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  <updated>2026-09-29T15:17:13.994002+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63888</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-63888 — scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd()</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T15:17:14.593030+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd()</p>
<p>Two latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the
original LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add
iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1"):</p>
<p>1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in).</p>
<p>text_in is kzalloc()'d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4).  rx_size is then
   incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest
   in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the
   buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf():</p>
<p>if (conn-&gt;conn_ops-&gt;DataDigest) {
               ...
               rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN;
       }
       ...
       if (conn-&gt;conn_ops-&gt;DataDigest) {
               data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL);</p>
<p>iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so
   when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the
   text_in allocation.  KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched
   mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text
   PDU path.  The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against
   the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to
   the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text
   PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C.</p>
<p>Fix by passing the actual padded payload length
   (ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63888"/>
  </entry>
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