Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

### Summary In `openclaw<=2026.2.23`, safe-bin trust in allowlist mode relied on static default trusted directories that included package-manager paths (notably `/opt/homebrew/bin` and `/usr/local/bin`). When a same-name binary (for example `jq`) is placed in one of those trusted default directories, safe-bin evaluation can be satisfied and execute the attacker-controlled binary.

### Impact This is an exec allowlist `safeBins` policy bypass that can lead to command execution in the OpenClaw runtime context. Severity is set to Medium given the required ability to write into trusted host binary directories.

### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Vulnerable versions: `<= 2026.2.23` - Patched versions: `>= 2026.2.24` (planned next npm release) - Latest published npm version at triage time (2026-02-24): `2026.2.23`

### Root Cause - Default safe-bin trusted directories included package-manager/user-managed paths. - Trust decision was directory-membership only for resolved executable paths.

### Remediation - Restrict default safe-bin trusted directories to immutable system paths: `/bin`, `/usr/bin`. - Require explicit operator opt-in for package-manager/user paths via `tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`.

### Fix Commit(s) - `b67e600bff696ff2ed9b470826590c0ce6b3bb0a`

### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.24`). Once npm release `2026.2.24` is published, this advisory should be ready for publish without ad…

Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.24 contain a policy bypass vulnerability in the safeBins allowlist evaluation that trusts static default directories including writable package-manager paths like /opt/homebrew/bin and /usr/local/bin. An attacker with write access to these trusted directories can place a malicious binary with the same name as an allowed executable to achieve arbitrary command execution within the OpenClaw runtime context.