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  <updated>2026-09-28T23:34:18.811995+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31576</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-31576 — media: hackrf: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in hackrf_probe()</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T23:34:18.855999+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>media: hackrf: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in hackrf_probe()</p>
<p>In hackrf driver, the following race condition occurs:
```
		CPU0						CPU1
hackrf_probe()
  kzalloc(); // alloc hackrf_dev
  ....
  v4l2_device_register();
  ....
						fd = sys_open("/path/to/dev"); // open hackrf fd
						....
  v4l2_device_unregister();
  ....
  kfree(); // free hackrf_dev
  ....
						sys_ioctl(fd, ...);
						  v4l2_ioctl();
						    video_is_registered() // UAF!!
						....
						sys_close(fd);
						  v4l2_release() // UAF!!
						    hackrf_video_release()
						      kfree(); // DFB!!
```</p>
<p>When a V4L2 or video device is unregistered, the device node is removed so
new open() calls are blocked.</p>
<p>However, file descriptors that are already open-and any in-flight I/O-do
not terminate immediately; they remain valid until the last reference is
dropped and the driver's release() is invoked.</p>
<p>Therefore, freeing device memory on the error path after hackrf_probe()
has registered dev it will lead to a race to use-after-free vuln, since
those already-open handles haven't been released yet.</p>
<p>And since release() free memory too, race to use-after-free and
double-free vuln occur.</p>
<p>To prevent this, if device is registered from probe(), it should be
modified to free memory only through release() rather than calling
kfree() directly.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31576"/>
  </entry>
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