<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-29T02:49:36.714267+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-40047</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-40047 — Apache Camel: Camel-Docling: Insufficient validation of custom CLI arguments enables argument injection and path traver…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T02:49:36.845516+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel</p>
<p>Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component.</p>
<p>The camel-docling component invokes the external `docling` command-line tool by assembling an argument list in DoclingProducer and executing it through java.lang.ProcessBuilder. Custom CLI arguments supplied through the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` exchange header (a List&lt;String&gt;) were appended to that argument list with insufficient validation: the original implementation relied on a denylist of disallowed flags and only rejected path values that contained a literal `../` sequence. As a result, a Camel route that forwards externally-influenced data into the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` header (or into the path-bearing headers used to build the invocation) could cause the producer to pass unrecognized or unintended `docling` CLI flags to the subprocess, and could supply path-like argument values that resolved outside the intended directory through traversal sequences not caught by the literal `../` check. Because Camel itself builds the `docling` invocation from these values, the component is responsible for constraining them, and the weak validation allowed CLI-argument injection and directory traversal in the arguments passed to the external tool. The invocation uses the list-based form of ProcessBuilder, so a shell does not interpret the argument values; OS command injection through shell metacharacters was not possible, and the metacharac…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-40047"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
