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  <updated>2026-09-28T09:31:40.317888+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100544</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-100544</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T09:31:40.347621+00:00</updated>
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        <p>openclaw's @openclaw/voice-call package before 2026.8.1 launches the configured agent for classic inbound voice calls without propagating the caller's identity or non-owner status. As a result, owner-only tool filtering can fail open and expose the agent's normal tool authority to a remote caller. A caller who is admitted by the configured inbound-call policy (open, pairing, or allowlist) on a deployment with inbound calling enabled can therefore drive tools intended for the trusted owner, potentially reading data, modifying files, executing commands, or controlling connected services depending on the agent's configuration. The issue is fixed in 2026.8.1.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100544"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3w3q-3hpq-fv5m</id>
    <title>GHSA-3w3q-3hpq-fv5m</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T09:31:40.347721+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>openclaw's @openclaw/voice-call package before 2026.8.1 launches the configured agent for classic inbound voice calls without propagating the caller's identity or non-owner status. As a result, owner-only tool filtering can fail open and expose the agent's normal tool authority to a remote caller. A caller who is admitted by the configured inbound-call policy (open, pairing, or allowlist) on a deployment with inbound calling enabled can therefore drive tools intended for the trusted owner, potentially reading data, modifying files, executing commands, or controlling connected services depending on the agent's configuration. The issue is fixed in 2026.8.1.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3w3q-3hpq-fv5m"/>
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