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  <updated>2026-10-07T22:22:50.620077+00:00</updated>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-106123</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-106123</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T22:22:50.622051+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.35.0, ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load() includes the raw uri value in wrapped exceptions when AMQP URI parsing fails. Because the URI may contain a plaintext username and password, startup logs, application performance monitoring systems, CI logs, and copied stack traces can disclose broker credentials to users who should not have access to them. This issue is fixed in version 5.35.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-106123"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h6w7-qmcm-q6xr</id>
    <title>GHSA-h6w7-qmcm-q6xr — RabbitMQ Java client: plaintext broker credentials leaked in exception message from ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load()</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T22:22:50.622140+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: com.rabbitmq:amqp-client</p>
<p>### Summary
When property-file/Map-based `ConnectionFactory` setup fails while parsing the `uri` key, the library wraps the underlying exception with the raw connection string — including the plaintext username and password — baked verbatim into the new exception's message.</p>
<p>### Details
`ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load(ConnectionFactory, Map&lt;String,String&gt;, String)` (`src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.java`, lines 142-155):</p>
<p>String uri = properties.get(prefix + "uri");
    if (uri != null) {
        try {
            cf.setUri(uri);
        } catch (URISyntaxException e) {
            throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
        } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
            throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
        } catch (KeyManagementException e) {
            throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
        }
    }</p>
<p>`uri` is the full AMQP URI — `amqp(s)://username:password@host:port/vhost` — concatenated verbatim into the exception message on any of the three catch branches. No masking/redaction exists anywhere in this class or in `ConnectionFactory.setUri()`. This is the library's documented Spring-Boot/ops-config entry point (`ConnectionFactory.load(...)`, available since 4.4.0), not obscure internal code.</p>
<p>RabbitMQ's own AMQP URI spec (rabbitmq.com/docs/uri-spec) explicitly warns the password "should avo…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h6w7-qmcm-q6xr"/>
  </entry>
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