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  <updated>2026-09-30T11:21:06.646371+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-krane-cve-2026-45363</id>
    <title>BREW-krane-CVE-2026-45363 — ruby-jwt: Empty-key HMAC bypass; cross-language sibling of CVE-2026-44351</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T11:21:07.018834+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: krane</p>
<p>`JWT.decode(token, '', true, algorithm: 'HS256')` accepts an attacker-forged token.
`OpenSSL::HMAC.digest('SHA256', '', payload)` returns a valid digest under an empty key, and no `raise
  InvalidKeyError if key.empty?` precondition exists in the HMAC algorithm.</p>
<p>```
JWT.decode(token, "", true, algorithm: 'HS256')
  -&gt; JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: "", ...)
  -&gt; OpenSSL::HMAC.digest('SHA256', "", signing_input) == signature
```</p>
<p>The same path is reached when a keyfinder block or key_finder: argument returns "", nil, or an
array containing nil for an unknown key. JWT::Decode#find_key only rejects literal nil and empty
arrays, and JWT::JWA::Hmac silently coerces nil to "" (signing_key ||= '') before signing.</p>
<p>```
JWT.decode(token, nil, true, algorithms: ['HS256']) { |_h| "" }
  -&gt; find_key returns ""               # "" &amp;&amp; !Array("").empty? == true
  -&gt; JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: "", ...)
  -&gt; verifies
```
Common application patterns that produce the unsafe value: `redis.get("kid:#{kid}").to_s`, ORM string columns with `default: ''`, `ENV['SECRET'] || '', Hash.new('')` lookups, [primary, fallback] where fallback may be nil. Applications passing a non-empty static key:, or whose keyfinder returns nil / raises on miss, are not affected.</p>
<p>The existing `enforce_hmac_key_length` option would block this but defaults to false. On OpenSSL ≥ 3.5 the empty-key HMAC.digest call no longer raises, so the OpenSSL-3.0 rescue in JWA::Hmac#sign does not fire.</p>
<p>Affects HS256/HS384/H…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-krane-cve-2026-45363"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45363</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-45363 — `jwt` (Ruby gem) - empty-key HMAC bypass</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T11:21:07.019004+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> jwt ruby-jwt</p>
<p>ruby-jwt is a Ruby implementation of the RFC 7519 OAuth JSON Web Token standard. Prior to 2.10.3 and 3.2.0, JWT.decode(token, '', true, algorithm: 'HS256') accepts an attacker-forged token because OpenSSL::HMAC.digest('SHA256', '', payload) returns a valid digest under an empty key and no empty-key precondition exists in the HMAC algorithm. The same path is reached when a keyfinder block or key_finder: argument returns an empty string, nil, or an array containing nil for an unknown key, affecting HS256, HS384, and HS512 verification through JWT.decode and JWT::EncodedToken#verify_signature!. This issue is fixed in versions 2.10.3 and 3.2.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45363"/>
  </entry>
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