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  <updated>2026-09-30T23:23:59.312653+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46253</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-46253 — pstore/ram: fix buffer overflow in persistent_ram_save_old()</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T23:23:59.315859+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>pstore/ram: fix buffer overflow in persistent_ram_save_old()</p>
<p>persistent_ram_save_old() can be called multiple times for the same
persistent_ram_zone (e.g., via ramoops_pstore_read -&gt; ramoops_get_next_prz
for PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG records).</p>
<p>Currently, the function only allocates prz-&gt;old_log when it is NULL,
but it unconditionally updates prz-&gt;old_log_size to the current buffer
size and then performs memcpy_fromio() using this new size. If the
buffer size has grown since the first allocation (which can happen
across different kernel boot cycles), this leads to:</p>
<p>1. A heap buffer overflow (OOB write) in the memcpy_fromio() calls
2. A subsequent OOB read when ramoops_pstore_read() accesses the buffer
   using the incorrect (larger) old_log_size</p>
<p>The KASAN splat would look similar to:
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ramoops_pstore_read+0x...
  Read of size N at addr ... by task ...</p>
<p>The conditions are likely extremely hard to hit:</p>
<p>0. Crash with a ramoops write of less-than-record-max-size bytes.
  1. Reboot: ramoops registers, pstore_get_records(0) reads old crash,
     allocates old_log with size X
  2. Crash handler registered, timer started (if pstore_update_ms &gt;= 0)
  3. Oops happens (non-fatal, system continues)
  4. pstore_dump() writes oops via ramoops_pstore_write() size Y (&gt;X)
  5. pstore_new_entry = 1, pstore_timer_kick() called
  6. System continues running (not a panic oops)
  7. Timer fires af…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46253"/>
  </entry>
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