https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-09-30T09:12:07.155345+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-14986 CVE-2025-14986 — ExecuteMultiOperation Namespace Policy Bypass 2026-09-30T09:12:07.692724+00:00

Affected: Temporal

When frontend.enableExecuteMultiOperation is enabled, the server can apply namespace-scoped validation and feature gates for the embedded StartWorkflowExecutionRequest using its Namespace field rather than the outer, authorized ExecuteMultiOperationRequest.Namespace. This allows a caller authorized for one namespace to bypass that namespace's limits/policies by setting the embedded start request's namespace to a different namespace. The workflow is still created in the outer (authorized) namespace; only validation/gating is performed under the wrong namespace context. This issue affects Temporal: from 1.24.0 through 1.29.1. Fixed in 1.27.4, 1.28.2, 1.29.2.

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hrxh-6v49-42gf GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf — gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC and HTTP/2 Vulnerabilities 2026-09-30T09:12:07.692892+00:00

Affected: Go: google.golang.org/grpc

Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in:

- Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields. - Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets. - Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing `NOT` rules around unsupported fields.

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_

#### xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass via `Metadata` & `RequestedServerName` matchers

- Affected Component: xDS RBAC - Impact: When building policy matchers for gRPC RBAC from xDS configurations, unsupported `permission` and `principal` rules (specifically `Metadata` and `RequestedServerName`) were silently ignored and treated as no-ops. - If an authorization policy relied purely on these matchers for access control, treating those rules as no-ops effectively removed the restrictions. - If these unsupported rules were nested inside logical `NOT` rules (`Permission_NotRule` / `Principal_NotId`) or multi-condition `OR/AND` rules, silently dropping them changed the boolean logic flow of the authorization engine.

As a result, policy evaluation decisions could fail open, allowing unauthorized…