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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-30T23:07:49.884804+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48782</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-48782 — pydantic-ai: SSRF blocklist bypass via IPv4-compatible, SIIT/IVI, and local NAT64 IPv6 addresses (incomplete fix of CVE…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T23:07:51.151454+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> pydantic-ai, pydantic-ai-slim</p>
<p>Pydantic AI is a Python agent framework for building applications and workflows with Generative AI. In versions 1.56.0 through 1.101.0, 2.0.0b1, and 2.0.0b2, the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form that the previous fix, CVE-2026-46678, did not decode, exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials. The previous remediation decoded only IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, and the NAT64 well-known prefix, so the metadata guarantee did not hold for the remaining transition forms: IPv4-compatible IPv6 (::a.b.c.d), the NAT64 RFC 8215 local-use prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48), operator-chosen NAT64 prefixes, and ISATAP. The IPv6 wrapper is then delivered to the underlying IPv4 metadata endpoint. This occurs when an application using Pydantic AI opts a URL into force_download='allow-local' (which disables the default block on private/internal IPs) and runs on a network that actually routes the affected IPv6 transition forms: NAT64-configured networks (IPv6-only or dual-stack-with-NAT64 deployments, including some Kubernetes setups) for the NAT64 variants, or networks with an ISATAP tunnel for ISATAP. A standard dual-stack cloud VM or container does not route these forms and is not affected in practice. The IPv4-compatible and Teredo variants are deprecated and addressed as defense-in-depth. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3 / CVE-2026-46678 (itself a follow-up to CVE-2026-25580). This issue has been fixed in version 2.0.0b3.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48782"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-cg7w-rg45-pc59</id>
    <title>GHSA-cg7w-rg45-pc59 — pydantic-ai: SSRF blocklist bypass via IPv4-compatible, SIIT/IVI, and local NAT64 IPv6 addresses (incomplete fix of CVE…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T23:07:51.151812+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pydantic-ai-slim, PyPI: pydantic-ai</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>When an application using Pydantic AI opts a URL into `force_download='allow-local'` (which disables the default block on private/internal IPs) **and runs on a network that routes the affected IPv6 transition forms (NAT64- or ISATAP-configured networks)**, the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form that the previous fix did not decode — IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::a.b.c.d`), the NAT64 RFC 8215 local-use prefix (`64:ff9b:1::/48`), operator-chosen NAT64 prefixes, or ISATAP. The IPv6 wrapper is then delivered to the underlying IPv4 metadata endpoint, exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials.</p>
<p>**The bypass is exploitable only in environments whose network actually routes these forms** — NAT64-configured networks (IPv6-only or dual-stack-with-NAT64 deployments, including some Kubernetes setups) for the NAT64 variants, or networks with an ISATAP tunnel for ISATAP. A standard dual-stack cloud VM or container does not route them and is not affected in practice. The IPv4-compatible and Teredo variants are deprecated and addressed as defense-in-depth.</p>
<p>This is an incomplete fix of [GHSA-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3) / [CVE-2026-46678](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46678) (itself a follow-up to [CVE-2026-25580](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25580)). The prior remediation decoded only IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, and the NAT64 well-kn…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-cg7w-rg45-pc59"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2977</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2977 — pydantic-ai: SSRF blocklist bypass via IPv4-compatible, SIIT/IVI, and local NAT64 IPv6 addresses (incomplete fix of CVE…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T23:07:51.151933+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pydantic-ai</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>When an application using Pydantic AI opts a URL into `force_download='allow-local'` (which disables the default block on private/internal IPs) **and runs on a network that routes the affected IPv6 transition forms (NAT64- or ISATAP-configured networks)**, the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form that the previous fix did not decode — IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::a.b.c.d`), the NAT64 RFC 8215 local-use prefix (`64:ff9b:1::/48`), operator-chosen NAT64 prefixes, or ISATAP. The IPv6 wrapper is then delivered to the underlying IPv4 metadata endpoint, exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials.</p>
<p>**The bypass is exploitable only in environments whose network actually routes these forms** — NAT64-configured networks (IPv6-only or dual-stack-with-NAT64 deployments, including some Kubernetes setups) for the NAT64 variants, or networks with an ISATAP tunnel for ISATAP. A standard dual-stack cloud VM or container does not route them and is not affected in practice. The IPv4-compatible and Teredo variants are deprecated and addressed as defense-in-depth.</p>
<p>This is an incomplete fix of [GHSA-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3) / [CVE-2026-46678](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46678) (itself a follow-up to [CVE-2026-25580](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25580)). The prior remediation decoded only IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, and the NAT64 well-kn…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2977"/>
  </entry>
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