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  <updated>2026-09-30T22:55:07.040078+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-33941</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-33941 — Handlebars.js has JavaScript Injection in CLI Precompiler via Unescaped Names and Options</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T22:55:07.043681+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> handlebars-lang handlebars.js, Red Hat Cluster Observability Operator 1.5.0, Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.27, Red Hat Cryostat 4, Red Hat Logging Subsystem for Red Hat OpenShift, Red Hat Data Grid 8, Red Hat Developer Hub, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 and 3 more</p>
<p>Handlebars provides the power necessary to let users build semantic templates. In versions 4.0.0 through 4.7.8, the Handlebars CLI precompiler (`bin/handlebars` / `lib/precompiler.js`) concatenates user-controlled strings — template file names and several CLI options — directly into the JavaScript it emits, without any escaping or sanitization. An attacker who can influence template filenames or CLI arguments can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when the generated bundle is loaded in Node.js or a browser. Version 4.7.9 fixes the issue. Some workarounds are available. First, validate all CLI inputs before invoking the precompiler. Reject filenames and option values  that contain characters with JavaScript string-escaping significance (`"`, `'`, `;`, etc.). Second, use a fixed, trusted namespace string passed via a configuration file rather than  command-line arguments in automated pipelines. Third, run the precompiler in a sandboxed environment (container with no write access to sensitive  paths) to limit the impact of successful exploitation. Fourth, audit template filenames in any repository or package that is consumed by an automated  build pipeline.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-33941"/>
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