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  <updated>2026-09-29T13:19:09.682825+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-676x-f7gg-47vc</id>
    <title>GHSA-676x-f7gg-47vc — Netty Vulnerable to DNS Cache Poisoning via Missing Bailiwick Checks in CNAME Records</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T13:19:09.687586+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-resolver-dns</p>
<p>### Summary
Netty's DnsResolveContext fails to validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses.</p>
<p>### Details
In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext#buildAliasMap`, the resolver processes the ANSWER section of a DNS response and blindly caches all CNAME records it finds.</p>
<p>According to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5452#section-6</p>
<p>```
Care must be taken to only accept
   data if it is known that the originator is authoritative for the
   QNAME or a parent of the QNAME.
   One very simple way to achieve this is to only accept data if it is
   part of the domain for which the query was intended.
```</p>
<p>### Impact
DNS Cache Poisoning (Bailiwick Bypass). Any application using Netty's DNS resolver is impacted.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-676x-f7gg-47vc"/>
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