<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-29T14:57:16.514217+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-asciidoctor-cve-2026-53727</id>
    <title>BREW-asciidoctor-CVE-2026-53727 — Ruby CSS Parser: SSRF and Local File Disclosure in `CssParser::Parser#read_remote_file`</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T14:57:16.548451+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: asciidoctor</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`CssParser::Parser#read_remote_file` (and therefore `load_uri!`, and the `@import`-following branch of `add_block!`) issues HTTP/HTTPS requests against any host, port and URI it is handed, with no scheme allowlist, no host / IP filtering, and no protection against link-local, loopback or RFC‑1918 addresses. `Location:` redirects are followed recursively back into the same function, which **also services `file://` URIs**, so a single attacker-controlled HTTP redirect upgrades the bug from SSRF to arbitrary local file disclosure.</p>
<p>In practice, any consumer of `css_parser` that hands it attacker‑influenced CSS together with a `base_uri:` option — Premailer being the canonical example — is exposed. The attacker only needs the ability to land one `@import url(...)` in the CSS that the host application parses.</p>
<p>## Vulnerable code</p>
<p>[`lib/css_parser/parser.rb#L613-L687`](https://github.com/premailer/css_parser/blob/cee10f16b11dd175f17b0e5f6aefa488378e964b/lib/css_parser/parser.rb#L613-L687):</p>
<p>```ruby
def read_remote_file(uri) # :nodoc:
  ...
  begin
    uri = Addressable::URI.parse(uri.to_s)</p>
<p>if uri.scheme == 'file'
      # local file
      path = uri.path
      path.gsub!(%r{^/}, '') if Gem.win_platform?
      src = File.read(path, mode: 'rb')        # &lt;-- arbitrary local read
    else
      # remote file
      if uri.scheme == 'https'
        uri.port = 443 unless uri.port
        http = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port)
        http.use_ssl = true
      else…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-asciidoctor-cve-2026-53727"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53727</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-53727 — css_parser: SSRF and Local File Disclosure in `CssParser::Parser#read_remote_file`</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T14:57:16.548743+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> premailer css_parser</p>
<p>css_parser is a Ruby CSS parser. From 2.2.0 until 3.0.0, CssParser::Parser#read_remote_file in lib/css_parser/parser.rb, and therefore load_uri! and the @import-following branch of add_block!, issued HTTP and HTTPS requests against any host, port, and URI without a scheme allowlist, host or IP filtering, or protection against link-local, loopback, or RFC-1918 addresses. Location: redirects were followed recursively back into the same function, which also serviced file:// URIs, so a single attacker-controlled HTTP redirect could upgrade the bug from SSRF to arbitrary local file disclosure. Any consumer of css_parser that hands it attacker-influenced CSS together with a base_uri: option is exposed. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53727"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
