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  <updated>2026-10-03T19:10:31.105064+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64310</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-64310 — crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for SEV ioctls</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T19:10:31.135812+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for SEV ioctls</p>
<p>Sashiko notes:</p>
<p>&gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
&gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
&gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
&gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
&gt; host?</p>
<p>sev_move_to_init_state() is called for ioctls requiring only SEV firmware:
SEV_PEK_GEN, SEV_PDH_GEN, SEV_PEK_CSR, SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT, and
SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT. After the firmware command, it does SEV_SHUTDOWN on
the SEV firmware. Since these commands do not require SNP to be
initialized, skip it by calling __sev_platform_init_locked() which only
initializes the SEV firmware. This way SNP is not Initialized at all, and
HSAVE_PA is not cleared.</p>
<p>The previous code saved any SEV initialization firmware error to
init_args.error and then threw it away and hardcoded the return value of
INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE regardless of the real firmware error. This patch
changes it to surface the underlying error, which is hopefully both more
useful and doesn't cause any problems.</p>
<p>Note that it is still safe to call __sev_firmware_shutdown() directly: it
calls __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(), which skips SNP shutdown if SNP was not
initialized.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64310"/>
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