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  <updated>2026-10-05T09:19:46.425990+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-445q-vr5w-6q77</id>
    <title>GHSA-445q-vr5w-6q77 — Axios: CRLF Injection in multipart/form-data body via unsanitized blob.type in formDataToStream</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T09:19:48.787359+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: axios</p>
<p>### Summary
The `FormDataPart` constructor in `lib/helpers/formDataToStream.js` interpolates `value.type` directly into the `Content-Type` header of each multipart part without sanitizing CRLF (`\r\n`) sequences. An attacker who controls the `.type` property of a Blob/File-like object (e.g., via a user-uploaded file in a Node.js proxy service) can inject arbitrary MIME part headers into the multipart form-data body. This bypasses Node.js v18+ built-in header protections because the injection targets the multipart body structure, not HTTP request headers.</p>
<p>### Details
In `lib/helpers/formDataToStream.js` at line 27, when processing a Blob/File-like value, the code builds per-part headers by directly embedding value.type:
```
if (isStringValue) {
  value = textEncoder.encode(String(value).replace(/\r?\n|\r\n?/g, CRLF));
} else {
  // value.type is NOT sanitized for CRLF sequences
  headers += `Content-Type: ${value.type || 'application/octet-stream'}${CRLF}`;
}
```
Note that the string path (line above) explicitly sanitizes CRLF, but the binary/blob path does not. This inconsistency confirms the sanitization was intended but missed for `value.type`.</p>
<p>### Attack chain:</p>
<p>1. Attacker uploads a file to a Node.js proxy service, supplying a crafted MIME type containing `\r\n` sequences
2. The proxy appends the file to a FormData and posts it via `axios.post(url, formData)`
3. axios calls `formDataToStream()`, which passes `value.type` unsanitized into the multipart body
4. The down…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-445q-vr5w-6q77"/>
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