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  <updated>2026-09-29T22:29:18.396989+00:00</updated>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-67422</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-67422 — pymdown-extensions: Exponential-backtracking ReDoS in caret, tilde, betterem, and magiclink inline processors</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T22:29:18.399151+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> facelessuser pymdown-extensions</p>
<p>pymdown-extensions is a collection of extensions for the Python Markdown library. In versions up to and including 11.0, four inline processors (caret, tilde, betterem, and magiclink) use regular expressions whose content groups can partition a run of delimiter characters in exponentially many ways, causing catastrophic backtracking. As a result, a single untrusted Markdown line under 50 bytes rendered with markdown.markdown() in each extension's default configuration drives the rendering thread into unbounded CPU usage that grows exponentially with input length, enabling an unauthenticated remote attacker who can submit Markdown to cause denial of service. The exposure is concrete for web applications that render user-supplied Markdown (comments, wikis, issue bodies, live preview), including any app using pymdownx.extra which bundles the vulnerable betterem default, as well as hosted docs/CI systems that build untrusted Markdown. The issue has been fixed in version 11.0.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-67422"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gm37-52c6-37mw</id>
    <title>GHSA-gm37-52c6-37mw — pymdown-extensions: exponential-backtracking ReDoS in caret, tilde, betterem, and magiclink inline processors</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T22:29:18.399235+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pymdown-extensions</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Four inline processors in pymdown-extensions contain regular expressions with
exponential backtracking. A single untrusted Markdown line under
50 bytes drives `markdown.markdown()` into unbounded CPU on the rendering thread
(seconds at ~45 bytes, growing exponentially with each added character). All four
fire in the extension's **default configuration**
and are reachable through the documented public API. The `caret`/`tilde`/
`betterem` blow-up was introduced by the emphasis-pattern rewrite in PR #2547
(first released in **10.13**, Dec 2024) — earlier releases used a linear
`(.+?)` / `([^\s]+?)` content group — and is present through **11.0** (latest);
`magiclink`'s host pattern is long-standing and affects effectively all releases.
Likely **CWE-1333 (Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity)**.</p>
<p>This is a distinct issue from CVE-2025-68142 (ReDoS in `pymdownx.blocks.caption`,
`RE_FIG_NUM`, fixed in 10.16.1): different extensions, different regexes, and a
different root cause (delimiter-run partition ambiguity rather than a `.`/`\.`
typo).</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>Four regexes share, or closely mirror, a vulnerable shape — an inner group that
can partition a run of the delimiter character into `{2,}`-sized pieces in
exponentially many ways, wrapped in a lazy `+?` that must fail before the engine
can give up:</p>
<p>| Extension | Regex | Location (`11.0`) |
|---|---|---|
| `pymdownx.caret` (superscript `^…^`) | `SUP2` | `pymdownx/caret.py:56` |
| `pymdownx.tilde` (subscript `~…~…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gm37-52c6-37mw"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3654</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-3654 — pymdown-extensions: exponential-backtracking ReDoS in caret, tilde, betterem, and magiclink inline processors</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T22:29:18.399339+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pymdown-extensions</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Four inline processors in pymdown-extensions contain regular expressions with
exponential backtracking. A single untrusted Markdown line under
50 bytes drives `markdown.markdown()` into unbounded CPU on the rendering thread
(seconds at ~45 bytes, growing exponentially with each added character). All four
fire in the extension's **default configuration**
and are reachable through the documented public API. The `caret`/`tilde`/
`betterem` blow-up was introduced by the emphasis-pattern rewrite in PR #2547
(first released in **10.13**, Dec 2024) — earlier releases used a linear
`(.+?)` / `([^\s]+?)` content group — and is present through **11.0** (latest);
`magiclink`'s host pattern is long-standing and affects effectively all releases.
Likely **CWE-1333 (Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity)**.</p>
<p>This is a distinct issue from CVE-2025-68142 (ReDoS in `pymdownx.blocks.caption`,
`RE_FIG_NUM`, fixed in 10.16.1): different extensions, different regexes, and a
different root cause (delimiter-run partition ambiguity rather than a `.`/`\.`
typo).</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>Four regexes share, or closely mirror, a vulnerable shape — an inner group that
can partition a run of the delimiter character into `{2,}`-sized pieces in
exponentially many ways, wrapped in a lazy `+?` that must fail before the engine
can give up:</p>
<p>| Extension | Regex | Location (`11.0`) |
|---|---|---|
| `pymdownx.caret` (superscript `^…^`) | `SUP2` | `pymdownx/caret.py:56` |
| `pymdownx.tilde` (subscript `~…~…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3654"/>
  </entry>
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