Most recent entries from all

CVE-2026-44243 — GitPython: Path traversal in GitPython reference APIs allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the repository

2026-09-29T01:43:38.007634+00:00

Affected: gitpython-developers GitPython

GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.48.

GHSA-7545-fcxq-7j24 — GitPython reference APIs has a path traversal vulnerability that allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the rep…

2026-09-29T01:43:38.007758+00:00

Affected: PyPI: GitPython

## 🧾 Summary

A vulnerability in **GitPython** allows **attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython** to **write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s `.git` directory** via **insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations**.

---

## 📦 Affected Versions

* Affected: `<= 3.1.46` and current `main` (`3.1.47` in local checkout)

---

## 🧠 Details

### Vulnerability Type

**Path Traversal leading to Arbitrary File Write and Arbitrary File Deletion**

---

### Root Cause

Reference paths are validated when they are resolved for reading, but are not consistently validated before filesystem write, rename, and delete operations.

`SymbolicReference._check_ref_name_valid()` rejects traversal sequences such as `..`, but `SymbolicReference.create`, `Reference.create`, `SymbolicReference.set_reference`, `SymbolicReference.rename`, and `SymbolicReference.delete` still construct filesystem paths from attacker-controlled ref names without enforcing repository boundaries.

---

### Affected Code

```python def set_reference(self, ref, logmsg=None): ... fpath = self.abspath assure_directory_exists(fpath, is_file=True)

lfd = LockedFD(fpath) fd = lfd.open(write=True, stream=True) ... ```

```python @classmethod def delete(cls, repo, path): full_ref_path = cls.to_full_path(path) abs_path = os.path.join(repo.common_dir, full_ref_path) if os.path.exis…

PYSEC-2026-2162

2026-09-29T01:43:38.007906+00:00

Affected: PyPI: gitpython