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  <updated>2026-09-29T23:50:08.384194+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55485</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-55485 — Piccolo Admin: Privilege escalation - admin to superuser via session-token disclosure in GET /api/tables/sessions/.</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T23:50:08.403513+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> piccolo-orm piccolo_admin</p>
<p>Piccolo Admin is an admin interface and content management system for Python, built on top of Piccolo. Prior to 1.14.0, piccolo_admin/endpoints.py uses superuser_validators to block PUT, PATCH, DELETE, and POST requests by non-superusers but permits GET requests to configured user and session tables, while piccolo_api/session_auth/tables.py exposes SessionsBase.token because the token column is not secret. In deployments that add the Sessions and User tables to create_admin, a non-superuser administrator can call GET /api/tables/sessions/, obtain another user's live session token, replay it as the Cookie id value to impersonate a superuser, and permanently set superuser to true on the attacker's own row. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55485"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3882</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-3882 — piccolo-admin has a privilege escalation issue - admin to superuser via session-token disclosure in GET /api/tables/ses…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T23:50:08.403794+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: piccolo-admin</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`piccolo_admin` uses a helper called `superuser_validators` to gate access to the user and session tables for non-superusers. The helper rejects `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, and `POST`, but **does not reject `GET`**.</p>
<p>The `sessions` table stores live session tokens **in plaintext**, and the token column is not marked `secret=True`, so it is included in every `GET` response. Any non-superuser admin can therefore list every other user's live session token with one request, replay the token as their own `Cookie: id=…`, impersonate that user (including the superuser), and then permanently self-promote by writing `superuser = true` on their own row.</p>
<p>The chain is reachable on a realistic, documented configuration: a deployer adds the `Sessions` (and `User`) tables to `create_admin([...])` so superusers have a UI to monitor and revoke sessions.</p>
<p>## Affected component</p>
<p>- **File**: `piccolo_admin/endpoints.py`
- **Function**: `superuser_validators` (around line 419)</p>
<p>```python
def superuser_validators(piccolo_crud: PiccoloCRUD, request: Request):
    user: BaseUser = request.user.user
    if not user.superuser:
        if request.method.upper() in ["PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE", "POST"]:
            raise HTTPException(
                detail="Only superusers can perform these actions.",
                status_code=405,
            )
```</p>
<p>The method check is a **deny-list** instead of an **allow-list**; `GET` is absent. Compounding the issue, `SessionsBase.token` in `piccolo_api…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3882"/>
  </entry>
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