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  <updated>2026-10-04T01:08:51.472286+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46195</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-46195 — smb: client: validate dacloffset before building DACL pointers</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T01:08:52.080894+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>smb: client: validate dacloffset before building DACL pointers</p>
<p>parse_sec_desc(), build_sec_desc(), and the chown path in
id_mode_to_cifs_acl() all add the server-supplied dacloffset to pntsd
before proving a DACL header fits inside the returned security
descriptor.</p>
<p>On 32-bit builds a malicious server can return dacloffset near
U32_MAX, wrap the derived DACL pointer below end_of_acl, and then slip
past the later pointer-based bounds checks. build_sec_desc() and
id_mode_to_cifs_acl() can then dereference DACL fields from the wrapped
pointer in the chmod/chown rewrite paths.</p>
<p>Validate dacloffset numerically before building any DACL pointer and
reuse the same helper at the three DACL entry points.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46195"/>
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