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  <updated>2026-10-06T11:39:00.579863+00:00</updated>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53492</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-53492 — containerd CRI checkpoint restore CDI annotation smuggling</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T11:39:00.609726+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> containerd</p>
<p>containerd is an open-source container runtime. In Versions prior to 2.3.2, 2.2.5 and 2.1.9, the CRI implementation improperly trusts Container Device Interface (CDI) annotations found within untrusted checkpoint image metadata during container restoration. When restoring a container from a checkpoint, containerd preserves CDI-related annotations from the checkpoint archive rather than relying solely on the pod's create-time specification. This allows a user with pod creation permissions to bypass standard Kubernetes resource allocation and device plugin enforcement, injecting arbitrary CDI edits (such as device nodes and host mounts) into the restored container. Successful exploitation requires that the node has CDI enabled and contains a matching host CDI specification for the requested device; environments where CDI is disabled or lacking sensitive device specifications are not affected. This issue has been fixed in versions 2.3.2, 2.2.5 and 2.1.9.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53492"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-33vj-92qq-66hc</id>
    <title>GHSA-33vj-92qq-66hc — containerd CRI checkpoint restore CDI annotation smuggling</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T11:39:00.609852+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/containerd/containerd/v2</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>containerd's CRI implementation improperly trusts Container Device Interface (CDI) annotations found within untrusted checkpoint image metadata during container restoration. When restoring a container from a checkpoint, containerd preserves CDI-related annotations from the checkpoint archive rather than relying solely on the pod's create-time specification. This allows a user with pod creation permissions to bypass standard Kubernetes resource allocation and device plugin enforcement, injecting arbitrary CDI edits (such as device nodes and host mounts) into the restored container. Successful exploitation requires that the node has CDI enabled and contains a matching host CDI specification for the requested device; environments where CDI is disabled or lacking sensitive device specifications are not affected.</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>This bug has been fixed in the following containerd versions:</p>
<p>* 2.3.2
* 2.2.5
* 2.1.9</p>
<p>Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue. Recreating existing containers restored from untrusted checkpoints may be necessary to remove smuggled configuration.</p>
<p>### Workarounds</p>
<p>Users can mitigate this issue by restricting the restoration of containers from untrusted checkpoint images. If Container Device Interface (CDI) capabilities are not utilized on the node, removing or temporarily relocating host CDI specifications from the default directories (`/etc/cdi` and `/var/run/cdi`) will eliminate the reachability of this vulnerability.</p>
<p>### C…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-33vj-92qq-66hc"/>
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