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  <updated>2026-10-03T21:30:16.131711+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g</id>
    <title>GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g — Nodemailer Vulnerable to SMTP Command Injection via CRLF in Transport name Option (EHLO/HELO)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T21:30:16.134820+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nodemailer</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Nodemailer versions up to and including 8.0.4 are vulnerable to SMTP command injection via CRLF sequences in the transport `name` configuration option. The `name` value is used directly in the EHLO/HELO SMTP command without any sanitization for carriage return and line feed characters (`\r\n`). An attacker who can influence this option can inject arbitrary SMTP commands, enabling unauthorized email sending, email spoofing, and phishing attacks.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The vulnerability exists in `lib/smtp-connection/index.js`. When establishing an SMTP connection, the `name` option is concatenated directly into the EHLO command:</p>
<p>```javascript
// lib/smtp-connection/index.js, line 71
this.name = this.options.name || this._getHostname();</p>
<p>// line 1336
this._sendCommand('EHLO ' + this.name);
```</p>
<p>The `_sendCommand` method writes the string directly to the socket followed by `\r\n` (line 1082):</p>
<p>```javascript
this._socket.write(Buffer.from(str + '\r\n', 'utf-8'));
```</p>
<p>If the `name` option contains `\r\n` sequences, each injected line is interpreted by the SMTP server as a separate command. Unlike the `envelope.from` and `envelope.to` fields which are validated for `\r\n` (line 1107-1119), and unlike `envelope.size` which was recently fixed (GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8) by casting to a number, the `name` parameter receives no CRLF sanitization whatsoever.</p>
<p>This is distinct from the previously reported GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 (envelope.size injection) as it affects a different parameter…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g"/>
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