https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-04T14:43:56.471037+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-26327 BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-26327 — OpenClaw allows unauthenticated discovery TXT records to steer routing and TLS pinning 2026-10-04T14:43:56.473869+00:00

Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

## Summary

Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated.

Prior to the fix, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs:

- iOS and macOS: used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL. - iOS and Android: allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin.

On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection.

## Distribution / Exposure

The iOS and Android apps are currently alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN.

CVSS can still be used for the technical (base) severity of the bug; limited distribution primarily affects environmental risk.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `<= 2026.2.13` (latest published on npm as of 2026-02-14) - Patched: planned for `>= 2026.2.14` (not yet published at time of writing)

## Fix

- Clients now prefer the…

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-26327 CVE-2026-26327 — OpenClaw allows unauthenticated discovery TXT records to steer routing and TLS pinning 2026-10-04T14:43:56.473988+00:00

Affected: openclaw

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated. Prior to version 2026.2.14, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs. iOS and macOS used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL. iOS and Android allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin. On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection. As of time of publication, the iOS and Android apps are alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN. Version 2026.2.14 fixes the issue. Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints. Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins. In iOS/Android, first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU) and discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only.…