Affected: BerriAI litellm, Red Hat Lightspeed Core, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)

LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.81.16 to before version 1.83.7, a database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/completions) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.

Affected: PyPI: litellm

### Impact

A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path.

An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.

### Patches

Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later.

### Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query.

### References

- Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable)

**Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab

Affected: PyPI: litellm

### Impact

A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path.

An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.

### Patches

Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later.

### Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query.

### References

- Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable) **Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab