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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-04T12:29:28.310274+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44641</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-44641 — Microsoft APM: plugin.json component paths escape plugin root and copy arbitrary host files during install</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T12:29:28.312999+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> microsoft apm</p>
<p>Microsoft APM is an open-source, community-driven dependency manager for AI agents. Prior to 0.8.12, Microsoft APM normalizes marketplace plugins by copying plugin components referenced in plugin.json into .apm/. The manifest fields agents, skills, commands, and hooks are attacker-controlled, but the implementation does not enforce that those paths remain inside the plugin directory. A malicious plugin can therefore use absolute paths or ../ traversal paths to copy arbitrary readable host files or directories from the installer's machine during apm install. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.12.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44641"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xhrw-5qxx-jpwr</id>
    <title>GHSA-xhrw-5qxx-jpwr — Microsoft APM CLI's plugin.json component paths escape plugin root and copy arbitrary host files during install</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T12:29:28.313106+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: apm-cli</p>
<p>### Summary
Microsoft APM normalizes marketplace plugins by copying plugin components referenced in `plugin.json` into `.apm/`. The manifest fields `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and `hooks` are attacker-controlled, but the implementation does not enforce that those paths remain inside the plugin directory. A malicious plugin can therefore use absolute paths or `../` traversal paths to copy arbitrary readable host files or directories from the installer's machine during `apm install`.</p>
<p>In the verified primary proof of concept, a malicious plugin sets `plugin.json.commands` to an external markdown file. A single `apm install` copies that outside file into `.apm/prompts/` and then auto-integrates it into `.github/prompts/secret.prompt.md` in the victim project. This is a local supply-chain trust-boundary violation with direct confidentiality and integrity impact.</p>
<p>Reviewed version and commit:</p>
<p>- `apm-cli` version `0.8.11`
- `main` commit `70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a`</p>
<p>### Details
Root cause:</p>
<p>- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:336-348`
  - `_resolve_sources()` joins manifest-controlled `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and directory-form `hooks` paths with `plugin_path`
  - it checks only `exists()` and `is_symlink()`
  - it does not resolve the candidate and verify containment inside the plugin root
- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:356-395`
  - copies attacker-selected agent and skill files/directories into `.apm/`
- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:397-45…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xhrw-5qxx-jpwr"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2379</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2379 — Microsoft APM CLI's plugin.json component paths escape plugin root and copy arbitrary host files during install</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T12:29:28.313225+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: apm-cli</p>
<p>### Summary
Microsoft APM normalizes marketplace plugins by copying plugin components referenced in `plugin.json` into `.apm/`. The manifest fields `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and `hooks` are attacker-controlled, but the implementation does not enforce that those paths remain inside the plugin directory. A malicious plugin can therefore use absolute paths or `../` traversal paths to copy arbitrary readable host files or directories from the installer's machine during `apm install`.</p>
<p>In the verified primary proof of concept, a malicious plugin sets `plugin.json.commands` to an external markdown file. A single `apm install` copies that outside file into `.apm/prompts/` and then auto-integrates it into `.github/prompts/secret.prompt.md` in the victim project. This is a local supply-chain trust-boundary violation with direct confidentiality and integrity impact.</p>
<p>Reviewed version and commit:</p>
<p>- `apm-cli` version `0.8.11`
- `main` commit `70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a`</p>
<p>### Details
Root cause:</p>
<p>- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:336-348`
  - `_resolve_sources()` joins manifest-controlled `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and directory-form `hooks` paths with `plugin_path`
  - it checks only `exists()` and `is_symlink()`
  - it does not resolve the candidate and verify containment inside the plugin root
- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:356-395`
  - copies attacker-selected agent and skill files/directories into `.apm/`
- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:397-45…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2379"/>
  </entry>
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