Affected: Go: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2

## AI Disclosure

I used an LLM to help review the source code, reason about attack surface, and help draft and refine this report. I manually validated the finding by reproducing it locally, confirming the vulnerable code path, and verifying the HTTP behavior with `curl -v`.

## Summary

Caddy's remote admin access control performs path authorization using prefix matching:

- [`admin.go`](/caddy/admin.go#L719): `strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath)`

This allows a client certificate authorized only for `/pki/ca/prod` to access sibling PKI resources whose paths merely share the same prefix, such as `/pki/ca/prod-backup`.

This is an authorization bug in Caddy's source code, not a misconfiguration issue. The configured policy is more restrictive than the behavior that Caddy actually enforces.

## Affected Component

Remote admin access control for PKI admin endpoints.

Relevant code:

- [`admin.go`](/caddy/admin.go#L687) - [`admin.go`](/caddy/admin.go#L719) - [`modules/caddypki/adminapi.go`](/caddy/modules/caddypki/adminapi.go#L68) - [`modules/caddypki/adminapi.go`](/caddy/modules/caddypki/adminapi.go#L164)

## Root Cause

In `RemoteAdmin.enforceAccessControls()`, allowed paths are checked like this:

```go for _, allowedPath := range accessPerm.Paths { if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath) { pathFound = true break } } ```

This does not enforce a path-segment boundary.

So if the allowed path is:

/pki/c…