Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.25 contain an authentication hardening gap in browser-origin WebSocket clients that allows attackers to bypass origin checks and auth throttling on loopback deployments. An attacker can trick a user into opening a malicious webpage and perform password brute-force attacks against the gateway to establish an authenticated operator session and invoke control-plane methods.

Affected: npm: openclaw

This issue is a browser-origin WebSocket auth chain on local loopback deployments using password auth. It is serious, but conditional: an attacker must get the user to open a malicious page and then successfully guess the gateway password.

## Context and Preconditions

OpenClaw’s web/gateway surface is designed for local use and trusted-operator workflows. In affected versions, a browser-origin client could combine three behaviors:

- Origin checks not enforced for some non-Control-UI WebSocket client IDs. - Loopback auth attempts exempt from password-failure throttling. - Silent local pairing path available to browser-origin non-Control-UI clients.

Successful exploitation requires all of the following:

- Gateway reachable on loopback (default). - Password auth mode in use. - Victim opens attacker-controlled web content. - Password is guessable within feasible brute-force/dictionary attempts.

## Practical Impact

If the password is guessed, an attacker can establish an authenticated operator WebSocket session and invoke control-plane methods available to that role. This is not an unauthenticated internet-exposed RCE class issue by itself; it is a local browser-origin auth-hardening gap with meaningful impact under the conditions above.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<=2026.2.24` (latest published npm version as of February 26, 2026) - Patched versions : `>=2026.2.25`

## Fix Commit(s)

- `c736f11a16d6bc27ea62a0fe40fffa…