `websockify` exposed noVNC for the container listener. - OpenClaw runtime (`src/agents/sandbox/browser.ts`) already mapped host publish to loopback, but observer auth was missing.

## Fix

- Require VNC password auth in the sandbox browser entrypoint (`x11vnc -rfbauth`), replacing `-nopw`. - Generate per-container noVNC password in runtime and inject `OPENCLAW_BROWSER_NOVNC_PASSWORD`. - Emit short-lived noVNC observer token URLs instead of sharing raw noVNC passwords in shared URLs. - Keep loopback-only host port publish and bump sandbox browser security hash epoch. - Add security audit findings for sandbox browser containers that publish ports on non-loopback interfaces.

Operational note: rebuild the sandbox browser image and recreate browser containers so existing containers pick up the fix.

## Fix Commit(s)

- `621d8e1312482f122f18c43c72c67211b141da01` - `8c1518f0f3e0533593cd2dec3a46c9b7…

Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.21 sandbox browser entrypoint launches x11vnc without authentication for noVNC observer sessions, allowing unauthenticated access to the VNC interface. Remote attackers on the host loopback interface can connect to the exposed noVNC port to observe or interact with the sandbox browser without credentials.