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  <updated>2026-09-30T23:24:35.574616+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31708</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-31708 — smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T23:24:35.576868+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path</p>
<p>smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL
and the default QUERY_INFO path.  The QUERY_INFO branch clamps
qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then
copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp-&gt;Buffer to userspace, but
it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within
rsp_iov[1].iov_len.</p>
<p>A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response
buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.</p>
<p>Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer
payload.  Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on
32-bit builds.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31708"/>
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