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  <updated>2026-09-28T14:11:40.251811+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100858</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-100858</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T14:11:40.711653+00:00</updated>
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        <p>heym before 0.0.109 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Slack, Discord, and Crawler workflow nodes. These nodes issue HTTP requests to URLs taken from user-created credentials (webhook_url / flaresolverr_url) using an unguarded HTTP client, bypassing the SSRF egress guard that already protects the HTTP, WebSocket, and MCP nodes; the credential API validates only that the URL is non-empty. Any registered user can create a credential pointing at an internal address and execute a workflow, causing the backend to reach loopback, private, link-local, or cloud-metadata endpoints and return the full response body in the node output (non-blind SSRF).</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100858"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-68x6-m7x2-mcgw</id>
    <title>GHSA-68x6-m7x2-mcgw</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T14:11:40.711765+00:00</updated>
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        <p>heym before 0.0.109 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Slack, Discord, and Crawler workflow nodes. These nodes issue HTTP requests to URLs taken from user-created credentials (webhook_url / flaresolverr_url) using an unguarded HTTP client, bypassing the SSRF egress guard that already protects the HTTP, WebSocket, and MCP nodes; the credential API validates only that the URL is non-empty. Any registered user can create a credential pointing at an internal address and execute a workflow, causing the backend to reach loopback, private, link-local, or cloud-metadata endpoints and return the full response body in the node output (non-blind SSRF).</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-68x6-m7x2-mcgw"/>
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