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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-29T04:52:28.584316+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-49855</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-49855 — tornado AsyncHTTPClient accumulates decompressed chunks without size limit (gzip bomb)</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T04:52:28.632843+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> tornadoweb tornado</p>
<p>Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Prior to 6.5.6, Tornado gzip decompression routines processed limited-size chunks but did not enforce an overall limit on accumulated decompressed chunks, allowing a malicious server accessed by SimpleAsyncHTTPClient or an HTTPServer configured with decompress_request=True to consume effectively unlimited memory. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.6.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-49855"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mgf9-4vpg-hj56</id>
    <title>GHSA-mgf9-4vpg-hj56 — tornado AsyncHTTPClient accumulates decompressed chunks without size limit (gzip bomb)</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T04:52:28.632950+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: tornado</p>
<p>Tornado's gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set.</p>
<p>This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.</p>
<p>Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting `decompress_response=False` or using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mgf9-4vpg-hj56"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3389</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-3389 — tornado AsyncHTTPClient accumulates decompressed chunks without size limit (gzip bomb)</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T04:52:28.633010+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: tornado</p>
<p>Tornado's gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set.</p>
<p>This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.</p>
<p>Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting `decompress_response=False` or using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3389"/>
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