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  <updated>2026-10-01T21:00:12.363313+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-69263</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-69263 — pnpm Lockfile Integrity Bypass Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T21:00:12.791122+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> pnpm, Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8, Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion Pack</p>
<p>pnpm is a package manager. Versions 10.26.2 and below store HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed. An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection. This issue is fixed in version 10.26.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-69263"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw</id>
    <title>GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw — pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T21:00:12.791320+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: pnpm</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:</p>
<p>`resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts`:
```javascript
return {
  resolution: {
    tarball: resolvedUrl,
    // No integrity field
  },
  resolvedVia: 'url',
}
```</p>
<p>The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:
```yaml
remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:
  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}
  version: 1.0.0
```</p>
<p>Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content.</p>
<p>This affects:
- HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs (`"pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz"`)
- Git shorthand dependencies (`"pkg": "github:user/repo"`)
- Git URLs (`"pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo"`)</p>
<p>npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.</p>
<p>### PoC</p>
<p>See attached [pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23819648/pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip)</p>
<p>The POC includes:
- A server that returns different tarball content on each request
- A `malicious-package` that depends on the HTTP tarball
- A `victim` project that depends on `malicious-package`</p>
<p>To run:
```bash
cd pnpm-bypass-int…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw"/>
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