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  <updated>2026-10-01T19:53:13.616460+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68255</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-68255 — drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T19:53:13.633345+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer</p>
<p>virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the
device-supplied resp-&gt;size field, never against the fixed-size resp-&gt;edid
array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension
count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size
together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent
kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds
read / info leak).</p>
<p>Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array.
Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68255"/>
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