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  <updated>2026-10-06T23:40:07.265428+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63915</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-63915 — nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T23:40:07.268705+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing</p>
<p>Both nfc_hci_recv_from_llc() and nci_hci_data_received_cb() read
packet-&gt;header from skb-&gt;data at function entry without first checking
that the buffer holds at least one byte. A malicious NFC peer can send
a 0-byte HCP frame that passes through the SHDLC layer and reaches
these functions, causing an out-of-bounds heap read of packet-&gt;header.
The same 0-byte frame, if queued as a non-final fragment, also causes
the reassembly loop to underflow msg_len to UINT_MAX, triggering
skb_over_panic() when the reassembled skb is written.</p>
<p>Fix this by adding a pskb_may_pull() check at the entry of each
function before packet-&gt;header is first accessed. The existing
pskb_may_pull() checks before the reassembled hcp_skb is cast to
struct hcp_packet remain in place to guard the 2-byte HCP message
header.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63915"/>
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