Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw before 2026.4.23 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the gateway tool's config.apply and config.patch operations that allows compromised models to write unsafe configuration changes by bypassing an incomplete denylist protection. Attackers can persist malicious config modifications affecting command execution, network behavior, credentials, and operator policies that survive restart.

Affected: npm: openclaw

## Summary

The agent-facing `gateway` tool protects `config.apply` and `config.patch` with a model-to-operator trust boundary. That guard used a hand-maintained denylist of protected config paths. The config schema outgrew that denylist, leaving sensitive subtrees writable through model-driven gateway config mutations.

## Impact

A prompt-injected or otherwise compromised model running with access to the owner-only `gateway` tool could persist unsafe config changes that crossed security boundaries. Examples included config paths affecting command execution, network/proxy/TLS behavior, credential forwarding, telemetry or hook endpoints, memory/indexing surfaces, and operator policy controls. These changes could survive restart once written to config.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` on npm - Affected: versions before `2026.4.23` - Fixed: `2026.4.23` - Latest stable verified fixed: `openclaw@2026.4.23`, tag `v2026.4.23`

## Fix

OpenClaw replaced the denylist with a fail-closed allowlist. Agent-driven `gateway config.apply` and `gateway config.patch` now permit only narrow agent-tunable prompt/model settings and mention-gating paths. Other config changes are rejected before the gateway mutation RPC is invoked.

## Fix Commit(s)

- `bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec` (`fix(gateway): fail closed on runtime config edits`)

## Severity

Severity remains `high`. The vulnerable entry point is owner-only, but the model/agent is not a trusted principal…