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  <updated>2026-09-30T13:28:47.843448+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44897</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-44897 — Mistune Heading ID Attribute Injection XSS</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T13:28:48.161832+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> lepture mistune</p>
<p>Mistune is a Python Markdown parser with renderers and plugins. Prior to 3.2.1, HTMLRenderer.heading() builds the opening &lt;hN&gt; tag by string-concatenating the id attribute value directly into the HTML — with no call to escape(), safe_entity(), or any other sanitisation function. A double-quote character " in the id value terminates the attribute, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary additional attributes (event handlers, src=, href=, etc.) into the heading element. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44897"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-v87v-83h2-53w7</id>
    <title>GHSA-v87v-83h2-53w7 — Mistune Heading ID Attribute has Injection XSS</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T13:28:48.161961+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mistune</p>
<p>## Summary
`HTMLRenderer.heading()` builds the opening `&lt;hN&gt;` tag by string-concatenating the `id` attribute value directly into the HTML — with no call to `escape()`, `safe_entity()`, or any other sanitisation function. A double-quote character `"` in the `id` value terminates the attribute, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary additional attributes (event handlers, `src=`, `href=`, etc.) into the heading element.</p>
<p>The default TOC hook assigns safe auto-incremented IDs (`toc_1`, `toc_2`, …) that never contain user text. However, the `add_toc_hook()` API accepts a caller-supplied `heading_id` callback. Deriving heading IDs from the heading text itself — to produce human-readable slug anchors like `#installation` or `#getting-started` — is by far the most common real-world usage of this callback (every major documentation generator does this). When the callback returns raw heading text, an attacker who controls heading content can break out of the `id=` attribute.</p>
<p>## Details
**File:** `src/mistune/renderers/html.py`</p>
<p>```python
def heading(self, text: str, level: int, **attrs: Any) -&gt; str:
    tag = "h" + str(level)
    html = "&lt;" + tag
    _id = attrs.get("id")
    if _id:
        html += ' id="' + _id + '"'    # ← _id is never escaped
    return html + "&gt;" + text + "&lt;/" + tag + "&gt;\n"
```</p>
<p>The `text` body (line content) *is* escaped upstream by the inline token renderer, which is why `text` arrives as `&amp;quot;` etc. But `_id` arrives as a raw string directly from whatever…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-v87v-83h2-53w7"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2207</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2207</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T13:28:48.162100+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mistune</p>
<p>Mistune is a Python Markdown parser with renderers and plugins. Prior to 3.2.1, HTMLRenderer.heading() builds the opening &lt;hN&gt; tag by string-concatenating the id attribute value directly into the HTML — with no call to escape(), safe_entity(), or any other sanitisation function. A double-quote character " in the id value terminates the attribute, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary additional attributes (event handlers, src=, href=, etc.) into the heading element. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2207"/>
  </entry>
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