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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-29T11:35:01.097308+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-68158</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-68158 — Authlib: 1-click Account Takeover</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T11:35:01.111132+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> authlib</p>
<p>Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. In versions 1.0.0 through 1.6.5, cache-backed state/request-token storage is not tied to the initiating user session, so CSRF is possible for any attacker that has a valid state (easily obtainable via an attacker-initiated authentication flow). When a cache is supplied to the OAuth client registry, FrameworkIntegration.set_state_data writes the entire state blob under _state_{app}_{state}, and get_state_data ignores the caller’s session altogether. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.6.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-68158"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fg6f-75jq-6523</id>
    <title>GHSA-fg6f-75jq-6523 — Authlib has 1-click Account Takeover vulnerability</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T11:35:01.111237+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: authlib</p>
<p># Security Advisory: Cache-Backed State Storage CSRF in Authlib</p>
<p>The Security Labs team at Snyk has reported a security issue affecting Authlib, identified during a recent research project.</p>
<p>The Snyk Security Labs team has identified a vulnerability that can result in a one-click account takeover in applications that utilize the Authlib library.</p>
<p>## Description</p>
<p>Cache-backed state/request-token storage is not tied to the initiating user session, making CSRF possible for any attacker that possesses a valid state value (easily obtainable via an attacker-initiated authentication flow). When a cache is supplied to the OAuth client registry, `FrameworkIntegration.set_state_data` writes the entire state blob under `_state_{app}_{state}`, and `get_state_data` disregards the caller's session entirely. [1][2]</p>
<p>```py
    def _get_cache_data(self, key):
        value = self.cache.get(key)
        if not value:
            return None
        try:
            return json.loads(value)
        except (TypeError, ValueError):
            return None
[snip]
    def get_state_data(self, session, state):
        key = f"_state_{self.name}_{state}"
        if self.cache:
            value = self._get_cache_data(key)
        else:
            value = session.get(key)
        if value:
            return value.get("data")
        return None
```</p>
<p>*authlib/integrations/base_client/framework_integration.py:12-41*</p>
<p>Retrieval in `authorize_access_token` therefore succeeds for whichever browser prese…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fg6f-75jq-6523"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-1201</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-1201 — Authlib has 1-click Account Takeover vulnerability</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T11:35:01.111346+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: authlib</p>
<p># Security Advisory: Cache-Backed State Storage CSRF in Authlib</p>
<p>The Security Labs team at Snyk has reported a security issue affecting Authlib, identified during a recent research project.</p>
<p>The Snyk Security Labs team has identified a vulnerability that can result in a one-click account takeover in applications that utilize the Authlib library.</p>
<p>## Description</p>
<p>Cache-backed state/request-token storage is not tied to the initiating user session, making CSRF possible for any attacker that possesses a valid state value (easily obtainable via an attacker-initiated authentication flow). When a cache is supplied to the OAuth client registry, `FrameworkIntegration.set_state_data` writes the entire state blob under `_state_{app}_{state}`, and `get_state_data` disregards the caller's session entirely. [1][2]</p>
<p>```py
    def _get_cache_data(self, key):
        value = self.cache.get(key)
        if not value:
            return None
        try:
            return json.loads(value)
        except (TypeError, ValueError):
            return None
[snip]
    def get_state_data(self, session, state):
        key = f"_state_{self.name}_{state}"
        if self.cache:
            value = self._get_cache_data(key)
        else:
            value = session.get(key)
        if value:
            return value.get("data")
        return None
```</p>
<p>*authlib/integrations/base_client/framework_integration.py:12-41*</p>
<p>Retrieval in `authorize_access_token` therefore succeeds for whichever browser prese…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-1201"/>
  </entry>
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