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  <updated>2026-09-28T17:34:28.813397+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-28446</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-28446 — OpenClaw &lt; 2026.2.1 - Inbound Allowlist Policy Bypass in voice-call Extension via Empty Caller ID and Suffix Matching</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T17:34:28.816165+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p>
<p>OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-28446"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x</id>
    <title>GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x — OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T17:34:28.816261+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>An authentication bypass in the optional `voice-call` extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to `allowlist` or `pairing`.</p>
<p>Deployments that do not install/enable the `voice-call` extension are not affected.</p>
<p>### Affected Packages / Versions</p>
<p>- `openclaw` (npm): `&lt;= 2026.2.1`
- Fixed in: `&gt;= 2026.2.2`</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>In affected versions (for example `2026.2.1`), the inbound allowlist check in `extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts` used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.</p>
<p>This allowed two bypasses:</p>
<p>1. Missing/empty `from` values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.
2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.</p>
<p>### Proof Of Concept</p>
<p>1. Configure the voice-call extension with `inboundPolicy: allowlist` and `allowFrom: ["+15550001234"]`.
2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.
3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with `15550001234` (for example `+99915550001234`). The call is accepted.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>Only operators who install/enable the optional `voice-call` extension and use `inboundPolicy=allowlist` or `pairing` could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x"/>
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